Opinion

P. Lombardot v. Wissahickon S.D.

Court: Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed: Jun 18, 2026
Status: Unpublished
Author: McCullough
On the bench: McCullough
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.0%

stipulation of discontinuance without single remaining defendant’s signature invalid to render order final and appealable; appeal filed thereafter was premature and quashed

How later courts described this case

stipulation of discontinuance without single remaining defendant’s signature invalid to render order final and appealable; appeal filed thereafter was premature and quashed
improperly filed discontinuance was a nullity

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Pascal Lombardot, Individually and : CASES CONSOLIDATED

as Administrator of the Estate of :

Yu-Yuan Lin, Deceased, :

Appellant :

: Nos. 1642 & 1643 C.D. 2024

v. : Nos. 515 & 602 C.D. 2025

Wissahickon School District, : Submitted: May 12, 2026

Dominic McNamee, Commonwealth :

of Pennsylvania, Department :

of Transportation, Sidelines Tree :

Removal, Delaware Valley Regional :

Planning Commission, Montgomery :

County, Whitpain Township, :

McMahon Associates, Inc., Simone :

Collins, Inc., The Waetzman Planning :

Group, Inc.,Urban Partners, Chambers :

Associates, Inc., Herbert H. Metz, Inc. :

d/b/a Metz Engineers, Guidemark, Inc., :

Asplundh Tree Expert, LLC, Davey :

Resource Group, Inc., The Davey Tree :

Expert Company, Blue Bell Meadows, :

LLC d/b/a Bluestone Country Club, :

BSK Meadows Realty Partners, LP, :

Meadows Realty GP, LLC, Goodman :

Properties, and Pennidhi Vee Karlakunta :

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BY JUDGE McCULLOUGH FILED: June 18, 2026

In these consolidated cases, Pascal Lombardot (Appellant), Individually

and as Administrator of the Estate of Yu-Yuan Lin (Estate), Deceased (Decedent),

appeals from two orders entered on November 21, 2024, by the Court of Common Pleas

of Montgomery County (trial court). Through those orders, the trial court granted

summary judgment in favor of Wissahickon School District (School District), Dominic

McNamee (McNamee), and Whitpain Township (Township) (together, Appellees) on

Appellant’s wrongful death and survival claims stemming from a fatal motor vehicle

accident. In this Court, Appellant argues that the trial court erred and abused its

discretion in granting summary judgment because it improperly resolved disputed

issues of material fact and, relatedly, failed to consider Appellant’s expert reports.

Also before the Court are the Township’s Motions to Quash Appeal

(Motions to Quash), in which the School District and McNamee join.1 The Township

argues that this Court is without jurisdiction to decide these appeals because the trial

court’s November 21, 2024 orders are not final orders disposing of all claims against

all parties. The Township accordingly contends that the appeals are interlocutory and

must be quashed.

Upon review, we grant the Township’s motions and quash these appeals.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The pertinent facts and procedural history underlying this case may be

summarized as follows. Appellant’s claims arise from a motor vehicle accident that

occurred on January 14, 2019, at the intersection (Intersection) of Morris Road (also

known as State Route 2001) and Plymouth Road (a Township road) in the Township.

Both roads have a single lane of travel in each direction. Traffic on Morris Road

proceeds in a general east-west direction and is uncontrolled at the Intersection. Traffic

on Plymouth Road proceeds in a general north-south direction and reaches its northern

terminus at the Intersection, which is controlled by a stop sign and stop line.

The School District and McNamee filed a written joinder at Nos. 1642 and 1643 C.D. 2024

on April 21, 2025. Although they did not file an analogous joinder at Nos. 515 and 602 C.D. 2025,

they incorporate the same arguments into their brief and request therein that the appeals be quashed.

See School District and McNamee Br., Nos. 515 and 602 C.D. 2025, at 1-10.

Just prior to the accident, McNamee was driving a Blue Bird school bus

for the School District in the eastbound lane of Morris Road approaching the

Intersection. Pennidhi Karlakunta (Karlakunta) was driving a Toyota Camry in the

northbound lane of Plymouth Road and was stopped at the stop sign/stop line at the

Intersection. Decedent was driving an Infiniti sedan in the westbound lane of Morris

Road toward the Intersection. The accident occurred when Karlakunta attempted to

make a left-hand turn into Morris Road’s westbound lane. As he negotiated the turn,

he collided into the front right corner of the school bus, which then veered left into

Morris Road’s westbound lane and collided with Decedent’s vehicle. Decedent

sustained fatal injuries from the crash.

