United States v. Toochukwu Okorie

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 24-14115

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TOOCHUKWU MICHAEL OKORIE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cr-00626-MHH-NAD-3

____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Toochukwu Okorie appeals his conviction and sentence for

conspiracy to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1956(h) and 1957. He argues on appeal that (1) venue was not

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proper in the Northern District of Alabama; (2) there was a

material variance between the indictment and the proof at trial as

to whether a single conspiracy existed; (3) the district court abused

its discretion by admitting evidence of Okorie’s prior convictions

and grand jury testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b);

(4) the district court erred in giving a deliberate ignorance

instruction; (5) the district court violated Okorie’s Fifth and Sixth

Amendment rights by imposing certain guidelines enhancements

based on judicial fact-finding; (6) his sentence is procedurally and

substantively unreasonable; and (7) the district court erred when it

ordered the immediate payment of restitution. After careful

review, we affirm.

I. Background

Due to the complexity of the case and the number of claims

on appeal, we divide our background discussion into three primary

sections for ease of reference: (A) the indictment and pretrial

motions; (B) the trial; and (C) sentencing.

A. The Indictment and Pretrial Motions

In 2019, a grand jury in the Northern District of Alabama

indicted Okorie, Etinosa Omorusi, and Edafe Peters Igben on

several counts related to a wire fraud and money laundering

conspiracy. Specifically, Count 1 charged Omorusi and Igben with

conspiracy to commit wire fraud; Count 2 charged Omorusi,

Igben, and Okorie with conspiracy to commit money laundering;

and Counts 3 and 4 charged Omorusi with aggravated identity

theft. The indictment alleged that, from approximately June 2017

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to May 2019, Omorusi, Igben, and Okorie, along with others

known and unknown, “were part of an international criminal

conspiracy” that targeted people across the United States, including

in the Northern District of Alabama, with fraud schemes, including

business e-mail compromise schemes and online romance

schemes. They deceived victims into sending money to bank

accounts controlled by the conspiracy and used for money

laundering. As for conspiracy to commit money laundering,1 the

indictment alleged that Okorie, Omorusi, and Igben, “willfully and

knowingly . . . engage[d] and attempt[ed] to engage in a monetary

transaction in criminally derived property of a value greater than

$10,000 that was derived from . . . [w]ire [f]raud.”

Okori pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss the

indictment for improper venue. He argued that venue was

improper in the Northern District of Alabama as to Count 2

because the money laundering conspiracy did not take place in

Alabama, and it was unclear whether any of the victims were in

Alabama. Alternatively, he argued that, even if the Northern

District of Alabama was a proper venue based on the broader

conspiracy, venue remained improper as to him specifically

because the acts committed by his co-conspirators that were linked

to Alabama occurred prior to him joining the conspiracy.

A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation

(“R&R”), recommending that the motion be denied because under

1 Count 2 is the only one in which Okorie was charged and is therefore the

only one at issue on appeal.

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our precedent in United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855 (11th Cir.

2010), whether venue is proper is a question for the jury to decide.

The district court adopted the R&R over Okorie’s objections and

denied his motion to dismiss. 2

Prior to trial, the government filed a notice that it intended

to introduce under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence of

Okorie’s prior convictions for wire fraud and money laundering

and his grand jury testimony from that case to establish Okorie’s

“intent, knowledge, absence of mistake, and lack of accident.”

Okorie objected, arguing that the probative value of his prior

convictions was substantially outweighed by the danger of

prejudice, and his grand jury testimony was of no probative value

and constituted improper character evidence. The district court

reserved its ruling until the trial.

B. The Trial3

At trial, FBI Agent Special Agent Brian Marsh testified that

in a business e-mail compromise scheme, “a third-party inserts

themselves into e[-]mail communication between a customer and

a service provider with the ultimate intention of taking a payment

that the customer would pay to the service provider and moving it

2 Consistent with the district court’s order, the jury was instructed at trial that,

for purposes of establishing venue, the government had to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that at least one act in furtherance of the charge

occurred in the Northern District of Alabama.

3 We provide additional subheadings concerning the trial testimony and

proceedings as necessary for clarity.

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into a bank account controlled by the third-party.” Once the

money is in the third-party controlled account, it is then moved

“very quickly” to other accounts by either “a witting . . . or an

unwitting conspirator.” “A romance scam is where an individual

preys on somebody romantically to either take their money or to

get them to do something on their behalf, be it move money or just

take what’s theirs.” Furthermore, victims of romance scams are

often used to move money on behalf of individuals conducting

business e-mail compromise schemes.

i. The business victims

Brian Daniels testified that he was the corporate claims

manager for Coca-Cola Bottling Company United (“CCBCU”), a

company located in Birmingham, Alabama. CCBCU had a third-

party administrator, CCMSI, that handled CCBCU’s liability

claims, such as worker’s compensation. CCMSI submitted

monthly invoices to Daniels via e-mail for payment for services

rendered. CCBCU would pay the invoices by mailing a physical

check to an address in Indiana per CCMSI’s instructions. However,

in July 2018, Daniels received an e-mail that purportedly came from

his CCMSI contact with new wiring instructions for all current and

future invoices. The e-mail indicated that CCMSI’s old bank

account had a hold on it because “a dud check was paid into

another vendor” and CCMSI would no longer be accepting checks.

The instructions directed that payments be wired to a Citizens

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Bank account in Pennsylvania.4 Daniels forwarded the e-mail to

the accounting department, and CCBCU paid the invoice

according to the new wiring instructions.

Another CCBCU employee in the accounts payable

department testified that, in September 2018, he received different

wiring instructions from CCSMI, which directed that payments be

wired to a SunTrust account because CCMSI’s prior bank account

had been closed “due to a dud check deposited by another

vendor.”5

Later, CCBCU discovered that the e-mails with the new

wiring instructions were fraudulent and had not been sent by a

CCMSI employee—an extra “i” had been added to CCMSI’s e-mail

address—and the bank accounts to which CCBCU had wired the

payments did not belong to CCMSI.

