Opinion

Ken Paxton, in His Official Capacity as Attorney General of Texas v. Savergv, Sierra Club, and carrizo/comecrudo Nation of Texas, Inc.

Court
Texas Supreme Court
Filed
Jun 19, 2026
Status
Published
Author
Huddle
On the bench
Huddle
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.0%

holding that suits to require governmental officials to comply with the Constitution are not barred by immunity

How later courts described this case

  • holding that suits to require governmental officials to comply with the Constitution are not barred by immunity
  • “[T]hose who are called on to construe the Constitution should not thwart the will of the people by construing it differently from its plain meaning.”
  • stating that a governmental defendant “retains immunity from suit unless the [plaintiffs] have pleaded a viable claim”
  • authorizing suits for damages against federal officials for Fourth Amendment violations

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Supreme Court of Texas

══════════

No. 24-0237

══════════

Texas General Land Office and Dawn Buckingham, in her official

capacity as the Texas Land Commissioner,

Petitioners,

v.

SaveRGV, Sierra Club, and Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas,

Inc.,

Respondents

~ and ~

══════════

No. 24-0407

══════════

Cameron County,

Petitioner,

v.

SaveRGV, Sierra Club, and Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas,

Inc.,

Respondents

~ and ~

══════════

No. 24-0457

══════════

Ken Paxton, in his official capacity as Attorney General of Texas,

Petitioner,

v.

SaveRGV, Sierra Club, and Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas,

Inc.,

Respondents

═══════════════════════════════════════

On Petitions for Review from the

Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas

═══════════════════════════════════════

Argued March 5, 2026

JUSTICE HUDDLE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1959, the Legislature declared by statute that Texans enjoy the

“free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from the

state-owned beaches.” Open Beaches Act, 56th Leg., 2d C.S., ch. 19, § 1,

1959 Tex. Gen. Laws 108, 108 (current version at TEX. NAT. RES. CODE

§ 61.011(a)). With this statute’s passage, the notion that Texas beaches

are the public’s to enjoy became more deeply engrained in our culture.

When the occasional dispute regarding the public’s access to beaches

arose, and protection of open beaches proved necessary, it was the State

and local governments that shouldered the enforcement duty, with

2

relatively little need or opportunity for courts to define the statute’s

contours.

Fifty years after the statute’s passage, in 2009, Texas voters

enshrined the right of public beach access in our Constitution. The

constitutional amendment granted the public a right, described as a

permanent easement, to ingress, egress, and use of Texas beaches. TEX.

CONST. art. I, § 33(b). But while the amendment constitutionalized the

right to use state-owned beaches, it also specified what it was not

creating. Subsection (d) provides that the new Article I, Section 33 “does

not create a private right of enforcement.” Id. § 33(d).

Since Section 33’s adoption, the Legislature has enacted statutes

that permit temporary closures of Boca Chica Beach in South Texas to

safeguard the public from nearby rocket launches and related space

flight activities. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE §§ 61.011(d)(11), .132. This

case presents two related questions arising out of those closures. First:

are the closures (and the statutes authorizing them) constitutional given

that they are in tension with Section 33’s guarantee of an “unrestricted

right to use and a right of ingress to and egress from” public beaches?

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 33(b). Second: irrespective of the answer to that

question, who has the authority to enforce Section 33?

No governmental actor seeks to enforce Section 33 in this case.

Instead, the plaintiffs are private parties—organizations whose

beachgoing members claim the temporary closures of Boca Chica Beach

conflict with their constitutional right to access and use the beach.

Without attempting to specify the extent to which their “unrestricted”

right to beach use may give way to the State’s countervailing interest in

3

protecting public safety—a task we leave for another day—we hold that

subsection (d)’s express proviso that it creates no private right of

enforcement bars these private plaintiffs’ claims. Because the claims

are not viable, it follows that the defendants, all of whom are

governmental actors, retain their immunity from suit. The trial court

was thus correct to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction. We reverse

the court of appeals’ contrary judgment and reinstate the trial court’s

judgment of dismissal.

I. Background

Enacted in 1959, the Open Beaches Act declares as “the public

policy of this state that the public, individually and collectively, shall

have the free and unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from

the state-owned beaches bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of

Mexico.” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.011(a). As we noted in Severance v.

Patterson, the Act strikes a careful balance between “preserv[ing]

private property rights” on the one hand and “guard[ing] the right of the

public to use public beaches against infringement by private interests”

on the other. 370 S.W.3d 705, 719 (Tex. 2012).

