MALIKAH ASANTE-CHIOKE v. NICHOLAS DOWDLE ET AL.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MALIKAH ASANTE-CHIOKE CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 22-4587

NICHOLAS DOWDLE ET AL. SECTION: “J”(3)

ORDER & REASONS

Before the Court are three motions for summary judgment: one filed by

Defendant Officers Jonathon Downing, Gerard Duplessis, and Terry Durnin (Rec.

Doc. 255); one filed by Defendant Officer Nicholas Dowdle (Rec. Doc. 262), and

another filed by Plaintiff Malikah Asante-Chioke. (Rec. Doc. 256). All motions are

opposed. (Rec. Docs. 267, 269). Replies to all oppositions have been filed. (Rec. Docs.

272, 273, 274). Having considered the motions, the legal memoranda, the record, and

the applicable law, the Court finds that Defendants’ motions should be GRANTED

and that Plaintiff’s motion should be DENIED.1

1 After the replies were filed, Plaintiff and Defendant Officers Downing, Duplessis, and Durnin each

moved for leave to file notices of supplemental authority regarding new federal cases released after

they filed their motions for summary judgment. (Rec. Doc. 277; Rec. Doc. 279). The motions were

opposed. (Rec. Doc. 278; Rec. Doc. 280; Rec. Doc 281). Plaintiff sought to submit a Fifth Circuit case

and a Tenth Circuit case that are both factually distinguishable from this case and unhelpful to the

Court. Defendants sought to submit two Supreme Court cases which support that qualified immunity

still applies to § 1983 claims. These cases are similarly unhelpful, as the Court does not intend to

overturn decades of qualified immunity doctrine upon Plaintiff’s request. However, even if the Court

had allowed the parties to supplement, these cases would not have changed the Court’s decision.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On the night of November 21, 2021, Jabari Asante-Chioke was traversing down

Airline Highway carrying a knife in one hand and a gun in the other. Several officers

tried to stop Mr. Asante-Chioke as he intermittently jogged across varying lanes of

traffic and waved the gun in the air. Mr. Asante-Chioke continuously ignored various

officer commands to stop, show his hands, drop the gun, and get on the ground. One

officer tried to taze Mr. Asante-Chioke but was ultimately unsuccessful. The situation

escalated as each attempt to subdue Mr. Asante-Chioke failed.

The tense scene culminated when Defendant Officers Nicholas Dowdle,

Johnathan Downing, and Gerard Duplessis caught up to Mr. Asante-Chioke as he

slowed to a brisk walk. All three officers had their guns drawn as they followed Mr.

Asante-Chioke along a dimly lit section of Airline Highway. Officer Dowdle, who was

closest to Mr. Asante-Chioke, told him, “You put the gun on me, you’re going to get

shot.” (Rec. Doc. 262-4, Ex. 1, at 05:38–05:39). Mr. Asante-Chioke responded that he

was “ready to die” and, seconds later, raised his gun towards the officers. Id. at 05:44–

05:52. All three officers opened fire. The continuous shooting lasted for 4.2 seconds.

During this time, Mr. Asante-Chioke fell forward onto the ground with his hands

outstretched and dropped his gun right before his hands hit the ground. He then

landed on his hands and knees before ultimately rolling on the ground with his back

facing officers. The shooting then ceased. Officers fired a total of thirty-six shots.

Fifteen shots struck Mr. Asante-Chioke, who died from his wounds.

Plaintiff Malikah Asante-Chioke is Mr. Asante-Chioke’s daughter, and she

brings this suit individually and on behalf of her father. She asserts a 42 U.S.C. §

1983 excessive force claim and four state law claims against the shooting officers, as

well as a negligent supervision and training claim against their supervisors.

Defendants move for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claims.

Plaintiff moves for summary judgment on her excessive force claim against Officer

Dowdle.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, the discovery and

disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as

to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56); see Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). When

assessing whether a dispute as to any material fact exists, a court considers “all of

the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or

weighing the evidence.” Delta & Pine Land Co. v. Nationwide Agribusiness Ins.

