Hanchey

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT PIERCE DIVISION

CASE NO. 25-14334-CIV-MARTINEZ/MAYNARD

DAWSON HANCHEY,

Plaintiff,

v.

BLEW BAYOU SERVICES, LLC,

Defendant.

___________________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

THIS CAUSE is before me upon Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Entry of Final Default

Judgment (“Motion”). DE 15. No response in opposition has been filed. U.S. District Judge Jose

E. Martinez has referred this Motion to me for appropriate disposition. DE 17. Having reviewed

the Motion, the record, and the governing law, I respectfully RECOMMEND that (1) the Motion

be DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, (2) the Clerk’s default be VACATED, (3) Plaintiff’s

Complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, and (4) Plaintiff be required to file and

serve an amended complaint before seeking default judgment.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action on September 11, 2025, asserting four claims against Defendant:

disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)

(Counts I and II), and parallel claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act (“FCRA”) (Counts III and

IV). DE 1.

The Complaint alleges that venue is proper in this District because the events giving rise

to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Martin County, Florida. Id. ¶ 3. In the section identifying the

parties, Plaintiff states that he “is a resident of Wauchula County, Florida, and he worked in Hardee

County.” Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “operates a store in Stuart, in Martin

County, Florida.” Id. ¶¶ 4-5. No further details about the parties are provided in this section.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff began working for Defendant as an apprentice

lineman on September 5, 2023. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges he is a qualified individual with a

disability based on multiple medical conditions, including rhinovirus, pneumonia, RSV,1 Still’s

disease, and myocarditis. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.

Plaintiff alleges that on November 1, 2023, which was approximately two months into his

employment, he was working “for Defendant in Georgia” when he informed his supervisor that he

was feeling ill. Id. ¶ 15. He sought medical care at a hospital on November 3, 2023, and was

diagnosed on November 8, 2023, with rhinovirus, pneumonia, and RSV. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. He later

received additional diagnoses of Still’s disease and myocarditis. Id. ¶ 18.

On November 9, 2023, Plaintiff allegedly informed Defendant’s owner that he was

hospitalized due to a heart condition. Id. ¶ 19. On November 11, 2023, the owner texted Plaintiff

requesting a status update; Plaintiff reported that he remained hospitalized, and the owner

encouraged Plaintiff to feel better. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. The Complaint then summarily alleges that

“Plaintiff required and requested a reasonable accommodation of a medical leave of absence.” Id.

1 The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff suffers from “RSV” but does not define the acronym or otherwise clarify the

condition. Based on the context provided, I assume Plaintiff is referring to respiratory syncytial virus.

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¶ 22. The pleading does not specify when this request was made, to whom it was directed, or its

scope or duration.

Plaintiff alleges he remained on medical leave until March 13, 2024, when he received

medical clearance. Id. ¶ 23. During his leave, Plaintiff’s brother-in-law, who was also employed

by Defendant, allegedly provided periodic updates to Plaintiff’s foreman. Id. ¶ 24.

Plaintiff alleges that on March 13, 2024, he texted his foreman a photograph of his medical

clearance and advised that he could return to work the following Monday. Id. ¶¶ 26-27. According

to Plaintiff, later that same day, the foreman called and terminated his employment, stating that

Plaintiff was “too much of a ‘liability’ for Defendant.” Id. ¶ 29.

On November 12, 2025, the Clerk entered default against Defendant for failure to appear

or otherwise respond. DE 6. On November 14, 2025, the case was administratively closed with

instructions for Defendant to respond or, failing that, for Plaintiff to “file a motion for final default

judgment that includes affidavits of the amounts due by Defendant, if necessary, and any other

supporting documentation necessary to determine the measure of damages and/or conclude this

action.” DE 7, reiterated in DE 10.

Plaintiff has since filed three motions for default judgment. DE 11, DE 13, DE 15. Judge

Martinez denied the first two motions without prejudice based upon procedural deficiencies,

including the absence of a legally sufficient proposed order and supporting legal analysis. DE 12,

DE 14. In his most recent order, Judge Martinez emphasized that that Plaintiff’s proposed order

failed to articulate the governing legal standards or provide meaningful analysis, noting that it

improperly “rubber stamps the requested relief with no analysis.” DE 14 at 2.

