IDOC

FOINR T THHEE U SNOIUTTEHD ESRTNA TDEISST DRIISCTTR IOCFT I CLOLIUNROTI S

CORDERO WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 26-cv-00035-SPM

v.

IDOC,

C/O HUNGATE,

SGT. AGNEW,

JOHN M BARWICK,

JANE DOE 1,

JANE DOE 2, and

JOHN DOE 1,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

MCGLYNN, District Judge:

Plaintiff Cordero Williams commenced this lawsuit while an inmate of the Illinois

Department of Corrections (IDOC). He brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violations of his constitutional rights that occurred at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. The

Complaint is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under

Section 1915A, any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted, or requests money damages from a defendant who by law is

immune from such relief must be dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

THE COMPLAINT

Plaintiff alleges that on November 15, 2024, while he was incarcerated at Pinckneyville

Correctional Center, Correctional Officer Hungate approached him saying that he had heard from

friends at Centralia Correctional Center, where Plaintiff was previously housed, that Plaintiff

thought of himself as tough but writes grievances. (Doc. 1, p. 4). Hungate also told Plaintiff that

he “would introduce Plaintiff to someone though.” (Id.). Plaintiff took this comment as a threat,

and so, later that night, Plaintiff wrote a letter to Chief Administrative Officer John Doe 1 and

“intel” describing his conversation with Hungate. (Id.). In the letter, Plaintiff asked for an

investigation to be conducted and to be protected because he feared for his life. (Id.).

The next day, on November 16, 2024, Hungate came to Plaintiff’s cell and placed him in

handcuffs. (Doc. 1, p. 4). While Plaintiff was sitting in his cell handcuffed, he heard an inmate

outside of his cell named Lamar Berger tell Hungate that he was not going to be housed with

anyone and that he would assault whoever was inside the cell. (Id. at p. 4, 19). Hungate responded,

“I know how you get down. Now this guy is going to find out.” (Id. at p. 4). Plaintiff asked Hungate

to “please get off that BS and to get [Plaintiff] a crisis team.” (Id.). Hungate told Plaintiff, “You’re

getting beat up and raped and I might spray you.” (Id.). Hungate then placed Berger in the cell

with Plaintiff and closed the door. (Id.). Once inside the cell, Berger spat on Plaintiff, threatened

him, and attempted to attack him. (Id.). Hungate instructed Berger to wait to assault Plaintiff until

he had uncuffed Berger so that Berger could “get [Plaintiff] good.” (Id. at p. 5). Plaintiff “pushed

up against” Berger to defend himself and so that Berger did not have room to attack him. (Id.).

Sergeant Agnew arrived at the cell. (Doc. 1, p. 5). At the time, Plaintiff and the inmate

were still both restrained with their hands cuffed, and they were not fighting. (Id.). Hungate told

Agnew, “Light them up for me.” (Id.). Agnew then sprayed a chemical agent onto Plaintiff. (Id.).

Plaintiff started to choke and was in excruciating pain. (Id.). Plaintiff asked Hungate and Agnew

for a chance to “properly decontaminate.” Hungate told Agnew, “That one doesn’t get a shower,

he tried snitching on me.” (Id.). Agnew responded, “I heard.” (Id.).

Plaintiff was treated by a nurse, Jane Doe 1.1 (Doc. 1, p. 5). He asked Jane Doe 1 for a

1 In the Complaint, Plaintiff describes interacting with two unknown nurses. He lists two Jane Does as defendants,

shower. (Id.). The Jane Doe 1 told Plaintiff, “That’s on them, you know how it goes.” (Id.). When

Plaintiff was escorted back to his cell, he again asked to be allowed to shower. (Id.). His request

was denied. (Id.).

Plaintiff sent a letter to Chief Administrative Officer John Doe 1 stating that he was in

severe pain from not being allowed to decontaminate and that he was suffering from burning skin,

irritation to his eyes, and a headache. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff did not receive a response to his letter,

and he was not allowed to shower for “a few days.” Plaintiff submitted a sick call slip but did not

receive a medical appointment. (Id.).

Plaintiff spoke to a nurse, Jane Doe 2, when she “did med line.” (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff

informed her that he needed proper decontamination procedure and his eyes needed to be

examined. (Id.). Jane Doe 2 responded, “One of Hungate’s people must of made [the] sick call

[slip] disappear. You know we’re all friends here.” (Id. at p. 5, 9). Jane Doe 2 failed to intervene

or do anything to assist Plaintiff in receiving medical care. (Id. at p. 6).

PRELIMINARY DISMISSAL

Plaintiff states that he is suing John Doe Intel Lieutenant under the Eighth Amendment for

“being alerted that [he] was in imminent danger then failed to investigate, intervene, or to take

responsible measures to protect Plaintiff causing an Eighth Amendment violation.” (Doc. 1, p. 9).

John Doe Intel Lieutenant, however, is not listed as a defendant. The Court will not treat parties

not listed in the case caption or un the “Defendants” section of the complaint form as defendants.

See Myles v. United States, 416 F.3d 551, 551–52 (7th Cir. 2005) (to be properly considered a

party a defendant must be “specif[ied] in the caption”). Accordingly, any claims brought against

John Doe Intel Lieutenant are dismissed.

and they are both described as nurses. (Doc. 1, p. 3). For clarity, the Court will refer to these individuals as Jane Doe

1 and Jane Doe 2.

The Court also dismisses any intended claims against John M. Barwick, described as the

Warden at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. (Doc. 1, p. 2). Barwick is listed as a defendant, but

Plaintiff does not identify him anywhere else in the Complaint. Thus, the Court is unable to

ascertain what claims, if any, Plaintiff has against Barwick. Where a plaintiff has not included a

defendant in his statement of the claim, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately put on notice

of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against him. Furthermore, merely invoking

the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. See

Collins v. Kibort, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998) (“A plaintiff cannot state a claim against a

defendant by including the defendant’s name in the caption.”). All claims against John Barwick

are therefore dismissed.

And finally, the Court also dismisses IDOC as a defendant. IDOC is not a “person” subject

to suit for money damages under Section 1983. Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir.

2012). Neither can IDOC be sued for prospective injunctive relief in federal court. See Quick v.

Ill. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, 468 F. Supp.3d 1001, 1009 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2020)

(collecting cases).

DISCUSSION

Based on Plaintiff’s allegations and his articulation of his claims, the Court designates the

following counts:

Count 1: First Amendment claim against Hungate and Agnew for retaliating

against Plaintiff because he filed grievances and reported threats.

Count 2: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against

Hungate for intentionally placing Plaintiff in a cell with a violent

inmate on November 16, 2024.

Count 3: Eighth Amendment claim against Hungate and Agnew for the use

of excessive force against Plaintiff on November 16, 2024.

Count 4: Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim against

Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and John Doe 1 for

rNeofuvseimngb etro 1 6a,l l2o0w2 4P, lwaiinthti faf chtoe msihcoawl aegr enaftt. er he was sprayed on

Count 5: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Jane Doe

2 for deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs –

irritated/injured eyes caused by the chemical agent sprayed on him

on November 16, 2024.

Count 6: Eighth Amendment claim against John Doe 1 for failing to intervene

and protect Plaintiff from the misconduct of Hungate and Agnew

that occurred on November 16, 2024.

Count 7: Illinois state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress

against Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2, and John Doe 1.

The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders, unless

otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any other claim that is mentioned in the

Complaint but not addressed in this Order should be considered dismissed without prejudice

as inadequately pled under the Twombly2 pleading standard.

Count 1

“To prevail on a First Amendment retaliation claim,” a plaintiff must establish “that (1) he

engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered an adverse action that would

likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the First Amendment activity was ‘at

least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v.

Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Woodruff v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th

Cir. 2008)).

Plaintiff asserts that because he has a history of filing grievances and he wrote a complaint

against Hungate, Hungate threatened him and attempted to house him with an inmate known to be

violent. Agnew then sprayed Plaintiff with a chemical agent, and both Hungate and Agnew refused

to allow Plaintiff to shower. These allegations are sufficient for Count 1 to proceed against Hungate

2 Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

and Agnew.

Count 2

Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment claim against Hungate, who knew Plaintiff’s

cellmate, Berger, posed a substantial risk of serious injury to him yet intentionally placed Berger

in the cell. Hungate not only failed to take appropriate steps to protect Plaintiff from danger but

encouraged Berger to physically assault Plaintiff. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847

(1994).