Eric Wong, a staff accountant with ABD, an insurance

brokerage firm, testified that he paid invoices from insurance

carriers on behalf of ABD. On October 23, 2018, he received an e-

mail purportedly from XL Insurance that contained a change in

4 Unbeknownst to CCBCU, this account belonged to one of the romance scam

victims, Sokchea Mam Chum. As we discuss further in this opinion, Chum

then wired the funds into accounts belonging to other members of the

conspiracy at the directive of the person she was communicating with as part

of the romance scam.

5 The SunTrust account belonged to one of the romance scam victims, Tonya

Helton. As we discuss further, after receiving the funds, Helton wired money

to various accounts, including one belonging to Okorie’s business, at the

directive of the person she was communicating with.

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banking instructions. The instructions directed ABD to wire its

payment to a SunTrust bank account.6 ABD wired the money to

the new account. Three days later, Wong received another e-mail

purportedly from XL Insurance stating that the payment ABD just

made “should be recalled” and deposited into a new account along

with all future payments, “due to the fact that [XL’s] previous

Suntrust bank account on file has been placed on hold indefinitely

because of a dud check deposited into it by another vendor.”

ABD’s corporate controller did not approve the request, and

noticed that the XL insurance e-mail address subtly misspelled. 7

Peter Dreyfuss, a commercial real estate developer in

California, testified that a person named Andrew Burton contacted

him and offered him a deal on a large loan to finance the purchase

of a hotel in New York City. However, Dreyfuss would have to

pay an up-front fee of $75,000. When Dreyfuss told Burton that he

did not have the money, Burton said he would “take care of it,” and

he wired several transfers into Dreyfuss’s business account in

November 2018. Burton then instructed Dreyfuss to wire the

6 Unbeknownst to ABD, this account belonged to romance scam victim

Helton.

7 A similar scheme was executed in August 2018 on Computer Solutions East

(“CSE”). CSE received a fraudulent e-mail from a person allegedly with

Microsoft about a payment due. Like the schemes involving CCBCU and

ABD, Microsoft’s e-mail address was subtly misspelled. The e-mail contained

new wiring instructions, directing the payment to be wired into a Citizens

Bank account. This Citizens Bank account was the same account included in

the CCBCU July 2018 wiring instructions, and it belonged to Chum, one of

the romance scam victims.

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money to certain accounts. One of these wires went to a Citizens

Bank account belonging to TMO Consulting, LLC, a company

owned by Okorie. Dreyfuss’s bank froze his account and

ultimately closed it because the transactions were “fraudulent.”

Dreyfuss did not know who Burton was and never met him in

person.

Patricia Davis testified that, in 2017, she was working as a

real estate broker in Montana when a person named Sang Soo Kim

contacted her about buying farm and ranch property for

approximately $35 million. Kim indicated that he was from South

Korea, and he wanted Davis to oversee the properties for him. Kim

told her that his money was “tied up in banks,” and he needed her

assistance to help “untie” his money. Davis met a representative

of Kim on two occasions and gave him cash totaling approximately

$160,000. She also wired funds to an account belonging to

Collective Intelligence Forensics, another business owned by

Okorie.

ii. The romance scam victims

Susan Polson testified that she was a retired teacher and

lived in Iowa. In the summer of 2016, Polson was “contacted on

Facebook by an individual using the name James Anderson.”

Anderson asked her for money on multiple occasions, and she

complied. For instance, in 2017, she wired him $20,000 from her

bank account to a PNC bank account belonging to TMO

Consulting (Okorie’s business). PNC bank flagged the transfer, and

it did not go through, and the money was returned to Polson. After

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that, Anderson instructed Polson to meet an individual in person

and give him the money. Polson complied and met an unknown

man outside the local airport and gave him $23,000 in cash. In

total, she sent between $80,000 and $83,000 to Anderson over a six-

month period. She never met Anderson in person and did not

know who he was.

Sokchea Mam Chum testified that she lived in New Jersey,

and she was contacted by an individual using the name Danh

Hoang on Facebook. They began communicating, and he asked

her for money. When she told him that she did not have any

money, he asked her to transfer money for him instead to help him

pay people that he owed money. In August 2018, she received a

wire for $98,500.67, and the description of the wire stated it was

from “Coca-Cola”—this was the payment from CCBCU. She

received a second wire transfer for $54,364.07 a few days later. She

then wired out the funds to other bank accounts as directed by

Hoang, including accounts belonging to Paulinus Ebhodaghe

doing business as Ebhos Auto and a bank account in Nigeria

belonging to Ohimai Asikhia doing business as Ohimai D Minister. 8

Chum did not know who was impersonating Hoang.

8 A digital forensic examiner analyzed WhatsApp messages between a cell

phone number registered to Asikhia and a phone number belonging to

Ebhodaghe (and listed as the number for Ebhos Auto). These messages

referred to various banks and instructions such as, “Say y u send me money

tell them say na for car.” The messages also contained two links to articles

related to the prosecution of individuals in bank fraud, wire fraud, and

romance fraud schemes.

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Tonya Helton testified that she lived in Tennessee, and in

2018, she was contacted on Instagram by a person using the name

Mark Sinclair, otherwise known as the actor Vin Diesel. He told

her he was doing charity work and asked her to send and receive

donations on his behalf via wire transfers. In August 2018, she

opened up a SunTrust account to assist with this endeavor. She

received a wire for $160,890. She wired $156,000 to a Capital One

bank account belonging to TMO Consulting (Okorie’s business)

based on Sinclair’s instructions. She did not know who was

impersonating Sinclair. 9

Similarly, Nakita Jones testified that, in 2017, while living in

Birmingham, Alabama, “a person using the name Mark or Vin

Diesel” contacted her on Instagram. They began communicating,

and eventually he asked her for money. Mark also asked her to

receive money via Western Union or MoneyGram on his behalf

and send it to different people. She complied until she realized that

“things . . . didn’t add up.”

iii. Okorie and his bank accounts

Stephanie Fitzgibbons, an FBI forensic accountant and a

certified fraud examiner, testified that Okorie had a master’s degree

9 Law enforcement believed that codefendant Omorusi was the owner of the

Mark Sinclair e-mail account because (1) the recovery e-mail address for the

Mark Sinclair account was “omorusietinosa@gmail.com”; (2) the associated

recovery phone number had a country code for Nigeria and Omorusi was

from Nigeria; (3) the IP address linked to the account came from Nigeria; and

(4) the account contained a picture of Omorusi’s passport.