Co., 530 F.3d 395, 398 (5th Cir. 2008). All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor

of the nonmoving party, but a party cannot defeat summary judgment with

conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated assertions. Little, 37 F.3d at 1075. A court

ultimately must be satisfied that “a reasonable jury could not return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Delta, 530 F.3d at 399.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden

of proof at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would

‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.’” Int'l

Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1991). The nonmoving

party can then defeat the motion by either countering with sufficient evidence of its

own, or “showing that the moving party's evidence is so sheer that it may not

persuade the reasonable fact-finder to return a verdict in favor of the moving

party.” Id. at 1265.

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the

burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing

out that the evidence in the record is insufficient with respect to an essential element

of the nonmoving party's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. The burden then shifts

to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out

specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. See id. at 324. The nonmovant may

not rest upon the pleadings but must identify specific facts that establish a genuine

issue for trial. See id. at 325; Little, 37 F.3d at 1075.

DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that they have qualified immunity from suit. Plaintiff

argues that the qualified immunity doctrine does not apply to § 1983 claims. She also

argues that, even if qualified immunity applies, the Defendants are not entitled to it.

As an initial matter, the Court again rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the

qualified immunity doctrine does not apply. Since Plaintiff last raised this argument,

neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court have overturned decades of qualified

immunity jurisprudence on the basis that Plaintiff requests, and therefore this Court

must also refrain from doing so. Asante-Chioke v. Dowdle, CV 22-4587, 2024 WL

2863379 at *4 (E. D. La. Jun. 6, 2024) (Barbier, J.) (rejecting Plaintiff’s argument and

finding that the qualified immunity doctrine applies to her § 1983 claims); See also

Zorn v. Linton, 146 S. Ct. 926, 930–31 (2026) (granting the defendant officer qualified

immunity against the plaintiff’s § 1983 excessive force claim). Therefore, the Court

will proceed with the required qualified immunity analysis.

“Qualified immunity shields public officials sued in their individual capacities

from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Kokesh v. Curlee, 14 F.4th 382, 391 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal citations

omitted). The qualified immunity defense has two prongs: (1) whether an official's

conduct violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff and (2) whether the right was

clearly established at the time of the violation. Manis v. Lawson, 585 F.3d 839, 843

(5th Cir. 2009).

A qualified immunity defense alters the usual summary judgment burden of

proof; when an official pleads the defense of qualified immunity, “the burden shifts to

the plaintiff, who must rebut the defense by establishing a genuine fact issue as to

whether the official's allegedly wrongful conduct violated clearly established

law.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Michalik v.

Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005)). If the official's actions violated a clearly

established law, the court then asks whether the actions were objectively reasonable

in light of “law which was clearly established at the time of the disputed

action.” Id. (quoting Collins v. Ainsworth, 382 F.3d 529, 537 (5th Cir. 2004)).

The first step of the qualified immunity analysis asks whether there was a

violation of a constitutional right. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is for excessive force. To

establish a claim for excessive force, a plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) injury, (2)

which resulted directly and only from a use of force that was clearly excessive, and

(3) the excessiveness of which was clearly unreasonable.” Trammell v. Fruge, 868

F.3d 332, 340 (5th Cir. 2017). Excessive force claims are necessarily fact-intensive;

whether the force used is “excessive” or “unreasonable” depends on the facts and

circumstances of each particular case. Deville v. Marcantel, 567 F.3d 156, 163–64 (5th

Cir. 2009). That inquiry requires consideration of three non-exclusive factors,

including “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate

threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest

or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).

The first element is easily satisfied because officers indisputably shot and

killed Chioke. However, upon review of the record evidence in the light most favorable

to Plaintiff, the Court finds that each shooting officer’s use of force was not clearly

unreasonable.

Mr. Asante-Chioke pointed a presumably loaded gun at the officers before they

opened fire. Minutes before the shooting, Mr. Asante-Chioke was behaving

erratically, refusing to comply with direct police orders, evading police, and carrying

a gun and a knife. See Hodge v. Engleman, 636 F. Supp. 3d 727, 735 (N.D. Tex. 2022),

aff’d, 90 F.4th 840 (5th Cir. 2024) (explaining that “[w]hen considering the great

threat posed to an officer, the Fifth Circuit gives great weight to whether a suspect is

armed and defiant”) (referencing three Fifth Circuit cases).

Seconds before he raised his gun, Mr. Asante-Chioke stated that he was “ready

to die.” (Rec. Doc. 262-4, Ex. 1, at 05:44–05:45). Thus, a reasonable officer reacting to

this event as it happened had probable cause to believe that Mr. Asante-Chioke posed

a serious threat of physical injury or death to the officers. Officers may use deadly

force in those circumstances without violating the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g.

Garza v. Briones, 943 F.3d 740, 748 (holding that use of deadly force was justified

where suspect pointed a gun at an officer); see also Manis, 585 F.3d at 843 (“An

officer’s use of deadly force is not excessive . . . when the officer reasonably believes

that the suspect poses a threat of serious harm to the officer or to others.”)

Plaintiff argues that Mr. Asante-Chioke was experiencing a mental health

crisis at the time of the shooting. However, that information was not knowable to the

officers at the time that they opened fire, so it cannot factor into the qualified

immunity analysis. White v. Pauly 580 U.S. 73, 77 (2017) (per curiam) (In assessing

whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, “the Court considers only the

facts that were knowable to the defendant officers” at the time.) Even if the officers

had known, it did not affect the danger that they immediately faced when Mr. Asante-

Chioke pointed a deadly weapon in their direction. Accordingly, the Court finds that

it was reasonable for the officers to open fire upon Mr. Asante-Chioke.

Plaintiff argues that the shooting became unreasonable at some moment

during its 4.2 seconds. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Asante-Chioke became

incapacitated as soon as he dropped the gun, and any shot fired afterwards was

unreasonable.

Defendants claim that the officers did not see Mr. Asante-Chioke drop his gun.

They also argue that they could not clearly see Mr. Asante-Chioke’s hands as he fell

to the ground. They also contend that Mr. Asante-Chioke was not incapacitated

during the shooting, and he could have returned fire. Defendants also note that

humans have a delayed reaction time, which prevents them from instantly ceasing

fire the exact moment a threat is ended.

The reasonableness of police force “requires analyzing the totality of the

circumstances.” Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73, 80 (2025) (internal quotations omitted).

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the continuous

shooting was not clearly unreasonable. All three shooting officers testified that they

did not see Mr. Asante-Chioke drop his gun. The shooting occurred at night in a dimly

lit section of Airline Highway. Officer Dowdle began shooting while 21 feet away from

Chioke and was 29 feet away by the shooting’s end. (Rec. Doc. 267-21, at 21.) Officers

Downing and Duplessis were around 68 feet away from Mr. Asante-Chioke

throughout the shooting. Id. The Court has reviewed Officer Dowdle’s unaltered

bodycam footage, and it does not see Mr. Asante-Chioke drop the gun. Mr. Asante-

Chioke is wearing dark clothing, and he quickly moves and changes position during

the 4.2 seconds of shooting. His hands are not clearly visible during that time. Only

by viewing a frame-by-frame pdf of a zoomed-in stabilized version of Officer Dowdle’s

bodycam footage, prepared by Plaintiff’s expert Cole Young, is the Court able to

observe the exact moment that Mr. Asante-Chioke dropped his gun. The officers did

not have the benefit of this analysis, and the Court cannot use it to retroactively

assess the reasonableness of their actions from the calm reserve of chambers.