To that end, the Act makes it unlawful “for any person to create,

erect, or construct any obstruction, barrier, or restraint that will

interfere with” the public’s right to use and access public beaches. TEX.

NAT. RES. CODE § 61.013(a). It further “provides the State with a means

of enforcing” the statute’s guarantees, Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 710,

such as by charging governmental officials with the duty of filing “suit

to . . . remove or prevent any improvement, maintenance, obstruction,

barrier, or other encroachment on a public beach, or to prohibit any

4

unlawful restraint on the public’s right of access to and use of a public

beach,” TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.018(a).

In 2009, Texas voters enshrined the rights described in the Open

Beaches Act in the Texas Constitution’s Bill of Rights. 1 Article I,

Section 33 states:

(b) The public, individually and collectively, has an

unrestricted right to use and a right of ingress to and

egress from a public beach.[ 2] The right granted by this

subsection is dedicated as a permanent easement in favor

of the public.

(c) The legislature may enact laws to protect the right of

the public to access and use a public beach and to protect

1 The Legislature proposed the constitutional amendment in the wake

of weather events that shifted the line of vegetation and caused private

structures to become located on the public beach. See, e.g., H. Rsch. Org., Bill

Analysis 2–3, Tex. H.J.R. 102, 81st Leg., R.S. (2009); H. Rsch. Org., Focus

Report No. 81-8, at 22 (Aug. 20, 2009); Tex. Legis. Council, Analyses of

Proposed Constitutional Amendments 50–51 (2009); see also TEX. NAT. RES.

CODE § 61.001(5) (defining “Line of vegetation” as “the extreme seaward

boundary of natural vegetation which spreads continuously inland”),

(8) (defining “Public beach” with reference to the line of vegetation).

Severance—the Court’s seminal case on the Open Beaches Act—addressed

whether such events caused the public easement to “roll” landward onto

privately owned property. 370 S.W.3d at 721–27. But Severance did not

address Section 33. See id. at 713 n.8.

2 “Public beach” is defined as

a state-owned beach bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf

of Mexico, extending from mean low tide to the landward

boundary of state-owned submerged land, and any larger area

extending from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation

bordering on the Gulf of Mexico to which the public has acquired

a right of use or easement to or over the area by prescription or

dedication or has established and retained a right by virtue of

continuous right in the public under Texas common law.

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 33(a).

5

the public beach easement from interference and

encroachments.

(d) This section does not create a private right of

enforcement.

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 33.

A few years later, Space Exploration Technologies Corp. (SpaceX)

was reviewing potential sites for its new rocket launch facility. One such

location was next to Boca Chica Beach in Cameron County. The Federal

Aviation Administration, which licenses rocket launch sites, conditioned

its approval of this site on SpaceX’s ability to restrict public access to

the launch area, including Boca Chica Beach. To facilitate this process,

in 2013 the Legislature passed House Bill 2623, which amended the

Open Beaches Act and authorized SpaceX to request Boca Chica Beach’s

closure on days SpaceX would be conducting space flight activities. 3

Two provisions of HB 2623, now codified in the Natural Resources

Code, are at issue in this case. First, plaintiffs assail the provision that

permits the General Land Office (GLO)’s commissioner to promulgate

rules on “the closure of beaches for space flight activities.” TEX. NAT.

RES. CODE § 61.011(d)(11). Second, plaintiffs challenge Section 61.132,

which permits a county containing an FAA-approved launch site to

3 See H. Rsch. Org., Bill Analysis 2, Tex. H.B. 2623, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013)

(noting that Texas was competing with Florida, Georgia, and Puerto Rico to

house the SpaceX facility), 3 (“[HB] 2623 is necessary for the location at Boca

Chica Beach to be viable as a space launch site.”); S. Rsch. Ctr., Bill Analysis 1,

Tex. H.B. 2623, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013) (“[F]or safety reasons, areas within a

certain radius of a launch site must be closed before a launch . . . .”). It was

understood that HB 2623 would apply only to Cameron County as it was

then—and still remains—the only coastal county in Texas containing an

FAA-approved launch site. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.132(a); H. Rsch.

Org., Bill Analysis 1–2, Tex. H.B. 2623, 83d Leg., R.S. (2013).

6

temporarily close the beach when a space flight is scheduled. That

section provides:

To protect the public health, safety, and welfare, the

commissioners court by order may temporarily close a

beach in reasonable proximity to the launch site or access

points to the beach in the county on a primary or backup

launch date . . . .

