Martinez

IN THE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

PEORIA DIVISION

ARTHUR JAMES MARTINEZ,

Individually and as Primary

Caregiver for DEVIN

MUHLENHAUPT, Case No. 1:26-cv-01234-JEH-RLH

Plaintiff,

v.

PEORIA POLICE DEPARTMENT,

PHOENIX COMMUNITY

DEVELOPMENT SERVICES,

MOLLY PILGREEN, SHENDANTE

LEWIS, and HEATHER HACKMAN,

Defendants.

Order

Now before the Court is Plaintiff Arthur James Martinez’s, Individually and

as Primary Caregiver for Devin Muhlenhaupt, Application to Proceed in District

Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (D. 2). For the reasons set forth below, the

Application to Proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) is GRANTED, and the Plaintiff’s

Amended Civil Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief (D. 4) is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE.1

The Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed IFP sufficiently demonstrates that

Martinez is unable to pay the costs of these proceedings, and thus, the Motion is

granted.

1 Citations to the electronic docket are abbreviated as “D. ___ at ECF p. ___.”

The Plaintiff’s Amended Civil Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief

(D. 4), filed on June 3, 2026, lists the Peoria Police Department, Phoenix

Community Development Services (Phoenix CDS), Molly Pilgreen, Shendante

Lewis, and Heather Hackman – the individuals all employed at Phoenix CDS – in

its caption. However, Plaintiff Martinez does not actually list the Peoria Police

Department in the body of the Amended Complaint which suggests he no longer

wishes to pursue any claims against that now former defendant. Further, on June

4, 2026, the Court entered an Order (D. 5) denying Plaintiff Martinez’s Emergency

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Emergency Injunction (D. 3)

questioning whether Martinez even has standing and/or the proper authority to

represent Muhlenhaupt, finding Martinez’s allegations failed to support a

constitutional or statutory deprivation sufficient for the Court to conclude the

underlying action had any chance of success on the merits, and finding the Court

did not otherwise have enough information to grant the emergency relief

requested. 6/4/2026 Order (D. 5 at ECF pp. 1-3).

Plaintiff Martinez alleges Muhlenhaupt, Martinez’s “ward,” is a 32-year-old

“vulnerable adult” who relies “entirely” on Martinez for “life-support care,

cognitive stabilization, and daily accommodation.” Pl.’s Am. Compl. (D. 4 at ECF

p. 2). Martinez alleges he “operates as the designated, state-recognized primary

caregiver and legal advocate” for Muhlenhaupt. Id. He further alleges Defendant

Phoenix CDS is a “federally funded administrative housing vendor and state

contractor” and receives “public funding streams under color of state law[,]”

Defendant Pilgreen is the active Vice President of Phoenix CDS, Defendant Lewis

is an active program supervisor for Phoenix CDS, and Defendant Hackman is a

field case manager for Phoenix CDS. Id. The Plaintiff alleges, among other things,

Defendant Hackman “executed an unauthorized physical extraction and transit of

the Ward away from his primary residence without the consent or knowledge of

the Plaintiff [Martinez][,]” “Defendants have systematically concealed the physical

location of the Ward,” and “the Ward is experiencing acute emotional distress

[and] is subjected to forced family separation[.]” Id. at ECF p. 3. Plaintiff Martinez

alleges that in retaliation for his conduct in response to the Defendants’ actions,

the Defendants have “intentionally withheld contracted utility stipends[,]” and

that has caused the “imminent termination” of Martinez’s Xfinity broadband

internet network and mobile cellular communication lines[.]” Id. at ECF p. 4. He

says the Defendants’ actions, in turn, “strip[ped] the care unit of mandatory

telehealth monitoring and digital access to the federal courts[]” as well as “severe

somatic and physiological stress to [Martinez.]” Id.

Plaintiff Martinez pursues a claim against all Defendants pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 for the “unlawful restriction of the Ward’s liberty and severe somatic

injuries to the Plaintiff under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. He pursues a claim

pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132, against

Defendant Phoenix CDS due to the latter “forcing the isolation of the Ward in an

unapproved facility and maliciously manipulating his communication channels to

prevent integration with his primary care support network.” Id. at ECF p. 5.

I

“The federal in forma pauperis statute, [28 U.S.C. § 1915], is designed to

ensure that indigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.”

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). Section 1915(e) directs a court to screen

a complaint when filed together with a request to proceed IFP. Luevano v. Wal-

Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1022 (7th Cir. 2013). A court shall dismiss a case at

any time if: 1) the allegation of poverty is untrue; 2) the action is frivolous or

malicious; 3) the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 4)

the action seeks monetary relief against an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2).

The Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard applies when

determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Coleman v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 468

(7th Cir. 2017). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint

must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted

as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556

U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

A plaintiff “must give enough details about the subject-matter of the case to

present a story that holds together.” Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404

(7th Cir. 2010).

A

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege: 1) he was

deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the Unted States; and 2)

the deprivation was visited upon him by a person or persons acting under color

of state law. Kramer v. Vill. of N. Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004). Here,

the Plaintiff states in a conclusory, mere recitation-of-the-elements-of-the-cause-

of-action manner that the Defendants acted under color of state law and utilized

state-delegated authority and Defendant Phoenix CDS is a federally funded state

contractor. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 694 F.3d 873, 885 (7th Cir.