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The present Motion is Plaintiff’s third attempt. The Motion references two attached

exhibits, DE 15 at 10, 12, 14, yet none are included. I assume for present purposes that Plaintiff

intends to rely on two affidavits attached to his initial motion for default judgment.2 The first is

Plaintiff’s own affidavit, which largely restates the Complaint’s allegations. DE 11-1. Plaintiff

also submits his counsel’s affidavit regarding attorney’s fees, although the fee figures vary across

submissions: $10,085 in counsel’s affidavit, DE 11-2 at 3; $10,709 in Plaintiff’s affidavit, DE 11-

1 at 5; and $10,000 requested in the Motion, DE 15 at 12, 14. Apart from these affidavits, Plaintiff

submits no corroborating documentation, such as medical records, medical clearance

documentation, or evidence of any request for accommodation. To date, Defendant has not

appeared or responded.

LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 55 establishes a two-step process for entry of default judgment. First, when a

defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend, the clerk of court may enter a clerk’s default. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after entry of default, the Court may enter default judgment against the

defendant under Rule 55(b), provided the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 55(b).

A default, however, does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of right. Because

cases should ordinarily be resolved on their merits, “default judgments are generally disfavored.”

Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing In re Worldwide

Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003)). A default judgment may be entered only

2 Although I have considered these affidavits for present purposes, I note that it is not the Court’s role to sift through

the record in search of evidentiary support for a party’s motion. Plaintiff is cautioned that future filings must include

all referenced exhibits or properly incorporate them by reference with pinpoint accuracy.

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where the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint establish a sufficient legal basis for liability.

Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245 (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200,

1206 (5th Cir. 1975)). A defaulting defendant is deemed to admit well-pleaded factual allegations,

but not legal conclusions or allegations that are not well-pleaded. Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins.

Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206). “[A] default

judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor

Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n.41 (11th Cir. 1997). “Conceptually, then, a motion for default

judgment is like a reverse motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1245.

Accordingly, courts must assess the sufficiency of the complaint before entering a default

judgment. See U.S. v. Kahn, 164 F. App’x 855, 858 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d

at 1206). While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must allege more

than labels, conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of elements. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

Finally, if liability is established, the Court must then evaluate damages. “A default

judgment must not differ in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.”

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating entitlement to recover

the amount of damages sought in the motion for default judgment. Wallace v. The Kiwi Grp., Inc.,

247 F.R.D. 679, 681 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Damages must be supported by competent evidence, and

the Court must independently determine the appropriate amount. Id. (citation omitted); Anheuser

Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003); see Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement

Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that damages may

be awarded on default judgment only if the record adequately reflects a basis for an award of

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damages). Ordinarily, unless a plaintiff’s claim against a defaulting defendant is for a liquidated

sum or one capable of mathematical calculation, the law requires the district court to hold an

evidentiary hearing to fix the amount of damages. See Adolph Coors, 777 F.2d at 1543-44.

However, no hearing is needed “when the district court already has a wealth of evidence from the

party requesting the hearing, such that any additional evidence would be truly unnecessary to a

fully informed determination of damages.” See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.13 (11th

Cir. 2005).

DISCUSSION

Before addressing damages, I must first determine if the Complaint’s allegations establish

liability. They do not. The Motion is undermined at the outset by substantive and procedural

deficiencies that go to the sufficiency of the Complaint itself, not merely the evidence. Against

that backdrop, below I will address (1) material inconsistencies in the Complaint, (2) liability, (3)

damages, and (4) the appropriate path forward.