Decedent is survived by her husband (Appellant) and two minor children.

Appellant filed two wrongful death/survival actions in the trial court against multiple

defendants, which actions were consolidated on May 17, 2021. Appellant filed first,

second, and third amended complaints, the last of which is operative (Third Amended

Complaint). Pertinent here, among the 22 defendants2 named in the suit are, inter alia,

the School District, McNamee, the Township, The Waetzman Planning Group, Inc.

Karlakunta is not one of the 21 named defendants in the Third Amended Complaint, as

Appellant settled with Karlakunta prior to the institution of this litigation. The Township added

Karlakunta to the suit as an additional defendant on February 12, 2021. (Joinder Complaint, Original

Record (O.R.) at Seq. No. 48.) Following the accident, Karlakunta was charged with violations of

(1) Section 3714 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714(b) (careless driving, unintentional death),

and Section 3323, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3323 (stop signs). Karlakunta pled guilty to the stop sign charge and

was convicted of the careless driving charge after a bench trial before a magisterial district judge.

Karlakunta appealed the latter conviction to the court of common pleas, which likewise found him

guilty.

(Waetzman),3 and Goodman Properties.4 Against the Township, Appellant alleged that

excess tree and foliage cover at the southwest corner of the Intersection blocked

Karlakunta’s view of eastbound traffic. Appellant further alleged that the Township

placed the stop sign and stop line on Plymouth Road at a distance too far from Morris

Road to provide an adequate view of oncoming traffic. Against the School District and

McNamee, Appellant alleged that McNamee was negligent in inspecting and driving

the school bus.

The School District, Township, and McNamee filed cross-claims against

multiple defendants, including Waetzman. (O.R. at Seq. Nos. 341, 358.) It is

undisputed for purposes of these appeals that the other 17 named defendants have been

dismissed or settled out of the suit. It also is undisputed that Waetzman was neither

dismissed nor settled out of the case at any point prior to the trial court’s entry of the

summary judgment orders now on appeal, and those orders expressly do not apply to

Waetzman.5

Regarding Goodman Properties’ dismissal from the suit, on September 6,

2024, Appellant filed a Petition for Approval of Settlement and Allocation of Wrongful

Death Act and Survival Act Proceeds, in which he sought court approval to allocate

$850,000 in settlement proceeds received from multiple defendants, including “Blue

Bell Meadows.” (Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.) at 106b.) According to the

Appellants alleged that Waetzman provides civil and highway engineering and design

services to the Township. (Third Amended Complaint, ¶ 18; R.R. at 7a.)

The Third Amended Complaint refers to Goodman Properties collectively with several other

named defendants as the “Bluestone defendants.” (Third Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 37-39; Reproduced

Record (R.R. at 10a.) Appellant alleged that the Bluestone defendants owned and operated a country

club situated on land abutting the Intersection on its southwest corner. Id. ¶¶ 38, 53; R.R. at 10a, 13a.

Although Waetzman was served with Appellant’s several complaints and Appellees’ cross-

claims, it did not file answers or otherwise participate in the litigation.

petition, if the proposed allocations were approved and the settling parties dismissed

from the suit, only the School District, McNamee, and the Township would remain in

the case. (Petition, 9/6/24, ¶ 16; S.R. at 106b.) Attached to the Petition as Exhibit “C”

was a proposed Settlement Agreement and Joint Tortfeasor Release between Appellant

and the several settling defendants, including “Blue Bell Meadows, LLC d/b/a/

Bluestone Country Club/BSK Meadows Realty Partners LP/Meadows Realty GP,

LLC/Goodman Properties (collectively “Blue Bell”)[.]” (S.R. at 173b) (emphasis

provided). “Blue Bell” is identified in the settlement agreement as one of the “Settling

Defendants” in favor of whom Appellant released all claims. Id. at 173-74b, 177b-78b.

The trial court approved the proposed settlement and proceeds allocations by order

entered November 4, 2024. (O.R. at Seq. No. 563; R.R. at 523a.)