Id. § 61.132(c). 4

SaveRGV, a nonprofit environmental advocacy corporation, sued

the GLO, its commissioner, 5 and Cameron County in 2021. According

to SaveRGV’s pleadings, Boca Chica Beach and State Highway 4—the

beach’s only access road—have been closed multiple times for SpaceX

launches. SaveRGV alleges that the beach closures interfere with the

beach-access rights of its members, who perform conservation work at

Boca Chica Beach, enjoy the beach’s wildlife, and otherwise use the

beach for recreation. The lawsuit seeks several declarations, which are

largely predicated on the theory that HB 2623 “irreconcilably conflicts”

with Section 33 and is thus unconstitutional and void.

The Attorney General intervened to defend the statutes, and

Sierra Club and Carrizo/Comecrudo Nation of Texas, Inc. (the Tribe)

intervened as plaintiffs. Like SaveRGV, Sierra Club and the Tribe

4 Section 61.132 requires GLO approval for beach closures on summer

weekends and certain holidays, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.132(d), and requires

compliance with the county’s “beach access and use plan” and “dune protection

plan” as adopted and certified under the Natural Resources Code, id.

§ 61.132(e).

5 When SaveRGV sued, George P. Bush was the GLO’s commissioner.

Dawn Buckingham succeeded him in office and was automatically substituted

in his place. See TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2(a).

7

allege that the beach closures deprive their members of their

constitutionally protected right to access and use Boca Chica Beach.

The Attorney General, GLO and its commissioner, and Cameron

County each filed a plea to the jurisdiction, asserting lack of standing

and immunity. The Attorney General and GLO argued, among other

things, that Section 33(d)’s express disclaimer that it “does not create a

private right of enforcement” deprived plaintiffs of standing to sue. TEX.

CONST. art. I, § 33(d). Cameron County asserted a similar argument but

also framed it in terms of immunity. Plaintiffs 6 responded that courts

have inherent jurisdiction to determine a statute’s constitutionality and

that the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) expressly waives

immunity for their claims. See Town of Shady Shores v. Swanson, 590

S.W.3d 544, 552 (Tex. 2019) (explaining that the UDJA “provid[es] only

a limited waiver” of immunity “for challenges to the validity of an

ordinance or statute”); see generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE

§§ 37.001–.011.

The trial court conducted a hearing, granted all three pleas, and

dismissed plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice. The court of appeals

reversed. 722 S.W.3d 433, 446 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg

2024). The court first held that at least one plaintiff, Sierra Club,

established standing as to all defendants. Id. at 442–44, 442 n.4. The

court then rejected defendants’ argument that plaintiffs failed to

establish a waiver of immunity. Id. at 444–45. The court reasoned that

it was unnecessary to first examine whether plaintiffs’ claims were

6 We refer to SaveRGV, Sierra Club, and the Tribe collectively as

“plaintiffs.”

8

viable because they challenge the constitutionality of a statute and not

governmental actions. Id. at 445.

All defendants petitioned this Court for review. We granted the

petitions and consolidated the cases for oral argument.

II. Discussion

A

Whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question of law we

review de novo. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

217, 228 (Tex. 2004). A “plea to the jurisdiction can challenge the

plaintiff’s pleadings, the existence of jurisdictional facts, or both.” Busse

v. S. Tex. Indep. Sch. Dist., ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL 1279764, at *2 (Tex.

May 8, 2026). When challenging the pleadings, we examine “whether

the plaintiff pleaded facts that affirmatively demonstrate subject matter

jurisdiction.” Id. Only when the pleadings “affirmatively negate the

existence of jurisdiction” will we grant a plea to the jurisdiction without

allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at

227 (emphasis added). When a plea challenges jurisdictional facts, our

standard of review mirrors summary judgment; we “consider relevant

evidence in the record” to determine whether a fact issue exists

regarding jurisdiction. Jones v. Turner, 646 S.W.3d 319, 325 (Tex.

2022).

In their pleas to the jurisdiction, defendants argued that plaintiffs

lack standing. The court of appeals held that at least one plaintiff had

established standing as to all defendants. See 722 S.W.3d at 442 n.4.

We have explained that when one “valid jurisdictional obstacle” exists,

“it is not necessary that every other potential jurisdictional defect be

9

raised, fleshed out, or resolved” by a reviewing court. Rattray v. City of

Brownsville, 662 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. 2023). As we explain below, our

resolution of defendants’ immunity challenge is dispositive here, so we

need not also address standing.

