The opinion
Filed 6/18/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL B340734
SAFETY AND HEALTH,
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. 23STCP03883)
v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Thomas D. Long, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part and remanded with directions.
Littler Mendelson, Alka N. Ramchandani-Raj, Amelia A.
McDermott, Edward Y.S. Tsui and S. Susie Keshishyan for
Defendant and Appellant.
Danielle A. Lucido, Chief Counsel, Rocio Y. Garcia-Reyes,
Assistant Chief Counsel, and Mark D. Licker, Staff Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
**********
In June 2023, the Division of Occupational Safety and
Health (OSHA), a state agency within the California Department
of Industrial Relations, was notified by the Los Angeles County
Medical Examiner (Coroner’s Office) of the death of a man who
made deliveries as a driver with Uber Technologies, Inc.’s (Uber)
app-based delivery platform. After efforts to arrange a meeting
with Uber about the driver fatality were unsuccessful, OSHA
served an administrative subpoena on Uber under Government
Code section 11181, subdivision (e), and Labor Code section 6314,
subdivision (c), seeking records related to the driver’s
employment status and the circumstances surrounding his death.
Uber responded with objections and did not produce any
documents. OSHA, under Government Code section 11187, then
filed this action below seeking to enforce its subpoena. The
superior court granted OSHA’s petition and ordered Uber to
produce all of the requested documents.
Uber appeals, arguing the trial court’s order enforcing
OSHA’s administrative subpoena is invalid on numerous
grounds. We affirm the order compelling production, but reverse
the order to the extent it orders production of all documents
without limitation, and remand to the superior court to
reconsider the scope of OSHA’s requests.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The death of Dino Park
On May 26, 2023, after making a delivery as a driver for
the “Uber Eats” app-based delivery platform, Dino Park fell down
a flight of stairs resulting in serious injuries. Park died several
days later from his injuries. OSHA was notified of Park’s death
on June 7, 2023 by the Coroner’s Office. OSHA spoke with Park’s
widow who had limited information about the work Park
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performed as a driver for Uber. She provided copies of tax
returns indicating Park had been paid by “Uber Technologies,
Inc.” OSHA attempted to arrange a meeting with Uber to discuss
Park’s employment status and the circumstances surrounding his
death, but Uber declined to participate.
2. The administrative subpoena
On September 5, 2023, OSHA served Uber with an
administrative subpoena, under Government Code section 11181,
subdivision (e), and Labor Code section 6314, subdivision (c),
seeking 20 separate categories of documents “relevant to the
issue of whether Mr. Park was an employee of Uber Technologies
or if he was an independent contractor,” any documents related to
Park’s death, and additional requests directed more broadly to
records related to other similarly situated Uber drivers. OSHA
asserted the requested records were necessary to resolve issues of
Park’s employment status and Uber’s compliance with Title 8 of
the California Code of Regulations.
Uber did not produce any documents, responding only with
objections, including that (1) OSHA did not have jurisdiction to
request documents or inspect its premises (citing Bus. & Prof.
Code, § 7448 et seq.), (2) OSHA failed to obtain consent from
Uber or an inspection warrant in accordance with Labor Code
section 6314, (3) the requests sought confidential and proprietary
business information, (4) the requests invaded the privacy rights
of third parties, including users of Uber’s app-based digital
platforms, and (5) the requests were overbroad, indefinite, and
sought irrelevant records.
3. Petition to compel compliance
On October 20, 2023, OSHA initiated this action in the
superior court by filing a petition to compel Uber to produce the
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requested records. (Gov. Code, § 11187.) OSHA asserted the
requested documents were relevant to the discharge of its duties,
including its mandatory duty to investigate on-the-job fatalities,
and to determine whether Park was an employee of Uber, and
whether Uber had violated any laws or safety orders.
The hearing on OSHA’s petition was continued due to the
court’s unavailability, and again after the court requested
supplemental briefing.
On December 7, 2023, while its petition to compel
compliance was pending, OSHA issued a citation to Uber under
Labor Code section 6317. Item 1 of the citation was a regulatory
violation based on Uber’s failure to immediately report the death
of Park. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 342.) The civil penalty
imposed was $5,000 to be abated by January 26, 2024. Item 2 of
the citation was a general violation based on Uber’s failure to
demonstrate the institution of an effective injury and illness
prevention program. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 3203.) The civil
penalty imposed was $1,350 to be abated by January 26, 2024.
Uber did not appeal the citation.