Plaintiff argues that the officers “should have seen––and did see––Mr. Asante-

Chioke drop his gun.” (Rec. Doc. 276, at 15). However, these allegations, without

more, are insufficient to overcome a qualified immunity defense. Orr. v. Copeland,

844 F.3d 484, 490 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Conclusory allegations and denials, speculation,

improbable inferences, unsubstantiated assertions, and legalistic argumentation are

all insufficient to overcome immunity.”) (internal quotations omitted); see also

Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994) (explaining that a party opposing

a motion for summary judgment on a qualified immunity defense must “identify

specific evidence in the . . . record demonstrating that there is a material fact issue

concerning the essential elements of its case.”) Plaintiff must provide evidentiary

support to suggest that a reasonable officer on the scene could or should have seen

Mr. Asante-Chioke drop his gun during the 4.2 seconds of continuous fire. She offers

none. Plaintiff thus fails to provide a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether

a reasonable officer would have seen Mr. Asante-Chioke drop his gun. Accordingly,

the Court finds that it was not clearly unreasonable for the shooting officers to believe

that Mr. Asante-Chioke was stilled armed.

Since it was not clearly unreasonable for officers to believe that Mr. Asante-

Chioke was still armed, it was not clearly unreasonable for the officers to continue

firing. As Defendants expert John Ryan, a former officer for 20 years, explained, “the

number of shots fired and the position of Mr. Asante-Chioke’s body would not

diminish the threat as long as he was still in possession or proximity to his firearm

and the officers reasonably perceived that he was not incapacitated.” (Rec. Doc. 255-

12, at 67–68). Dowdle’s bodycam footage shows that Mr. Asante-Chioke continuously

moved throughout the shooting. Mr. Asante-Chioke even raises his arm after the

shooting, suggesting that he may have been capable of retrieving his gun and

returning fire. The dimly lit area combined with Mr. Asante-Chioke’s dark clothing

would have made it extremely difficult for officers to determine whether Mr. Asante-

Chioke was struck by bullets and whether he was incapacitated.

After reviewing the stabilized zoomed-in frame-by-frame stills of Dowdle’s

bodycam footage, the Court notes that the firing continued for approximately 1.5

seconds after Mr. Asante-Chioke turned his back to the officers. Plaintiff may be

correct, in hindsight, that Mr. Asante-Chioke was incapacitated during that time and

was unable to return fire. But that is not enough to find that the officers’ actions were

clearly unreasonable. As one federal district court explained, “[A]lthough it is possible

that [the suspect]’s ability to pose a serious threat to [officers] ended before the last

shot was fired, it is unreasonable to expect officers acting in response to a drawn

weapon to stop and reevaluate the threat after each shot.” Garza v. Briones, No. CV-

16-251, 2018 WL 8868510, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 13, 2018), aff’d, 943 F.3d 740 (5th

Cir. 2019); see also, Hodge v. Engleman, 636 F. Supp. 3d at 735, 736 (N.D. Tex. 2022),

aff’d, 90 F.4th 840 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding that the officer was entitled to qualified

immunity even though “some shots were fired after [the suspect] fell to the ground,”

but “the officers immediately ceased shooting within one second after [the suspect]’s

incapacitation and did not resume firing their weapons at any point after.”) see also

Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that requiring an

officer to stop shooting and “reevaluate whether a deadly threat has been eliminated

after each shot . . . places additional risk on the officer not required by the

Constitution.”)

Two of Defendants’ experts testified about the reactionary gap between the

moment that an officer perceives a threat of danger and the moment that an officer

responds to those dangers. (Rec. Doc. 262-26, at 31–32; Rec. Doc. 262-27, 11–12). The

expert’s explained that this same reactionary gap also occurs between the moment

an officer perceives that a threat is over and responds accordingly. After reviewing

Plaintiff’s expert Cole Young’s stabilized still frames, the Court finds that officers did

not begin firing until .9 seconds after Mr. Asante-Chioke began raising his gun

toward their direction. It stands to reason that the officers should be afforded a

similar period to stop firing. This expert testimony further strengthens the Court’s

conclusion that the shooting officers’ actions were not clearly unreasonable.