Because sovereign or governmental immunity implicates subject

matter jurisdiction, a governmental defendant may assert its immunity

in a jurisdictional plea. Matzen v. McLane, 659 S.W.3d 381, 388 (Tex.

2021). To defeat an immunity challenge at the plea to the jurisdiction

stage, the plaintiff must plead facts that “affirmatively demonstrate” a

waiver or exception to immunity—otherwise, the plea must be granted.

Id. at 388–89. Suits seeking to vindicate constitutional rights are often

not barred by governmental immunity. See State v. Zurawski, 690

S.W.3d 644, 660–61 (Tex. 2024) (recognizing that the UDJA waives

immunity for suits to declare a statute unconstitutional); City of El Paso

v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372 (Tex. 2009) (holding that suits to

require governmental officials to comply with the Constitution are not

barred by immunity). Nevertheless, “immunity from suit is not waived

if the constitutional claims are facially invalid.” Klumb v. Hou. Mun.

Emps. Pension Sys., 458 S.W.3d 1, 13 (Tex. 2015).

Defendants argue that the court of appeals erred in concluding

their immunity was waived without first evaluating whether plaintiffs

alleged facially valid constitutional claims. See 722 S.W.3d at 445. The

court of appeals expressly declined to “determine the merits of

[plaintiffs’] constitutional arguments at this stage of the proceeding.”

Id. In doing so, the court acknowledged this Court’s decision in Klumb

but distinguished it on the basis that the plaintiffs there challenged the

10

constitutionality of governmental actions rather than, as here, a statute.

See id. (citing Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 3–4). In essence, the court of

appeals concluded it was unnecessary to evaluate the facial validity of

plaintiffs’ constitutional claims because they challenge a statute instead

of merely alleging that the defendants acted ultra vires—i.e., outside the

bounds of their lawful authority. See, e.g., Matzen, 659 S.W.3d at 388.

We agree with defendants that the court of appeals erred in

disregarding this critical analytical step. When, as here, a

governmental defendant asserts that it is immune from a claim

asserting a constitutional violation, Klumb requires courts to determine

whether the claim is facially valid. In Klumb, the plaintiffs alleged that

members of Houston’s pension board acted ultra vires and

unconstitutionally in restructuring contribution requirements for city

employees. 458 S.W.3d at 7. The pension board and its members

countered that sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs’ constitutional

claims because those claims were “facially invalid.” Id.

This Court agreed. First, it rejected the plaintiffs’ equal-

protection claims, stating that the claims “fail[ed] as a matter of law”

because “the board’s actions [we]re rationally related to at least two

legitimate government objectives which [we]re promoted by the

challenged classification.” Id. at 14. Second, the Court rejected the

plaintiffs’ due-course challenge because a prior dispositive decision

foreclosed the legal theory they pleaded. See id. at 15–17. The

consequence of these holdings was that the plaintiffs “failed to plead

actionable . . . constitutional claims,” and thus subject matter

jurisdiction over those claims was “lacking as a matter of law.” Id. at

11

17. Klumb did not turn on whether the plaintiffs challenged a statute

or conduct they alleged was ultra vires.

Since Klumb, this Court has undertaken the same analysis when

a plaintiff challenges a statute as unconstitutional. In Abbott v. Mexican

American Legislative Caucus, the plaintiffs challenged statutes that

reapportioned legislative districts. 647 S.W.3d 681, 687–88 (Tex. 2022).

The defendants asserted immunity in pleas to the jurisdiction, arguing

that the plaintiffs failed to establish an immunity waiver because their

constitutional claims were not “viable.” Id. at 688.

We concluded immunity was waived as to one constitutional

claim. Id. at 700. But we rejected another claim, explaining that the

plaintiffs’ reading of the constitutional provision at issue was not

supported by its text, context, or case law. Id. at 701–03. This latter

claim, we held, was “facially invalid and thus barred by sovereign

immunity.” Id. at 703.

More recently, in State v. Zurawski, we examined the validity of

claims raising constitutional challenges to the Human Life Protection

Act. See 690 S.W.3d at 661. At the outset, we reaffirmed that the UDJA

does not waive immunity for any and all claims against the government.

Id. at 660–61. Rather, we explained that “to obtain declaratory relief

against the government, it is necessary to show that the challenged law

is invalid because it is unconstitutional, preempted by superior

governing law, or barred for some similar reason.” Id. at 661.