2012) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action, supported by

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678)). In

addition, his allegations suggest nothing more than that Phoenix CDS received

public funds. That is not enough to transform private actions into actions of the

State. See Norman v. Campbell, 87 F. App’x 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2003) (unpublished

opinion) (“a private person’s receipt of state funds, without more, does not make

that person a state actor[]”); Barlow-Johnson v. Ctr. for Youth and Fam. Sols., No. 22-

cv-3214, 2023 WL 5826966, at *5 (C.D. Ill. Sep. 8, 2023) (“the receipt of public funds

alone is insufficient to transform otherwise private actions into actions of the

State[]”); and Potter v. Gray, No. 25-CV-00143-SPM, 2025 WL 2771115, at *3 (S.D. Ill.

Sep. 29, 2025) (“The mere fact that a private entity or individual receives state

funding, or provides services that benefit the state, does not make it a state actor.”)

(citing Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982)).

Furthermore, Plaintiff Martinez does not identify a right secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States he was deprived of – his alleged right to

be free of “severe somatic injuries” is not a recognized constitutional right. To the

extent he attempts to allege the deprivation of his liberty interest in his familial

relations, nowhere in the Amended Complaint does the Plaintiff allege he and

Muhlenhaupt are father-son, brothers, parent-child, or otherwise actual family

members. Such a right to familial association typically involves parents and

children. See, e.g., Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing

cases explaining there is a fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the

care, custody, and management of their child); Montoya v. Jeffreys, 565 F. Supp. 3d

1045, 1064 (N.D. Ill. 2021) (articulating the liberty interest in “a parent’s right to

enjoy the companionship of his children[]”).

To the extent Plaintiff Martinez pursues a Section 1983 claim on

Muhlenhaupt’s behalf for the unlawful restriction of Muhlenhaupt’s liberty, a pro

se party cannot represent another individual in court, even if the pro se party is, as

Martinez puts it, “state-recognized.” See Elustra v. Mineo, 595 F.3d 699, 704 (7th

Cir. 2010) (“Normally, representative parties such as next friends may not conduct

litigation pro se; pleadings may be brought before the court only by parties or their

attorney.”) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654); Georgakis v. Ill. State Univ., 722 F.3d 1075, 1077

(7th Cir. 2013) (“A nonlawyer can’t handle a case on behalf of anyone except

himself.”).

Plaintiff Martinez fails to state a Section 1983 claim both on his own behalf

as well as on Muhlenhaupt’s behalf.

B

With regard to Martinez’s attempted claim on behalf of Muhlenhaupt for

violations of the ADA, fatal to the claim is the fact that, yet again, Martinez cannot

represent Muhlenhaupt pro se. Indeed, Plaintiff Martinez’s cited case of Olmstead

v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), was brought by mentally disabled patients

through counsel. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 provides: “Subject to the provisions of this

subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such

disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the

services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination

by any such entity.” The ADA defines a “public entity” as “any State or local

government” or “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other

instrumentality of a State of States of local government.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1)(A),

(B). None of the Plaintiff’s allegations bring Defendant Phoenix CDS within the

realm of either of those definitions.

Plaintiff Martinez fails to state an ADA claim on behalf of his “ward,”

Muhlenhaupt.

C

To the extent that Martinez complains of retaliation against him, again, he

has failed to include allegations from which a plausible inference arises that the

Defendants are state actors. So any would-be Section 1983 retaliation claim

necessarily fails. See Zitzka v. Vill. of Westmont, 743 F. Supp. 2d 887, 914-15 (N.D.

Ill. 2010) (providing that in order to establish a prima facie case of First Amendment

retaliation under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show his speech was

constitutionally protected, he suffered a deprivation likely to deter free speech,

and the speech was the but-for cause of the defendants’ action).

Lastly, as the Court questioned in its June 4th Order, Plaintiff Martinez’s

standing to pursue the Amended Complaint, in certain respects, is obviously

lacking. The standing requirements imposed by the Constitution are three-fold,

the first being that a litigant must show that he suffered a concrete and

particularized injury that is either actual or imminent. Milwaukee Police Ass’n v.

Flynn, 863 F.3d 636, 639 (7th Cir. 2017). Here, several of the allegations of in the

Amended Complaint pertain to the wrongs apparently suffered by Muhlenhaupt.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(c)(2), which provides a representative may sue

on behalf of an incompetent person, does not remedy the lack of standing here

because, as the Court already explained, a nonlawyer cannot handle a case on

behalf of anyone except himself.

II

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff Arthur James Martinez’s,

Individually and as Primary Caregiver for Devin Muhlenhaupt, Application to

Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (D. 2) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Martinez’s Amended Civil Complaint for Damages and Injunctive

Relief (D. 4) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim. The

Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his complaint within 21 days if he believes he

can do so consistent with this Order. The Clerk is directed to mail a copy of this

Order to pro se Plaintiff Martinez.

It is so ordered.

Entered on June 17, 2026

s/Jonathan E. Hawley

U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE