WIELAND

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ERIE

JAMIR MITCHELL, )

)

Plaintiff ) 1:25-CV-00012-RAL

)

vs. ) RICHARD A. LANZILLO

) Chief United States Magistrate Judge

CAPT WIELAND, LT FIEDOR, SGT. )

KEMP, C.O. CROSE, CO YOUNG, ) MEMORANDUM OPINION ON

SUPERINTENDANT R. IRWIN, CERT ) DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO

TEAM-, JOHN DOES 1-10/JANE DOE; DISMISS

LPN CRYSTAL BEST, NURSE; AND )

D.O.C.,

) RE: ECF NO. 21

Defendants

Defendants Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Irwin, Wieland, Kemp,

Crose, Young, Fiedor, and Best have moved to dismiss certain claims of Plaintiffs

Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See ECF No. 21. For the following reasons,

Defendants’ motion will be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.!

I. Relevant Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff Jamir Mitchell (“Mitchell”), an inmate in the custody of the

Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”), brings this pro se civil rights

action against eight named Defendants? and eleven Doe Defendants employed at the

DOC’s State Correctional Institution in Forest County (“SCI-Forest”), where Mitchell

1 The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge as authorized by

28 U.S.C. § 636.

2 The eight identified Defendants are the PA DOC, Superintendent R. Irwin, Capt. Wieland, Lt. Fiedor,

Set. Kemp, C.O. Crose, C.O. Young, and LPN Crystal Best. See ECF No. 12.

was previously incarcerated.?

The Complaint alleges that the Defendants used excessive force against

Mitchell in retaliation for filing a lawsuit against Defendant Kemp. Defendants

argue that: (1) Mitchell’s claims against Defendants in their official capacities are

barred by the Eleventh Amendment; (2) the claims against Defendants Irwin and

Wieland should be dismissed based on their lack of personal involvement; and (3) the

Complaint fails to allege facts to state claims of conspiracy under § 1983, First

Amendment retaliation, Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference, Eighth

Amendment failure to protect, and disability discrimination under Title II of the

American Disabilities Act (“ADA”). The motion is ripe for disposition. See ECF No.

22 (Defendants’ brief); ECF No. 29 (Mitchell’s opposition brief).

II. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests

the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (8d Cir.

1993). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept as true

all factual allegations of the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to

the plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.8d 224, 228 (8d Cir. 2008)

(citing Worldcom, Inc. v. Graphnet, Inc., 343 F.3d 651, 653 (3d Cir. 2003). In making

its determination under Rule 12(b)(6), the court is not opining on whether the

plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present

Mitchell remains in the custody of the DOC but is currently housed at its State Correctional

Institution at Benner Township.

factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A.

Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-36 (8d ed. 2004)).

Furthermore, a complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it

fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id.

at 570.

While a complaint does not require detailed factual allegations to survive a

motion to dismiss, it must provide more than labels and conclusions. Id. at 555. A

“formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Jd. (citing

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept

inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts alleged in the

complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nor must the court accept

legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;

McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania, 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet

that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is

inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Put another way, in assessing a motion to

dismiss, while the Court must view the factual allegations of the pleading at issue as

true, the Court is “not compelled to accept unwarranted inferences, unsupported

conclusions or legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations.” Baraka v.

McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 211 (3d Cir. 2007).

Finally, because Mitchell is proceeding pro se, his Complaint will be held to

“less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the Court can reasonably read his pro se

pleading to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted, it will do so despite

his failure to cite correct legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and

sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v.

MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141

F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be unartfully drawn

and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”). But “any pleading must still

contain sufficient factual allegations that, when accepted as true, ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Heffley v. Steele, 2019 WL 5092127, at *4 (W.D.

Pa. Oct. 11, 2019), aff'd, 826 Fed. Appx. 227 (3d Cir. 2020) (citations omitted).

III. Factual Allegations and Claims

For the purposes of Defendants’ motion, the Court accepts as true the following

factual allegations of the Complaint. In late April 2024, Mitchell was placed in cell

JC-24 with cellmate Ryshawn Crawford (“Crawford”), where C.O. Smith provided

Crawford with two additional trays of food at least twice a week, for an unspecified

length of time. ECF No. 12, {1.4 Prior to Mitchell’s placement in JC-24, Defendant

Kemp told Crawford that if he were to assault Mitchell for “filing a lawsuit against

[Kemp],” Kemp would ensure Crawford would receive “extra trays.” Id., § 2. Mitchell

does not allege how he became aware of this instruction.

On May 24, 2024, approximately one month later, while in the dayroom,

Defendants Crose and Young expressed dissatisfaction that Crawford had not

The relevant factual allegations are set out in paragraphs 1-15 of Mitchell’s Complaint (ECF No. 12).

Citations to the pleading are omitted except for quoted allegations.

assaulted Mitchell despite receiving extra trays of food. Again, Mitchell does not

allege how he became aware of this discussion. After the distribution of the lunch

trays, Young threatened to spray Mitchell and Crawford with oleoresin capsicum

(“OC”) spray as punishment for Crawford not attacking Mitchell.

The following day, May 25, 2024, between 3:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., Kemp,

Young, and unspecified others allegedly came to JC-24 to carry out the prior threats.

Kemp ensured that Crawford and Mitchell did not receive dinner. Mitchell explained

the situation to Lt. Fiedor, who did nothing. Mitchell alleges that this omission

demonstrated Fiedor’s participation in the alleged conspiracy. Moments later, Fiedor

returned with a one-man extraction team and authorized Mitchell and Crawford to

be sprayed with “an entire fire extinguisher full of OC,” after which Fiedor instructed

the team to leave the unit. Jd., § 7. Five to ten minutes later, Fiedor returned to the

cell with two extraction teams and deployed “about two more fire extinguishers of OC

into JC-24.” Id., § 8. Mitchell did not scream or yell, and the windows of his cell were

uncovered. He asserts that the use of OC spray against “two mental health patients

that are taking medication for mental disorders and were restrained behind the door”

constituted a violation of the ADA. Id., { 9. Mitchell also alleges that Defendant

Best’s authorization of OC spray against him, despite his asthma and a history of a

collapsed lung, constituted deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and

violated his rights under the equal protection clause because clearing the use of OC

spray against inmates is a practice “applied to black prisoners and not whites”. Id.,

10. Mitchell further alleges that he was left in JC-24 for nearly an hour, and when

he was finally removed, he did not receive full-body decontamination. He was then

returned to JC-24, which he alleges had not been decontaminated. He was then

placed on a seven-day shower restriction, effectively remaining exposed to OC spray

during that time. Mitchell asserts that Irwin and Wieland were aware of the

misutilization of OC spray and excessive force in the RHU since 2022 but failed to

train staff at SCI-Forest. Id., J 15.

Mitchell’s Complaint does not include separate counts. Construing the

Complaint’s allegations liberally, the Court has identified the following claims:

1. An Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Fiedor and

the John/Jane Doe Defendants;

2. An Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim

against Defendant Best;

3. A Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Defendant Best;

4. A First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants Kemp, Crose, and

Young;

5. A Fourteenth Amendment conspiracy claim against Defendants Kemp,

Crose, Young, Fiedor, Irwin, Wieland, and Best;

6. An ADA claim against Defendant Best, Fiedor, and John/Jane Doe

Defendants; and

7. An Eighth Amendment failure to train claim against Defendants Irwin and

Wieland.

IV. Discussion

A. All claims for monetary relief against Defendants in their official

capacities will be dismissed.

Mitchell asserts his constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which

authorizes an action in federal court to remedy a violation of rights secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States “by a person acting under color of state law.”

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Mitchell's Complaint seeks compensatory and

punitive damages against Defendants in their respective official and individual

capacities. To the extent he seeks money damages against the Defendants in their

official capacities, his claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which

proscribes actions for money damages in the federal courts against states, their

agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities. See Laskaris v.

Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1981) (Pennsylvania); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed.

v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (state agencies); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)

(state employees acting in their official capacity).

The DOC is an agency of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and, as such, it

and its agents and employees acting in their official capacities are immune from

monetary damages. See Brown v. Smith, 2019 WL 2411749 (W.D. Pa. June 7, 2019).

