MARTE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION

RUBEN MARTE Sheriff, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 1:26-cv-00701-JPH-MJD

)

TODD ROKITA in his official capacity as )

Attorney General of Indiana, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER DENYING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

A new Indiana law that goes into effect July 1, 2026, will require state

governmental entities to comply with federal immigration detainer requests.

Before that law's passage, Monroe County, Indiana Sheriff Ruben Marté had

implemented a Monroe County Sheriff's Office ("MCSO") policy that, in part,

directed his officers "not to detain someone past their release date based solely

on a non-criminal or administrative ICE detainer request." Dkt. 1 at 11.

Sheriff Marté alleges that Indiana's new law violates the Fourth Amendment of

the United States Constitution and therefore asks the Court to enter a

preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the new law. Because the

Court appears to lack jurisdiction over this case under the political subdivision

doctrine, Sheriff Marté's motion is DENIED. Dkt. [8].

I.

Facts and Background

The parties have filed uncontested exhibits, so these facts are based on

that designated evidence and the undisputed facts alleged in the complaint.

See dkt. 1; dkt. 22; dkt. 28. Neither party has requested a hearing on the

motion for preliminary injunction. See dkt. 8; dkt. 9; dkt. 23; see Dexia Credit

Local v. Rogan, 602 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir. 2010) (A hearing is required only if

"one is called for as a result of a fact issue created by" the preliminary-

injunction filings.).

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") may issue

detainer requests for individuals it seeks to remove from the country. See 8

C.F.R. § 287.7(a). These detainer requests ask other agencies, including local

law enforcement, to hold individuals for up to 48 hours after they otherwise

would have been released so that ICE can take them into custody. Id. §

287.7(a), (d). The requests can be accompanied by a judicial or administrative

warrant, but that is not required under ICE regulations. See id.

Indiana Senate Enrolled Act 76 will impose new, state-law requirements

for compliance with ICE detainers when it takes effect on July 1, 2026:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), a governmental

body that has custody of an individual who is the subject

of an immigration detainer request shall:

(1) provide to the judge authorized to grant or deny the

individual's release on bail under IC 35-33-8-3.2

written notice that the individual is subject to an

immigration detainer request;

(2) record in the individual's case file that the

individual is subject to an immigration detainer

request;

(3) comply with all requests made in the immigration

detainer request; and

(4) inform the individual that the individual is being

held pursuant to an immigration detainer request

issued by an authorized immigration officer.

(b) An individual who is the subject of an immigration

detainer request may challenge the immigration detainer

request by claiming that:

(1) the individual has been misidentified and the

correct subject of the immigration detainer request is

not the individual; or

(2) the individual is a citizen of the United States and

is not subject to removal.

After an individual makes either of these claims, the

governmental body shall contact the authorized

immigration officer to determine whether the individual

has been misidentified or is a citizen of the United States.

(c) A governmental body or an employee of a

governmental body is not criminally or civilly liable for any

action taken in compliance with an immigration detainer

request under this section as long as the action does not

violate federal or state law.

SEA 76 § 8 (to be codified at Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2-9). SEA 76 defines

"immigration detainer request" as "a request issued by an authorized

immigration officer to a law enforcement agency to detain an individual

pursuant to 8 C.F.R. 287.7 or any successor provision or other applicable

federal authority." Id. § 3 (to be codified at Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2-1.7).

Monroe County, Indiana Sheriff Ruben Marté challenges subsection

(a)(3), which requires compliance "with all requests made in the immigration

detainer request." See id.; dkt. 1 at 14. Sheriff Marté is responsible for making

policy decisions for his officers about immigration detainers. Dkt. 1 at 1–2. He

therefore adopted policy MCSO-12 to govern how officers handle interactions

with noncitizens and with ICE. Id. at 1–2, 11. The current policy allows

officers to assist federal immigration enforcement in several ways, including

informing federal officers of detainees' upcoming hearings and release dates.

See dkt. 9 at 13.

Sheriff Marté's policy in MCSO-12 also directs officers not to detain

anyone based solely on a detainer request that is not accompanied by a judicial

warrant. Id. The policy therefore conflicts with SEA 76's required compliance

with immigration detainer requests. Violations of SEA 76 are punishable by "a

civil penalty of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for each knowing

or intentional violation." SEA 76 § 6 (codified at Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2-5(b)).

Sheriff Marté brought this case against Indiana Attorney General Todd

Rokita alleging that complying with SEA 76 would require the Sheriff's Office to

violate the Fourth Amendment by keeping individuals in custody based solely

on an ICE detainer request that is unaccompanied by a judicial arrest warrant.

Dkt. 1 at 1–2, 13. He seeks a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 65 prohibiting the enforcement of SEA 76 "as applied to ICE

detainer requests unaccompanied by a judicial warrant." Id. at 14.

