TEMPLETON

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

ROBERT TEMPLETON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 24cv671

)

CITY OF HIGH POINT et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge.

Before the court is the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19)

by Defendants City of High Point, Brian Evans, and Thomas Reid.

The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 20, 23, 26), and the court heard

argument on it on April 29, 2026. At the hearing, the court

granted the motion in part and denied it in part. (See Text Order

of April 29, 2026.) The court reserved ruling on whether

Defendants Evans and Reid are entitled to qualified immunity. (See

Doc. 20 at 24-27.) For the following reasons, the court concludes

that fact issues remain that preclude Defendants Evans and Reid

from entitlement to qualified immunity, and the motion for summary

judgment is therefore denied to that extent.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Robert Templeton began his employment with the High

Point Fire Department (“HPFD”) in June 2000. (Doc. 23-1 at 330.)

He currently holds the rank of Fire Captain II. (Id.) Templeton

became President of Local 673 of the International Association of

Fire Fighters (“IAFF”) in January 2023. (Id. at 331, 333.) The

IAFF is a labor union which represents more than 360,000

firefighters, paramedics, and emergency responders in the United

States and Canada. (Id. at 331.) IAFF Local 673 had fewer than

ten members at the beginning of Templeton’s tenure as President,

despite there being approximately 240 HPFD employees. (Id.)

Shortly after starting as President, Templeton reached out to

the High Point Mayor, High Point City Council, and the High Point

City Manager to express his views on what he considered “matters

of public concern,” “includ[ing] staffing shortages and pay-

related issues.” (Id. at 333.) On February 6, 2023, he addressed

the High Point City Council about such concerns. (Id.) In the

fall of that year he met with Cyril Jefferson, then a candidate

for Mayor of High Point; news of that meeting spread throughout

HPFD, and HPFD leadership, according to Templeton, backed

Jefferson’s opponent. (Id. at 334.) Several weeks after this

meeting, on October 24, Templeton received the lowest performance

review of his career. (Id.) Local 673 nevertheless endorsed

Jefferson for mayor on October 30. (Id.) Templeton posted on

social media about Local 673’s support for Jefferson, both before

and after Jefferson won the mayorship in November. (Id.)

Templeton was involuntarily transferred to Station 11 from

Station 4 on November 27, 2023; he had not requested a transfer.

(Id.) Station 11 is a “punishment station” because, Templeton

declares, higher call volume is correlated with higher performance

reviews, which in turn corresponds to higher compensation. (Id.;

id. at 338.) Station 11 is one of the slowest stations in High

Point, while Station 4 is one of the busiest. (Id. at 334-35.)

Templeton nevertheless continued to advocate for Local 673

and its interests, such as “pay compression issues, recruitment

and retention issues, safety-related issues, [and] staffing

shortages.” (Id. at 335, 336; see id. at 338 (stating that his

public concern speech includes “posting on the union’s social media

about staffing shortages, pay compression issues, [and] safety-

related issues; discussing the union’s work with [his] HPFD

colleagues; notifying the High Point community whenever there are

station closures due to staffing shortages; notifying the High

Point community about the need for an increased budget for the

HPFD; working with the IAFF to conduct pay studies; and challenging

the HPFD promotional process”).) He posted these concerns on

social media, spoke with HPFD colleagues, and sought meetings with

HPFD leadership on these issues. (Id.)

On March 29, 2024, Defendant Reid, the fire chief, retired,

and Defendant Evans was named interim fire chief. (Id.) In April,

Evans met with Templeton about his union speaking and told him

that fire department concerns needed to be raised through the chain

of command. (Id.) Templeton filed a grievance thereafter. (Id.)

