Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

RICARDO ALBERTO HERNANDEZ )

CASALLAS, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-26-053-J

)

DON JONES, Warden, et al., )

)

Respondents. )

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner Ricardo Alberto Hernandez Casallas, a noncitizen and Venezuelan

national proceeding with counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”),

Doc. 1, challenging under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 his detention by U.S. Immigration and

Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). United States District Judge Bernard M. Jones, II re-

referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in accordance with 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Grant Release (“Motion”).

Doc. 21. Respondents filed a Response, Doc. 25, and the Motion is at issue. For the

reasons outlined below, the undersigned recommends the Court DENY Petitioner’s

Motion.

I. Background

On January 13, 2026, Petitioner filed his Petition alleging Respondents were

illegally detaining him pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) without a bond hearing. Pet.

at 13. Petitioner further alleged he was entitled to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

Id. On January 29, 2026, after expedited briefing, the undersigned issued a Report and

Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending the Court grant the Petition and order a bond

hearing under § 1226(a) or otherwise release Petitioner if he does not receive a bond

hearing within five days. Doc. 13 at 25. On February 6, 2026, the Court issued an Order,

largely adopting the undersigned’s R&R, and ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner

with a “prompt” bond hearing under § 1226(a) or otherwise release him. Doc. 16 at 7. The

Court also ordered Respondents to certify compliance within seven business days of the

Order. Id. Respondents’ certification was due on February 18, 2026.1

On February 18, 2026, Petitioner filed a Notice of Non-Compliance with Order,

stating no bond hearing had been set and “request[ing] an Order for Immediate release of

the Petitioner.” Doc. 18. The following day, the Court ordered Respondents to respond to

Petitioner’s Notice. Doc. 19. On February 20, 2026, Respondents notified the Court that

Petitioner was scheduled for a bond hearing that day at the Kay County Justice Facility

where he is detained. Doc. 20.

On March 5, 2026, Petitioner filed the present Motion for immediate release,

alleging his due process rights were violated at the bond hearing. Mot. at 4. Specifically,

Petitioner alleges he “submitted substantial evidence in advance to the bond hearing,”

including character letters, a sponsor letter, evidence of previous legal entry into the United

States, and evidence of stable employment and residence, but he claims the immigration

judge (“IJ”) ignored the evidence when analyzing his request for bond. Id. at 1-2, 5-42.

Petitioner also alleges before the bond hearing, “the IJ stated to counsel that the filing of

1 February 16, 2026, was a federal holiday and thus not a business day.

the [Pretermit] Motion2 alone is sufficient grounds to determine that the Petitioner is a

flight risk and asked if counsel still wanted to proceed.” Id. at 3. Counsel proceeded and

the IJ denied Petitioner’s bond request, finding him to be a flight risk for several reasons,

including the Pretermit Motion. According to Petitioner, “this decision is not a finding that

any reasonable neutral adjudicator could have made” and “was made prior to the

commencement of the hearing” without “any meaningful due process.”3 Id. (citation

modified).4

2 Pretermit Motions filed by the government commonly seek pretermission of a legally

insufficient application for asylum for the noncitizen. See Memorandum from Sirce E.

Owens, Acting Director of the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) (Apr.

11, 2025), at

https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1396411/dl?inline#:~:text=EOIR's%20interpretation

%20of%20applicable%20law,)%20(disqualifying%20criminal%20conviction (last

accessed Apr. 17, 2026).

3 Petitioner alleges an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) is “hopeless”

given recent cases upholding similar IJ decisions that noncitizens are flight risks. Mot. at

3. Respondents do not address whether Petitioner exhausted his remedies before filing the

Motion. The undersigned agrees Petitioner did not need to appeal to the BIA before filing

this Motion. See Diaz Ortiz v. Smith, 384 F. Supp. 3d 140, 142 n.1 (D. Mass. 2019) (finding

petitioner “need not exhaust administrative remedies by appealing the immigration judge’s

denial of bond to the [BIA] insofar as he argues that his hearing was again constitutionally

inadequate”).

4 According to EOIR’s online case portal, an IJ ordered Petitioner removed on March 13,

2026, and “[n]o appeal was received for this case.” See EOIR Automated Case

Information, at https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation (last accessed Apr. 17,

2026). A nonresident has 30 days to appeal the IJ’s removal order to the BIA, 8 C.F.R.

§ 1003.38(b), or else it becomes final. During the subsequent “removal period” of a

noncitizen with a final order of removal, detention is mandatory. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2).

The parties have not informed the Court whether Petitioner timely appealed the IJ’s

removal order or whether it is indeed final. Without advisement from the parties that

Petitioner has a final order of removal that impacts his Motion, the undersigned proceeds

to address the merits of his claims.

