Marfil v. City of New Braunfels, Texas

Case: 25-50025 Document: 114-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 06/18/2026

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

____________ Fifth Circuit

FILED

No. 25-50025 June 18, 2026

____________

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Rafael Marfil; Verge Productions, L.L.C.; Enrico

Marfil; Naomi Marfil; Korey A. Rholack; Daniel

Olveda; Douglas Wayne Mathes,

Plaintiffs—Appellants,

versus

City of New Braunfels, Texas,

Defendant—Appellee.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 6:20-CV-248

______________________________

Before Higginson, Willett, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Stephen A. Higginson, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs-Appellants, owners of properties located in the City of New

Braunfels, Texas, appeal the district court’s entry of summary judgment in

favor of the City. Appellants claim that the City’s zoning ordinance (the

“Ordinance”) regulating short-term property rentals in certain residential

districts—enacted years before any Appellant purchased their property—

violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States

and Texas Constitutions. Their due process claim rests on the premise that

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Texas law recognizes a protected property interest in “the right to lease

one’s home on a short-term basis.” Texas courts, however, have held that it

does not. We further hold that the Ordinance survives rational-basis review

under the Equal Protection Clause. The district court’s judgment is

accordingly AFFIRMED.

I.

This appeal turns on the City of New Braunfels’s ordinances

surrounding short-term rentals. In 2006, the City enacted a comprehensive

zoning ordinance. New Braunfels, Tex., Ordinances ch. 144, § 1.1

et seq. Nov. 8, 2006). Section 5.16 of the Ordinance was entitled “Short term

rental or occupancy in one and two unit dwellings,” and it outlined certain

restrictions on the occupancy of such dwellings “for less than 30 consecutive

days” outside of certain commercial districts absent a special use permit. It

also prohibited short-term rentals in certain districts zoned “Residential.”

Section 5.16 was amended in 2011 to expand the regulation of short-term

rentals, but the designation of the “Residential” districts in the City at issue

here, where short-term rentals are prohibited, did not change.

Each Appellant purchased their property after the City had enacted

the Ordinance’s prohibition on short-term rentals in Residential districts.

Appellant Doug Mathes purchased his property in 2011. The remaining Ap-

pellants purchased their properties in 2017 and 2018. Appellants’ properties

are all located in zoning districts designated “Residential,” where short-term

rentals are prohibited under both the 2006 and the 2011 versions of the Ordi-

nance. The Ordinance contains provisions by which a property owner can

apply for a zoning change to his property for the purpose of engaging in short-

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term rentals. Appellants (other than Mathes) all applied for and were denied

a zoning change. 1

In response, Appellants sued the City for alleged violations of the

Unites States and Texas Constitutions. The district court dismissed all

claims in 2020 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). A panel

of our court vacated and remanded in a one-paragraph opinion, noting that,

“based on the complaint’s well-pled allegations, plaintiffs are entitled to en-

gage in discovery in an attempt to surmount the currently high bar for chal-

lenging local zoning ordinances under the Constitution.” Marfil v. City of

New Braunfels, 70 F.4th 893, 893 (5th Cir. 2023) (Mem). We did not address

the merits of the Appellants’ claims.

Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary

judgment. The district court ultimately entered judgment in favor of the City

on all claims. This appeal followed.

II.

“Because this case is before the court on cross motions for summary

judgment, we review the district court’s rulings de novo and construe all

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1

After purchasing neighboring properties in 2018, Enrico and Rafael Marfil

engaged in illegal short-term rental of their properties, leading to at least one complaint

from a neighbor. The City thereafter opened an investigation into both properties,

culminating in the issuance of Notices of Violation by the City. Thereafter, in 2019, Rafael

Marfil, Verge Productions, LLC, Enrico, and Naomi Marfil applied to the City for a zoning

change of their property to allow for short-term rentals. As part of the zoning change

process, neighbors were invited to comment; the City received several comments regarding

the Marfil applications; most were against the proposed change, although two were in

favor. The City’s Planning Commission recommended that the City Council deny the

requests, which it did. The City Council’s decision was not appealed. Appellants’

complaint does not challenge the City’s procedure for applying for zoning changes or assert

that there was error in the proceedings conducted with respect to their requests for a zoning

change.