We went on to examine whether the plaintiffs’ allegations—that

the Act violated the Texas Constitution’s due-course and equal-

protection guarantees—had merit. In doing so, we analyzed what those

12

who ratified the due-course clause in 1845 would have understood its

language to mean. Id. at 666–67. We ultimately dismissed the due-

course claim because the allegations did not demonstrate a viable

constitutional challenge to the Act. See id. at 668–69. We also rejected

the equal-protection challenge because the “record [did] not demonstrate

that the Act lacks a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental

purpose.” Id. at 671.

The court of appeals in this case, however, distinguished Klumb—

and determined no facial validity analysis was needed—because the

plaintiffs in Klumb challenged governmental conduct, whereas plaintiffs

here contend that the statutes codifying HB 2623 are themselves

unconstitutional. See 722 S.W.3d at 445. Our recent cases demonstrate

that this distinction does not hold up. Although the court of appeals did

not have the benefit of Zurawski, many other cases embrace the

principle we emphasize today: “immunity from suit is not waived if the

constitutional claims are facially invalid.” Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus,

647 S.W.3d at 698 (quoting Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 13); see also Matzen,

659 S.W.3d at 394 (explaining that “when sovereign immunity is

asserted,” the plaintiff has the “burden to plead facts that affirmatively

state a viable claim”); Andrade v. NAACP of Aus., 345 S.W.3d 1, 11 (Tex.

2011) (stating that a governmental defendant “retains immunity from

suit unless the [plaintiffs] have pleaded a viable claim”). Whether such

claims are premised on allegedly unconstitutional governmental

conduct or allegedly unconstitutional statutes is immaterial.

The court of appeals was thus obligated to determine whether

plaintiffs’ claims are facially valid. Although we could remand for the

13

court of appeals to evaluate facial validity, in the interest of judicial

economy, we will exercise our discretion to address the question here.

See RSL Funding, LLC v. Newsome, 569 S.W.3d 116, 124 (Tex. 2018)

(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 53.4); Pedernal Energy, LLC v. Bruington Eng’g,

Ltd., 536 S.W.3d 487, 495 (Tex. 2017) (“The parties have briefed and

argued the issue here, so in the interest of judicial economy we will

address it rather than remanding to the court of appeals.”).

B

We have described the task of addressing a constitutional claim’s

facial validity as a “jurisdictional inquiry [that] touches the merits.”

Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d at 699. And we have

emphasized that courts undertaking this analysis should “go no further

than necessary to determine jurisdiction,” id., and “address the

‘merits’ . . . only to the extent necessary to grant the opportunity to

replead,” id. at 700 n.9. See also Matzen, 659 S.W.3d at 394 (“[I]t is not

the [defendant]’s burden to show that the plaintiff could never state a

viable claim. Instead, it is the plaintiff’s burden to plead facts that

affirmatively state a viable claim.” (emphasis added)).

Here, the viability of plaintiffs’ challenge to HB 2623 is

“intertwined with” our interpretation of the constitutional provision

they invoke. See Zurawski, 690 S.W.3d at 661–62. So we examine

Section 33 in accordance with our principles of constitutional

interpretation to determine whether plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are

facially valid, which, in turn, determines whether defendants retain

immunity from suit. See Mexican Am. Legis. Caucus, 647 S.W.3d at 698

(explaining that whether “constitutional claims are facially invalid and

14

thus barred by immunity . . . hinges on our interpretation of the

provisions at issue”).

When interpreting the Constitution, “our bottom-line task is to

identify what the constitutional provision would have meant to those

who ratified it.” Hogan v. S. Methodist Univ., 688 S.W.3d 852, 857 (Tex.

2024). We “rely heavily on the literal text,” presume “the framers

carefully chose the language,” and “focus on the voters’

contemporaneous understanding” to identify “what the voters who

ratified the amendment would have understood it to mean.” Perez v.

City of San Antonio, 715 S.W.3d 709, 715 (Tex. 2025) (citations omitted).

We may also “consider contextual factors such as ‘the history of the

legislation, the conditions and spirit of the times, the prevailing

sentiments of the people, the evils intended to be remedied, and the good

to be accomplished.’” Degan v. Bd. of Trs. of Dall. Police & Fire Pension

Sys., 594 S.W.3d 309, 313 (Tex. 2020) (quoting Harris Cnty. Hosp. Dist.

v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009)).