1. Material Inconsistencies in the Complaint

As a threshold matter, the Complaint contains glaring inconsistencies regarding location

and key facts. Plaintiff alleges he resides in “Wauchula County, Florida,” and worked in Hardee

County, DE 1 ¶ 4, even though Wauchula is not a county, but is a city located within Hardee

County. See Wauchula Main Website, available at https://www.cityofwauchula.gov/ (last accessed

Apr. 15, 2026). He further alleges that Defendant “operates a store” in Stuart, Martin County,

Florida, and that venue is proper based on events occurring there. Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. But he later alleges

that he was working in Georgia for Defendant as an “apprentice lineman” when he first became

ill. Id. ¶¶ 11, 15. Beyond these bare assertions, the Complaint provides no allegations regarding

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the nature of Defendant’s business, Plaintiff’s duties as an employee, or what happened in Stuart,

Florida that would cause venue to be appropriately located in this court. This lack of clarity

obscures key information about where the operative events occurred and the employment

relationship at issue. It also undermines the basis for venue and the asserted Florida statutory

claims.

2. Liability

a. Disability Discrimination Under the ADA/FCRA (Counts I and III)

As currently pled, Plaintiff’s disability-discrimination claims fail as a matter of law. The

ADA prohibits employers from discriminating against a qualified individual employee because of

disability. Surtain, 879 F.3d at 1246 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)). To state a disability

discrimination claim under the ADA and FCRA, Plaintiff must allege facts showing that he (1) has

a disability; (2) was a qualified individual for the position in question; and (3) his employer

discriminated against him because of his disability. Akridge v. Alfa Ins. Cos., 93 F.4th 1181, 1191

(11th Cir. 2024) (citing Beasley v. O’Reilly Auto Parts, 69 F.4th 744, 754 (11th Cir. 2023)); Holly

v. Clairson Indus., LLC, 492 F.3d 1247, 1255 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that courts evaluate FCRA

claims under the same framework as ADA claims). The ADA defines a “qualified individual” as

“an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

The ADA regulations define “essential functions” as “the fundamental job duties of the

employment position.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1). Whether a plaintiff can perform the essential

functions of a position with or without reasonable accommodation requires a “fact-intensive

inquiry.” Hardin v. Oakley Transp., Inc., 2025 WL 948313, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2025).

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Plaintiff’s disability-discrimination allegations are largely conclusory and merely trace the

statutory definitions of disability. For instance, he asserts he is a “qualified individual,” but fails

to provide factual support regarding job duties or functional limitations. DE 1 ¶ 13. He alleges

multiple medical conditions but provides no facts to link those conditions to an inability or ability

to perform essential job functions with or without accommodation.

The Complaint also fails to plausibly allege that Defendant discriminated against Plaintiff

“because of” his disability. The allegation that Plaintiff “required and requested” a reasonable

accommodation—a medical leave of absence—is unsupported by factual detail. The Complaint

does not identify when the request was made, to whom it was directed, the scope or duration of

the requested accommodation, or whether any denial occurred. Nor do the allegations plausibly

support a causal connection between disability and termination beyond the conclusory assertion

that Plaintiff was deemed a “liability.” This is insufficient.

b. Retaliation Under the ADA/FCRA (Counts II and IV)

Plaintiff’s retaliation claims, as currently pled, likewise fail as a matter of law. The ADA

prohibits employers from taking adverse action against individuals because they challenge conduct

prohibited by the ADA or because they file a complaint under it. Frazier-White v. Gee, 818 F.3d

1249, 1255 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)). To state a retaliation claim, Plaintiff

must allege that (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an adverse

employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the

adverse action. Id. ADA and FCRA retaliation claims are analyzed under the same framework.

See Monroe v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 793 F. App’x 924, 928 (11th Cir. 2019) (citing Frazier-White,

818 F.3d at 1258).

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While a request for accommodation may constitute protected activity, it must be grounded

in a good-faith, objectively reasonable belief of entitlement. Meyer v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Health

& Hum. Servs., 592 F. App’x 786, 792 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc.,

161 F.3d 1318, 1328 (11th Cir. 1998)). A request for leave “might be a reasonable accommodation

in some cases,” so long as the leave request is not for an indefinite leave. See Wood v. Green, 323

F.3d 1309, 1314 (11th Cir. 2003); Santandreu v. Miami Dade County, 513 Fed. App’x 902, 905

(11th Cir. 2013). Additionally, a plaintiff must show that the decisionmaker was aware of the

protected activity, because “[a] decision maker cannot have been motivated to retaliate by

something unknown to him.” Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791, 799 (11th

Cir. 2000).