Even if the shooting officers’ actions were clearly unreasonable, Plaintiff fails

to prove that the officers violated a clearly established constitutional right. “A

Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of

the challenged conduct, ‘the contours of a right are sufficiently clear’ that every

‘reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’

Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483

U.S. 635, 640 (1987)) (alternations in original omitted). In other words, a controlling

court must have previously held the “very action in question” to be unlawful.

Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640. “Where no controlling authority specifically prohibits [the

official]’s conduct, and when the federal circuit courts are split on the issue, the law

cannot be said to be clearly established.” Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 372 (5th

Cir. 2011).

Plaintiff argues that the shooting Defendants violated clearly established Fifth

Circuit law under Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2021) and Mason v.

Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 806 F.3d 268 (5th Cir. 2015). Defendants

disagree, arguing that the Fifth Circuit cases of Garza v. Briones, 943 F.3d 740 (5th

Cir. 2019) and Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840 (5th Cir. 2024) show that the

shooting officers’ actions were lawful. The Court will analyze each of these cases in

turn.

In Roque, multiple officers responded to the scene where about 225 feet away

Jason Roque was pacing the sidewalk in front of his home with a gun in his

waistband. 993 F.3d 325, 330. Roque repeatedly asked officers to shoot and kill him

while his nearby mother implored him not to kill himself. Id. Roque then pulled the

gun out of his waistband, pointed it at his head, turned away from officers and

threatened to kill himself. Id. An officer then, for the first and only time, commanded

Roque to put the gun down. Id. After this command, Roque turned around and faced

the officers with the gun and pointed it in the air. Id. A split second later, Officer

Harvel shot Roque with a semi-automatic rifle. Id. Video that captured the incident

showed Roque “immediately double over, drop the gun, and stumble from the

sidewalk” away from the officers and his mother. Id. About two seconds after the first

shot, Officer Harvel fired a second shot but missed. Id. Roque continued floundering

away from officers and his mother, but “two seconds later, Harvel took” a third shot,

which struck and killed Roque. Id.

The district court granted Harvel’s motion for summary judgment on qualified

immunity grounds for the first shot but denied his motion as to the second and third

shot. Id. at 331. The Fifth Circuit agreed, finding two genuine factual disputes as to

(1) whether a reasonable officer would have seen Roque drop his “black gun on the

white sidewalk in broad daylight” and (2) whether a reasonable officer would continue

firing after the video showed Roque “double over and stumble into the street” away

from the officers. Id. at 333–34.

In Mason, officers responded to a suspected armed robbery inside an

apartment. 806 F.3d at 272. The apartment belonged to the suspect’s girlfriend, and

both the suspect and his girlfriend were inside the apartment when officers arrived.

Id. The couple opened the door to reveal officers with their guns drawn. Id. at 273. As

officers moved into the apartment, the girlfriend informed officers that Quamaine

Mason, the suspect, was doing nothing wrong. Id. Officers ordered Mason and his

girlfriend to put their hands up and get on the ground. Id. One of the officers saw that

Mason had a gun in his waistband, and the officer unleashed his dog. Id. The officer

claimed that Mason reached for his gun when the dog attacked him and that he

responded by opening fire. Id. The officer fired an initial round of five shots into

different parts of Mason’s body. Id. After the initial round, Mason was face down on

the ground, and the officer temporarily stopped firing. Id. However, the officer

claimed that Mason then moved to reach for his gun, so the officer fired two more

shots into his back. Id. at 274.

Mason’s girlfriend disputed the officer’s claims. Id. at 273. She said that Mason

never touched his gun or attempted to resist the officers. Id. She also said that after

the initial five shots, Mason only raised and lowered his head but never moved for his

gun. Id. One of the Defendant’s experts also testified that Mason would have had

great difficulty retrieving his gun after the initial round. Id.