Count 3

Plaintiff’s assertions that Agnew, at the direction of Hungate, sprayed him and his cellmate

with a chemical agent while they were both restrained and not fighting states an Eighth

Amendment claim for excessive force. See Gaines v. Prentice, No. 21-1588, 2022 WL 2304227,

at *3 (7th Cir. June 27, 2022) (allegations that officer personally ordered the unnecessary and

excessive use of mace without justification stated Eighth Amendment claim under § 1983) (citing

Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding plaintiff must plausibly allege

supervisor had requisite state of mind to state a claim for facilitating, approving, or condoning

unlawful act); Guitron v. Paul, 675 F.3d 1044, 1046 (7th Cir. 2012) (the use of force maliciously

and sadistically to cause harm states claim under Eighth Amendment)). Count 3 will proceed

against Hungate and Agnew.

Count 4

Plaintiff states that Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe 1, and Jane Doe 2 denied his requests for a

shower so that he could wash off the chemical agent that coated his face and body. He states that

he had to wait “a few days” to shower, suffering ongoing pain and discomfort in the meantime.

(Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff has sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment claim. See Kervin v. Barnes,

144 F. App’x 551, 552 (7th Cir. 2005)( “detaining an inmate for eight hours after using chemical

agents without allowing him to wash his face amounts to the wanton infliction of pain and

suffering”). See also Keller v. Sanchez, No. 25-cv-712-MAB, 2025 WL 1734884, at *3 (S.D. Ill.

June 23, 2025) (observing that the plaintiff’s claim that he was refused a shower to wash off pepper

spray was “better viewed as a generic cruel and unusual punishment claim” than deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs). Count 4 will proceed against Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe

1, and Jane Doe 2.

Count 4 will be dismissed against John Doe 1, the chief administrative officer. Supervisory

liability does not constitute an independent legal theory under Section 1983. To state a claim

against a defendant who is an upper-level official a plaintiff must allege that the supervisor knew

of an underlying wrong and affirmatively assisted in furtherance of that wrong or deliberately

turned a blind eye. Plaintiff’s allegations, however, are too vague to state a claim against John Doe

1. A single letter sent to John Doe 1 informing him that Plaintiff needed a shower is insufficient

for the Court to plausibly infer that John Doe knew about and disregarded a serious risk of harm

to Plaintiff. See Wilson v. Warren County, Ill., 830 F.3d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 2016); Burks v.

Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2009).

Count 5

Plaintiff asserts that Jane Doe 2 “turned a blind eye to his medical needs” when she refused

to help him after he told her that he had submitted a sick call request and that his eyes needed to

be examined due to the chemical agent that had been sprayed. (Doc. 1, p. 5, 6). According to

Plaintiff, Jane Doe 2 acknowledged that Plaintiff’s sick call request probably “disappeared” at

Hungate’s request and stated, “We’re all friends here.” (Id. at p. 5, 9).

The Court notes that numerous courts in this Circuit and others “have specifically held that

exposure to pepper spray or similar chemical agents does not create lingering effects that are

objectively serious medical conditions for the purposes of the Eighth Amendment.” See e.g.,

Hughes v. Durrent, No. 15 C 6432, 2017 WL 3978702, at * (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 2017) (collecting

cases). However, exposure to a chemical agent, such as OC spray, can “result in a serious medical

condition that implicates the Eighth Amendment,” and is “a fact-intensive inquiry.” McCloud v.

Vanschoyck, No. 21-cv-00429-JPH-MKK, 2024 WL 229740, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 19, 2024).

Therefore, given that Plaintiff pleads that (1) he was continuing to suffer from ongoing issues

caused by the chemical agent; (2) Jane Doe 2 was aware that he was in need of additional treatment;

(3) Jane Doe 2 knew that his sick call request had been mishandled or destroyed; and (4) Jane Doe

2 failed to ensure he received needed medical treatment, the Court finds that at this stage, Plaintiff

has adequately stated a deliberate indifference claim against Jane Doe 2. Count 5 will proceed.