Here, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to plausibly establish protected activity or causation. First,

Plaintiff summarily asserts that he “required and requested” a medical leave of absence at some

unspecified time as an accommodation. DE 1 ¶ 22. However, he does not identify the timing,

content, or recipient of the alleged accommodation request. No documents are attached to the

Complaint or Plaintiff’s affidavit to support the existence or content of any such request. Second,

Plaintiff fails to clearly connect any decisionmaker to knowledge of the request. Plaintiff describes

a shifting series of communications involving multiple individuals: first to a supervisor, then to

the owner, and later to a foreman, with some of these latter communications relayed through his

third party brother-in-law. DE 1 ¶¶ 15, 19-20, 24, 26-29. These allegations do not support a

plausible inference that any decisionmaker acted with retaliatory intent.

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The allegations overall are insufficient to establish liability for disability discrimination or

retaliation under the ADA or FCRA. The deficiencies go to the core elements of each claim and

preclude a finding of liability as to all counts asserted in the Complaint.

3. Damages

Even assuming liability, Plaintiff has not established a competent evidentiary basis for

damages.

Plaintiff’s back pay calculations are internally inconsistent and unsupported, including

discrepancies in the relevant time period and math errors. In his Motion, Plaintiff asserts that he

earned $24 per hour for approximately 45 hours per week ($24 x 45 = $1,080), plus $12 per hour

for five overtime hours per week ($12 x 5 = $60), and $150 in daily per diem for five days ($150

x 5 = $750), for a claimed weekly total of $1,890 ($1,080 + $60 + $750 = $1,890). DE 15 at 9.

The Motion estimates 16 weeks of total backpay damages “amounting to the following: $1,890.00

x 16 weeks = $20,240.00.” Id. Plaintiff’s affidavit attached to a prior motion includes these same

calculations. DE 11-1 at 4.3

On closer review, Plaintiff’s calculations are largely unsupported and flawed. As an initial

matter, other than his affidavit, Plaintiff provides no documentation supporting his claimed wages,

overtime, or per diem. More importantly, his submissions contain inconsistent calculations. In

his affidavit and Motion, Plaintiff asserts a back pay period of “roughly 16 weeks” from “around

March 13, 2024 until September 2024.” Id.; see also DE 15 at 9. However, the alleged time span

from March 13, 2024 through September 1, 2024, is approximately 24 weeks. Additionally,

3 As I previously noted, the Motion refers to exhibits that are not attached and appears to rely on prior filings. The

Court should not have to assemble a record from prior motions. Plaintiff’s counsel shall ensure that any future

submissions are complete and self-contained.

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$1,890 multiplied by 16 weeks equals $30,240—not $20,240 as stated. These discrepancies

prevent any determination of back pay with reasonable certainty.

Plaintiff’s claim for $50,000 in emotional distress is similarly deficient. This claim rests

on four brief, conclusory statements in his affidavit. DE 11-1 at 4-5. Although a plaintiff’s own

testimony may, in some circumstances, support an award of compensatory damages for emotional

distress, such damages must nonetheless “be proven by competent, sufficient evidence” that

demonstrates articulable harm. Garcia v. Unit Dose Servs., LLC, 2023 WL 6962827, at *4 (S.D.

Fla. Oct. 2, 2023) report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 6958658 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 20,

2023) (citing Akouri v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338, 1344-45 (11th Cir. 2005)).

Notably, Plaintiff’s cited case of Garcia ultimately underscores the requirement he fails to

satisfy here. Unlike the Title VII plaintiff in Garcia who described her experiences at work based

on a supervisor’s sexual advances and harassment, Plaintiff offers only brief, generalized

statements in his affidavit, with no corroboration or factual detail to tie the alleged disability-based

discrimination to his alleged emotional distress. This stands in contrast to cases where courts have

awarded such damages based on more developed evidence describing the plaintiff’s experiences

and their tangible effects. See, e.g., Fountain v. Chime Sols., Inc., 2023 WL 12166515, at *10

(N.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 12166500 (N.D. Ga.