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and he was previously a certified fraud examiner.10 Business

records from Pennsylvania confirmed that Okorie was the sole

organizer of the companies Collective Intelligence Forensics and

TMO Consulting, LLC.

Between February 2016 and March 2019, Okorie opened ten

bank accounts at seven different financial institutions for TMO

Consulting and Collective Intelligence Forensics. During roughly

the same period, Okorie also had nine personal bank accounts with

five different financial institutions.

TMO Consulting’s account at PNC bank was the one that

Polson wired $20,000 to, but PNC’s security flagged the

transaction, returned the money, and closed TMO Consulting’s

account. Another TMO Consulting account at Capital One bank

received a wire transfer from Helton for $156,000 on October 26,

2018. Following the deposit, between October 26 and November

5, 2018, various checks were issued depleting the account’s balance.

These checks included: (1) a $32,800 payment to TMO LLC; (2) a

$17,500 payment to Okorie himself; (3) a $10,000 payment to

Delphi Exports, LLC; (4) a $33,200 payment to TMO LLC; and (5) a

$24,800 payment to TMO LLC. 11 The above-referenced checks to

TMO LLC were deposited into another of TMO Consulting’s

accounts at Citizens Bank, and Okorie was the only authorized

10 Okorie’s fraud examiner license was suspended in 2009.

11 There were also several smaller withdrawals that appeared to be related to

personal expenses, such as a payment to Verizon, Comcast, credit card and

loan payments, and a grocery store charge.

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signatory. Between October 26 and November 6, 2018, multiple

checks or withdrawals were then made from that Citizens Bank

account, including a $14,500 payment to Ebhos Autos.

Fitzgibbons further testified that she reviewed account

information for Okorie’s personal bank account with Citizens

Bank. Okorie was the only signatory on this account as well. As

of October 24, 2018, Okorie’s personal Citizens Bank account had

a balance of $345.84. The account showed the receipt of the

$17,500 check from TMO Consulting’s Capital One account on

October 29, 2018. Between October 29 and November 6, 2018,

Okorie made a series of payments or withdrawals that depleted

most of the money in the account.

Another of TMO Consulting’s accounts at Citizens Bank had

a balance of approximately $200 on November 13, 2018. It received

$130,000 from Dreyfuss Capital Partners LLC on November 14,

2018. [Id.] Almost $20,000 was transferred between November 14

and November 15 to Okorie’s personal bank account. A total of

$42,000 was transferred to another TMO Consulting account with

Citizens Bank between November 14 and November 16. And two

substantial payments were made to Ebhos Auto totaling over

$52,000 between November 15 and November 21.

Fitzgibbons also analyzed a Chase account for Okorie’s

other business, Collective Intelligence Forensics. That account

received five wire transfers for several thousand dollars each from

Patricia Davis between April and June 2019. For instance, at the

beginning of April 2019, Collective Intelligence Forensics’s account

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had only $40 in it. Then, Davis wired $10,000 and $3,975 to the

account between April 4 and April 10. After that influx of cash,

there were several cash withdrawals, credit card payments, some

food purchases, living expenses, and a $1,000 check to Okorie

himself.

Throughout the trial, Okorie argued that there was no

connection between himself and the co-conspirators or the victims;

that he lacked the necessary intent; and that he had no knowledge

that the proceeds wired into his account were fraudulent.

iv. The Rule 404(b) evidence

Over Okorie’s objection, the government introduced

evidence under Rule 404(b) that (1) Okorie pleaded guilty to three

counts of wire fraud and three counts of money laundering in 2011

in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and that Okorie was

sentenced to 54 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay

$1,727,376.10 in restitution, and (2) his grand jury testimony from

that case. As part of his grand jury testimony in the 2011 case,

Okorie admitted that he knowingly laundered proceeds from

lottery scams initiated by other people through his businesses,

including a Western Union he owned and his consulting firm,

Collective Intelligence Forensics.

With regard to the Rule 404(b) evidence, the jury was

instructed that:

[d]uring the trial, you heard evidence of acts allegedly

done by Mr. Okorie on other occasions that may be

similar to the acts with which Mr. Okorie is currently

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charged. You must not consider any of this evidence

to decide whether Mr. Okorie engaged in the activity

alleged in the superseding indictment. This evidence

is admitted and may be considered by you for the

limited purpose of assisting you in determining

whether Mr. Okorie had the state of mind or intent

necessary to commit the crime charged in the

superseding indictment, the motive to commit the

acts charged in the superseding indictment, that Mr.

Okorie acted according to a plan or in preparation to

commit a crime as charged in the superseding

indictment, or the defendant committed the acts

charged in the superseding indictment by accident or

mistake.

v. The deliberate ignorance instruction

Okorie objected to the district court giving a deliberate

ignorance jury instruction, arguing that such an instruction was not

warranted by the evidence. The district court denied the objection

and instructed the jury that:

[i]f a defendant’s knowledge of a fact is an essential

part of the crime, it’s enough that the defendant was

aware of a high probability that the fact existed,

unless the defendant actually believed the fact didn’t

exist. . . .

“Deliberate avoidance of positive knowledge”—

which is the equivalent of knowledge—occurs, for

example, if a defendant possesses a package and

believes it contains a controlled substance but

deliberately avoids learning that it contains the

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controlled substance so he or she can deny knowledge

of the package’s contents.

So you may find that a defendant knew about the

unlawful purpose of the plan to violate 18 U.S.C.

§ 1957 if you determine beyond a reasonable doubt

that the Defendant (1) actually knew about the

unlawful purpose of the plan . . ., or (2) had every

reason to know but deliberately closed his eyes.