Count 6

Plaintiff asserts that John Doe 1, the chief administrative officer, was alerted that Plaintiff

was in imminent danger from Hungate but “failed to investigate, intervene, or to take reasonable

measures to protect [him].” (Doc. 1, p. 9).

A failure to intervene claim requires the plaintiff to plead that “(i) the defendant knew of

the unconstitutional conduct; (ii) the defendant had a realistic opportunity to prevent the harm; (iii)

the defendant failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the harm; and (iv) the plaintiff suffered

harm as a result.” Watkins v. Ghosh, No. 11 C 1880, 2014 WL 840949, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 4,

2014) (citing Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir.1994)).

Plaintiff states that John Doe 1 was alerted to imminent harm by a letter he sent November

15, the day before Hungate and Agnew’s misconduct. As stated above, one letter without any

suggestion that it might have been received is typically not enough to sustain a Section 1983 claim

premised on that individual’s personal responsibility for some issue mentioned in the

correspondence. See e.g., Burks, 555 F.3d at 595-96 (a letter-writing campaign to high-level

officials such as local government officials or the prison warden is not sufficient to sustain a claim

premised on personal involvement under Section 1983). There are no facts to suggest that John

Doe 1 knew of Hungate and Agnew’s unconstitutional conduct and had a realistic opportunity to

prevent the harm based on Plaintiff’s letter. Accordingly, Count 6 is dismissed.

Count 7

Plaintiff asserts that Hungate, Agnew, John Doe 1, Jane Doe 1, and Jane Doe 2 “engaged

in extreme and outrageous conduct that exceeded all bounds of decency tolerated in a civilized

society.” (Doc. 1, p. 6). Because of Defendants’ conduct, Plaintiff claims that he suffered severe

emotional distress, including fear, anxiety, humiliation, psychological trauma, and mental anguish.

(Id.).

Under Illinois law, to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff

must allege (1) the defendants engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct; (2) the defendants

either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or knew there was a high probability that their

conduct would cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the defendants’ conduct in fact caused

severe emotional distress. McGreal v. Vill. Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308, 314 (7th Cir. 2017). See

also Bailey v. City of Chic., 779 F.3d 689, 696–97 (7th Cir. 2015); Schiller v. Mitchell, 828 N.E.2d

323, 333 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (citing Pavlik v. Kornhaber, 761 N.E.2d 175 (Ill. 2001)).

The Court considers it “extreme and outrageous” conduct that Hungate would orchestrate

an attack on Plaintiff by another inmate, direct Agnew to spray Plaintiff with a chemical agent,

and then refuse Plaintiff a shower. Furthermore, based on Hungate’s threat to Plaintiff and

Agnew’s affirmation that he had heard that Plaintiff filed a complaint against Hungate, the Court

can plausibly infer that Hungate and Agnew either intended to inflict severe emotional distress or

knew there was a high probability that severe emotion distress would result from their actions.

Count 7 will proceed against Hungate and Agnew.

Count 7 will also proceed against Jane Doe 2. According to Plaintiff, Jane Doe 2 knew that

Plaintiff was in need of a shower and medical care and that his sick call slips were purposefully

not being processed, and Jane Doe 2 still refused to help him because she was friends with the staff

members who had targeted Plaintiff. As pled, Jane Doe 2’s behavior could be considered extreme

and outrageous.

Count 7 is dismissed, however, against Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 1. Plaintiff states that

after he was sprayed with the chemical agent, he was treated by Jane Doe 1. He asked Jane Doe 1

if he could shower, and she responded, “[T]hat’s on them, you know how it goes.” (Doc. 1, p. 5).

Denying Plaintiff’s request and relying on correctional staff to ensure Plaintiff received a shower

is not outrageous behavior and does not allow the inference that Jane Doe 1 intended to cause or

knew her actions would cause severe emotional distress. Count 7 is therefore dismissed against

Jane Doe 1.

Because the Court has found that Plaintiff’s letters to John Doe 1, the chief administrative

officer, did not establish that John Doe 1 was personally involved or aware of any of the alleged

constitutional violations, the Court finds that a lack of response by John Doe 1 was not extreme or

outrageous. Count 7 is dismissed against John Doe 1.