On May 28, Templeton met with High Point officials to discuss his

grievance; present at the meeting were High Point Human Resources

Director Scherrie Lowery, Angela Kirkwood, and HPFD leadership,

including Evans. (Id.; see Doc. 26 at 5 n.4.) At this meeting,

Kirkwood repeatedly told Templeton that he was not prohibited from

speaking as a citizen on matters of public concern. (See generally

Audio Recording of Plaintiff’s May 28, 2024 Meeting (Exhibit C to

Doc. 26).) But Kirkwood and others repeatedly expressed their

view that “fire department concerns” should be brought up through

HPFD’s chain of command, rather than directly to members of High

Point’s governance. (E.g., id. at 1:05:45-1:06:10.) A member of

HPFD leadership, possibly Evans, also expressed a narrow view of

what constituted a matter of public concern. He stated as an

example that the closure of six fire stations would be a matter of

public concern, but that the issues Templeton had been raising

were specific to HPFD – and these were “two different things.”

(Id. at 1:20:30-1:20:42.)

Templeton declares that he also received other corrective

action by Defendants that amounted to discipline. On March 6,

2023 (before his transfer to the “punishment station” but after he

had started as President of Local 673), Templeton received a

counseling form for his decision to execute a “suicide

run” – deliberately driving on the left (wrong) side of the road

to arrive more quickly at the scene of an emergency. (Doc. 23-1

at 24.) On September 7, 2023, Templeton received a counseling

form for his objection to carrying out a training exercise during

high temperatures. (Doc. 23-1 at 38.) Templeton declares that he

has never heard of an HPFD employee being disciplined for deciding

to carry out a suicide run or objecting to training exercises

during high temperatures. (Doc. 23-1 at 333.) On April 8, 2024,

Templeton received a counseling form signed by Evans, advising him

that his “conversations with members of City Council in reference

to Fire Department concerns . . . violate[] departmental policy

(chain of command).”1 (Doc. 20-4 at 33.)

Templeton filed this lawsuit on August 9, 2024. (Doc. 1.)

His complaint alleges the following: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for

retaliation in violation of his freedom of speech rights under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1 at 13 (Count I)); a § 1983

claim for a prior restraint in violation of his freedom of speech

rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1 at 14

(Count II)); a § 1983 claim for violation of his right to freedom

of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1

at 16 (Count III)); a § 1983 claim for violation of his right to

petition under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1 at 18

(Count IV)); and last, a claim for violation of his freedom of

speech, petition, and association rights under Article 1 of the

1 Defendants for their part offered testimony that counseling forms “are

not discipline.” (Doc. 20-6 at 1 (Declaration of Scherrie Lowery).)

North Carolina Constitution (Doc. 1 at 20 (Count V)). Templeton

pleads each claim against all Defendants. (See Doc. 1 at 13, 14,

16, 18, 20.)

On September 6, 2024, Templeton was involved in a “verbal

altercation” with a community member while he responded to an

emergency call; HPFD ordered him “to undergo mandatory EAP

sessions” after the incident. (Doc. 23-1 at 336-37.) Finally, on

December 30, 2024, Templeton was disciplined for failing to timely

respond to an emergency call notification. (Id. at 337.)

At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the court

ruled on all aspects of the motion except as it related to Reid

and Evans’ request for qualified immunity. The court granted

Defendants summary judgment on Templeton’s prior restraint claim

(Count II), because Templeton offered no evidence that Defendants

had actually prohibited any of his speech. The court also

dismissed Templeton’s claim for violations of the North Carolina

Constitution (Count V) as it related to Defendants Reid and Evans

in their individual capacities, because North Carolina does not

recognize a state claim against state officials in their individual

capacities for alleged violations of state constitutional rights.

And the court dismissed all claims against the City of High Point,

because Templeton could not identify a specific city policy that

led to his claimed First Amendment injury. But the court denied

the motion as it related to Templeton’s First Amendment retaliation

claim (Count I), freedom of association claim (Count III), and

petition claim (Count IV). The court reserved ruling on Reid and

Evans’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity,

which applies to those latter three claims.

II. ANALYSIS

Qualified immunity shields government officials performing

discretionary functions from personal liability for civil damages

under § 1983, so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors

Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson

v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)). Officials are entitled to

immunity unless the § 1983 claim satisfies a two-prong test: (1)

the allegations, if true, substantiate a violation of federal

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was “clearly

established” such that a reasonable official would have known his

acts or omissions violated that right. Id.; Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 739 (2002). The court may consider the prongs in either

order, as a plaintiff’s failure to satisfy either entitles the

officer to immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236

(2009).

“A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established

law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of

a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would

have understood that what he is doing violates that right.”

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (alterations,

quotation marks, and citation omitted). However, it is not

necessary that the precise “action in question has previously been

held unlawful.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).

Rather, “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be

apparent.” Id. An officer has a right to fair notice of the

unlawfulness of the conduct. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739. The Fourth

Circuit applies a split burden of proof for claims of qualified

immunity. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing a violation

of his rights, while the defendant bears the burden of proving

that the right was not clearly established. Stanton v. Elliott,

25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir 2022).

Here, Templeton alleges that Defendants have violated his

First Amendment rights. Specifically, he alleges that Defendants

retaliated against him and violated his freedom of speech,

association, and petition rights. (Doc. 1 at 13-14, 16-20.) To

succeed on his First Amendment claims, Templeton must show: (1)

the speech at issue relates to a matter of public concern, (2) his

interest in First Amendment expression outweighs his employer’s

interest in efficient operation of the workplace, (3) he suffered

an adverse action that would tend to chill his exercise of his

First Amendment rights, and (4) the First Amendment expression was

a “substantial factor” in his employer’s decision to take the

adverse action. Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co.,

218 F.3d 337, 351-52 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Minnick v. Cnty. Of

Currituck, 521 F. App’x 255, 264 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting the

analytical similarity between freedom of speech and freedom of

association claims);2 Daniels v. Quinn, 801 F.2d 687, 690 (4th Cir.

1986) (“The considerations that have led the Supreme Court to

delimit the protection accorded public employees under the Free

Speech Clause apply equally to the right to petition.”).

In asserting qualified immunity, Defendants challenge both

prongs of the defense. They argue first that Templeton has failed

to offer sufficient evidence to make out a constitutional

violation. More specifically, they argue that he fails to offer

evidence on the third and fourth elements of his First Amendment

claims – that is, he has neither suffered an adverse employment

action, nor shown a causal connection between his protected speech

and any adverse action. (Doc. 20 at 14-20.) They explicitly

reserve argument on the question of whether Templeton can establish

the first and second elements: whether his speech was on a matter

of public concern, and whether his interest in speaking outweighed

any disruption to workplace operations. (Id. at 14 n.3.)

In attacking the clearly established prong of qualified

2 Unpublished opinions of the Fourth Circuit are not precedential but

are cited for their persuasive, but not controlling, authority. See

Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006).

immunity, by contrast, Defendants focus on the first two elements.

They argue that whether Templeton’s “workplace criticisms related

to Department pay, understaffing, surrendered vacations, and

leadership favoritism constitute matters of public concern that

outweigh HPFD’s interest in regulating the speech is a highly fact-

intensive, gray area under the law” that was not clearly

established. (Id. at 26; see Doc. 26 at 14 (asserting that “an

employee’s workplace criticisms are highly fact-intensive, gray

areas under the law”).)

Templeton responds by arguing that his speech about fire

department issues of equipment sufficiency, recruitment and

retention problems, and community safety is clearly established as

a matter of public concern. (Doc. 23 at 14.) He also argues that

he has suffered adverse actions, pointing to his transfer to the

“punishment station” and lower appraisal scores following his

speech on issues of public concern, and offering evidence that

these actions will ultimately reduce his earnings. (Doc. 23 at 7,

12-14; Doc. 23-1 at 338.)