In the meantime, the trial court entered the controlling case management

order on December 13, 2023, which established deadlines for the completion of fact

discovery (May 6, 2024), the service of Appellant’s expert reports (June 5, 2024), the

service of Appellees’ expert reports (July 5, 2024), and the filing of dispositive motions

(August 5, 2024).6 (S.R. at 093b.) Appellant did not identify any expert witnesses or

serve any expert reports by the June 5, 2024 deadline. The Township timely produced

the expert report of Brian Keaveney on July 3, 2024. The School District and

McNamee did not serve any expert reports.

The Township moved for summary judgment on August 2, 2024. In its

motion, the Township argued that Appellant’s claims against the Township were barred

because Appellant failed to produce any evidence, including expert opinion,

establishing the applicability of any exceptions to immunity under Section 8542(b) of

This case management order was entered in response to the Joint Motion for Extraordinary

Relief filed by the School District and McNamee requesting an extension of the original discovery

deadlines established by the trial court. All parties consented to the requested relief. (O.R. at Seq.

No. 529.)

the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b).

(R.R. at 351a.) The Township also asserted that any evidence proffered by Appellant

after the expiration of the discovery deadlines should be excluded as untimely and

prejudicial. Id.

The School District and McNamee moved for summary judgment on

August 5, 2024, arguing that Appellant did not produce any evidence, expert or

otherwise, establishing (1) McNamee’s negligence in operating the school bus, (2) that

any such negligence was a proximate cause of the underlying accident, or (3) that

Karlakunta’s operation of his vehicle was not the proximate cause of the accident as a

matter of law. Id. at 411a-21a.

Appellant responded to the Township’s summary judgment motion on

August 30, 2024. With the response, Appellant served, for the first time, the expert

report of Kevin O’Conner, dated August 12, 2024. (R.R. at 137a.) In the report, Mr.

O’Conner opined concerning the Township’s liability for the design and physical

characteristics of the Intersection. Id. at 154a-55a. Appellant filed a response to the

School District’s and McNamee’s summary judgment motion on September 3, 2024.

Appellant attached to that response, again for the first time, the expert report of Henry

Lipian, who opined concerning McNamee’s alleged negligence in inspecting and

operating the school bus prior to the accident. (R.R. at 92a, 112a-14a.)

The trial court granted both summary judgment motions by orders entered

November 21, 2024. The next day, Appellant appealed both orders, which appeals

were docketed in this Court at Nos. 1642 and 1643 C.D. 2024. The trial court issued a

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion on December 26, 2024. As to Appellant’s claims against

the School District and McNamee, the trial court concluded that the evidence and

testimony presented at Karlakunta’s criminal trial established as a matter of law that

Karlakunta’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and Decedent’s death.

(R.R. at 487a.) The trial court noted that there was no evidence in the record that could

establish McNamee’s negligence and, vicariously, the School District’s liability. Id. at

488. Because the Lipian report was submitted by Appellant after the deadline for doing

so, the trial court did not consider it in its analysis. Id. at 488a-89a. The trial court

further noted that, even if McNamee’s negligence could be established, the “sudden

emergency doctrine” would preclude a finding of liability. Id. at 489a.

As to Appellant’s claims against the Township, the trial court concluded

that Appellant did not produce any evidence establishing the applicability of any of the

exceptions to immunity in Section 8542(b) of the Tort Claims Act. Specifically, the

trial court concluded that Appellant did not establish the applicability of any of the

three exceptions asserted in the Third Amended Complaint, namely, the real property;

trees, traffic controls, and street lighting; and streets exceptions. See 42 Pa.C.S. §

8542(b)(3), (4), (6)(i). As to the real property exception, the trial court noted that

Section 8542(b)(3) excludes “trees, traffic signs, and other traffic controls” from the

definition of real property and further requires that the subject property be in the care,

custody, or control of the local agency. (R.R. at 490a; 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(3),

(b)(3)(i)) Because Appellant’s claims against the Township related to tree and foliage

cover on private property not owned by the Township and the placement of the stop

sign and stop line on Plymouth Road, the real property exception to immunity could

not apply. (R.R. at 490a-91a.)

As to the streets exception, the trial court concluded that Appellant did not

establish a dangerous condition on Plymouth Road that contributed to the accident. As

with the Lipian report, the trial court declined to consider the O’Conner report in its

analysis because Appellant served it months after Appellant’s expert discovery

deadline passed. Id. at 491a-92a. In the alternative, the trial court concluded that, even

if the streets exception applied, the evidence of record established as a matter of law

that Karlakunta’s negligence, and not any condition of Plymouth Road, caused the

accident and Decedent’s death. Id. at 492a.