The Fifth Circuit found that there were genuine issues of material fact

concerning the final two shots, and whether they were rendered after Mason was

incapacitated. Id. at 277. The Court emphasized the competing narratives between

the officer and Mason’s girlfriend as well as the expert’s testimony. Id.

In Garza, an officer arrived at the front of a truck stop at night and observed

Tomas Garza holding a handgun. 943 F.3d at 743. The officer drew his gun and

advanced toward Garza while repeatedly ordering him to drop the gun. Id. Garza

continuously ignored the officer’s commands as several more officers arrived on the

scene. Id. The arriving officers formed a semi-circle around Garza with their weapons

drawn. Id. Garza raised his weapon and pointed it in the direction of one of the

officers. Id. at 744. That officer then fired his weapon at Garza. Id. The other officers,

believing Garza had fired his weapon, also fired. Id. The officers “continued to fire

until Garza fell to the ground and stopped moving.” Id. The officers continuously fired

for eight seconds, firing a total of sixty-one shots. Id. Eighteen shots hit Garza, who

died from his wounds. Id. Relying on video evidence which captured the shooting, the

Court found no genuine disputes of material fact. Id. at 747. The Court held that the

shooting officers were entitled to qualified immunity for all sixty-one shots. Id. at 748.

In Hodge, two officers attempted to pull over Schaston Hodge after observing

him run a stop sign and turn without signaling. Id. at 842. Hodge continued driving

with police in tow until he reached his driveway. Id. at 842–43. One officer then

sprinted towards Hodge and ordered him to show his hands and step out of the

vehicle. Id. at 843. Hodge exited the vehicle holding a gun pointed at the other officer.

Id. Both officers then fired a total of 19 shots at Hodge for “approximately three to

four seconds.” Hodge, 636 F.Supp.3d at 732. Sixteen of those shots hit Hodge, who

died from his wounds. Hodge, 90 F.4th at 843. The Fifth Circuit held that the officers

were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 847.

The Court finds that this case is more factually analogous to Garza and Hodge

than it is to Mason and Roque. Like here, Garza and Hodge concerned a defiant

suspect who pointed a gun at officers. “When considering the threat posed to an

officer, the Fifth Circuit gives great weight to weather a suspect is armed and

defiant.” Hodge v. Engleman, 636 F.Supp.3d 727, 735 (N.D. Tx. 2022) aff’d 90 F.4th

840 (5th Cir. 2024) (referencing three Fifth Circuit cases). Also, like here, in both

cases the officers continuously fired without stopping, and they did not have time to

stop and reevaluate the threat due to the exigency of the situation. See Garza, 943 F.

3d at 745 (finding that “it is unreasonable to expect officers acting in response to a

drawn weapon to stop and reevaluate the threat after each shot.”); see also Wilkinson

v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 552 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that requiring an officer to

“reevaluate whether a deadly threat has been eliminated after each shot . . . places

additional risk on the officer not required by the Constitution.”) Further, unlike here,

in Mason and Roque the plaintiffs disputed the alleged threat posed to officers during

the shooting and supported their disputes with evidence. Roque, 993 F.3d at 333.

(disputing suspect’s ability to pose a threat “with [unaltered] video and expert

evidence”; see also Mason, 993 F.3d at 273 (disputing suspect’s ability to pose a threat

with conflicting accounts and expert testimony). This created genuine issues of

material fact in those cases that are non-existent here. Thus, the Court finds that

Garza and Hodge control, and the officers did not violate any clearly established

rights at the time of the incident. Therefore, for those additional reasons, Defendants

are entitled to qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendants’ Motions for Summary

Judgment (Rec. Doc. 255; Rec. Doc. 262) are GRANTED, and that Plaintiff's

Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 256) is DENIED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs federal law claims are

DISMISSED with prejudice, and that her state law claims are DISMISSED

without prejudice. Plaintiff has failed to defeat qualified immunity on her federal

law claims, and the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her

remaining state law claims.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this 10th day of June, 2026.

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CARL J. BAR R

UNITED Thies DISTRICT JUDGE

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