4. The trial court’s order
The hearing on OSHA’s petition took place on June 20,
2024. After argument, the trial court granted OSHA’s petition,
ordering Uber to produce the requested documents within
30 days. The court did not limit or modify the scope of any of the
20 categories of requested documents.
This appeal followed. On April 9, 2025, we granted Uber’s
petition for a writ of supersedeas, staying the trial court’s order
pending resolution of this appeal or further order of this court.
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DISCUSSION
We discuss the applicable law before turning to a
discussion of Uber’s contentions challenging the validity of the
trial court’s order enforcing OSHA’s administrative subpoena.
1. Government Code section 11180 et seq.
More than 60 years ago in Brovelli v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 524 (Brovelli), the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the broad authority of state agencies to
investigate matters within the scope of their statutory
jurisdiction, and to issue administrative subpoenas in those
investigations, explaining: “There is no constitutional objection
to a system under which the heads of departments of government
may compel the production of evidence for purposes of
investigation, without instituting formal proceedings against the
one from whom the evidence is sought or filing any charges
against him. As has been said by the United States Supreme
Court, the power to make administrative inquiry is not derived
from a judicial function but is more analogous to the power of a
grand jury, which does not depend on a case or controversy in
order to get evidence but can investigate ‘merely on suspicion
that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants
assurance that it is not.’ ” (Brovelli, at p. 529, quoting United
States v. Morton Salt Co. (1950) 338 U.S. 632, 642–643.)
Government Code section 11180 states that the head of
state agencies and departments “may make investigations and
prosecute actions concerning: [¶] (a) All matters relating to the
business activities and subjects under the jurisdiction of the
department. [¶] (b) Violations of any law or rule or order of the
department. [¶] (c) Such other matters as may be provided by
law.” (Ibid.) Under section 11181, department heads may, in
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connection “with any investigation or action authorized” by
section 11180, issue subpoenas for the production of documents
and tangible things pertinent to “any inquiry, investigation,
hearing, proceeding, or action conducted in any part of the state.”
(§ 11181, subd. (e).) Department heads may delegate the powers
conferred by section 11180 to other officers of the department. (§
11182.) Department heads are further authorized to file a
petition in a court of competent jurisdiction to compel compliance
with an administrative subpoena. (§ 11187; see also Brovelli,
supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 527.)
Brovelli instructs that administrative subpoenas are valid
and enforceable and do not offend the Fourth Amendment so long
as they (1) inquire into matters “which the agency demanding
production is authorized to make,” (2) they are “not too
indefinite” in scope, and (3) the information sought is “reasonably
relevant” to the agency’s inquiry. (Brovelli, supra, 56 Cal.2d at
p. 529.)
2. The Labor Code
California has long regulated matters of occupational safety
and health. (Solus Industrial Innovations, LLC v. Superior Court
(2018) 4 Cal.5th 316, 328.) In 1973, with the passage of the
California Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Legislature
made substantial revisions to the statutory scheme. (Solus
Industrial Innovations, at pp. 328–329.) The California
Occupational Safety and Health Act was passed “for the purpose
of assuring safe and healthful working conditions for all
California working men and women by authorizing the
enforcement of effective standards, assisting and encouraging
employers to maintain safe and healthful working conditions, and
by providing for research, information, education, training, and
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enforcement in the field of occupational safety and health.”
(Lab. Code, § 6300.)
Under the amended statutory scheme, OSHA was granted
“exceedingly broad authority” to enforce regulations to achieve
safe working environments for workers throughout the state.
(United Air Lines, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals
Bd. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 762, 767 (United Air Lines).) Labor Code
section 6307 declares that OSHA “has the power, jurisdiction,
and supervision over every employment and place of employment
in this state, which is necessary adequately to enforce and
administer all laws and lawful standards and orders, or special
orders requiring such employment and place of employment to be
safe, and requiring the protection of the life, safety, and health of
every employee in such employment or place of employment.”
Labor Code section 6309 vests OSHA with the authority to
“summarily investigate,” on its own motion or upon a third-party
complaint, any “employment” or “place of employment” that it
“has reason to believe … is not safe or is injurious to the welfare
of an employee.”
Labor Code section 6313 imposes a mandatory duty on
OSHA to investigate the cause of any employment accident that
results in a fatality, unless it determines that an investigation is
unnecessary. (Id., subd. (a).) Moreover, OSHA has the discretion
to undertake an investigation of any other occupational accident
“which occurs within the state in any employment or place of
employment, or which directly or indirectly arises from or is
connected with the maintenance or operation of the employment
or place of employment.” (Id., subd. (b).)