Because we take into account the historical context surrounding

the ratification of constitutional language, “we may consider evidence of

the contemporaneous explanations and understandings of the

legislature that proposed the language.” Perez, 715 S.W.3d at 716; see

also TEX. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (describing the process for amending the

Constitution, which begins with a legislative proposal and ends with

majority approval by qualified voters). Whereas legislative history

accompanying a statute is “generally useless to courts,” we have

acknowledged that such history “can be relevant” to contextualize

constitutional ratification. Perez, 715 S.W.3d at 716 n.8 (citation

15

omitted). If historical context suggests that the framers chose words

that constitute “a legal term of art” or “carr[y] jurisprudential baggage

beyond [their] plain meaning,” we must factor such context into our

analysis. Hogan, 688 S.W.3d at 857, 858.

This Court has not yet had occasion to interpret Section 33. Cf.

Severance, 370 S.W.3d at 713 n.8 (acknowledging Section 33’s adoption

but noting it was “not at issue”). We also note that the text central to

our facial validity analysis—subsection (d)’s declaration that Section 33

“does not create a private right of enforcement”—is unique. TEX. CONST.

art. I, § 33(d). The phrase appears nowhere else in our Constitution or

our statutes. Unsurprisingly, the parties advance conflicting arguments

about what this language means.

In their jurisdictional pleas, defendants argued that

Section 33(d)’s declaration that it “does not create a private right of

enforcement” categorically precludes private-party claims seeking

Section 33(b)’s enforcement. Defendants assert that only governmental

actors may enforce Section 33 and that this reading harmonizes

subsection (d) with the Open Beaches Act’s longstanding enforcement

scheme. The logical endpoint of their claim that only governmental

actors may enforce Section 33 is that dismissal of the entire case is

warranted here, since all plaintiffs are private actors. 7

Plaintiffs do not dispute that they are private parties. Rather,

they respond that their suit is not a “private right of enforcement”

7 The Attorney General abandoned this argument in the court of

appeals, see 722 S.W.3d at 443 n.5, and does not press it in this Court. But the

GLO and Cameron County consistently pressed the argument in the courts

below and continue to do so in this Court.

16

because they do not seek damages or an injunction. For its part, the

court of appeals opined that the private right of enforcement referenced

in subsection (d) “would most likely take the form of an injunction

against a private entity, such as SpaceX, to prohibit their space flight

launches that lead to the closure of Boca Chica Beach.” 722 S.W.3d at

443. It is not clear whether the court of appeals concluded that a suit

must both be brought against a private party and seek injunctive relief

to fall within the scope of subsection (d). Regardless, we disagree with

the court’s conclusion because a request for injunctive relief is not

necessary to bring a claim within subsection (d)’s ambit and

subsection (d)’s applicability does not turn on whether the defendant is

a private actor.

To discern the meaning voters ascribed to subsection (d) when it

was ratified in 2009, we first consider the plain meaning of its text

according to contemporaneous sources. See Perez, 715 S.W.3d at

716–17. We begin by consulting dictionary definitions. See, e.g., id. at

718; In re Dallas County, 697 S.W.3d 142, 156–57 (Tex. 2024). “Private

right” means a “personal right, as opposed to a right of the public or the

state.” Private right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). “Public

right,” by contrast, means a “right belonging to all citizens and usu[ally]

vested in and exercised by a public office or political entity.” Public

right, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). And “enforcement”

means the “act or process of compelling compliance with a law, mandate,

command, decree, or agreement.” Enforcement, BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009); see also Enforcement, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW

INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (2002) (“the compelling of the fulfillment (as

17

of a law or order)”); Enforce, THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY

(2001) (“compel observance of or compliance with (a law, rule, or

obligation)”).

As noted, the focal point of constitutional interpretation is how

voters contemporaneously understood the text. Within Section 33,

subsection (b) recognizes that the public has a right both “individually”

and “collectively” to access and use public beaches. TEX. CONST. art. I,

§ 33(b). By contrast, subsection (d)’s proviso that the amendment “does

not create a private right of enforcement,” id. § 33(d) (emphasis added),

means Section 33 created no new personal right of enforcement for

private individuals. Instead, the plain meaning of the text suggests the

right to enforce Section 33 resides with public, or governmental, actors.

We next consult the background law that existed at the time of

Section 33’s adoption because, as a general matter, we “read the

constitutional text not in a vacuum but also through the lenses of history

and precedent.” Borgelt v. Aus. Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF Loc. 975, 692

S.W.3d 288, 299 (Tex. 2024); see also Perez, 715 S.W.3d at 716 n.8

(collecting cases in which this Court looked to the drafters’

understanding of related law in interpreting the Constitution). Our

attention to context is especially important where, as here, the

constitutional text indicates that it was adopted with reference to

preexisting law. That Section 33 does not “create” a private right of

enforcement points our attention to the enforcement rights that were

already in place regarding open beaches—rights that would remain

unchanged after the amendment’s passage according to its text.