Last, as to the trees, traffic controls, and street lighting exception, the trial

court concluded that Appellant failed to establish that any condition on property owned

by the Township caused the accident. The trial court also concluded that Appellant

failed to establish that any traffic controls, including the stop sign and stop line on

Plymouth Road, contributed to the accident. Id. at 493a. In this regard, the trial court

again declined to consider the O’Conner report. Id. at 493a-94a.

On February 3, 2025, this Court issued orders at Nos. 1642 and 1643 C.D.

2025, noting that the trial court’s orders did not appear to dispose of all claims against

all parties, as no disposition or other final order had been entered as to Waetzman.

(Orders, 2/3/2025.) We therefore directed the parties to address in their principal briefs

the question of whether the trial court’s orders were final and appealable. Id.

Apparently in response to this Court’s orders, on February 17, 2025, Appellant filed in

the trial court a Praecipe to Discontinue and End the underlying actions as against

Waetzman. (S.R. at 258b.) Appellant did not obtain the consent of any parties or leave

of court prior to filing the praecipe. On March 5, 2025, Appellant filed a similar

Praecipe to Discontinue and End as against Goodman Properties, again without consent

of the parties or leave of court. (S.R. at 259b.) Then, on March 25, 2025, Appellant

filed new Notices of Appeal from the trial court’s November 21, 2024 orders. Those

appeals were docketed in this Court at Nos. 515 and 602 C.D. 2025.7

On April 7, 2025, and May 16, 2025, the Township filed Motions to Quash

all four appeals on the ground that, because Appellant’s claims against Waetzman

remain pending below, the trial court’s November 21, 2024 orders are not final. The

We consolidated all four appeals by order entered April 28, 2026.

School District and McNamee join in the Motions, arguing with the Township that

Appellant’s failure to obtain either consent of the parties or leave of court rendered the

Waetzman discontinuance invalid as a matter of law pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 229(b)(1).

As a result, the trial court’s orders are not final and appealable. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b).

In the alternative, Appellees argue that, even assuming the Waetzman

discontinuance is valid, Appellant’s notices of appeal filed on March 25, 2025, are

untimely because they were filed more than 30 days after the date the discontinuance

was docketed (and served), February 17, 2025. Appellees lastly contend that the

discontinuance as to Goodman Properties is irrelevant to finality because Goodman

Properties settled out and was dismissed from the case via the trial court’s November

4, 2024 order.

II. ISSUES

In this Court, Appellant argues that the trial court (1) failed to consider

and credit Appellant’s expert reports submitted in response to Appellees’ motions for

summary judgment; and (2) improperly made proximate cause determinations,

resolved disputed issues of fact, and failed to consider the factual record in a light most

favorable to Appellant as the non-moving party. (Appellant’s Br. at 4-5.)

In response, Appellees argue that these appeals are premature and,

accordingly, must be quashed. In the alternative, Appellees contend that summary

judgment in their favor was appropriate on multiple grounds, including immunity and

the “sudden emergency doctrine.” They further argue that the trial court properly

declined to consider Appellant’s expert reports because Appellant did not identify the

experts during discovery and untimely served the reports after the expiration of the trial

court’s case management order.

III. DISCUSSION

Because they implicate our jurisdiction and, in this instance, are

dispositive, we begin with the Township’s Motions to Quash.8

This Court’s jurisdiction over appeals from orders of the courts of

common pleas generally is limited to final orders. See Section 762(a) of the Judicial

Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 762(a); Mahoning Township v. Zoning Hearing Board of Mahoning

Township, 320 A.3d 861, 867 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). Relatedly, Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 341(a)9 provides that, with exceptions not applicable here, “an

appeal may be taken as of right from any final order of an administrative agency or

lower court.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(a). Rule 341(b) defines a “final order” as one that (1)

disposes of all claims against all parties; (2) is entered as a final order pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 341(c);10 or (3) is a qualifying Post Conviction Relief Act11 order under

Pa.R.A.P. 341(f). Pa.R.A.P. 341(b). See also Pa.R.A.P. 311 (allowing certain

interlocutory appeals as of right), 312 and 1311 (allowing certain interlocutory appeals

by permission), and 313 (allowing appeals from qualifying “collateral orders”). “The

The appealability of trial court orders implicates our jurisdiction, is an unwaivable issue, and

may be raised by this Court sua sponte. Smith v. Ivy Lee Real Estate LLC, 326 A.3d 1064, 1069 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2024); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. James, 90 A.3d 813, 815 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014).