As to the first prong, the court finds that Templeton has

offered sufficient evidence to support an underlying

constitutional violation. Defendants argue that Templeton has

failed to establish a materially adverse employment action; he has

not shown, according to Defendants, that his counseling forms,

lower performance reviews, or transfer to a station with lower

call volume will result in his losing income. (Doc. 20 at 15-16;

Doc. 26 at 6-9.) They point to the declaration of HPFD’s Deputy

Chief of Operations, Jayson Valade, who states that “[c]all volume

is not a metric in determining compensation.” (Doc. 26-3 at 1,

3.) They also note the declaration of High Point’s Assistant Human

Resources Director, Scherrie Lowery, who states that “counseling

forms are not discipline.” (Doc. 20-6 at 1.) And they argue that

Templeton has not established a causal connection between any

adverse action and his speaking. (Doc. 20 at 17-19.)

For the reasons expressed at the hearing, however, Templeton

has offered sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether HPFD took adverse employment actions

against him linked to his First Amendment expression. As a 25-

year HPFD employee, Templeton appropriately claims personal

knowledge of the factors that affect compensation. Defendants’

argument that he “lacks the foundational knowledge” to support his

assertion that call volume affects compensation is unpersuasive at

this stage. (Doc. 26 at 8.) The court declines to disregard

Templeton’s understanding of his compensation, for two reasons.

First, as a fire department employee with over 25 years’

experience, it is implausible that Templeton would not have an

understanding of the factors influencing his compensation.

Second, record evidence indicates that “Emergency Management” is

one factor impacting an HPFD employee’s annual appraisal. (See,

e.g., Doc. 23-1 at 277, 279-80.) It is at least plausible that a

decrease in call volume – which is to say, a decrease in

Templeton’s ability to respond to emergencies as a result of his

transfer – could negatively impact the appraisal.

Templeton also states that Defendants repeatedly expressed

their displeasure with him for going outside the “chain of command”

with his public speaking on behalf of the firefighters’ union,3

and evinced a too-cramped view of matters of public concern. In

addition to the statements made in the May 28, 2024 meeting,

Templeton also offers the April 8, 2024 counseling form, signed by

Evans, in which the HPFD “advised” him that his “conversations

with members of City Council in reference to fire department

concerns . . . violate[d] departmental policy (chain of command).”

(Doc. 23-1 at 42.) There is therefore disputed evidence on the

materiality of Defendants’ actions, including whether they in fact

reduced his compensation,4 as Plaintiff argues, which the court

3 A recording of Templeton’s May 28, 2024 meeting with Defendants, offered

by Defendants (Doc. 27), reflects that Templeton claimed to have

attempted to raise his concerns through HPFD’s chain of command, without

a satisfactory response. (Audio Recording of Plaintiff’s May 28, 2024

Meeting at 58:15-1:00:17.)

4 Defendants assert that Templeton’s 2022-2023 performance review is not

a materially adverse action because the lowering of his score by .19 was

only “de minimis” and resulted in the same categorical score of “Meets

Expectations.” (Doc. 20 at 15-16.) Templeton declares, however, that

his 2022-2023 score of 2.9 fell below the 3.0 threshold for the Meets

Expectations category, and “directly lowered” his “pay since 2024.”

(Doc. 23-1 at 334.) Determining who is right in this dispute is for

trial, not summary judgment.

cannot weigh at this summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Rather, Templeton has

created a fact issue as to whether Defendants have materially

altered the terms and conditions of his employment in a way that

would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First

Amendment rights.