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evidence and inferences in favor of the non-moving parties.” Evanston Ins.

Co. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 909 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation

omitted). “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that

there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled

to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

III.

We separately analyze Appellants’ due process and equal protection

claim.

A.

We first address Appellants claim of a due process violation under the

United States Constitution and a due course violation under the Texas Con-

stitution. Appellants’ brief states that their “claims involve facial and as-ap-

plied challenges” to the Ordinance. But Appellants do not brief the facial

challenge, nor did they raise it in the district court. Accordingly, we only ad-

dress the as-applied challenge. Rollins v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 8 F.4th 393,

398 (5th Cir. 2021) (“We do not ordinarily consider issues that are for-

feited because they are raised for the first time on appeal.”).

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states

that no person shall be “depriv[ed] . . . of life, liberty, or property, without

due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Article I, Section 19

of the Texas Constitution provides: “No citizen of this State shall be

deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any manner

disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.” There is no

“meaningful distinction” between “due process” in the United States

Constitution and “due course” in the Texas Constitution. Univ. of Tex. Med.

Sch. at Hous. v. Than, 901 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Tex. 1995).

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“To prevail under the Due Process Clause, Appellants must first

‘allege a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right.’” Hignell-Stark v.

City of New Orleans, 154 F.4th 345, 353 (5th Cir. 2025) (quoting Mikeska v.

City of Galveston, 451 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2006)). “The Constitution does

not create property interests; ‘they are created and their dimensions are

defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent

source such as state law.’” Id. (quoting Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d

709, 713 (5th Cir. 1987)). “Accordingly, we usually treat, as dispositive, the

existence—or absence—of a property interest under state law.” Id. at 322.

That issue is dispositive here. Appellants assert the existence of a

property interest under Texas law. They argue that the “right to lease” is

“an inherent liberty and property right” and that “Texas courts have

repeatedly held that this ‘right to lease’ includes the right to lease one’s home

on a short-term basis.” Appellants either overstate or misstate the holdings

of the Texas courts. 2

In certain cases involving retroactive ordinances and/or regulatory

takings claims, Texas courts have found a vested or settled property interest

allows continued engagement in short-term rentals of property where the

property owner had already been engaged in such activity prior to the

enactment of the ordinance. See, e.g., Zaatari v. City of Austin, 615 S.W.3d

172, 188 (Tex. App.—Austin 2019, pet. denied) (finding ordinance

unconstitutionally retroactive); Village of Tiki Island v. Ronquille, 463 S.W.3d

562, 582 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (regulatory taking

claim).

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2

Appellants are represented by counsel who have been actively involved in a

multitude of cases throughout Texas challenging municipal short-term rental regulations,

wherein they have repeatedly—and unsuccessfully—asked the Texas state courts to

declare such a protected property interest exists under Texas law.

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But, contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the Texas courts have not

found a vested property interest in “the right to lease one’s home on a short-

term basis.” 3 Appellants cite City of Grapevine v. Muns, 651 S.W.3d 317 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2021, pet. denied), in support of their cause, which

extensively discussed the nature of the right claimed by Appellants. 4

In Grapevine, the property owners brought regulatory takings claims

as well as asserting the ordinance was unconstitutionally retroactive and

violated the due course clause. Id. at 325. In its discussion of the due course

of law provision, the court held, “although the Homeowners have a vested

right in their properties, they do not have a vested right under the Zoning

Ordinance to use them as [short-term rental]s.” Id. at 346 (footnote omitted).

The Grapevine court further clarified its limited holding with respect to any

purported vested right to lease on a short-term basis:

In its motion for en banc reconsideration, the City asks us to

reconsider our holding that Texas property owners have a

vested right to lease their homes on a short-term basis. This

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3

In Zaatari, which Appellants rely on heavily, the court distinguished between

“vested” rights and “settled” interests. Zaatari, 615 S.W.3d at 190.That court

“conclude[d] that owners of type-2 rental properties have a settled interest in their right to

lease their property short term” based on the record before it, which included a finding that

the city had admitted that short-term rentals were an “established practice” in Austin, and

a showing that some of the plaintiffs had engaged in short-term rentals before the passage

of the ordinance. Id. at 191. This is not the same as a protected or vested property interest

for purposes of due process or due course of law analysis. See, e.g., City of Dickinson v.