Mitchell’s claims for monetary relief against the Defendants in their official capacities

will therefore be dismissed with prejudice.>

B. The Complaint fails to state a failure-to-protect claim against

Defendants Irwin and Wieland.

It is axiomatic that a § 1983 plaintiff “must show that each and every

defendant was ‘personal[ly] involve[d]’ in depriving him of his rights.” Kirk v. Roan,

2006 WL 2645154, at *3 (M.D. Pa. 2006) (quoting Evancho v. Fischer, 423 F.3d 347,

5 The Complaint does not seek injunctive or prospective declaratory relief against the Defendants in

their official capacities. Such relief is not subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Will v. Mich.

Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (citations omitted). In any event, Mitchell’s release from

SCI-Forest makes such relief unavailable against the Defendants.

353 (3d Cir. 2006)). This requires that each defendant play an “affirmative part” in

the complained-of misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677 (“In a § 1983 suit ... [a]bsent

vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only

liable for his or her own misconduct.”); Oliver v. Beard, 358 Fed. Appx. 297, 300 (3d

Cir. 2009). In the absence of specific allegations that a defendant participated in

depriving the plaintiff of a constitutional right, dismissal is appropriate. See, e.g.,

Mearin v. Swartz, 951 F. Supp. 2d 776, 781-82 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (dismissing claims

under Rule 12(b)(6) where the plaintiffs failed to allege sufficient facts showing that

certain defendants played an affirmative role in the alleged Eighth Amendment

violation).

Here, Mitchell alleges only that Irwin and Wieland “have been made aware of

the misutilization of OC, and excessive force being implemented in RHU since 2022,

yet failed to train/improperly trained subordinates, and is as if they set the stage for

this to occur and is guilty for failing to protect, and involved in the conspiracy to

retaliate.” ECF No. 12, § 15. These allegations, however, are conclusory and

therefore insufficient to state a plausible claim.

The issue of “personal involvement” frequently arises when the plaintiff sues

a supervisory official based on misconduct allegedly committed by a subordinate. See

Evancho, 423 F.3d at 353. In that context, a defendant’s lability “cannot be

predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Jd. (quoting Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998)). Instead, the plaintiff must show

that each defendant played an “affirmative part” in the complained-of misconduct.

Id. This can be shown by alleging facts to support that the defendant “participated

in violating the plaintiffs rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in

charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced” in a subordinate’s unconstitutional

conduct. A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586

(3d Cir. 2004) (citing Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (8d Cir. 1995)).

“Allegations of participation or actual knowledge and acquiescence, however, must be

made with appropriate particularity,” including the specifics of each defendant's

direct involvement in the conduct that violated the plaintiffs rights or the source of

each defendant’s knowledge of the violation and how his acquiescence contributed to

it. Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08. See also Evancho, 423 F.3d at 354.

Mitchell does not allege that Irwin or Wieland participated in, directed, or

contemporaneously knew of the alleged use of force against him on May 25, 2024.

Nor does he allege facts showing how either Defendant became aware of the alleged

misconduct in the RHU, what information they received, when they received it, or

how either acquiesced in the specific conduct at issue in this case. Instead, Mitchell

relies on generalized and conclusory assertions that Irwin and Wieland were aware

of prior incidents involving OC spray and excessive force and failed to properly train

subordinates. Such allegations do not support personal involvement under § 1983.

Accordingly, Mitchell’s claims against Irwin and Wieland will be dismissed without

prejudice.

C. The Complaint fails to state a First Amendment retaliation claim

against any Defendant.

To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must allege facts to

support that: (1) his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) he suffered an adverse

action at the hands of prison officials; and (8) his constitutionally protected conduct

was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to take the adverse action.

Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417, 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d

330, 333-34 (8d Cir. 2001)). In the prison context, protected activity includes filing

grievances, lawsuits, or otherwise petitioning the government for redress. An

“adverse action” is one that would “deter a person of ordinary firmness” from

exercising his First Amendment rights. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 225 (3d

Cir. 2000) (quoting Suppan v. Dadonna, 203 F.3d 228, 235 (3d Cir. 2000)). Absent

direct evidence, retaliatory motive may be inferred from either: (1) an unusually

suggestive temporal proximity between the protected activity and the alleged

retaliatory action; or (2) a pattern of antagonism coupled with timing that suggests a

causal link. Id. (citing Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267

(3d Cir. 2007)).

Mitchell alleges that Kemp instructed Crawford to assault him because

Mitchell had “filfed] a lawsuit against [Kemp].” ECF No. 11, § 2. But he alleges no

meaningful information concerning the lawsuit, including when it was filed, in which

court, and its subject matter. Mitchell’s allegations are far too vague and conclusory

to support a plausible inference that the unspecified prior lawsuit motivated Kemp’s

subsequent conduct. Any such inference is further negated by the absence of any

10

allegation that Crawford acted on the alleged instruction and assaulted Mitchell.®

Mitchell’s retaliation claims against the other Defendants are even more untenable.

He alleges no facts to support that the other Defendants knew of the lawsuit or that

the lawsuit motivated their alleged use of force against him. These deficiencies are

fatal to Mitchell’s retaliation claim. The Court will therefore dismiss Mitchell’s First

Amendment retaliation claim.

D. Defendants’ motion will be denied as to the Complaint’s Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Best.

The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment

extends to prison officials’ “deliberate indifference” to inmates’ “serious medical

needs.” See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (stating that “deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”) (internal quotation

omitted). To state a claim for violation of his Eighth Amendment right to medical

care, Mitchell must allege facts to support findings that: (1) he had a serious medical

need, and (2) prison officials acted with deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v.

Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (8d Cir. 1999). A prison official acts with deliberate

indifference to a prisoner’s medical needs only when he or she “knows of and

disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S.

6 “Because retaliation claims can be easily fabricated, district courts must view prisoners’ retaliation

claims with sufficient skepticism to avoid becoming entangled in every disciplinary action taken

against a prisoner.” Brightwell v. Lehman, No. CIV.A. 03-205J, 2007 WL 2479682, at *6 (W.D. Pa.

Aug. 29, 2007), aff'd, 637 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th

Cir.1996); Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1084 (1996); Colon

v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)).

11

825, 837 (1994). Such indifference may be manifested by an intentional refusal to

provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed

medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in

suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or

“persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White

v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (8d Cir. 1990).

Here, Mitchell alleges that Defendant Best authorized the use of OC spray

against him despite knowing that he suffered from asthma and had previously

sustained a collapsed lung. ECF No. 12, { 10. A respiratory condition such as asthma

may constitute a serious medical need depending on its severity. See Lee v. Young,

533 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 2008) (“As a general matter, asthma can be, and

frequently is, a serious medical condition, depending on the severity of the attacks.”

(internal quotations omitted)). And a prison official’s alleged intentional exposure of

a severely asthmatic inmate to chemical agents plausibly supports an inference of

deliberate indifference, particularly where, as here, it is alleged that the official

repeatedly permitted deployment of large amounts of OC spray without proper

decontamination. Accordingly, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion to dismiss

as to Mitchell’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim

against Best.

E. The Complaint fails to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim against any

Defendant.

Mitchell's Complaint is peppered with allegations that can be construed as

raising a civil conspiracy claim. See e.g., ECF No. 12, generally. “To demonstrate a

12

conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached

an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right ‘under color of law.”

Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (8d Cir. 1983),

abrogated on other grounds by United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc. v. Twp. of

Warrington, 316 F.3d 392 (8d Cir. 2008). The plaintiff must allege facts to support

an actual agreement among the parties to the conspiracy. See Watson v. Sec’y Pa.

Dep't of Corr., 436 Fed. Appx. 131, 137 (8d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). “Mere conclusory

allegations that a conspiracy existed will not survive a motion to dismiss.” Rogers v.