As Templeton has offered sufficient evidence of an underlying

constitutional violation, the court now considers whether

Defendants have demonstrated that the law in this area was not

clearly established. In determining whether a right is clearly

established, the court is “not to define clearly established law

at a high level of generality.” Byers v. Painter, 173 F.4th 155,

165 (4th Cir. 2026) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104

(2018)). Here, the question is whether the law was clearly

established by January 2023 that Templeton had a right to speak to

the public and city officials about HPFD pay, staffing and

recruitment difficulties, and equipment sufficiency, without

receiving transfer to a less-desirable fire station and counseling

forms with lower scores that result in lower pay for him, as a

result of this speaking. Cf. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 804

(4th Cir. 1995) (phrasing the question presented as “whether it

was clearly established in the Fall of 1990, when these actions

allegedly occurred, (1) that statements such as those made by

DiMeglio before the EBIA were constitutionally protected

expressions and (2) that retaliatory conduct in the form of a

reprimand and reassignment of responsibilities constituted

deprivation of a valuable government benefit”) (footnote omitted);

Lilienthal v. City of Suffolk, 275 F. Supp. 2d 684, 694 (E.D. Va.

2003) (“Stated at the appropriate level of particularity, the first

right allegedly violated by defendant Outlaw is the right of a

firefighter to express his personal views on a matter of public

concern without being threatened with termination motivated by the

fire chief's opposition to the expression of such views.”).

It was. Templeton has offered evidence that he spoke to

mayoral candidates, city council members, fire department

employees, and the public at large about “pay compression issues,

recruitment and retention issues, safety-related issues, [and]

staffing shortages.” (Doc. 23-1 at 335, 336.) These issues

concern the ability of the HPFD to carry out its vital work

protecting life and property; indeed, Templeton’s concerns go to

the safety of the community. Speech on these matters has been

clearly established as a matter of public concern within the Fourth

Circuit at least as far back as 2002. See, e.g., Lilienthal, 275

F. Supp. 2d at 691, 694 (first concluding that “fire department

issues such as safety, equipment, staffing, and response time are

subjects in which ‘the public or the community is likely to be

truly concerned’ and ‘interested,’” and then concluding that “in

September 2002, it was clearly established that a fire chief’s

disagreement with a firefighter’s views on fire department safety

issues and the firefighter’s manner of expressing those views is

insufficient to justify conditioning continued employment upon the

cessation of the protected expression based on a perceived threat

of disruption”).

Defendants’ argument to the contrary is sparse, and their

caselaw is not on point. Although it is true that “the Fourth

Circuit has recognized that only infrequently will it be ‘clearly

established’ that a public employee’s speech on a matter of public

concern is constitutionally protected,” Sheaffer v. County of

Chatham, 337 F. Supp. 2d 709, 722 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (quotation marks

and citation omitted), Templeton’s speech touches on a matter of

quintessential public concern – the ability of the fire department

to carry out its mission effectively, and by extension the safety

of the community. And Defendants do not offer any evidence or

argument at this stage of disruption from Templeton’s speaking

that would be necessary for this court to find their interest in

suppressing the speech outweighed his interest in speaking. (See

generally Docs. 20, 26.)

Because Templeton has shown that his right to speak about the

ability of HPFD to carry out its mission was clearly established

as a matter of public concern, any retaliation by reducing the

speaker’s income would constitute a clearly established violation

of that right. Cf. Saleh v. Upadhyay, 11 F. App’x 241, 257 (4th

Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“The reduction of Saleh’s raises for three

years in a row constitutes an adverse employment action that may

be expected to chill an employee’s First Amendment rights.”).

Framed as such, “a reasonable person in the official’s position

would have known that his conduct would violate that right.”

Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999).

Defendants do not argue that a reduction in income, either in

the form of a direct reduction in salary or a reduction in raises

and retirement benefits, would not amount to a materially adverse

action for First Amendment retaliation purposes. (See generally

Docs. 20, 26.) Defendants instead argue that Templeton has not

shown his income has been reduced. For the reasons discussed

above, however, the court cannot accept Defendants’ contention at

this summary judgment stage because of Templeton’s conflicting

evidence. Granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified

immunity is therefore inappropriate.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated,

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity (Doc. 19) is DENIED.

/s/ Thomas D. Schroeder

June 18, 2026 United States District Judge