The jury found Okorie guilty of conspiracy to commit

money laundering.

C. Sentencing

Prior to sentencing, the United States Probation Office

prepared a presentence investigation report (“PSI”). The base

offense level for the money laundering conspiracy was 20. Okorie

received additional guidelines enhancements for being “in the

business of laundering funds,” pursuant to U.S.S.G.

§ 2S1.1(b)(2)(C), and because the offense involved “sophisticated

These enhancements increased the total offense level to 26, which

when combined with Okorie’s criminal history category of II

resulted in an advisory guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’

imprisonment. He faced a statutory maximum of 10 years’

imprisonment. In terms of his financial condition, the PSI indicated

that Okorie had $596,550 in assets (checking and savings accounts,

stocks, property, and land), and $480,632 in liabilities, making his

net worth $115,918. The PSI indicated that the guideline fine range

for the offense was $25,000 to $250,000, and that Okorie “[did] not

have the ability to pay a fine.”

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Okorie objected to the two guidelines enhancements,

arguing that he engaged in legitimate business and was not in the

business of laundering funds and that the offense did not involve

sophisticated means of laundering. He maintained that without

these enhancements, his guidelines range would be only 37 to 46

months’ imprisonment.

Okorie filed a sentencing memorandum requesting a

37-month sentence. He asserted that the two persons responsible

for perpetrating this scheme were Ebhodaghe and Asikhia and they

were sentenced to 37 and 18 months, respectively. Thus, he

maintained that he should receive a similar sentence and that a

sentence within his guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’

imprisonment would create an unwarranted sentencing disparity.

At sentencing, after hearing arguments from both parties,

the district court overruled Okorie’s objections to the guidelines

enhancements and adopted the PSI’s guidelines range. Okorie

urged the court to consider that, since his release in his prior case,

he had “liv[ed] a law-abiding life” with his wife and children, and

“he was doing his very best to make his way in a very difficult

environment after being convicted previously.” He also reiterated

his argument that he should receive a sentence similar to

Ebhodaghe and Asikihia, noting that they did the “lion[’s] share of

the conduct” in the scheme and profited more than he did.

The government, in turn, requested a sentence of 87

months’ imprisonment, highlighting the vulnerable victims that

were the subject of the romance scheme and that Okorie was a

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recidivist “professional money launderer.” The government

further noted that there was no evidence that Ebhodaghe and

Asikhia received larger shares of the profits, but regardless, they

were not similarly situated to Okorie because they cooperated with

the government by “proffer[ing] multiple times,” and they had no

criminal history.

The district court varied upward and imposed a sentence of

108 months’ imprisonment to be followed by three years’

supervised release. The court acknowledged that this sentence was

“twice the original sentence” that Okorie received for his 2011

conviction. Nevertheless, the court noted that “[t]he conduct in

this case [was] bad” and explained that “[Okorie] took advantage of

people and allowed that to go on by [his] support[] [of] the frauds

as they [went] on.” The court emphasized that the sentence was

appropriate based on the nature and circumstances of the offense,

Okorie’s personal history and characteristics, including the fact that

he was a recidivist, and to deter Okorie’s future criminal conduct.12

Finally, the court ordered Okorie to pay $30,713 in restitution to

victim Patricia Davis immediately. Okorie objected to the

reasonableness of the sentence.

12 Consistent with these oral reasons, the district court explained in the

statement of reasons that it varied upward from the guidelines range because

of the “nature and circumstances of the offense”; “to reflect the seriousness of

the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment

for the offense”; and “to afford adequate deterrence.” The court further noted

that it “considered [Okorie’s] recidivism and doubled prior sentence to afford

adequate deterrence to this defendant.”

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This appeal followed.

II. Discussion

Okorie argues that (1) venue was not proper in the Northern

District of Alabama; (2) there was a material variance between the

indictment and the proof at trial as to whether a single conspiracy

existed; (3) the district court abused its discretion by admitting

evidence of Okorie’s prior convictions and grand jury testimony

under Rule 404(b); (4) the district court erred in giving a deliberate

ignorance instruction; (5) his sentence was procedurally and

substantively unreasonable; and (6) the district court erred when it

ordered the immediate payment of restitution. We address each

argument in turn.

A. Venue Claim

Okorie argues that the district court erred in finding that

venue was proper in the Northern District of Alabama because

(1) the alleged money laundering occurred outside Alabama, (2) a

majority of the alleged victims were located outside Alabama, and

(3) venue was improper as to Okorie, specifically, because all of the

conduct linking the alleged conspiracy to Alabama occurred prior

to Okorie joining the conspiracy.13

13 The government argues that we should review this claim only for plain error

because Okorie failed to renew his venue challenge at trial when moving for

a judgment of acquittal. Okorie maintains that he is challenging only the

denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment for improper venue. Therefore,

we limit our discussion to that motion.

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We review de novo the “district court’s denial of a motion to

dismiss for improper venue.” United States v. Muench, 153 F.3d

1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998). A criminal defendant has a

constitutional right “to be tried in the district in which the crime

was committed.” United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 866 (11th Cir.

2010) (quotations omitted). “[V]enue is an essential element of the

government’s proof at trial.” Id. at 865 (quotations omitted). Thus,

when an indictment is facially sufficient, whether venue was

proper is a question of fact that must be left to the jury to decide.

Id. at 866.

“In a conspiracy case, venue is proper in any district where

an . . . act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. The

government must support its choice of venue only by a

preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d

Additionally, Okorie acknowledges that his argument that venue was

improper as to him individually because the conduct linking the alleged

conspiracy to the Northern District of Alabama occurred prior to his entering

the conspiracy is foreclosed by our decision in United States v. Davis, 666 F.2d

195, 200 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (holding that “prior actions of coconspirators in

furtherance of the conspiracy are attributable to one who later joins the

conspiracy”). See Stein v. Reynolds Sec., Inc., 667 F.2d 33, 34 (11th Cir. 1982)

(acknowledging that decisions made by Unit B of the Fifth Circuit are binding

precedent). Nevertheless, he urges us to apply a different standard. However,

under the prior-panel-precedent rule, “a prior panel’s holding is binding on all

subsequent panels unless and until it is overruled or undermined to the point

of abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.” United

States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we are

bound by Davis, and we do not discuss Okorie’s argument on this point

further.