Questions of appealability and subject matter jurisdiction are questions of law, over which we exercise

de novo, plenary review. Com. ex rel. Kane v. Philip Morris, Inc., 128 A.3d 334, 340 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2015).

Rule 341 was amended on December 11, 2025, effective July 1, 2026, with changes that do

not impact the issues involved here. Nevertheless, because the trial court orders and discontinuances

at issue pre-date the effective date of the amendments, we apply the former Rule 341.

Rule 341(c) provides a mechanism by which a trial court may enter a final order as to fewer

than all claims against all parties upon the court’s determination that “an immediate appeal would

facilitate resolution of the entire case.” Pa.R.A.P. 341(c).

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

purpose of limiting appellate review to a final order is to prevent piecemeal

determinations and the consequent protraction of litigation.” In re First Baptist Church

of Spring Mill, 22 A.3d 1091, 1095 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (citations and quotations

omitted).

As to the impact of a discontinuance on finality, Rule 229(a) of the

Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in pertinent part, that “[a]

discontinuance shall be the exclusive method of voluntary termination of an action, in

whole or in part, by the plaintiff before commencement of the trial.” Pa.R.Civ.P.

229(a). A discontinuance terminates an action without a disposition on the merits and

places a plaintiff in the same position as if the action had never been filed. Kalmeyer

v. Municipality of Penn Hills, 197 A.3d 1275, 1279 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018). At that point,

no proceeding remains over which the trial court has jurisdiction. Id. See also

Wilmington Township v. Hahn (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 457 C.D. 2019, filed March 2, 2020),

slip op. at 12 (praecipe to discontinue functions as a final order).12

Pertinent here, Rule 229(b) governs partial discontinuances against fewer

than all defendants. It provides, with certain inapplicable exceptions, that “a

discontinuance may not be entered as to [fewer] than all defendants except upon the

written consent of all parties or leave of court upon motion of any plaintiff or any

defendant for whom plaintiff has stipulated in writing to the discontinuance.”

Pa.R.A.P. 229(b)(1). Further, in actions involving the claims or beneficial interests of

minors, court approval of discontinuances is mandatory. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 229(c), Note

(“Court approval of a discontinuance must be obtained in . . . an action for wrongful

death in which a minor is a beneficiary interested, [Pa.R.Civ.P.] 2206(a)”); Pa.R.Civ.P.

We may cite to unreported decisions of this Court issued after January 15, 2008, for their

persuasive value. See Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures,

210 Pa. Code. § 69.414(a).

229, Comment-1991 (“[T]here are several rules which would still require court

approval of a discontinuance: . . . [Pa.R.Civ.P.] 2206(a) governing wrongful death

actions involving minors”); Pa.R.Civ.P. 2206(a) (“No action for wrongful death in

which a minor or an incapacitated person has an interest shall be discontinued . . . until

the court, upon petition of any party in interest, shall allow the discontinuance . . . .”).

Where a trial court’s order grants summary judgment in favor of fewer than all

defendants, a partial discontinuance as to the remaining defendants will render the

summary judgment orders final as of the date the discontinuance is entered on the trial

court’s docket. See Burkey v. CCX, Inc., 106 A.3d 736, 738-41 (Pa. Super. 2014).13

Here, Appellant does not dispute that the trial court’s November 21, 2024

orders were not final because they did not dispose of all claims against all parties.

Relatedly, Appellant also does not dispute that the notices of appeal filed on November

22, 2024, and docketed in this Court at Nos. 1642 and 1643 C.D. 2024, were

premature.14 Instead, Appellant ostensibly argues that his voluntary and unilateral

discontinuances of both Waetzman and Goodman Properties accomplished finality as

of March 5, 2025, and that he timely filed new notices of appeal on March 25, 2025.

We cannot agree.

First, we agree with Appellees that the Waetzman discontinuance is

invalid, for two reasons.15 Rule 229(b)(1) expressly requires the consent of all parties

Although they are not binding on this Court, we may cite to Superior Court opinions for

their persuasive value where they address analogous issues. Lerch v. Unemployment Compensation

Board of Review, 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).