II. Analysis

A. The Court has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s Motion.

As a threshold matter, the Court retains jurisdiction to address Petitioner’s Motion

to the extent it must ensure its judgment has been fully effectuated. See Pena-Gil v. Lyons,

No. 25-CV-03268, 2026 WL 25143, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 5, 2026) (confirming that “because

a federal court always retains jurisdiction to enforce its lawful judgments, including habeas

judgments, the court has the authority to see that its judgment is fully effectuated” (quoting

Gall v. Scroggy, 603 F.3d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 2010)); see also Akhemedov v. Pittman, No.

CV 25-13734, 2026 WL 323404, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2026) (noting “the Court’s review

of the bond hearing is limited in that it can only determine whether Respondents complied

with the Court’s [previous habeas] Order”).

Further, the undersigned acknowledges 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) “strips federal courts of

jurisdiction to hear challenges to an IJ’s discretionary decision to keep a noncitizen in

detention.” Nucamendiz v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-13851, 2026 WL 221449, at *1 (D. Mass.

Jan. 28, 2026) (citation modified); see also Mwangi v. Terry, 465 F. App’x 784, 787 (10th

Cir. 2012) (citing § 1226(e) and noting “the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion is

not subject to judicial review”). “Thus, a district court has no jurisdiction to consider a

habeas petitioner’s challenge to the decision to either grant or deny bond.” Kumar v. De

Anda-Ybarra, No. CIV-26-164-R, 2026 WL 753944, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 17, 2026).

Respondents acknowledge that § 1226(e) “does not, however, deprive [courts] of

jurisdiction to hear constitutional challenges to the extent of the Government’s detention

authority under the statutory framework as a whole.” Nucamendiz, 2026 WL 221449, at

*1 (citation modified); see Doc. 25 at 10 (same). This Court similarly recognized earlier

in this case that Section “1226(e) does not preclude habeas jurisdiction over constitutional

claims or questions of law.” Hernandez Casallas v. Jones, No. CIV-26-53-J, 2026 WL

324646, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 6, 2026) (citation modified). In sum, “courts cannot

override an immigration judge’s bond decision simply because they might have reached a

different result,” and “habeas relief is appropriate only if the immigration judge’s exercise

of discretion in denying bond was so arbitrary that it would offend fundamental tenets of

due process.” Nucamendiz, 2026 WL 221449, at *2 (citation modified).

Here, Respondents do not dispute this Court’s jurisdiction for limited habeas review

because Petitioner’s Motion alleges a violation of due process under the Fifth Amendment.

See Doc. 25 at 4-5. This Court has previously found jurisdiction to consider whether a

petitioner’s procedural due process rights were violated at an IJ’s earlier bond hearing.5

See Sin Johal v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-1408-J, 2026 WL 893185, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 1,

2026) (agreeing “a procedural due process violation likely occurred” at a bond hearing but

was rendered harmless); see also Daboin Mendez v. Dedos, No. 26-CV-00394, 2026 WL

973077, at *2 (D.N.M. Apr. 10, 2026) (finding jurisdiction over petitioner’s motion to

enforce when petitioner raised a constitutional claim that the IJ failed to follow due process

when denying bond because it has “authority to ensure compliance with its own habeas

5 Respondents argue substantive due process “is at issue in this case.” Resp. at 4. Here,

the Court need not decide whether Petitioner’s substantive or procedural due process rights

are specifically at issue because he fails to establish any due process violation during his

bond hearing.

orders”). As such, the Court has jurisdiction over Petitioner’s Motion to the extent he

challenges his due process at the IJ’s bond hearing.

B. Petitioner has not demonstrated that the IJ violated his right to due

process.

As noted above, the Court’s review of the IJ’s decision is limited to whether the IJ

exercised his discretion in accordance with the law when denying Petitioner bond. “To

make this showing, [petitioner] can either point to the language of the immigration judge’s

opinion or demonstrate that the evidence itself could not—as a matter of law—have

supported the immigration judge’s decision to deny bond.” Diaz Ortiz, 384 F. Supp. 3d at

143 (citation modified). “In a fundamentally fair bond hearing, due process has three

essential elements. The noncitizen ‘(1) is entitled to factfinding based on a record produced

before the decisionmaker and disclosed to him or her; (2) must be allowed to make

arguments on his or her own behalf; and (3) has the right to an individualized determination

of his [or her] interests.’” De Souza v. Soto, No. CV 25-18734, 2026 WL 102946, at *3

(D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2026) (quoting Ghanem v. Warden Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 21-

1908, 2022 WL 574624, at *2 (3d Cir. Feb. 25, 2022)).