II.

Preliminary Injunction Standard

Injunctive relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 is "an exercise

of very far-reaching power, never to be indulged in except in a case clearly

demanding it." Cassell v. Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021). To

obtain such extraordinary relief, the party seeking the preliminary injunction

carries the burden of persuasion by a clear showing. See id.; Mazurek v.

Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997).

Determining whether a plaintiff "is entitled to a preliminary injunction

involves a multi-step inquiry." Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, Local 365 v. City of E.

Chi., 56 F.4th 437, 446 (7th Cir. 2022). "As a threshold matter, a party seeking

a preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) some likelihood of succeeding

on the merits, and (2) that it has no adequate remedy at law and will suffer

irreparable harm if preliminary relief is denied." Id. "If these threshold factors

are met, the court proceeds to a balancing phase, where it must then consider:

(3) the irreparable harm the non-moving party will suffer if preliminary relief is

granted, balancing that harm against the irreparable harm to the moving party

if relief is denied; and (4) the public interest, meaning the consequences of

granting or denying the injunction to non-parties." Cassell, 990 F.3d at 545.

This "involves a 'sliding scale' approach: the more likely the plaintiff is to win

on the merits, the less the balance of harms needs to weigh in his favor, and

vice versa." Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020). "In the final

analysis, the district court equitably weighs these factors together, seeking at

all times to minimize the costs of being mistaken." Cassell, 990 F.3d at 545.

III.

Analysis

The parties dispute both the merits of injunctive relief and the Court's

jurisdiction over this case. See dkt. 23; dkt. 29. "A district court . . . can

address a motion for a preliminary injunction without making a conclusive

decision about whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction." Simic v. City of

Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017). But "issues of subject matter

jurisdiction are always on the table in federal courts," including in preliminary-

injunction proceedings. Id. Accordingly, if the Court lacks jurisdiction over

this case, Sheriff Marté's motion for preliminary injunction should be denied on

that basis. Id. at 738–39; Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen, 968 F.3d 628, 638–39,

647 (7th Cir. 2020).

The Attorney General argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this

case because the political subdivision doctrine prevents federal courts from

resolving claims between a state and a subdivision of that state. Dkt. 23 at 18–

24.1 Sheriff Marté responds that Supreme Court precedent "explicitly allows

public officials to challenge an unconstitutional state law" and that the sheriff's

office is not a political subdivision of the state. Dkt. 29 at 9.

A political subdivision is "created by a state for the better ordering of

government." Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933). So,

under the political subdivision doctrine, "as far as the national government is

concerned, a state and all of its creatures is a unit." City of S. Bend v. S. Bend

Common Council, 865 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 2017). One "part of a single

government" therefore cannot generally sue another part in federal court. Id.

(holding that the suit by South Bend's executive branch against its legislative

branch was not justiciable); State of Ill. v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 476

1 The Attorney General also argues that the Court lacks jurisdiction because Sheriff

Marté has no cognizable, redressable injury and therefore lacks standing. Dkt. 23 at

20–24. Because the political subdivision doctrine is jurisdictional, see City of S. Bend

v. S. Bend Common Council, 865 F.3d 889, 892 (7th Cir. 2017), and resolves Sheriff

Marté's motion for preliminary injunction, the Court does not address that standing

argument.

(7th Cir. 1998) ("Relieving the state of a self-inflicted wound would be a novel

mission for a federal court."). This is consistent with "the long-recognized

general principle that no person may sue himself," because "courts only

adjudicate justiciable controversies." United States v. Interstate Commerce

Com'n, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949).

The Attorney General argues that here "the State is effectively the party

on both sides" because Sheriff Marté "necessarily sues in [his official] capacity."

Dkt. 23 at 19. Sheriff Marté does not argue otherwise, though he cites

potential individual liability in separate actions to show that he has a "personal

stake in the outcome of this litigation." Dkt. 29 at 7 n.1. Sheriff Marté's filings

unequivocally demonstrate that he brings this case in his official capacity as

Sheriff of Monroe County. Dkt. 1 at 1–2; dkt. 29 at 7 (arguing that "[o]fficials

have standing to raise constitutional claims in their official capacity"). Sheriff

Marté's complaint, for example, is based on SEA 76's effects on MCSO's official

policies and procedures and his official orders to his deputies. Dkt. 1 at 1–2;

see dkt. 8 at 1–3. Sheriff Marté also recognizes that any civil liability "would be

borne by the Sheriff's Office." Dkt. 9 at 35; see dkt. 8 at 2. And the relief he

seeks is an injunction against enforcing SEA 76 "as applied to" official policy

"MCSO-012." Dkt. 1 at 14; see Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 494 (7th Cir.