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1551, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotations and citations omitted); see

also 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(2) (providing that a prosecution for

conspiracy to commit money laundering “may be brought in the

district where venue would lie for the completed offense . . . , or in

any other district where an act in furtherance of the attempt or

conspiracy took place”). 14

Here, the district court did not err in denying Okorie’s

motion to dismiss the indictment based on improper venue.

Okorie was charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering;

thus, the prosecution could be brought in the district where venue

would exist for the completed offense had it been accomplished or

in any district “where an act in furtherance of the attempt or

conspiracy took place.” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(i)(2); Smith, 918 F.2d at

1557. The superseding indictment alleged that acts in furtherance

of the conspiracy took place in the Northern District of Alabama.

Accordingly, the indictment contained facially sufficient allegations

of venue, and the district court properly denied the motion to

dismiss because, where there is a facially valid indictment, whether

14 Okorie relies on United States v. Cabrales, 524 U.S. 1 (1998), for the principle

that venue is proper only in the district where the money laundering occurred.

His reliance is misplaced. Cabrales involved the substantive offense of money

laundering, not conspiracy. Id. at 7–8. In holding that venue was appropriate

only where the money laundering occurred, the Supreme Court expressly

recognized that in conspiracy cases venue may lie based on the acts of a

co-conspirator in a particular district. Id. Accordingly, Cabrales does not aid

Okorie.

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venue was proper is a question of fact that must be left to the jury

to decide. 15 Snipes, 611 F.3d at 866.

B. Material Variance Claim

For the first time on appeal, Okorie argues that there was a

material variance between the allegations in the indictment and the

evidence presented at trial. Specifically, he contends that the

indictment alleged a single conspiracy, but the evidence at trial

established three different fraudulent schemes and reflected the

kind of “rimless wheel” conspiracy and material variance described

in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 755–57 (1946), and United

States v. Chandler, 388 F.3d 796, 807 (11th Cir. 2004).

Ordinarily, we review de novo whether a material variance

occurred between the indictment’s allegations and the evidence

presented at trial. United States v. Goldstein, 989 F.3d 1178, 1198

(11th Cir. 2021). However, when a defendant failed to raise a

material variance argument at trial, our review is for plain error.

15 Although Okorie states in his reply brief that he is challenging only the denial

of his motion to dismiss the indictment based on improper venue, we note

that the jury did not err in concluding that venue was proper in the Northern

District of Alabama because the government established by a preponderance

of the evidence that acts in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred in the

Northern District of Alabama. Specifically, CCBCU employees in

Birmingham received fraudulent e-mails requesting a change in payment

procedures for CCSMI, and CCBCU complied with those instructions and sent

money to accounts associated with the conspiracy. Additionally, Jones, one

of the romance scam victims, lived in Birmingham when she was contacted

by someone pretending to be Vin Diesel who convinced her to send money

to various accounts.

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22 Opinion of the Court 24-14115

United States v. Wilson, 788 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2015). Thus,

to obtain relief, Okorie

must show that there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain, and

(3) that affects substantial rights. If all conditions are

met, [we] may then exercise [our] discretion to notice

a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously

affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of

judicial proceedings.

Id. (quotations omitted).

“A variance exists where the evidence at trial proves facts

different from those alleged in the indictment.” Id. (emphasis

omitted) (quotations omitted). Thus, a material variance can occur

“if the government proves multiple conspiracies under an

indictment alleging only a single conspiracy.” United States v.

Castro, 89 F.3d 1443, 1450 (11th Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, “a

variance requires reversal only when the defendant can establish

that his rights were substantially prejudiced.” United States v. Holt,

777 F.3d 1234, 1261 (11th Cir. 2015).

Importantly, “[t]he arguable existence of multiple

conspiracies . . . does not constitute a material variance from the

indictment if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the government, a rational trier of fact could have found that a

single conspiracy existed beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States

v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1347 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotations

omitted). In other words, “[a] material variance will only result if

there is no evidentiary foundation for the jury’s finding of a single

conspiracy.” United States v. Richardson, 532 F.3d 1279, 1284 (11th

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24-14115 Opinion of the Court 23

Cir. 2008); Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1347 (“[T]he jury makes the initial

determination of whether the evidence supports a single

conspiracy and their determination will not be disturbed if

supported by substantial evidence.” (quotations omitted)).

“To determine whether a jury could have found that [the]

evidence established a single conspiracy beyond a reasonable

doubt, we must consider: (1) whether a common goal existed;

(2) the nature of the underlying scheme; and (3) the overlap of

participants.” Richardson, 532 F.3d at 1284 (quotations omitted).

“[S]eparate transactions . . . are not necessarily separate

conspiracies, so long as the conspirators act in concert to further a

common goal.” Id. (emphasis omitted) (quotations omitted).

“Courts typically define the common goal element as broadly as

possible. And as [we have] repeatedly stated, ‘common’ for the

purposes of this test means ‘similar’ or ‘substantially the same’

rather than ‘shared’ or ‘coordinate.’” Id. at 1285 (quotations and

citation omitted).

[Further, i]f a defendant’s actions facilitated the

endeavors of other co-conspirators or facilitated the

venture as a whole, then a single conspiracy is

established. It is irrelevant that particular

conspirators may not have known other conspirators

or may not have participated in every stage of the

conspiracy; all that the government must prove is an

agreement or common purpose to violate the law

and intentional joining in this goal by coconspirators.

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24 Opinion of the Court 24-14115

Id. at 1284 (emphasis omitted) (quotations and citations omitted).

“Each co-conspirator thus does not have to be involved in every

part of the conspiracy.” United States v. Seher, 562 F.3d 1344, 1366

(11th Cir. 2009).