Mount Union Borough ex rel. Zook, 816 F. Supp. 308, 314 (M.D. Pa. 1993). Because

“the linchpin for conspiracy is agreement,” allegations of parallel or concerted

conduct, without more, are insufficient. Watson, 436 Fed. Appx. at 137. Rather, a

plaintiff must allege particularized facts concerning the period, object, and actions

taken in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. Grigsby v. Kane, 250 F. Supp. 2d 453,

458 (M.D. Pa. 2003); see also Brown v. Camp Hill, 2015 WL 5675575, at *5 (M.D. Pa.

Sept. 25, 2015) (“A conspiracy claim requires more than mere speculation as to an

agreement. Plaintiff must provide specific allegations of combination, agreement, or

understanding among all or between any of the defendants to plot, plan or conspire

to carry out the challenged conduct.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

While Mitchell’s allegations arguably suggest coordinated conduct among

certain Defendants, they do not support a plausible inference of an actual agreement

to violate Mitchell’s constitutional rights. See Watson, 436 Fed. Appx. at 137;

13

Grigsby, 250 F. Supp. 2d at 458. The Court will therefore dismiss Mitchell’s

conspiracy claim without prejudice.

F. The Complaint fails to state a claim under the ADA.

Title II of the ADA prohibits a public entity from discriminating against

disabled individuals by denying them equal access to services, programs, or activities.

42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12132. “State prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition

of ‘public entity,’ which includes ‘any department, agency, special purpose district, or

other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” Pennsylvania Dep't

of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(B)).

To succeed on a Title II claim, the plaintiff “must demonstrate: (1) he is a

qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) [who] was excluded from participation

in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or

was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.”

Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178-79 (3d Cir. 2018); see also Williams v. Sec’y Pa.

Dep’t of Corr., 117 F.4th 503, 527 (3d Cir. 2024). When seeking compensatory

damages, the plaintiff must also demonstrate intentional discrimination under a

deliberate indifference standard. Durham uv. Kelley, 82 F.4th 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2023).

Mitchell alleges that he and Crawford were “mental health patients that are

taking medication for mental disorders and were restrained behind the door” when

OC spray was deployed into their cell. ECF No. 12, § 9. He further alleges that

Defendant Best authorized the use of OC spray despite Mitchell’s asthma and history

of a collapsed lung caused by prior gunshot wounds. I/d., | 10. These allegations fail

14

to support an ADA claim because they do not support a plausible inference that

Mitchell was excluded from participation in, denied the benefits of, or otherwise

discriminated against with respect to a prison service, program, or activity by reason

of a disability. These allegations simply repackage Mitchell’s Eighth Amendment

claims as an ADA claim. Claims concerning allegedly improper medical treatment,

excessive force, or unconstitutional conditions of confinement do not, without more,

establish discrimination under the ADA. See Iseley v. Beard, 200 Fed. Appx. 137, 142

(3d Cir. 2006) (noting that denial of medical treatment for disabilities “is not

encompassed by the ADA’s prohibitions”). The Complaint also fails to allege facts to

support a plausible inference that any Defendant acted “by reason of’ Mitchell’s

alleged disabilities. The Complaint does not identify any accommodation that

Mitchell requested and was denied, nor does it allege that Defendants treated him

differently because of a disability. The Court will therefore dismiss Mitchell’s ADA

claim without prejudice.

V. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will enter an Order granting in part and

denying in part Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss the Complaint. The motion

will be granted as to (1) all claims for monetary relief against Defendants in their

official capacities, (2) the failure-to-train claim against Defendants Irwin and

Wieland, (3) the First Amendment retaliation claim against all Defendants, (4) the

Fourteenth Amendment conspiracy claim against all Defendants, and (5) the ADA

claim. Mitchell’s official capacity claims will be dismissed with prejudice because any

15

attempt to amend as to these claims would be futile. All other dismissed claims will

be dismissed without prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint within

twenty (20) days to cure the deficiencies identified in this Memorandum Opinion. The

motion will be denied to the extent it seeks dismissal of Mitchell’s Eighth Amendment

deliberate indifference to medical needs claim against Defendant Best. Mitchell’s

Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Defendant Fiedor and the

John/Jane Doe Defendants is unaffected by this Memorandum Opinion.

DATED this 6th day of June 2026.

BY THE COURT:

—~7 zoey

RICHARD A. LANZILLO

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16