Ferrari

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PATRICK M. FERRARI, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 26-cv-00009-SMY

)

CHRISTOPHER THRELKELD,et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

)

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

YANDLE, ChiefJudge:

Now before the Court are motions to dismiss filed separately by Defendants Sarah Smith

and Christopher Threlkeld (the “Judicial Defendants”) (Doc. 19)and various named and unnamed

employees of Madison County (the “County Defendants”) (Doc. 34). For the following reasons,

both motions are GRANTED.

Background

Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3), challenging

administrative orders entered by Defendants Sarah D. Smith and Christopher Threlkeld, Associate

and Chief Judge of the Third Judicial Circuit Court of Illinois (Doc. 13). The first order was

entered October 1, 2025 by Judge Smith, before whom Plaintiff had multiple pending cases. Id.

at 17. In the order, Judge Smith found that Plaintiff had filed over a dozen frivolous pleadings in

the span of two weeks and repeatedly berated the court staff demanding “immediate access to the

court.” Id. Accordingly, Judge Smith imposed sanctions prohibiting Plaintiff from filing

additional pleadings without first obtaining leave from the court. Id.

The second order challenged by Plaintiff isa general administrative order entered by Chief

Judge Threlkeld on November 12, 2025. Id. at 19. This order prohibited Plaintiff from entering

any court facility within the Third Judicial Circuit without written authorization, so as “to ensure

… the fair and orderly administration of justice and the judicial process.” Id.

Plaintiff alleges these court orders deprived him of his constitutional rights to due process

under the Fourteenth Amendment and access to the courts under the First Amendment, as well as

various rights under the Illinois Constitution. Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts the

following claims:

Count I: Denial of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the

U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 2 of the Illinois Constitution (All

Defendants);

Count II: Judicial Bias in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 63(C)(1)

(Judicial Defendants);

Count III: Denial of court access in violation of the First Amendment (All

Defendants);

Count IV: Fabrication of evidence/perjury (Defendant Smith and unnamed deputies

of the Madison County Sheriff’s Department);

Count V: Conspiracy under § 1985(3) (All Defendants);

Count VI: Monell/supervisory liability (Madison County Defendants).

(Doc. 13).

In his prayer for relief, Plaintiff seeks an order declaring the challenged state-court orders void,

enjoining enforcement of the orders, restoring access to the relevant court facilities, and requiring

the state court clerk’s office to accept all of Plaintiff’s filings. Id. at 16. Plaintiff also seeks

$4,650,000 in punitive and compensatory damages. Id.

The Judicial Defendants move to dismiss all claims against them for insufficient of process

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(5). In the alternative, the Judicial

Defendants move for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), arguing all of Plaintiff’s claims against

them are barred by judicial immunity and sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.1

Separately, the Madison County Defendants move to dismiss all counts against them on grounds

of quasi-judicial immunity, qualified immunity, and failure to state a claim.

Discussion

Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 19)

Judicial officers enjoy absolute immunity from suits for damages for all acts taken in their

capacity as judges. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967). Additionally, the 1996

amendments to § 1983 specifically bar most claims for injunctive relief against judges. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (“[I]n any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such

officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was

violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.”).

Plaintiff acknowledges the doctrine of judicial immunity but argues that immunity does

not apply to the challenged administrative orders because they were “administrative

policymaking” and “were issued ultra vires, ex parte, without notice, hearing, courtroom, or case

number” (Doc. 26 at 3). In support of his argument, Plaintiff cites Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.

219 (1988),2in whichthe Supreme Court heldthat absolute immunity applied only to judicial acts

and not “administrative, legislative, or executive functions that judges may on occasion be

assigned by law to perform.” Id. at 227-28.

Plaintiff misreadsForrester. The plaintiff in that case challenged decisionsmade by a state

judge in their capacity as an employer, not a judge; namely, the decision to demote and then

1 Because the Court grants the Judicial Defendant’s motion on grounds of judicial immunity, it does not consider their

arguments based on service of process and sovereign immunity.

