Opinion

Biton

Court
District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
Filed
May 20, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.0%

“[A] Rule 60(b) motion is not an appropriate vehicle to advance new arguments or supporting facts that were available but not raised at the time of the original argument.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[A] Rule 60(b) motion is not an appropriate vehicle to advance new arguments or supporting facts that were available but not raised at the time of the original argument.”
  • “Those who act through agents are customarily bound by their agents’ mistakes. It is no different when the agent is an attorney.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ETTI BITON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-23-968-SLP

)

JEFFREY JACKSON, )

)

Defendant. )

O R D E R

Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Regarding [sic]

Order to Show Cause and Renewed Request for Enforcement Relief [Doc. No. 156].

Plaintiff has also submitted a declaration in support of the Motion. See Dec. of Etti Biton

[Doc. No. 157]. The Court construes Plaintiff’s Motion as a request for relief, pursuant to

Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, from the Court’s Order [Doc. No. 155]

denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendant Should Not Be Held

in Civil Contempt [Doc. No. 153] (“Motion for Order to Show Cause”). For the reasons

that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion [Doc. No. 156] is DENIED.

I. Background

The Court has addressed the extensive factual and procedural background of this

matter in several of its prior Orders. See [Doc. Nos. 24, 33, and 155]. The Court

summarizes the relevant background as follows.

Plaintiff filed a Motion for Order Requiring Judgment Debtor to Appear and Answer

Concerning Property and Asserts and for Injunction Forbidding Transfer or other

Disposition of Property [Doc. No. 84] (Asset Hearing Motion) on June 16, 2025. Plaintiff

requested that the Court conduct a hearing on Defendant’s assets and that the Court should

enjoin the Defendant from “attempting to transfer, encumber, alienate or conceal property”

because “[p]ending a hearing on assets, there [was] a risk that Defendant [would] attempt”

to do such activities to frustrate creditors. See [Doc. No. 84] at 1-2. The Asset Hearing

Motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Amanda L. Maxfield, who entered an Order [Doc.

No. 94] (the Asset Hearing Order) on June 24, 2025, setting a judgment debtor exam and

requiring the Defendant to bring relevant financial documents that could assist in collection

of the money judgment. Asset Hearing Order [Doc. No. 94] at 1-2. The Asset Hearing

Order also stated, in relevant part, that Defendant was:

HEREBY ENJOINED FROM ALIENATING,

CONCEALING, ENCUMBERING, SELLING,

TRANSFERING, PAYING OUT, MORTGAGING OR IN

ANY WAY DISPOSING OF ANY MONEY OR

PROPERTTY [sic], EITHER REAL OR PERSONAL,

EXCEPT SUCH PROPERTY WHICH IS NECESSARY

FOR REASONABLE LIVING EXPENSES AND IN THE

ORDINARY COURSE OF BUSINESS, UNTIL

FURTHER ORDER OF THIS COURT.

Id. at 3 (All caps and boldface in original). The judgment debtor exam was held on June

27, 2025, before the Magistrate Judge. See Courtroom Minute Sheet [Doc. No. 97].

On July 24, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Application for Contempt [Doc. No. 104] on

the basis that Defendant failed to produce the relevant financial documents required by the

Asset Hearing Order. While the Application for Contempt was pending, the Parties advised

the Court on multiple instances as to the production of Defendant’s financial documents.

See [Doc. Nos. 114, 124, 130, 137]. The Court conducted a hearing on Plaintiff’s

Application for Contempt on December 12, 2025. See Courtroom Minute Sheet [Doc. No.

149] at 1. Both Plaintiff herself and her counsel appeared at the hearing. See id. At the

hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel advised the Court that all of Defendant’s financial documents

at issue that could be produced were produced by the Defendant. Id. at 1. Counsel for

Plaintiff was subsequently granted leave to withdraw at the hearing. Id. at 2.