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, Okorie cannot show that there was a material

variance because there was sufficient evidence at trial to support

the jury’s conclusion that a single conspiracy existed. See

Richardson, 532 F.3d at 1284–85. First, the evidence at trial

demonstrated that the conspirators of the business e-mail

compromise schemes and the romance schemes shared a common

goal—to launder the proceeds from those online fraud schemes.

Second, each co-conspirator’s actions, even if they did not know

each other, facilitated the achievement of this goal. For instance,

the evidence at trial established that Omorusi created the fake Vin

Diesel e-mail account. That account was used to correspond with

some of the romance scam victims and convince the victims to

receive and transfer money on behalf of the conspiracy. Some of

that money was wired to bank accounts controlled by Okorie.

Likewise, some of the money from the business e-mail

compromise schemes was wired into bank accounts controlled by

Okorie. And after every influx of cash, Okorie quickly withdrew,

transferred, or otherwise used the funds. Third, the evidence

demonstrated a link between Okorie and co-conspirator

Ebhodaghe because, after receiving proceeds from the online

schemes, Okorie frequently sent substantial funds to Ebhodaghe’s

business, Ebhos Auto. Ebhos Auto, in turn, also wired substantial

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funds to co-conspirator Asikhia’s bank in Nigeria. Accordingly,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

government, the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt

that a single conspiracy existed.

We also disagree with Okorie that the evidence in this case

depicted a “rimless wheel” conspiracy. Specifically, in “a classic

‘hub-and-spoke’ conspiracy . . . a central core of conspirators [(‘the

hub’)] recruits separate groups of co-conspirators to carry out the

various functions of the illegal enterprise [(‘the spokes’)].”

Chandler, 388 F.3d at 807. “The core conspirators [in the hub] move

from spoke to spoke, directing the functions of the conspiracy.” Id.

“A ‘rimless wheel’ conspiracy is a variation of the ‘hub-and-spoke’

model, in which the individual at the ‘hub’ of the conspiracy

interacts separately with those along the various ‘spokes’ of the

wheel.” Seher, 562 F.3d at 1367; see also Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755,

768–69. Thus, in a “rimless wheel” conspiracy, “the ‘spokes’ of a

conspiracy have no knowledge of or connection with the other

‘spokes’ and deal independently with the hub conspirator.” Seher,

562 F.3d at 1367 (alteration adopted) (quotations omitted). As a

result, “there is not a single conspiracy, but rather as many

conspiracies as there are spokes. . . . because there is no rim to

connect the spokes in a single scheme.” Id. (quotations and citation

omitted). Here, as discussed above, there was substantial evidence

that the co-conspirators were aware of the nature and scope of the

schemes and were aware of each other, as evidenced by the large

sum money transfers between Okorie and Ebhos Auto and Ebhos

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26 Opinion of the Court 24-14115

Auto and Asikhia. Accordingly, the conspiracy here was not a

“rimless wheel.” See id.

C. Rule 404(b) Evidence Claim

Okorie argues that the district court erred in admitting

evidence of his prior convictions under Rule 404(b). 16 He maintains

that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative and was

unnecessary because there was sufficient other evidence

demonstrating his knowledge and intent.

“We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of

discretion.” United States v. Troya, 733 F.3d 1125, 1131 (11th Cir.

2013). “[T]he district court is uniquely situated to make nuanced

judgments on questions that require the careful balancing of

fact-specific concepts like probativeness and prejudice, and we are

loathe to disturb the sound exercise of its discretion in these areas.”

Id. (quotations omitted).

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or bad acts is not

admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that he

acted in conformity with that character. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1).

16 For the first time in his reply brief, Okorie also argues that the district court

erred in admitting under Rule 404(b) his grand jury testimony from his prior

case. It is well-established that we will not “consider issues raised for the first

time in an appellant’s reply brief.” United States v. Levy, 379 F.3d 1241, 1244

(11th Cir. 2004) (collecting cases); see also United States v. Fiallo-Jacome, 874 F.2d

1479, 1481 (11th Cir. 1989) (“An appellant in a criminal case may not raise an

issue for the first time in a reply appellate brief . . . .”). Accordingly, we do not

address Okorie’s Rule 404(b) argument concerning the admission of his grand

jury testimony.

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However, evidence of other crimes “may be admissible for another

purpose, such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

Id. R. 404(b)(2). Under Rule 403, “[t]he court may exclude relevant

evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a

danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the

jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting

cumulative evidence.” Id. R. 403. “Exclusion under Rule 403 is an

extraordinary remedy which the district court should invoke

sparingly, and the balance should be struck in favor of

admissibility.” Troya, 733 F.3d at 1132 (quotations omitted); see also

United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1313 (11th Cir. 2009)

(“Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion, and accordingly 404(b)

evidence, like other relevant evidence, should not be lightly

excluded when it is central to the prosecution’s case.” (quotations

omitted)). Furthermore, a limiting instruction to the jury can

diminish any unfair prejudice caused by the admission of Rule

404(b) evidence. Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1346.

Importantly, “[a] defendant who enters a not guilty plea

makes intent a material issue which imposes a substantial burden

on the government to prove intent, which it may prove by

qualifying Rule 404(b) evidence absent affirmative steps by the

defendant to remove intent as an issue.” Id. at 1345 (quotations

omitted). A similarity between an extrinsic act and the “charged

offense will make the other offense highly probative with regard to

a defendant’s intent in the charged offense.” United States v.

Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005).

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28 Opinion of the Court 24-14115

Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting the evidence of Okorie’s prior 2011 convictions. By

pleading not guilty and going to trial, Okorie made his intent a

contested issue, and his prior 2011 convictions for wire fraud and

money laundering were probative of his intent in this case, which

involved a conspiracy to commit money laundering. See Edouard,

485 F.3d at 1345; Ramirez, 426 F.3d at 1354. Although Okorie is

correct that the government had other evidence against him

including his numerous bank accounts, multiple money transfers,

and his experience as a certified fraud examiner, none of that

evidence necessarily demonstrated his intent. And he argued

throughout the trial that he lacked the necessary intent and

knowledge. Thus, evidence of his prior 2011 convictions was a key

part of the government’s ability to establish his intent in this case.

See Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1345.

Moreover, even if Okorie could show that the risk of

prejudice from this evidence outweighed the probative value, “any

unfair prejudice possibly caused by admitting evidence of [Okorie’s

prior convictions] was mitigated by the district court’s limiting

instruction to the jury.” Id. at 1346. Accordingly, the district court

did not abuse its discretion in admitting the prior convictions under

Rule 404(b).

D. Jury Instruction Claim

Okorie argues that the district court erred in giving a

deliberate ignorance instruction because such an instruction is not

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24-14115 Opinion of the Court 29

proper when, as here, the government presented evidence of actual

knowledge.

“We . . . review de novo whether the circumstances of a

particular case rendered it appropriate to instruct the jury on

deliberate ignorance.” United States v. Morley, 99 F.4th 1328, 1336

(11th Cir. 2024). “[W]e will reverse only if we are left with a

substantial and eradicable doubt as to whether the jury was

properly guided in its deliberations.” Id. (quotations omitted).

In order to convict Okorie of conspiracy to commit money

laundering, the government had to prove that Okorie knew that

the proceeds involved were derived from an illegal activity. See

United States v. Martinelli, 454 F.3d 1300, 1310 (11th Cir. 2006);

United States v. Medina, 485 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007).

“[D]eliberate ignorance of criminal activity [is] the equivalent of

knowledge.” United States v. Arias, 984 F.2d 1139, 1143 (11th Cir.

1993) (quotations omitted).

A deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate

when the facts support the inference that the

defendant was aware of a high probability of the

existence of the fact in question and purposely

contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to

have a defense in the event of a subsequent

prosecution. We have cautioned the district courts

against instructing juries on deliberate ignorance

when the evidence only points to either actual

knowledge or no knowledge on the part of the

defendant. But it is not error when the evidence

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30 Opinion of the Court 24-14115

could support both actual knowledge or deliberate

ignorance and the jury was instructed on both.

Morley, 99 F.4th at 1342 (quotations and citations omitted).

Here, the district court did not err in giving the deliberate

ignorance instruction because the evidence could support both

actual knowledge or deliberate ignorance. Id. Okorie’s defense at

trial was that there was no evidence that he knew that the funds

wired into his account were the result of criminal activity. The

evidence showed that Okorie, who was a certified fraud examiner,

received several wire transfers of substantial funds into various

accounts and then quickly moved those funds out of those

accounts. The jury could have inferred that the amounts of cash

being transferred strongly suggested criminal activity and that

Okorie deliberately avoided learning more in order to protect

himself in the event of a future prosecution. Accordingly, the

deliberate ignorance instruction was proper. See United States v.

Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1149 (11th Cir. 2003) (upholding the

deliberate ignorance instruction under similar circumstances).

E. Sentencing Claims

Okorie argues that his sentence is procedurally

unreasonable because the district court used his prior sentence as

the starting point for its sentencing determination instead of the

guidelines range. 17 He maintains that the district court relied so

17 We note that Okorie failed to make this argument in the district court and

only objected generally to the reasonableness of the end of the sentencing

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heavily on his prior sentence in fashioning the current sentence

that it essentially improperly created a floor for the current

sentence based on his prior sentence and failed to conduct its own

analysis of the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. Additionally, he

argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is

greater than necessary to accomplish the objectives of § 3553(a)

and is an unwarranted sentencing disparity. 18

We review a sentence for procedural and substantive

reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. See Gall v.

hearing. Accordingly, it does not appear that he preserved this argument and

that we should review it for plain error. See United States v. Hamilton, 168 F.4th

1354, 1367 (11th Cir. 2026) (explaining that we review an unpreserved claim

of procedural unreasonableness only for plain error). However, because the

government does not make that argument and asserts that the abuse of

discretion standard applies, we will review Okorie’s procedural

reasonableness challenge for abuse of discretion.

18 Okorie also argues for the first time on appeal that the district court violated

his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by imposing the guidelines

enhancements based on judicial fact-finding, citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530

U.S. 466 (2000), Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), and their progeny.

Okorie cannot show plain error because this claim is squarely foreclosed by

binding precedent. See United States v. Charles, 757 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir.

2014) (rejecting identical challenge and holding that “a district court may

continue to make guidelines calculations based upon judicial fact findings and

may enhance a sentence—so long as its findings do not increase the statutory

maximum or minimum authorized by facts determined in a guilty plea or jury

verdict”); see also United States v. Dean, 487 F.3d 840, 854 (11th Cir. 2007)

(explaining that a district court may enhance a sentence based on its judicial

fact findings, so long as it treats the guidelines as advisory and its findings do

not increase the sentence beyond the statutory maximum authorized by the

offense). Accordingly, we do not address it further.

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32 Opinion of the Court 24-14115

United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). In reviewing a sentence for

procedural reasonableness, we “ensure that the district court

committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to

calculate (or improperly calculating) the [g]uidelines range,

treating the [g]uidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the

§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous

facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United

States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall,

552 U.S. at 51).

As for substantive reasonableness, the district court must

issue a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary”

to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a)(2), which include the

need for a sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense,

promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter

criminal conduct, and protect the public from future criminal

conduct. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The court must also consider the

“nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and

characteristics of the defendant,” and “the need to avoid

unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar

records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.” Id.

§ 3553(a)(1), (6). When evaluating the § 3553(a) factors, a court

may properly consider information that is already accounted for in

the guidelines. See United States v. Williams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1324

(11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the district court could properly

consider the defendant’s criminal history as part of the § 3553(a)

factors even though it was already “part of the calculation of his

guideline range”); see also United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353,

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1362 (11th Cir. 2014) (“The district court may consider facts that

were taken into account when formulating the guideline range for

the sake of a variance.”).

“[T]he district court need only acknowledge that it

considered the § 3553(a) factors, and need not discuss each of these

factors . . . .” United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 833 (11th Cir.

2007) (emphasis in original) (quotation and citation omitted).