Crystal Cruise Invs., LLC, No. 01-24-00684-CV, 2026 WL 530391, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 26, 2026, no pet.) (discussing the nature of vested property rights

in connection with Texas due course claim).

4

In Grapevine, property owners who were already engaged in short-term renting

challenged an ordinance banning short-term rentals. 651 S.W.3d at 325. The city filed a plea

to the jurisdiction asserting that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The

appellate court’s holding affirmed that the property owners had pleaded viable claims such

that they were entitled to proceed. Id. at 328–29.

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overstates our holding. To be clear, we hold that a property

owner has a vested right to lease his property. Whether the

durational restrictions imposed by the [Short-Term Rental]

Ordinance violate the Homeowners’ due-course-of-law rights

regarding their right to lease goes to the case’s merits, an

altogether improper inquiry at this stage of the case.

Id. at 347 (emphasis added). 5

Most recently, in Modern Builders, LLC v. City of Fort Worth, No. 02-

25-00275-CV, 2026 WL 1501055 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 28, 2026, no

pet. h.), the Second Court of Appeals, which had decided Grapevine,

returned to the issue, addressing similar short-term rental regulations in Fort

Worth, where property owners in districts where short-term rentals had

never been allowed raised constitutional challenges to the city’s zoning

scheme. Id. at *1. Determinatively, the court found that 1) there was no

vested right to lease the properties short-term; and 2) the city’s ordinances

were rationally related to legitimate government interests in preserving the

character of single-family residential neighborhoods. Id. at *1.

Indeed, the court specifically noted its prior discussion and holding in

Grapevine: “Answering the question left open in Grapevine, then, we hold

that the Owners do not have a vested common-law right to use their

properties as short-term rentals.” Id. at *7 (footnote omitted). The court

went on to explain the significance of properly defining the property interest

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5

The Supreme Court of Texas denied review, City of Grapevine v. Muns, 671

S.W.3d 675, 676 (Tex. 2023), with two Justices concurring to express that the case before

them was “a less-than-ideal vehicle for resolving the constitutional issues” and that it was

“premature for [the Supreme Court of Texas] to render a final decision that binds all our

cities, the legislature, and the lower courts,” id. at 677 (Young, J., joined by

Blacklock, J., concurring in the denial of the petition for review).

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at stake, which is the exact property interest asserted by Appellants in their

complaint:

In defining the interest at stake here, and narrowing it as we

should, we thus distinguish between a right to lease and a right

to lease for less than 30 days; the former is a core incident of

property ownership, the latter a specific use carrying no

common-law categorical vested-right protection.

Id. at *7 n.20.

Similarly, in City of Dickinson v. Crystal Cruise Investments, LLC, 2026

WL 530391, at *5, the First Court of Appeals addressed a zoning ordinance

limiting short-term rentals and reversed the trial court’s order enjoining the

enforcement of the ordinance. In its analysis of the protected interest

asserted, the court discussed the nature of the rights protected under the due

course of law protections afforded by the Texas Constitution:

A constitutionally protected right must be a vested right, which

is something more than a mere expectancy based upon an

anticipated continuance of an existing law. A right is vested

when it has some definitive, rather than merely potential

existence. Under this Court’s precedent, the right to lease is

not absolute and does not establish a vested property interest.

Further, property owners do not acquire a constitutionally

protected vested right in property uses once commenced or in

zoning classifications once made. Dickinson’s vacation rental

ordinance was in place for six years before Crystal Cruise

bought the property, so under this Court’s precedent, Crystal

Cruise cannot show that it has any vested right to use the

property as a vacation rental as a matter of law.

Id. at *5–6 (citation modified).

Thus, the two Texas appellate courts to squarely address the question

of whether the protected property right claimed here by Appellants exists

under Texas law have held that it does not. And that matters. “In instances[,

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like this one,] where the State’s highest court has not spoken on the direct

question, federal courts are required to make an Erie guess and determine, in

their best judgment how the State’s highest court would resolve the issue if

presented with the same case.” McGlothin v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 925

F.3d 741, 745–46 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). “In making our Erie

guess, we look first to those Texas Supreme Court cases that, while not

deciding the issue, provide guidance as to how the Texas Supreme Court

would decide the question before us.” Am. Int’l Specialty Lines Ins. Co. v.