Plaintiff, appearing pro se, filed the Motion for Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 153]

on December 23, 2025. Plaintiff asserted in the Motion for Order to Show Cause that

Defendant violated the Asset Hearing Order [Doc. No. 94] by making purchases beyond

such which are “necessary for reasonable living expenses.” See [Doc. No. 153] at 2-3. As

such, Plaintiff requested that the Court issue a Show Cause Order and direct Defendant to

submit payments to Plaintiff. See id. at 7.

On January 29, 2026, the Court issued an Order [Doc. No. 155] denying Plaintiff’s

Motion for Order to Show Cause. First, the Court found that Plaintiff’s Motion for Order

to Show Cause was impermissibly requesting the Court to assist in executing a money

judgment by finding Defendant in contempt. See Order [Doc. No. 155] at 5-6.

Furthermore, the Court found that the primary purpose of the Asset Hearing Order was

accomplished as a hearing on assets was conducted and the requested financial documents

were produced. See id. at 6-8.

II. Governing Law

Under Rule 60(b), the Court may relieve a party from an order or judgment due to,

inter alia, “fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or

misconduct by an opposing party” or for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 60(b)(3) and (6). “Relief under Rule 60(b) . . . is ‘extraordinary and may only be

granted in exceptional circumstances.” Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th

Cir. 1999) (citing Cashner v. Freedom Stores, Inc., 98 F.3d 572, 576 (10th Cir. 1996)).

“Grounds warranting a motion to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the

controlling law, (2) new evidence previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear

error or prevent manifest injustice.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012

(10th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff, despite appearing pro se, must “follow the same rules of

procedure that govern other litigants.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d

836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

III. Discussion

As an initial matter, Plaintiff raises numerous arguments that are unrelated to

reconsideration of the Court’s January 29, 2026, Order [Doc. No. 155]. Plaintiff’s Motion

for Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 153] related solely to purported violations of the Asset

Hearing Order [Doc. No. 94]. It is impermissible for Plaintiff to raise new arguments or

legal issues in the present Motion that were not addressed in her original Motion for Order

to Show Cause. See Lebahn v. Owens, 813 F.3d 1300, 1306 (10th Cir. 2016) (“[A] Rule

60(b) motion is not an appropriate vehicle to advance new arguments or supporting facts

that were available but not raised at the time of the original argument.”); Van Skiver, 952

F.2d at 1243 (“advancing new arguments or supporting facts which were otherwise

available for presentation” is not permissible for motion for reconsideration) (cleaned up

and citations omitted). The narrow purpose of a motion for reconsideration is to evaluate

grounds which warrant relief from the specific consequences of a particular order or

judgment of the Court. Many of the arguments presented by Plaintiff in her Motion relate

to alleged frustration of enforcement efforts, Defendant’s conduct in post-judgment

discovery, and interactions between Plaintiff and her former counsel. See Mot. [Doc. No.

156] at 4-13. Such arguments are not properly before the Court and do not relate to

reconsideration of the Court’s findings in its previous Order [Doc. No. 155]. Furthermore,

to the extent Plaintiff seeks enforcement relief under Rule 70 in the Motion, such requests

exceed the narrow function of a Rule 60(b) motion and is violative of the Court’s local

rules. See LCvR7.1(c) (“Each motion filed shall be separate document, except where

otherwise allowed by law, these rules, or court order.”).

The Court found in its prior Order that Plaintiff was impermissibly requesting the

Court to order Defendant to direct payments to Plaintiff by means of contempt. See Order

[Doc. No. 155] at 4-5. Plaintiff states in the present Motion that the purpose of her Motion

for Order to Show Cause [Doc. No. 153] was “to vindicate the Court’s authority against

Defendant’s affirmative acts of misconduct . . . .” See Mot. [Doc. No. 156] at 2. The Court

finds the proposition underdeveloped and not well taken. Plaintiff does not cite any

authority nor demonstrate how the requested relief in the Motion for Order to Show Cause

was not seeking execution on a money judgment. Plaintiff’s characterization of the Motion

for Order to Show Cause does not supplant the Court’s prior findings. The Court has now

noted on three separate occasions that “contempt is not the appropriate means of seeking

execution on a money judgment.” See Order [Doc. No. 155] at 5; [Doc. No. 33] at 3-5;

[Doc. No. 40] at 2. Additionally, Plaintiff’s request for different relief in the present

motion to reconsider does not cure the defects of the requested relief in her Motion for

Order to Show Cause.1 Plaintiff has not asserted any grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)

that warrant reconsideration of the Court’s findings and conclusions as to the nature of the

requested relief in her Motion for Order to Show Cause.