Importantly, the weight given to a particular § 3553(a) factor “is

committed to the sound discretion of the district court,” and it is

not required to give “equal weight” to the § 3553(a) factors. United

States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11th Cir. 2015)

(quotation omitted). “We will not second guess the weight given

to a § 3553(a) factor so long as the sentence is reasonable under the

circumstances.” United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1355 (11th

Cir. 2022). A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to

consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives

significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or

(3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper

factors unreasonably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th

Cir. 2010) (en banc).

“Upward variances are imposed based upon the § 3553(a)

factors.” Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355. No presumption of

reasonableness or unreasonableness applies to a sentence that lies

outside the advisory guidelines range. Id. Extraordinary

justification or “rigid mathematical formula[s]” are not required for

a sentence outside the guidelines range, but the district court

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34 Opinion of the Court 24-14115

should explain why the variance is appropriate and the

“justification for the variance must be sufficiently compelling to

support the degree of the variance.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1186–87

(quotations omitted).

The burden rests on the party challenging the sentence to

show “that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire

record, the § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded

sentencing courts.” Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1256. We will

“vacate the sentence if, but only if, we are left with the definite and

firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of

judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence

that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the

facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotations omitted).

Here, Okorie’s sentence is procedurally reasonable because,

contrary to his contention, the district court did not treat his prior

sentence as a baseline for his current sentence. Rather, the record

confirms that the district court started with the guidelines range

and then varied upward based on the relevant § 3553(a) factors,

including Okorie’s bad conduct in the present offense, his personal

history and characteristics (which included his prior convictions

and sentence), and the need for deterrence. Although the district

court clearly considered Okorie’s prior sentence when making its

decision, such a consideration was not erroneous. First, it is

well-established that the district court was entitled to consider

Okorie’s prior criminal history even if it was already accounted for

by the guidelines. See Williams, 526 F.3d at 1324. Second, “[c]ourts

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have broad leeway in deciding how much weight to give to prior

crimes the defendant has committed, and placing substantial

weight on a defendant’s criminal record is entirely consistent with

§ 3553(a) because five of the factors it requires a court to consider

are related to criminal history.” United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272,

1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (alteration adopted) (quotations and citation

omitted); see also Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355 (explaining that “a court

may also impose an upward variance if it concludes that the

[g]uidelines range was insufficient in light of a defendant’s criminal

history”). Accordingly, the sentence is procedurally reasonable.

Turning to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,

the district court did not abuse its discretion in varying upward

from the applicable guidelines range of 70 to 87 months’

imprisonment and imposing a sentence of 108 months. The district

court explained that an upward variance was appropriate because

of the nature and circumstances of the offense, Okorie’s criminal

history and personal characteristics, and the need to provide

adequate deterrence. The district court acted within its discretion

in giving more weight to certain sentencing factors over others and

provided sufficient justifications for the variance. See Rosales-Bruno,

789 F.3d at 1254. At bottom, Okorie quarrels with how the district

court weighed the relevant § 3553(a) factors, but “[w]e will not

second guess the weight” the district court gave the § 3553(a)

factors. Butler, 39 F.4th at 1355.

To the extent Okorie argues that his sentence created an

unwarranted sentencing disparity because Ebhodaghe and Asikhia

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36 Opinion of the Court 24-14115

received lower sentences, it is not enough for Okorie “to simply

compare” his sentence to that of a co-conspirator. 19 United States v.

Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018, 1048 (11th Cir. 2015) (“One needs to have

more than the crime of conviction and the total length of the

sentences to evaluate alleged disparities.”). Rather, “[t]he

underlying facts of the crime and all of the individual characteristics

are relevant,” and Okorie has not carried his burden to produce

specific facts concerning Ebhodaghe’s and Asikhia’s individual

characteristics. 20 Id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 980 F.3d 1364,

1386 (11th Cir. 2020) (rejecting disparity claim because

“[d]efendant ha[d] not carried his burden to show specific facts

establishing that any codefendants [were] similarly situated”).

Finally, we note that Okorie’s 108-month sentence is below

the statutory maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment, which is

another indicator of reasonableness. See United States v. Gonzalez,

550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that a sentence that

is below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness).

Accordingly, we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction

that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in

19 We also note that “disparity between the sentences imposed on

codefendants is generally not an appropriate basis for relief on appeal.” United

States v. Cavallo, 790 F.3d 1202, 1237 (11th Cir. 2015) (alteration adopted).

20 Moreover, we note that based on the government’s statements at

sentencing, Okorie is not similarly situated to Ebhodaghe or Asikhia because

(1) they cooperated with the government and made multiple proffers and

(2) they did not have criminal history. These facts explain why they received

lower sentences than Okorie.

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24-14115 Opinion of the Court 37

weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies

outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of

the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotations omitted).

Consequently, we conclude that Okorie’s sentence is procedurally

and substantively reasonable.

F. Restitution Claim

For the first time on appeal, Okorie argues that the district

court erred in ordering the immediate payment of $30,713 in

restitution without considering his financial condition and ability

to pay.

Generally, we review the legality of a restitution order de

novo. United States v. Edwards, 728 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2013).

However, because Okorie failed to raise this objection below, “we

review only for plain error.” United States v. Romines, 204 F.3d 1067,

1068 (11th Cir. 2000).

After the district court establishes the amount of restitution

owed, it should “consider[] the defendant’s financial resources to

create a schedule for restitution payments.” Edwards, 728 F.3d at

1291. Nevertheless, “the defendant bears the burden of

demonstrating his financial condition, and the court can rely on the

[PSI] and need not make independent findings.” Id.

Here, Okorie’s PSI contained a detailed accounting of his

assets and liabilities and indicated that he had a net worth of

$115,918. He did not object to this data. Nor did he offer any other

evidence of his financial status and ability to make the restitution.

USCA11 Case: 24-14115 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 06/22/2026 Page: 38 of 38

38 Opinion of the Court 24-14115

Accordingly, the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, in

relying on the information in the PSI. See id.

III. Conclusion

For the above reasons, we affirm Okorie’s conviction and

sentence.

AFFIRMED.