Rentech Steel LLC, 620 F.3d 558, 564 (5th Cir. 2010). “Though the decisions

and dicta of the Texas Supreme Court weigh more heavily in our Erie

analysis, we also consider those decisions of Texas appellate courts in

determining how the Texas Supreme Court would rule on this issue.” Id. at

566. “When making an Erie guess, we do not adopt innovative theories of

state law but aim simply to apply that law as it currently exists.” Weatherly v.

Pershing, L.L.C., 945 F.3d 915, 920 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). “If

the law of the state is to be changed, it is up to the supreme court of the state

and not this court to change the substantive law of that state.” In re DePuy

Orthopaedics, Inc., Pinnacle Hip Implant Prod. Liab. Litig., 888 F.3d 753, 765

n.5 (5th Cir. 2018) (citation modified) (quoting Jackson v. Johns–Manville

Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 397 (5th Cir. 1986) (en banc), abrogated on other

grounds by Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 242 (1991)).

The Supreme Court of Texas has not yet considered whether a

protected property interest in “the right to lease one’s home on a short-term

basis” exists. And, as noted, the two Texas appellate court decisions to

squarely examine the issue have held that there is no such protected right.

Unless and until such time as the Supreme Court of Texas rules differently,

we must “apply that law as it currently exists.” Weatherly, 945 F.3d at 920

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “Because Appellants have

not alleged a protected property interest under [Texas] law, their due-

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process claims fail.” Hignell-Stark, 154 F.4th at 354; see also Tex. Dept. of

State Health Servs. v. Crown Distrib., LLC, 647 S.W.3d 648, 653 (Tex. 2022)

(declining to reach rational basis or oppressiveness arguments because due

course clause does not protect the asserted interest).

B.

Appellants also assert claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Sec-

tion 3 of the Texas Constitution. 6 Appellants’ complaint asserts the Ordi-

nance makes a distinction between rentals of twenty-nine days (banned) and

rentals of thirty days (permitted) in the designated Residential Districts. Ap-

pellants posit that “both short and long-term rentals are residential uses,”

that there is “no significant difference between the two that would fall within

the scope of the police power,” that “short term rentals do not cause sub-

stantially more nuisances than long-term rentals,” and that this is “particu-

larly true as applied to Plaintiffs’ properties which are in high traffic areas

surrounded by other short-term rentals.” In other words, Appellants argue

that the Ordinance’s line drawing either is arbitrary or does not meaningfully

advance a legitimate government interest, failing rational-basis review.

The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states

that equal protection of the laws shall not be denied to any United States cit-

izen. U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1. Likewise, Article 1, Section 3 of the

Texas Constitution guarantees that “[a]ll free men, when they form a social

compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive

separate public emoluments, or privileges, but in consideration of public

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6

We reject Appellants’ argument that the district court failed to address the Equal

Protection claims in its order. The district court expressly found that “the ordinance

limiting short term rentals seems to meet rational basis by preserving residential

character.” That ruling speaks directly to the Equal Protection claim.

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services.” “Because ‘the federal analytical approach applies to equal protec-

tion challenges under the Texas Constitution,’ we do not address separately

the [Appellants’] claim under the Texas Constitution.” Lindquist v. City of

Pasadena, 669 F.3d 225, 233 (5th Cir. 2012) (first quoting Bell v. Low Income

Women of Tex., 95 S.W.3d 253, 266 (Tex. 2002); and then citing Lindquist v.

City of Pasadena, 525 F.3d 383, 386 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008)).

“The equal protection clause essentially requires that all persons sim-

ilarly situated be treated alike.” Mahone v. Addicks Util. Dist., 836 F.2d 921,

932 (5th Cir. 1988) (first citing City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,

473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985); and then citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216

(1982)). “‘Similarly situated’ means ‘in all relevant respects alike.’” Golden

Glow Tanning Salon, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 52 F.4th 974, 978 (5th Cir.