Next, the Court found in its prior Order [Doc. No. 155] that the purpose of the Asset

Hearing Order had been accomplished and cannot serve as a basis for a finding of contempt.

In the present Motion, Plaintiff asserts that additional documents had not been produced

by Defendant. Defendant’s production of documents was one of the several considerations

in the Court’s analysis. See Order [Doc. No. 155] at 6-7. Plaintiff does not demonstrate

how the alleged additional documents affect the Court’s overall conclusions that the

purpose of the Asset Hearing Order was accomplished and warrants reconsideration under

Rule 60(b). As the Court previously mentioned, Plaintiff requested the injunctive language

in the Asset Hearing Order to prevent Defendant from performing activities to frustrate

collection activities prior to the hearing on assets. See id. at 3, 6-7. A judgment debtor

exam was performed on June 27, 2025. See Courtroom Minute Sheet [Doc. No. 97]. In

addressing whether any documents relating to the hearing on assets needed to be produced,

counsel for Plaintiff represented at the Court’s December 12, 2025 hearing that all

requested financial documents that could be produced had been produced by the

Defendant.2 See Courtroom Minute Sheet [Doc. No. 149]. The representations made by

1 The Court finds that granting relief which differs from Plaintiff’s original Motion for Order to

Show Cause is impermissible under the narrow scope of a motion to reconsider. See, e.g.,

Lebahn, 813 F.3d at 1306.

2 While counsel for Plaintiff subsequently withdrew from their representation of Plaintiff, counsel

for Plaintiff were still agents of Plaintiff and deemed to have acted on her behalf until they were

counsel for Plaintiff cannot simply be undone after counsel’s subsequent withdrawal. See

Gripe v. City of Enid, Okla., 312 F.3d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Those who act through

agents are customarily bound by their agents’ mistakes. It is no different when the agent

is an attorney.”); Hernandez v. Michaud, 131 F.3d 151, at *2 (10th Cir. 1997) (table

decision) (“The actions of Plaintiff’s counsel are binding on Plaintiff because a party

authorizes counsel to act as its agent.”) (citations omitted); Mendez v. Brown, 12 Fed.

App’x. 784 at 787 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) (“Parties choose their counsel and

generally are bound by their acts.”). In addition, Plaintiff was present at the December

12, 2025 hearing and had the opportunity to clarify whether such statement was accurate.

While Plaintiff asserts in her Motion that she was not aware of the finality of her counsel’s

statements, “a party who simply misunderstands or fails to predict the legal consequences

of [her] deliberate actions cannot later, once the lesson is learned, turn back the clock to

undo those mistakes.” Yapp v. Excel Corp., 186 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 1999) (citations

omitted). Furthermore, Plaintiff’s argument as to this issue is underdeveloped, cites to no

authority, and does not demonstrate how her circumstances warrant relief under a particular

Rule 60(b) ground.3 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief from

the Court’s January 29, 2026 Order [Doc. No. 155].

given leave to withdraw. See LCvR 83.5 (“attorneys of record shall not withdraw from the case

except by leave of the judge to whom the case is assigned . . .”).

3 The request for Defendant to produce additional documents is outside the scope of Plaintiff’s

motion for reconsideration.

IV. Conclusion

Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of Order Regarding [sic] Order to Show

Cause and Renewed Request for Enforcement Relief [Doc. No. 156] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 20" day of May, 2026.

/ a

SCOTT L. PALK

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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