2 Plaintiff also cites “Cooper v Rapp, 702 F.3d 1001, 1005 (7th Cir. 2012),” a Seventh Circuit case that does not exist.

terminate a court employee. Id. at 221. Other decisions by the Supreme Court make clear that

whether a particular act is judicial turns on “the nature and function of the act, not the act itself.”

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991)(quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360(1978)).

Relevant considerations include “whether [the act] is a function normally performed by a judge,

and … the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial

capacity.” Id. Immunity still applies “despite any informality with which the judge proceeded,

and despite any ex parte feature of the proceeding.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200

(1985) (internal quotation omitted).

Under thesestandards, Judge Smith’s October 11, 2025 administrative order was clearly a

judicial act. Judge Smith’s order imposed sanctions against Plaintiff based on his conduct in

multiple cases pending before her; namely, the repetitive filing of frivolous motions. The

imposition of sanctions against litigants is an inherently and exclusively judicial function. See

Ramirez v. T&H Lemont, Inc., 845 F.3d 772, 776 (7th Cir. 2016). Because judicial immunity is

determined using a functional test, the fact that the challenged orders were titled “administrative”

orders is irrelevant under Forrester. See Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 2006)

(“Forrester stands for the unremarkable proposition that internal employment decisions made by

judges are not judicial acts. Such acts have no relevance to the development and implementation

of A[dministrative]O[rder] 03-11.”). Thus, Judge Smith is immune from all claims based on her

October 11, 2025 order.

Chief Judge Threlkeld’s general administrative order poses a closer question because

Plaintiff was not a party in any case before Judge Threlkeld at the time the order was issued. The

Seventh Circuit has yet to consider whether a general order entered by a chief judge is a judicial

act entitled to immunity, and the other circuits are divided. Some courts have found that judicial

immunity does not apply to a general administrative order when an affected litigant cannot appeal

the order. See Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 466 (6th Cir. 1989) (An administrative order

directing clerk’s office not to accept petitions “differs from an adjudication in that a litigant

offended by a judicial act can … appeal the court's decision …[;]here, no direct appeal is available,

making the absence of judicial liability far less reasonable.”). However, othercourtshave applied

judicial immunity to general orders setting court policy that are by their nature unappealable. See

John Chism Bail Bonds, Inc. v. Pennington, 656 F. Supp. 2d 929 (E.D. Ark. 2009) (finding that a

general order prohibiting “credit bonding” was a judicial act subject to immunity); Roth, 449 F.3d

at 1287.

Considering the full context in which Judge Threlkeld’s administrative order was issued,

this Court finds that it was a judicial act. Although Plaintiff was not appearing before Judge

Threlkeld as a litigant, the order applies to Plaintiff’s conduct in several cases (Doc. 26-1 at 29).

This was not an order setting general policy that may impact other parties, but rather a tailored

response to disruptive conduct by a specific litigant. Indeed, the order directs the Clerk of Court

to create a case file titled “In the Matter of Patrick M. Ferrari” in which all related orders and

correspondence may be filed (Doc. 26-1 at 30). This is more akin to an imposition of sanctions,

an act that can only be performed by a judge, than a decision to terminate a court employee, such

as was at issue in Forrester.

Because Plaintiff’s claims against Judges Smith and Threlkeld are based on judicial acts

for which they are absolutely immune, all claims against them will be dismissed. Moreover,

because any attempt to reassert claims barred by absolute immunity would be futile, the dismissal

shall be with prejudice. See James Cape & Sons Co. v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 401 (7th

Cir. 2006) (holding dismissal with prejudice is appropriate when a district court “reasonably

believe[s]that an amended complaint would suffer the same fatal flaws as the one before it”).

County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 34)

Plaintiff asserts various claims against the County Defendants on two bases: the

enforcement of the judges’ administrative orders by clerk’s office staff and deputies of the

Madison County Sherrif’s office, and the alleged omission by an unnamed deputy of exculpatory

footage from a 25-minute interview of Plaintiff. The absolute immunity afforded to judges also

extends to “those performing ministerial acts under a judge's supervision and intimately related to

judicial proceedings[.]” Ashbrook v. Hoffman, 617 F.2d 474, 477 n.4. (7th Cir. 1980). Here, most

of Plaintiff’s claims against the County Defendants are based on allegations that they “enforced

the filing ban” and “physical exclusions” imposed by the Judicial Defendants’ orders. Because

these actions were taken “at the explicit direction of a judicial officer,” they are protected by quasi-

judicial immunity. Zoretic v. Darge, 832 F.3d 639, 644 (7th Cir. 2016).