2000) (a suit should be treated as official capacity when the complaint uses the

person's official title and involves "an official policy or custom"). This all fits

with SEA 76 itself, which imposes obligations on "a governmental body"—as the

institution "that has custody of an individual who is the subject of an

immigration detainer request"—rather than on employees or officials in their

individual capacities. SEA 76 § 8 (to be codified at Ind. Code § 5-2-18.2-9(a));

see Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (explaining that a suit is in

an official capacity when "the real party in interest is the entity").

Sheriff Marté also sues Attorney General Rokita "in his official capacity

as Attorney General of Indiana," as the state official empowered to enforce SEA

76. Dkt. 1 at 1–2. "[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity

is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office"

and therefore "is no different from a suit against the State itself." Will v. Mich.

Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). So, this case involves an Indiana

county sheriff's office suing the State of Indiana. Federal courts ordinarily lack

jurisdiction over such a case under the political subdivision doctrine. See City

of S. Bend, 865 F.3d at 892; see also Tr. of Ind. Univ. v. Curry, 918 F.3d 537,

539 (7th Cir. 2019).

Sheriff Marté nevertheless argues that the political subdivision doctrine

does not apply because a county sheriff's office is a constitutional office rather

than a subdivision of the state. Dkt. 29 at 9–10. But his office remains a

creation of the State of Indiana, even if the office is a constitutional one. See

Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass'n, 555 U.S. 353, 363 (2009) ("[A] political

subdivision, created by a state for the better ordering of government, has no

privileges or immunities under the Federal Constitution which it may invoke in

opposition to the will of its creator."). And the Seventh Circuit has applied the

political subdivision doctrine to subdivisions created by a state constitution

when they remain controlled by the state. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Reg.

Transp. Auth., 653 F.2d 1149, 1152–53 (7th Cir. 1981). In this way, under

Indiana law, sheriffs' offices are like counties, which are similarly recognized in

Indiana's Constitution, e.g. Ind. Const. Art. 4 § 22; Art. 6 §§ 2, 6, 9; Art. 15 § 7,

and are undisputedly political subdivisions, State v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Marion

Cnty., 85 N.E. 513, 517 (Ind. 1908) ("A county is an involuntary corporation,

organized as a political subdivision of the state."); Dept. of Pub. Welfare of Allen

Cnty. v. Potthoff, 44 N.E.2d 494, 497 (Ind. 1942).

Moreover, the Indiana Constitution does not grant sheriffs' offices powers

independent of the state. Ind. Const. Art. 6 § 2; see City of Trenton v. State of

New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) ("In the absence of state constitutional

provisions safeguarding it to them, municipalities have no inherent right of

self-government which is beyond the legislative control of the state."). Instead,

the Indiana Constitution provides only that there "shall be elected, in each

county by the voters thereof, . . . [a] Sheriff." Ind. Const. Art. 6 § 2. "[T]he

powers and duties" of the sheriff's office are then "established by the [Indiana]

Legislature." Delk v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Delaware Cnty., 503 N.E.2d 436, 440

(Ind. Ct. App. 1987); see Ind. Code § 36-2-13-5.

An Indiana sheriff's office, like the county it serves, is therefore controlled

"by the Legislature, the sovereign power, solely for governmental purposes."

Bd. of Comm'rs of Marion Cnty., 85 N.E. at 517; see Vill. of Arlington Heights,

653 F.2d at 1152–53. That legislative control means that Sheriff Marté

"exercise[s] the powers delegated by the state and act[s] for the state." Bd. of

Comm'rs of Marion Cnty., 85 N.E. at 517; see Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 362. Even if

those delegated powers include some independence and discretion, the

legislature's delegated authority can be removed, so it does not make a county

sheriff's office any less a political subdivision or arm of the state. Bd. of

Comm'rs of Marion Cnty., 85 N.E. at 518 ("If such powers are delegated by the

Legislature, and not by the Constitution, the Legislature may enlarge,

diminish, or withdraw the same, in the absence of a constitutional

restriction."); Potthoff, 44 N.E.2d at 497 (explaining that political subdivisions

act "pursuant to statutory authority" that "the state may withdraw"). At

bottom, "[h]owever great or small" the MCSO's "sphere of action, it remains the

creature of the state exercising and holding powers and privileges subject to

the sovereign will." City of Trenton, 262 U.S. at 537.

Under these authorities, SEA 76, as applied to Sheriff Marté, is the State

of Indiana dictating how its own subdivisions must respond to ICE detainer

requests. See id.; Bd. of Comm'rs of Marion Cnty., 85 N.E. at 517. That makes

this case an "intramural dispute" not justiciable in federal court under the

political subdivision doctrine. City of S. Bend, 865 F.3d at 892.2 Sheriff Marté

2 Several circuits recognize an exception to this doctrine under the Supremacy Clause

that allows a political subdivision to challenge a state statute that conflicts with

federal law. E.g., Tweed–New Haven Airport Auth. v. Tong, 930 F.3d 65, 72–73 (2d Cir.