Appellant characterizes these notices of appeal as being “protective” in nature. See

Appellant’s Response in Opposition, 5/27/25, at 5 n.3.

Although Appellant appears to have abandoned any attempt to argue that the Waetzman

discontinuance alone renders final the trial court’s November 21, 2024 orders, we nevertheless must

(Footnote continued on next page…)

or leave of court before a discontinuance may be entered as to fewer than all parties.

The failure to obtain one or the other will render the discontinuance ineffective. See,

e.g., Toney v. Chester County Hospital, 961 A.2d 192, 196-97 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citing

Matyas v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 310 A.2d 301, 302 (Pa. Super. 1973)

(stipulation of discontinuance without single remaining defendant’s signature invalid

to render order final and appealable; appeal filed thereafter was premature and

quashed). Moreover, because this action involves minor beneficiaries to a wrongful

death action, court approval for any discontinuance is obligatory. See Pa.R.Civ.P.

2206(a); Pa.R.Civ.P. 229(c), Note; Pa.R.Civ.P. 229, Comment--1991. Appellant’s

failure to comply with these mandatory prerequisites renders the Waetzman

discontinuance of no effect, and, as a result, Appellant’s claims against Waetzman

remain pending in the trial court.16 Matyas, 310 A.2d at 302 (improperly filed

discontinuance was a nullity); Solomon v. Hulme (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 681 C.D. 2017,

filed April 17, 2018), slip op at 7 n.6 (citing Matyas).

address its impact. If the Waetzman discontinuance is effective, then, as Appellees argue, all four of

Appellant’s appeals are untimely and this Court is without jurisdiction.

Ordinarily, the method to challenge an improperly filed discontinuance is a motion to strike.

See Pa.R.Civ.P. 229(c). In this instance, however, and contrary to Appellant’s insistence that

Appellees have waived the ability to challenge the defects in the discontinuances, see Appellant’s

Response, 5/27/25, at 6-8, a motion to strike was not necessary to our consideration of these issues.

First, the finality and appealability of trial court orders impacts our jurisdiction, which is an

unwaivable issue that we may, and here did, raise sua sponte. See supra, n.8. Second, the court

approval requirement for discontinuances in wrongful death actions involving minor beneficiaries is

a safeguard designed to protect the minor beneficiaries’ interests, which are not adequately

represented by counsel for either the plaintiff or the defendants. See Feliciani v. Impact Project, Inc.,

347 A.3d 682, 688 (Pa. Super. 2025) (court approval requirement is to “ensure that a minor’s interest

is protected and that any settlement entered into for the benefit of the minor is fair and equitable”)

(citation and quotations omitted). The failure of a party to file a motion to strike should not, therefore,

waive the defects in a discontinuance that does not comply with Pa.R.Civ.P. 2206(a).

Second, we also agree with Appellees that Appellant’s attempt to

discontinue the action against Goodman Properties was neither necessary nor effective

in accomplishing finality. Goodman Properties was settled out of the underlying action

weeks prior to the trial court’s November 21, 2024 orders, and—to state the obvious—

a discontinuance as to an already-dismissed party is a nullity. Appellant nowhere in

his filings acknowledges Goodman Properties’ prior dismissal, and the discontinuance

in any event suffers from the same defects as the Waetzman discontinuance; Appellant

obtained neither the parties’ consent nor leave of court prior to filing it.

IV. CONCLUSION

In sum, because the trial court’s November 21, 2024 orders do not dispose

of all claims against all parties and have not been rendered final by any subsequent

discontinuance or order of court, they remain interlocutory. We, as a result, are

constrained to conclude that all four appeals filed from those orders are premature and

must be quashed for lack of jurisdiction.17

________________________________

PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.

We note that Appellant filed both the Waetzman and Goodman Properties discontinuances

after filing notices of appeal on November 22, 2024. It is unclear whether the trial court retained

jurisdiction under Pa.R.A.P. 1701 to approve the discontinuances during the pendency of those

appeals. See Pa.R.A.P. 1973(b), City of Philadelphia v. Kalidave, LLC (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1079 C.D.

2019, filed August 16, 2022), slip op. at 16 n.26; Estate of Paterno v. National Collegiate Athletic

Association (NCAA), 168 A.3d 187, 202-03 (Pa. Super. 2017). If not, this would only reinforce our

conclusion that Appellant’s unilateral discontinuances were not effective to render final the trial

court’s orders.