2022) (quoting Tex. Ent. Ass’n, v. Hegar, 10 F.4th 495, 513 (5th Cir. 2021)).

Assuming without deciding that the Ordinance discriminates against

similarly situated property owners, Appellants have not overcome rational-

basis review. The parties do not dispute that rational-basis review applies be-

cause Appellants have not alleged that they belong to a protected class that

would trigger strict scrutiny of their equal protection claims. Glass v. Paxton,

900 F.3d 233, 244 (5th Cir. 2018). The burden is on Appellants to show the

district court erred in granting the City’s motion for summary judgment, and

rational basis is a high bar to overcome:

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Whether embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment or inferred

from the Fifth, equal protection is not a license for courts to

judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In ar-

eas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that

neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental

constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection

challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts

that could provide a rational basis for the classification.

FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); see id. at 320.

Texas’s substantive due process jurisprudence illustrates the point.

Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 939 (Tex. 1998) (“In analyz-

ing [the equal protection] claim, we apply the same standards as to the[] sub-

stantive due process analysis.”). Under Texas law, a “generally applicable

zoning ordinance will survive a substantive due process challenge if it is de-

signed to accomplish an objective within the government’s police power and

if a rational relationship exists between the ordinance and its purpose.” Id. at

938 (collecting cases). “This deferential inquiry does not focus on the ulti-

mate effectiveness of the ordinance, but on whether the enacting body could

have rationally believed at the time of enactment that the ordinance would pro-

mote its objective.” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Williams v. Lee Optical of

Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955)). “If it is at least fairly debatable that

the decision was rationally related to legitimate government interests, the de-

cision must be upheld.” Id. (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449

U.S. 456, 464 (1981)). “The ordinance will violate substantive due process

only if it is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted) (em-

phasis omitted).

“If the municipal council deemed any of the reasons which have been

suggested, or any other substantial reason, a sufficient reason for adopting

the ordinance in question, it is not the province of the courts to take issue

with the council.” Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 393

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(1926) (quotation omitted). “We have nothing to do with the question of the

wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances. If they are not satisfying to a

majority of the citizens, their recourse is to the ballot—not the courts.” Id.

(quotation omitted). As we held in Shelton v. City of College Station:

The difference between an inquiry into whether there was any

possible rational basis for legislation and an inquiry into the

actual basis of legislation is significant. A court’s assumption of

the power to decide between competing legislative proposals or

to require the state to prove the validity of its choice is quickly

the right to change the legislative process itself.

780 F.2d 475, 481 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search

of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection,

86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972)).

We explained, “[f]ar from treating the question of rationality as a

historical fact necessarily subject to evidentiary procedures and findings of a

trial court,” courts should look “for a conceivable rational basis for the

implicit judgment of the governing body that its legislative purpose was

served by its decision.” Id. at 484. Even where the government is asked “to

point to a rational basis employed in reaching its decision, as opposed to a

basis later hypothesized by others, nothing requires proof of the, as

distinguished from a, basis of decision.” Id. (emphasis in original).

These restraints on judicial review have added force “where the

legislature must necessarily engage in a process of line-drawing.” U.S. R.R.

Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). Defining the class of persons

subject to a regulatory requirement “‘inevitably requires that some persons

who have an almost equally strong claim to favored treatment be placed on

different sides of the line,’ and the fact [that] the line might have been drawn

differently at some points is a matter for legislative, rather than judicial,

consideration.” Id. (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 83–84 (1976)).

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Applying these precepts here, we agree with the district court’s

finding that the City’s goal of “preserving residential character” of the

neighborhoods at issue satisfied the rational-basis requirement. The City

enacted the 2006 Ordinance to “promot[e] health, safety, and the general

welfare of the public,” and regarding the zoning districts, it noted that, “each

district has been established with reasonable consideration for the character

of the district and its peculiar suitability for the particular uses, and with the

view of conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most

appropriate use of land throughout the community.” The City enacted the

2011 amendment, which further regulated short-term rentals because, “the

City Council of the City of New Braunfels, Texas, finds it necessary to amend

the regulatory standards of short term rentals and occupancy to protect

residential neighborhoods in New Braunfels.”