2019); Branson Sch. Dist. RE-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 629 (10th Cir. 1998); Rogers

v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1068 (5th Cir. 1979); but see Burbank–Glendale–

Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a

Supremacy Clause exception). But Sheriff Marté does not invoke this exception or the

"structural protections of the Supremacy Clause." Romer, 161 F.3d at 629; see dkt. 1.

Nor has the Seventh Circuit adopted a Supremacy Clause exception, though it may

have implicitly exercised jurisdiction under such an exception. See McHenry Cnty. v.

Raoul, 44 F.4th 581 (7th Cir. 2022) (deciding Supremacy Clause preemption issues in

an appeal from an Illinois county against the Illinois Attorney General). Regardless, it

seeks an exception to the doctrine under a footnote to a 1968 Supreme Court

opinion finding that school board members had standing to sue to prevent

their removal from office. Dkt. 29 at 9 (relying on Bd. of Ed. of Cent. Sch. Dist.

No. 1. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241 n.5 (1968)). But Allen does not address—

much less provide an exception to—the political subdivision doctrine. 392 U.S.

at 241 n.5; see City of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251, 1263 (10th Cir. 2011)

(addressing Allen and holding that the case must be dismissed for lack of

jurisdiction, explaining that "we have not found . . . a single case where a court

of appeals or the Supreme Court has expressly allowed to proceed a claim by a

municipality against its parent state premised on a substantive provision of the

Constitution"); see also Donelon v. Louisiana Div. of Admin. Law, 522 F.3d 564,

567 nn.5–6 (5th Cir. 2008).

The lack of federal jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that there is no

forum where the parties may adjudicate their dispute. "State courts may have

authority to resolve [this] intramural dispute, but otherwise it must be worked

out the same way Congress and the President resolve their differences: by

politics." City of S. Bend, 865 F.3d at 892. Indeed, the State of Indiana has

appears that this case could not proceed even under such an exception. See Kerr v.

Polis, 20 F.4th 686, 696 (10th Cir. 2021) (en banc) (If "the political subdivision's cause

of action rests on a substantive constitutional provision" it "cannot proceed."); see City

of Hugo v. Nichols, 656 F.3d 1251, 1263 (10th Cir. 2011) (A political subdivision can

bring claims "based on a federal statutory enactment affording it federal rights," but

not claims based on constitutional provisions granting individual rights); Sharritt v.

Henry, No. 1:23-cv-15838, 2026 WL 795868 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 20, 2026) (explaining

that the Seventh Circuit has not recognized any Supremacy Clause exception, and

even if it did it "would be limited to federal statutes that specifically provide rights to"

subdivisions). At the least, Sheriff Marté has not provided any argument under a

potential Supremacy Clause exception, so he has not shown that this is "a case clearly

demanding" preliminary injunctive relief. Cassel, 990 F.3d at 544.

brought an enforcement action in Indiana state court against Sheriff Marté,

Indiana ex rel. Rokita v. Marté, No. 53C06-2407-PL-001733 (Monroe Cir. Ct.).

Moreover, federal court intervention to resolve this dispute between the State of

Indiana and one of its constituent parts "would reflect a lack of respect for the

state's ability to resolve these issues properly before its courts." J.B. v.

Woodard, 997 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2021).

As Sheriff Marté recognizes, the political subdivision doctrine would not

prevent detainees from challenging the constitutionality of their detention

pursuant to an ICE detainer request. Dkt. 9 at 8, 17; dkt. 30 at 16–17. It only

prevents a federal court from adjudicating the dispute between a state and its

subdivision regarding how ICE detainers are to be handled. See Director, Off. of

Workers' Comp. Programs v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514

U.S. 122, 132–33 (1995) (explaining that it would be "inappropriate" for a

federal court to determine "intrabranch and intraagency policy disputes"). If

Indiana wants to fine its own political subdivision for not complying with an

ICE detainer request under its understanding of the Fourth Amendment, that

is for the State of Indiana to work out. See City of S. Bend, 865 F.3d at 892;

State of Ill., 137 F.3d at 476 ("Relieving the state of a self-inflicted wound would

be a novel mission for a federal court.").

Since it appears that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case, Sheriff

Marté is not entitled to preliminary injunctive relief in federal court. Simic, 851

F.3d at 738.

IV.

Conclusion

Sheriff Marté's motion for preliminary injunction is DENIED. Dkt. [8].

SO ORDERED.

Date: 6/18/2026 and Pat tanbone

James Patrick Hanlon

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

All electronically registered counsel

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