Nov. 21, 2023) (awarding $50,000 in compensatory damages to a plaintiff based on her testimony

at an evidentiary hearing that her employer’s conduct in not reasonably accommodating her

disability by allowing her to work remotely, and terminating her based on her disabilities and her

protected activity, caused her significant stress and mental distress). Accordingly, on the present

record, Plaintiff has not adequately demonstrated entitlement to emotional distress damages.

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Should Plaintiff continue to pursue such relief, he must provide more detailed evidentiary support

or be prepared to substantiate his claims at an evidentiary hearing.

Lastly, Plaintiff’s request for attorney’s fees is inconsistent across filings. The Motion

seeks $10,000 in attorney’s fees and $624 in costs. DE 15 at 13-14. In support, counsel provides

an affidavit with a differing lodestar calculation of $10,085. DE 11-2 at 3. Although the Motion

acknowledges the $10,085 and indicates that this amount was reduced to $10,000, DE 15 at 14,

Plaintiff’s affidavit reflects a differing combined request of $10,709 for fees and costs, DE 11-1 at

5. These variations, even if relatively minor, create internal inconsistencies that render the request

unclear and unsupported. On this record, there is no reliable basis to award attorneys’ fees and

costs as requested.

4. Appropriate Outcome

Given the above defects, I conclude that the Motion should be denied. The deficiencies

are fundamentally pleading-based and cannot be cured through a fourth motion for default

judgment or additional evidence. See Nelson v. Atlas Apartment Homes, LLC, 2020 WL

10456792, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2020) (in the default judgment context, a party “may not rely

on (nor may the Court consider) other evidence or argument outside the complaint and attachments

thereto in determining whether the plaintiff has adequately stated a claim for which relief may be

granted”); CHCC Co. LLC v. Pilgrim Pipeline Holdings, LLC, 2017 WL 4216464, at *5 (M.D.

Fla. Sept. 22, 2017) (“Plaintiff cannot cure a deficiency in its Complaint through its Motion for

Default Judgment.”). The existing Clerk’s default and the present default judgment proceedings

rest on a Complaint that does not state a plausible claim. Under these circumstances, maintaining

the default does not serve the interests of orderly procedure. At the same time, a sua sponte

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dismissal for failure to state a claim without notice and an opportunity to amend would be improper

where amendment may not be futile. See Surtain, 789 F.3d at 1248 (11th Cir. 2015) (a district

court abuses its discretion when it dismisses an action sua sponte without providing the plaintiff

with notice of its intent to dismiss or an opportunity to respond unless amendment would be futile

or the complaint is patently frivolous).

Accordingly, the appropriate course is to deny the Motion without prejudice, vacate the

Clerk’s default, dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice, and permit Plaintiff the

opportunity to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies before any renewed request for

default judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully RECOMMEND that:

1. Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Final Default Judgment, DE 15, be DENIED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

2. The Clerk’s Default entered on November 12, 2025, DE 6, be VACATED;

3. Plaintiff’s Complaint, DE 1, be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;

4. Plaintiff be directed to file and properly serve an amended complaint within a

specified time that cures the deficiencies identified in this Report; and

5. Plaintiff be permitted to renew any motion for default judgment only after curing

pleading deficiencies and satisfying procedural requirements.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

The parties shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of being served with a copy of this

Report and Recommendation within which to file written objections, if any, with presiding U.S.

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District Judge Jose E. Martinez. Failure to timely file objections shall bar the parties from a de

novo determination by the District Judge of an issue covered in the Report and Recommendation

and shall bar the parties from attacking on appeal unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions

contained in this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140, 149 (1985); Henley v. Johnson, 885 F.2d 790, 794 (11th Cir. 1989); 11th Cir. R. 3-1

(2016). Conversely, if a party does not intend to object to this Report and Recommendation,

then that party shall file a Notice of such within five (5) days of the date of this Report and

Recommendation.

DONE AND RECOMMENDED in Chambers at Fort Pierce, Florida, this 17th day of

April, 2026.

Seow Nanpold

SHANIEK MILLS MAYNA

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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