With respect to the alleged omission of video interview footage, Plaintiff’s Complaint does

not indicate whether the interview between himself and the unnamed deputy was conducted at the

direction of a judge. Because no further information regarding this interview and the alleged

omission of evidence is included, the Court cannot determine whether quasi-judicial immunity

applies. Nevertheless, dismissal is still appropriate because Plaintiff has failed to state a valid

claim based on the alleged omission of evidence from this interview.

Count IV of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which asserts a claim for fabrication of

evidence/perjury, is the only claim based on the alleged omission of evidence. A fabrication of

evidence claim is only cognizable when such evidence is used in a criminal trial. Patrick v. City

of Chi., 974 F.3d 824, 835 (7th Cir. 2020). Similarly, a claim for suppression of exculpatory

evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963),cannot be brought if Plaintiff was

never subject to prosecution or trial. Fields v. Wharrie, 672 F.3d 505, 513-14 (7th Cir. 2012)

(Because “Brady and Giglioviolations breach a defendant's trial rights,” there is no Bradyviolation

“unless and until a prosecutor, in the course of preparing for or conducting a trial or direct appeal,

does not turn over the material evidence in question.”). Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the

interview and resulting evidence was related to any criminal prosecution, and the only charge

pending against him appears to be an unrelated traffic violation (Doc. 16 at 4-5). As such, Plaintiff

fails to state a viable claim based on the suppression of evidence.

Additionally, although Plaintiff names both Madison and Bond Counties as Defendants,

Bond County has not entered an appearance in this case. A review of the docket reveals the Bond

County Defendants were not properly served. While a “proof of service” on these defendants was

docketed on February 26, 2026, the documentation indicates that summonses were sent to Madison

County’s trial court administrator by certified mail (Doc. 25). Service by certified mail is not

recognized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or any equivalent Illinois statute, in the absence

of valid service. Khan v. Presence St. Mary & Elizabeth Hosps., at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2020)

(“In Illinois, service on individual defendants through the United States Postal Service by certified

mail is not permitted under the statute.”).3 The Court nevertheless finds it appropriate to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint as to Bond Couty as well.

Although Bond County has not entered an appearance and thus has not joined either motion

to dismiss, the Court “may grant a motion to dismiss as to non-moving defendants where the

nonmoving defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where the claims

against all defendants are integrally related.” Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir.

3 Although the same defect in service applies to both Madison and Bond Counties, Madison County waived any

objection based on service of process by entering an appearance in this case (Doc. 28, 29).

1993). Here, the only allegation Plaintiff makes against Bond County is that it “ratified and

implemented” the judges’ orders (Doc. 13 at 8). Bond County’s position is thus identical to that

of Madison County and its employees. As such, all claims against Bond County will be dismissed

on the basis of immunity. See Burgess v. Michealson, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12410, at *4 (N.D.

Ill. Sep. 1, 1993) (“A sua sponte dismissal may apply to a party prior to service of the complaint,

particularly where, as here, plaintiff has had an opportunity to respond to a motion to dismiss.”).

Because Plaintiffs claims against the County Defendants are either barred by quasi-

judicial immunity or otherwise deficient, they will be dismissed. Further, this Court finds that any

attempt to reassert claims based on conduct shielded by absolute immunity would be futile, as

would any claim for fabrication or suppression of evidence where no charges were ever brought.

Therefore, this dismissal shall be with prejudice as well.

Disposition

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to dismiss (Docs. 19 and 34) are

GRANTED. Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 13) is DISMISSED with prejudice in its entirety. All

pending motions are TERMINATED as MOOT, and all pending deadlines and all settings are

VACATED. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and

close this case.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: June 2, 2026. Aol

STACI M. YANDLE

Chief U.S. District Judge