We have previously held that “the protection of residential integrity

is a legitimate objective of a zoning regulation.” Jackson Ct. Condos., Inc. v.

City of New Orleans, 874 F.2d 1070, 1078 (5th Cir. 1989) (citation omit-

ted)(addressing a city-wide moratorium on time-share arrangements). We

have also held that an ordinance “explicitly intended to ‘enhance property

values, promote economic development, and provide identity and a sense of

community’” concerned “purposes [that] easily serve as the rational basis

for a municipal zoning ordinance.” Yur-Mar, L.L.C. v. Jefferson Par. Council,

451 F. App’x 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2011). And most recently, we found that pre-

venting nuisances, promoting affordable housing, and protecting neighbor-

hoods’ residential character were legitimate local purposes. Hignell-Stark, 46

F.4th at 328. 7

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7

The Second Court of Appeals has similarly found objectives such as safeguarding

the life, health, safety, welfare, and property of STR occupants, neighborhoods, and the

general public; and minimizing the adverse impacts resulting from increased transient

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The distinction at issue in the Ordinance—between twenty-nine and

thirty days—represents reasonable line drawing by the City. Similarly, the

prohibition of short-term rentals in certain neighborhoods zoned as residen-

tial also represents reasonable line drawing by the City. In enacting the Ordi-

nance and the amendment, the City determined the necessity of regulating

short-term rentals. “This necessity renders the precise coordinates of the re-

sulting legislative judgment virtually unreviewable, since the legislature must

be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally.” Beach

Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 316.

Similarly, the City had to draw the line between zoning districts some-

where. A review of the zoning maps offered into evidence by the City shows

one line drawn was down South Union Avenue. One side of this street is

zoned commercial, and one side is zoned residential. Of course, the City

could have drawn the line somewhere else, but it did not. It is true that some

of Plaintiffs’ properties are close to, or even abut, these lines, but as the

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rental uses in neighborhoods that were planned, approved, and constructed for single-

family residences to be permissible. Draper v. City of Arlington, 629 S.W.3d 777, 786 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth, 2021, pet.denied). It further noted:

It stands to reason that the residential character of a neighborhood is

threatened when a significant number of homes . . . are occupied not by

permanent residents but by a stream of tenants staying a weekend, a week,

or even 29 days. Whether or not transient rentals have the other

“unmitigatable [sic], adverse impacts” cited by the Council, such rentals

undoubtedly affect the essential character of a neighborhood and the

stability of a community. Short-term tenants have little interest in public

agencies or in the welfare of the citizenry. They do not participate in local

government, coach little league, or join the hospital guild. They do not lead

a Scout troop, volunteer at the library, or keep an eye on an elderly

neighbor. Literally, they are here today and gone tomorrow—without

engaging in the sort of activities that weld and strengthen a community.

Id. at 792 n.21 (quoting Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (Cal.

Ct. App 1991)).

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Supreme Court noted in United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, it is

inevitable that “some persons who have an almost equally strong claim to

favored treatment [will] be placed on different sides of the line.” 449 U.S. at

179 (citation omitted). The cases are clear that absent some showing of an

improper motive or purpose, the courts are not meant to second guess the

line drawing by the City. And Plaintiffs have not presented evidence that

shows any improper purpose. Rather, they argue the City should have either

drawn the line differently or not drawn a line at all.

Because “a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding

and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empir-

ical data,” 8 Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315, we find no violation of the

Equal Protection Clauses of either the United States or the Texas Constitu-

tions.

IV.

Finding no reversible error, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district

court.

_____________________

8

For this reason too, it is beside the point that, according to Appellants, “short-

term rentals do not produce meaningfully more disturbances than other residential uses.”

What’s more, the City’s Ordinance was enacted after a deliberative process, which

revealed complaints from the citizenry about short-term rentals in residential

neighborhoods. The Development Code Steering Committee began working on the

Ordinance in 2001 and made a recommendation to the Planning Commission in March

2006, a five-year process. Similarly, the record shows that when enacting the 2011

amendment, the City’s Planning Commission held a public hearing and workshops, and

then the City Council also held public hearings on the proposed amendment. We are

satisfied that the City’s “legislative choice” here was at least “based on rational

speculation.” Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. at 315.

16