Under Labor Code section 6314, OSHA has the authority to
inspect a place of employment, and to order an employer to
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preserve physical materials, other tangible items, and an
accident site pending completion of an investigation. Under
subdivision (c) of section 6314, OSHA “may issue subpoenas to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of books,
papers, records, and physical materials, administer oaths,
examine witnesses under oath, take verification or proof of
written materials, and take depositions and affidavits for the
purpose of carrying out the duties of the division.” (Ibid.)
In addition, OSHA may, during an “investigation of the
policies and practices of an employer or a related employer entity,
… issue a subpoena if the employer or the related employer
entity fails to promptly provide the requested information, and
may enforce the subpoena if the employer or the related employer
entity fails to provide the requested information within a
reasonable period of time.” (Lab. Code, § 6317.9.)
3. The Protect App-Based Drivers and Services Act
In the general election of November 2020, California voters
passed Proposition 22, otherwise known as the Protect App-
Based Drivers and Services Act, which enacted sections 7448
through 7467 of the Business and Professions Code. The purpose
of the legislation was “[t]o protect the basic legal right of
Californians to choose to work as independent contractors with
rideshare and delivery network companies throughout the state”
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7450, subd. (a)), “[t]o require rideshare and
delivery network companies to offer new protections and benefits
for app-based rideshare and delivery drivers” (id., subd. (c)), and
“[t]o improve public safety by requiring criminal background
checks, driver safety training, and other safety provisions to help
ensure app-based rideshare and delivery drivers do not pose a
threat to customers or the public” (id., subd. (d)).
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Business and Professions Code section 7451 enumerates
four conditions that must be established in order for an app-
based driver to be considered an independent contractor, rather
than an employee. Section 7451 states: “Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, including, but not limited to, the Labor
Code, the Unemployment Insurance Code, and any orders,
regulations, or opinions of the Department of Industrial Relations
or any board, division, or commission within the Department of
Industrial Relations, an app-based driver is an independent
contractor and not an employee or agent with respect to the app-
based driver’s relationship with a network company if the
following conditions are met:
“(a) The network company does not unilaterally prescribe
specific dates, times of day, or a minimum number of hours
during which the app-based driver must be logged into the
network company’s online-enabled application or platform.
“(b) The network company does not require the app-based
driver to accept any specific rideshare service or delivery service
request as a condition of maintaining access to the network
company’s online-enabled application or platform.
“(c) The network company does not restrict the app-based
driver from performing rideshare services or delivery services
through other network companies except during engaged time.
“(d) The network company does not restrict the app-based
driver from working in any other lawful occupation or business.”
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7451, italics added; Castellanos v. State of
California (2024) 16 Cal.5th 588, 595 [acknowledging
independent contractor status applies only so “long as several
conditions are met” (italics added)].)
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4. OSHA has the authority to issue an administrative
subpoena to determine its statutory jurisdiction to
investigate
Uber contends the trial court’s order violates the first
element of the Brovelli test which states that an administrative
subpoena is valid only if it inquires into matters “which the
agency demanding production is authorized to make.” (Brovelli,
supra, 56 Cal.2d at p. 529.) Uber acknowledges that OSHA is
entitled to issue subpoenas to employers and to make
investigative inquiries regarding employees. But Uber says it
was not Park’s employer since he was an independent contractor
under Business and Professions Code section 7451. Uber argues
the trial court failed to resolve this threshold jurisdictional
question, and should have required OSHA to first bring a
declaratory relief action to secure an order in its favor before it
could issue any subpoena. We do not agree.
It is well settled that “[a]n administrative agency has the
authority to conduct an investigation and to subpoena records to
determine whether the entity under investigation is subject to
the agency’s jurisdiction and whether there have been violations
of provisions over which the agency has jurisdiction.” (Millan v.
Restaurant Enterprises Group, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 477,
487 [division of labor standards enforcement had authority to
issue subpoena to determine whether the defendant was subject
to vacation pay requirements under the Labor Code]; accord,
Okla. Press Pub. Co. v. Walling (1946) 327 U.S. 186, 192, 215–217
[subpoena by administrator at Department of Labor properly
sought information about whether certain newspaper entities
were subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act]; Younger v. Jensen
(1980) 26 Cal.3d 397, 405 [Attorney General had authority to
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subpoena records not only to determine existence of antitrust
violations, but with respect to California’s jurisdiction to
proceed]; People v. Alorica Inc. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 60, 66
[Attorney General had authority to subpoena records to
determine if corporate entity qualified as a debt collector under
the Rosenthal Act].)
Thus, OSHA had the authority to subpoena records from
Uber to determine whether Park was an employee or an
independent contractor within the meaning of Business and
Professions Code section 7451, and to determine whether Uber
had taken any actions that contributed to Park’s on-the-job
accident. OSHA had a mandatory statutory duty to investigate
Park’s death, which included resolving whether Uber was
properly deemed Park’s employer at the time of the accident.
As a state agency with broad enforcement and investigatory
duties, OSHA could investigate “ ‘merely on suspicion that the
law [was] being violated, or even just because it want[ed]
assurance that it [was] not.’ ” (Brovelli, supra, 56 Cal.2d at
p. 529.) OSHA was not required to first obtain a declaratory
judgment finding Park to be an employee before it could
undertake an investigation and issue a subpoena to Uber.
We also reject Uber’s contention that OSHA was not
entitled to an order enforcing its subpoena because it failed to
carry its burden of proof that Park was an employee and not an
independent contractor. We are not persuaded Business and
Professions Code section 7451 places any burden on OSHA where
OSHA is still investigating the facts relevant to its jurisdiction.
Irrespective of whether OSHA should ultimately be
expected to bear the burden of proof at some future point, it is, at
this time, entitled to enforce its subpoena to obtain those
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documents relevant to establish its jurisdiction to proceed and to
satisfy itself that Uber was compliant with Business and
Professions Code section 7451.
5. OSHA is not limited to issuing administrative
subpoenas only in connection with an on-site
inspection of a place of employment
Uber also contends the trial court’s order is invalid because
it improperly expanded OSHA’s statutory authority to issue
administrative subpoenas. Uber argues that subdivision (c) of
Labor Code section 6314 is not a lawful basis to issue a subpoena
divorced from a duly instituted investigation or inspection of a
place of employment. Uber says OSHA cannot issue a subpoena
in a vacuum, but can only do so in the context of conducting an
inspection of an employer’s place of employment under
subdivision (a) of section 6314, or after having obtained a
warrant to inspect under subdivision (b). We reject Uber’s
interpretation of the statutory language.
In answering any question of statutory interpretation, “our
goal is to effectuate the Legislature’s intent.” (Riverside County
Sheriff’s Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 630.) “ ‘ “When
interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain, commonsense
meaning of the language used by the Legislature. [Citation.] If
the language is unambiguous, the plain meaning controls.”
[Citation.] “[W]henever possible, significance must be given to
every word [in a statute] in pursuing the legislative purpose, and
the court should avoid a construction that makes some words
surplusage.” [Citation.] “[W]e may reject a literal construction
that is contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statute
or that would lead to absurd results.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Furthermore,
“[p]otentially conflicting statutes must be read in the context of
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the entire statutory scheme, so that all provisions can be
harmonized and given effect.” (Voices of the Wetlands v. State
Water Resources Control Bd. (2011) 52 Cal.4th 499, 519.)
Where statutory language is susceptible of more than one
reasonable interpretation, “we consider ‘the ostensible objectives
to be achieved by the statute, the evils to be remedied, the
legislative history, public policy, contemporaneous administrative
construction and the statutory scheme of which the statute is a
part.’ ” (Ferra v. Loews Hollywood Hotel, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th
858, 865; People v. Jackson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 128, 166–
167.)
Uber’s interpretation of Labor Code section 6314 is strained
and unreasonably narrow. Our Supreme Court has instructed
that the provisions of the Labor Code are to be broadly construed
in favor of the protection of workers. “When construing
provisions of the Labor Code, ‘ “ ‘[t]ime and again, we have
characterized that purpose as the protection of employees—
particularly given the extent of legislative concern about working
conditions, wages, and hours when the Legislature enacted key
portions of the Labor Code.’ ” ’ [Citation.] We therefore
‘ “ ‘liberally construe the Labor Code … to favor the protection of
employees.’ ” ’ ” (People ex rel. Garcia-Brower v. Kolla’s, Inc.
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 719, 725; accord, Troester v. Starbucks Corp.