For habeas relief, Petitioner must show the IJ’s “decision was somehow legally

erroneous or unconstitutional.” Kumar, 2026 WL 753944, at *2; see also, e.g., id. (denying

habeas motion where petitioner failed to allege he was denied the opportunity to present

evidence at a bond hearing or that the IJ improperly shifted the burden of proof); Daboin

Mendez, 2026 WL 973077, at *2 (granting habeas petitioner’s motion to enforce where IJ

did not appropriately shift the burden to the government at the bond hearing as ordered by

the district court); Garcia v. Hyde, No. 25-CV-585, --- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3466312,

at *11 (D.R.I. Dec. 3, 2025) (granting habeas because the IJ failed to apply the correct

standard and ignored two key documents).

Petitioner fails to make any such showing here. His Motion is framed as a

constitutional challenge that his bond hearing did not comply with due process, see Mot.

at 3, but he fundamentally asks the Court to re-weigh the evidence presented at the bond

hearing and to reach a different result from the IJ. Petitioner alleges he “submitted

substantial evidence” in support of his bond request and attaches the relevant documents.

Id. at 1. This evidence, he argues, demonstrates he is not a flight risk and so the IJ should

not have made such a finding. See id. at 2 (“The Immigration Judge ignored the filed

evidence demonstrating fixed address, employment, prior legal status, compliance with

ICE obligations, significant family and community ties, and other favorable equities that

Petitioner has when analyzing his request for bond.”). However, “after full consideration

of the evidence presented,” the IJ determined Petitioner is a flight risk because of his “lack

of ties to the USA; recent entry and manner of entry,” and “a pending pretermit motion.”

Doc. 25-1 at 1 (IJ Order) (citation modified).

Thus, Petitioner has not demonstrated a violation of his right to due process. He has

not, for example, alleged the IJ applied the wrong standard of proof. See, e.g., Kumar,

2026 WL 753944, at *2 (finding petitioner’s arguments do not warrant habeas relief where

“[p]etitioner does not indicate that he was denied the opportunity to present evidence at the

bond hearing or that the IJ improperly shifted the burden of proof”). Additionally, while

Petitioner generally alleges the IJ failed to consider his evidence, he offers no record

support that the IJ refused to consider a specific document when making the determination

or that failure to consider any document impacted the IJ’s final determination. See De

Souza, 2026 WL 102946, at *3 (denying petitioner’s motion to enforce a habeas judgment

where evidence showed “the IJ did not ‘summarily’ deem Petitioner a flight risk” but rather

conducted an individualized review); accord Garcia, 2025 WL 3466312, at *11 (granting

habeas because the IJ failed to apply the correct standard and the record showed the IJ

ignored two key documents). Further, the IJ’s order specifically states he considered all

the evidence Petitioner presented. Doc. 25-1 at 1. This can be true even if the IJ indicated

to Petitioner’s counsel that the Pretermit Motion was enough to support a finding that he is

a flight risk.

Finally, Petitioner acknowledges he was allowed to present evidence and the IJ

considered the evidence. And nothing in the IJ’s decision indicates the IJ failed to consider

or improperly considered the evidence Petitioner presented. See, e.g., Nucamendiz, 2026

WL 221449, at *2 (finding the IJ’s determination petitioners were a flight risk did not

violate due process because “Respondents and Petitioners were each permitted to present

evidence of risk of flight at their respective hearings, and the reasons given by the

immigration judge were, in each case, specific to the petitioner’s circumstances and

plausibly related to the risk that the petitioner would abscond”).

The undersigned acknowledges the IJ’s order—provided to the Court by

Respondents—lacks much detail. But Petitioner fails here to point to any document the IJ

didn’t consider; nor has he otherwise proven he did not receive a true individualized

hearing.6 Notably, while Petitioner contends the outcome was pre-determined because the

IJ told his counsel the Pretermit Motion alone was enough to show a flight risk, the IJ’s

Order included additional reasons—lack of ties to the country and manner of entry—as to

why Petitioner was not entitled to bond. Doc. 25-1. Accordingly, the IJ’s decision was

not so arbitrary that it offends fundamental tenets of due process, and Petitioner’s Motion

should be denied.

III. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court DENY

Petitioner’s Motion. The parties are advised of their right to object to this Supplemental

Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed not later

than April 24, 2026. See id. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). If a party wishes to

respond to the other party’s objections, such response must be filed not later than April 29,

2026. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate

review of the factual and legal issues addressed in this Supplemental Report and

Recommendation. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).

This Supplemental Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to

the undersigned Magistrate Judge in this matter.

6 Petitioner fails even to provide the Court with the IJ’s order, which Respondents attached

to their Response. Doc. 25-1. Petitioner also did not file an optional Reply. His bare-

bones Motion alone does not provide the Court with sufficient allegations to show no

individualized consideration without asking the Court to re-weigh the evidence, which is

explicitly prohibited under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).

ENTERED this 17" day of April, 2026.

CHRIS M. STEPHENS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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