18

We thus turn to examine the law that existed at the time of

Section 33’s ratification—the Open Beaches Act itself. Our conclusion

above regarding the plain meaning of Section 33’s text coheres with the

Act’s preexisting enforcement scheme. The Act authorizes—indeed,

mandates—governmental enforcement of open beaches. For example,

the Act states that the GLO’s commissioner “shall strictly and

vigorously enforce the prohibition against encroachments on and

interferences with the public beach easement” and “shall promulgate

rules” on related matters. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE § 61.011(c), (d).

Further, the commissioner “may order the removal of a structure,

improvement, obstruction, barrier, or hazard from a public beach.” Id.

§ 61.0183(a). The Act also commands local governments to “adopt a plan

for preserving and enhancing access to and use of public beaches within

the[ir] jurisdiction” when private development is sought near the beach.

Id. § 61.015(a). And in a section titled “Enforcement,” the Act authorizes

“[a]ny county attorney, or the attorney general at the request of the

commissioner, [to] bring a suit for a declaratory judgment to try any

issue affecting the public’s right of access to or use of the public beach.”

Id. § 61.018(d) (emphasis added).

In contrast to several provisions vesting responsibility for the

Act’s enforcement with governmental actors, the Act contains a single

provision authorizing suits by private parties. Section 61.019 permits

property owners whose rights are affected by the Act to bring a

declaratory-judgment action against the State. Id. § 61.019. Notably,

19

plaintiffs here allege no injury falling within this narrow category of

permitted private suits. 8

In short, the Act includes just one provision authorizing

private-plaintiff suits against the State in a particular scenario, and it

is inapplicable here. By contrast, multiple provisions authorize and

require governmental enforcement of the Act. Thus, Section 33’s

statement that it “does not create a private right of enforcement,” TEX.

CONST. art. I, § 33(d) (emphasis added), signals the framers’

understanding that the Act’s existing enforcement scheme, involving

almost exclusively governmental actors, would continue after

Section 33’s ratification.

Beyond considering text and context, we also consult

contemporaneous public sources to discern original public meaning. See,

e.g., Perez, 715 S.W.3d at 722 (citing a newspaper editorial to determine

public understanding of a constitutional amendment). Our research has

revealed only one contemporaneous publication that referenced

subsection (d), and it supports our interpretation. A 2009 editorial in

the Corpus Christi Caller–Times analyzed the proposed constitutional

amendment and warned voters of subsection (d)’s important caveat that

“enforcement . . . still would be the responsibility of authorities.”

Editorial, Yes on Prop. 9, with a couple reservations, CORPUS CHRISTI

CALLER–TIMES, Oct. 24, 2009, at 8A. In a similar vein, the House

Research Organization, which publishes reports on proposed

8 Although SaveRGV’s petition identifies a member who owned property

near Boca Chica Beach and alleges that the beach closures “impacted her

ability to use and enjoy her home,” she did not sue to determine her property

rights and eventually “s[old] her property and move[d] elsewhere.”

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constitutional amendments, noted supporters’ belief that Section 33

“would not change current practices,” H. Rsch. Org., Focus Report

No. 81-8, at 21 (Aug. 20, 2009)—the current practices being those set out

under the Open Beaches Act, which vested enforcement authority with

the State and local governments, save the one inapplicable provision

noted above.

To sum up, text, context, and contemporaneous sources all point

in the same direction: Section 33 constitutionalized the public’s right to

beach access, but it did not expand or confer on private citizens a right

of enforcement or otherwise alter the preexisting enforcement scheme,

which resided with governmental actors alone.

Plaintiffs respond that we must allow their suit to proceed

because of Section 33’s placement in Article I—our Constitution’s Bill of

Rights. This placement is critical, they argue, because constitutional

guarantees located within the Bill of Rights are self-executing and thus

invoke the judicial power to declare contrary laws void. To support this

argument, plaintiffs cite City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143

(Tex. 1995). In Bouillion, former officers of the Beaumont Police

Department sued the city, alleging they were punished for exercising

their free-speech and assembly rights when they disclosed the

Department’s legal violations to the press. Id. at 144–45. The officers

asked this Court to “recognize an implied private right of action for

damages” for constitutional violations, akin to the “federal Bivens-type

cause of action.” Id. at 146; see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents

of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (authorizing suits

for damages against federal officials for Fourth Amendment violations);

21

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (authorizing suits against state officials for

constitutional violations).