MOTIONS FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3), which is DENIED.3 In

an attempt to find an attorney on his own, Plaintiff states that he has written to lawyers, and they

declined to take his case. He has attached declination letters from three law firms to his Motion.

Based on this information, the Court finds that Plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to retain

counsel on his own.

With respect to his ability to pursue this action pro se, Plaintiff indicates that he only has a

3 In evaluating the Motion for Recruitment of Counsel, the Court applies the factors discussed in Pruitt v. Mote, 503

F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) and related authority.

grade school education. He states that he is unable to represent himself because he cannot read and

write, and he had assistance in drafting the Complaint. Nonetheless, the Court finds that Plaintiff

is capable of proceeding pro se, at least for now. Given that this litigation is in the very early stages

and Defendants have not been served, it is difficult to accurately evaluate the need for assistance

of counsel. See Kadamovas v. Stevens, 706 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[U]ntil the defendants

respond to the complaint, the plaintiff’s need for assistance of counsel…cannot be gauged.”).

Plaintiff has recently been released from custody, which means the people and resources available

to assist him are now presumably more readily accessible. Thus, recruiting counsel would be

premature. Should Plaintiff’s situation change as the case proceeds, he may file another motion

setting forth all facts that support his request for court recruited counsel.

IDENTIFICATION OF UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff will have the opportunity to engage in limited discovery to ascertain the identity

of the unknown defendants. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 832 (7th

Cir. 2009). Although all claims are dismissed against Warden Barwick, Barwick will remain a

defendant in his official capacity only for the purpose of responding to discovery aimed at

identifying Jane Doe 1 and Jane Doe 2. Guidelines and information for discovery will be set by a

separate order once all Defendants are served.

DISPOSITION

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint survives preliminary review pursuant to

Section 1915A. COUNT 1 will proceed against Hungate and Agnew. COUNT 2 will proceed

against Hungate. COUNT 3 will proceed against Hungate and Agnew. COUNT 4 will proceed

against Hungate, Agnew, Jane Doe 1, and Jane Doe 2 but is DISMISSED without prejudice as

to John Doe 1, the chief administrative officer. COUNT 5 will proceed against Jane Doe 2.

COUNT 6 is DISMISSED without prejudice. COUNT 7 will proceed against Hungate, Agnew

and Jane Doe 2 and is DIMISSED without prejudice as to Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 1, the chief

administrative officer. All intended claims against Warden Barwick are DISMISSED without

prejudice. Because there are no surviving claims against IDOC and John Doe 1, the Clerk of Court

is DIRECTED to terminate IDOC and John Doe 1 as parties on the docket.

The Clerk of Court shall prepare for Hungate, Agnew, John Barwick (official capacity

only), and Jane Does 1 and 2 (once identified) the following: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and

Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The

Clerk is DIRECTED to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and

Order to each Defendant’s place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to

sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the

date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the

Defendant, and the Court will require the Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, to the

extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the employer

shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not known, his last known

address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally

effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address

information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Because this suit includes claims of physical injury, the Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to

enter the standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and

Accountability Act.

Defendants, with the exception of Warden Barwick, are ORDERED to timely file an

appropriate responsive pleading to the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1997e(g). Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2(b), Defendants should respond to the issues

stated in this Merit Review Order.

Plaintiff is ADVISED that at the time application was made under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 for

leave to commence this civil action without being required to prepay fees and costs or give security

for the same, the applicant and (if applicable) his or her attorney were deemed to have entered into

a stipulation that any unpaid costs taxed against the applicant shall be paid from any recovery

secured in the action.

Finally, Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk

of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not

independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than 14 days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a

delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of

prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 1, 2026

STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN

United States District Judge

NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF

The Court will take the necessary steps to notify the appropriate defendants of your lawsuit and

serve them with a copy of your complaint. After service has been achieved, the defendants will

enter their appearance and file an Answer to the complaint. It will likely take at least 60 days from

the date of this Order to receive the defendants’ Answers, but it is entirely possible that it will take

90 days or more. When all of the defendants have filed Answers, the Court will enter a Scheduling

Order containing important information on deadlines, discovery, and procedures. Plaintiff is

advised to wait until counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, to give the

defendants notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before defendants’

counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit

any evidence to the Court at this time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.