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 829, 839; United Air Lines, supra, 32 Cal.3d at
p. 771; see also 2 Wilcox, Cal. Employment Law (2026)
Subpoenas, Deposition, and Statements Under Oath, § 21.41
[acknowledging OSHA’s broad authority to issue subpoenas in
order “to carry out its enforcement duties”].)
The language of Labor Code section 6314, subdivision (c), is
clear and unambiguous. It provides that OSHA “may issue
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subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of books, papers, records, and physical materials,
administer oaths, examine witnesses under oath, take
verification or proof of written materials, and take depositions
and affidavits for the purpose of carrying out the duties of the
division.” It does not state that this authority can only be
exercised in the course of an inspection of a place of employment,
and we do not believe Uber’s interpretation is supported by the
mere fact the provision is included in a section that also describes
OSHA’s authority to inspect a place of employment.
The language of section 6314 is substantially similar to and
consistent with OSHA’s broad authority to issue administrative
subpoenas under Government Code section 11181. We do not
read Labor Code section 6314 as purporting to limit that well-
settled authority. Moreover, we cannot conceive of any valid
policy rationale for constraining OSHA’s ability to issue
administrative subpoenas only in connection with an onsite
inspection of an employer’s place of business. OSHA’s
investigatory powers and enforcement duties are much broader
than merely conducting on-site inspections.
6. The subpoena was not mooted by issuance of the
citation
Uber also contends that even assuming OSHA had the
authority to issue the subpoena, the subpoena was mooted in
December 2023 when OSHA issued its citation to Uber under
Labor Code section 6317. Once again, we reject Uber’s
interpretation of the statutory language.
The six-month statutory period set forth in Labor Code
section 6317, subdivision (e)(1), is clear and unambiguous. It
states, in relevant part, that “[a] citation or notice shall not be
14
issued by the division more than six months after the occurrence
of the violation.” (Lab. Code, § 6317, subd. (e)(1).) Occurrence is
defined to include the date on which OSHA first discovers a
violation. (Ibid.) The six-month statutory deadline applies only
to issuance of a citation or notice. Nothing in the language of
section 6317 is reasonably construed to apply to other actions by
OSHA.
Had the Legislature intended to impose a time limit on
OSHA’s investigatory powers or enforcement authority, it would
have said so clearly and explicitly. It did not do so, and it is not
our role to engraft a time limit onto OSHA’s authority by
implication. Moreover, adopting Uber’s interpretation would
have absurd consequences, encouraging employers to stonewall
and delay cooperation with OSHA’s investigatory efforts, forcing
OSHA to issue a citation before the six-month period ran out,
only to moot its ability to complete its investigation. Here for
instance, there was delay in obtaining an order enforcing the
subpoena due to matters beyond OSHA’s control, including
continuances ordered by the court due to its unavailability and
the court’s desire for supplemental briefing. OSHA issued the
citation to Uber while its petition to compel remained pending.
We do not believe the statutory language should be interpreted in
a manner that gives employers the ability to thwart OSHA’s
enforcement and investigatory responsibilities.
7. The trial court must reconsider issues of relevance
and overbreadth on remand
The trial court ordered Uber to produce documents as to all
20 categories of requests without limitation or modification.
The record is not well developed as to the relevance of certain
requests, particularly request Nos. 8 through 20, which are
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broadly worded, and made even broader still by the definitions
included in the subpoena. For instance, “ ‘DRIVER(S)’ ” is
defined as an “app-based driver or person who uses the UBER
TECHNOLOGIES online-enabled application or platform.”
The inclusion of the word “person” could be construed to include
customers of the delivery platform. Further, “ ‘USER(S)’ ” is
defined as any “app-based customer, rider or person who uses the
UBER TECHNOLOGIES online-enabled application or platform.”
There is inadequate discussion explaining how records related to
users or customers of Uber’s digital platforms are relevant to
determining Park’s status as an independent contractor, the
circumstances surrounding his death, or any actions Uber may
have taken or not taken regarding training or prevention that
may have contributed to the fatality.
On remand, the trial court is directed to conduct such
further proceedings as are necessary to reconsider the scope of
the document requests under Brovelli, and issue a new order
compelling production as appropriate.
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DISPOSITION
The order compelling production of documents is reversed
to the extent it orders production as to all requested documents
without limitation. On remand, the superior court shall conduct
such further proceedings as are necessary to reconsider the scope
of the document requests, and issue a new order compelling
production as appropriate.
In all other respects, the order is affirmed.
The parties shall bear their own respective costs of appeal.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
SCHERB, J.
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