This Court declined to recognize such a claim. Not only was there

“no historical basis to create the remedy sought,” the Court reasoned,

but “the text of the Texas Bill of Rights cuts against an implied private

right of action for the damages sought because it explicitly announces

the consequences of unconstitutional laws.” Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d at

148. “When a law conflicts with rights guaranteed by Article 1,” the

Court explained, “the Constitution declares that such acts are void

because the Bill of Rights is a limit on State power.” Id. at 149.

Bouillion described this principle as emanating from Article I,

Section 29 of our Constitution, which states:

To guard against transgressions of the high powers herein

delegated, we declare that every thing in this “Bill of

Rights” is excepted out of the general powers of

government, and shall forever remain inviolate, and all

laws contrary thereto, or to the following provisions, shall

be void.

TEX. CONST. art. I, § 29; see also Tex. Med. Res., LLP v. Molina

Healthcare of Tex., Inc., 659 S.W.3d 424, 432 (Tex. 2023) (“[T]he Bill of

Rights expressly provides for an equitable action to declare a law void.”).

We agree that Bouillion stands for the general principle that

private citizens can seek to declare statutes conflicting with Article I

void—subject, of course, to other legal obstacles any given case may

present. But we disagree with plaintiffs’ contention that Section 33’s

placement in Article I means that it, too, automatically invokes the

judicial power to award equitable relief from unconstitutional statutes.

Section 33 diverges from other Bill of Rights provisions by including

22

express language that “[t]his section does not create a private right of

enforcement.” TEX. CONST. art. I, § 33(d) (emphasis added).

We must give meaning, first and foremost, to subsection (d)’s text

and consider the backdrop of the Open Beaches Act against which that

constitutional provision was adopted. See, e.g., Oakley v. State, 830

S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“[T]hose who are called on to

construe the Constitution should not thwart the will of the people by

construing it differently from its plain meaning.”). We cannot ignore

that the People disclaimed private enforcement suits when they enacted

Section 33—after Bouillion was decided—to create new constitutional

rights. Cf. BankDirect Cap. Fin., LLC v. Plasma Fab, LLC, 519 S.W.3d

76, 86 (Tex. 2017) (“Separation of powers demands that judge-

interpreters be sticklers . . . about not rewriting statutes under the

guise of interpreting them.”).

* * *

Section 33’s plain text and the historical and legislative context

in which it was adopted together compel our conclusion that

subsection (d) bars these private plaintiffs’ claims. We thus hold that

plaintiffs’ claims are facially invalid. 9 This jurisdictional defect—the

fact that plaintiffs are private, not governmental, actors—cannot be

9 Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims are facially invalid for a

second, independent reason: HB 2623 is a constitutional exercise of the State’s

police power. Because the jurisdictional challenge based on subsection (d) is

dispositive, we express no view on whether the beach closures, or the statutes

permitting them, violate the public’s “unrestricted” right described in

Section 33(b). See, e.g., Rattray, 662 S.W.3d at 868 (“When defendants

challenge jurisdiction on multiple grounds, courts are . . . not duty-bound to

address them all if any one of them warrants dismissal . . . .” (footnote

omitted)).

23

cured on remand. Rather, these pleadings “conclusively negate the

existence of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Klumb, 458 S.W.3d at 17; see

also Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227 (“If the pleadings affirmatively negate

the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be

granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend.”).

Accordingly, the trial court correctly dismissed the case with prejudice. 10

III. Conclusion

The court of appeals erred in concluding it was unnecessary to

examine whether plaintiffs alleged a facially valid constitutional claim

before determining whether the UDJA waives defendants’ immunity.

Determining whether a plaintiff’s constitutional claim is facially valid is

a prerequisite to answering whether immunity bars the suit. Here,

plaintiffs’ claims challenging HB 2623 as violative of Article I,

Section 33 are facially invalid because they constitute an attempted

“private right of enforcement,” which Section 33(d) forecloses. We

reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstate the trial court’s

judgment dismissing all claims for lack of jurisdiction.

Rebeca A. Huddle

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: June 19, 2026

10 We acknowledge that the Tribe’s allegations allude to a different kind

of injury the beach closures may inflict on its members: interference with their

religious practices. Today’s holding should not be construed to prohibit the

Tribe—or private parties generally—from seeking relief for such injuries they

suffer due to HB 2623. We hold only that Section 33 cannot serve as the basis

for that relief.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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