Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ

SANTA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:25-cv-1139-KCD-DNF

M. MCKINNEY, T. QUEGAN, and

J. MARSHALL,

Defendants.

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Francisco Rodriguez Santa, a prisoner of the Florida

Department of Corrections, initiated this action by filing a pro se civil rights

complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 1.) He moves to proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. 5), and his complaint is before the Court for initial screening.

After considering Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court dismisses his

complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

I. Amended Complaint

Plaintiff alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true at

this stage: On June 11, 2025, while at Florida State Prison, Plaintiff

experienced a psychological emergency and blacked out. (Doc. 1 at 4, 7.) When

he woke, Plaintiff was evaluated by mental health, taken to C-dorm, placed

under 24-hour observation, and declared mentally unstable. (Id. at 7.) He

remained under psychological observation until June 13, 2025, when a series

of transfers landed him at Charlotte Correctional Institution. (Id. at 6.)

On July 21, 2025, Plaintiff was taken to a disciplinary hearing for a

disciplinary report written by Defendant McKinney regarding the June 11,

2025, incident. (Doc. 1 at 6.)1 Plaintiff alleges that he was surprised by the

hearing because he had not been served with a disciplinary report and was

unaware that he had received one. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Florida

Department of Corrections rules forbid serving an inmate with a disciplinary

report when he is on “psych watch.” (Id.) Defendants Quegan and Marshall

conducted the hearing and found Plaintiff guilty. (Id.) They sentenced him to

60 days’ confinement and revoked 60 days of gain time credit. (Id.)

On July 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed an administrative appeal of the decision.

(Doc. 1 at 6.) The Warden overturned Plaintiff’s disciplinary report due to an

administrative error, restored his gain time, and released him from

confinement. (Id.)

Plaintiff now asserts that Defendant McKinney violated the Fourteenth

Amendment by writing Plaintiff a disciplinary report while he was on

psychological evaluation. The disciplinary report allegedly caused Plaintiff

great pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional distress. (Doc. 1 at 7.)

1 Plaintiff attached a summary of the hearing to his complaint. (Doc. 1-2.) Plaintiff was

accused of (and found guilty of) possessing a metal “homemade edged weapon.” (Id.)

He next asserts that Defendants Quegan and Marshall took 60 days’ gain time

and sentenced him to 60 days’ confinement without proper due process, again

causing Plaintiff great pain and suffering, mental anguish, and emotional

distress. (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against

each defendant. (Doc. 1 at 3, 9.)

II. Screening Standards

A prisoner who seeks to proceed in forma pauperis must have his

complaint screened in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a)

(“The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon

as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner

seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity.”). This procedure requires the court to dismiss a

prisoner's civil action prior to service if it determines that the complaint is

frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

seeks monetary damages from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii), 1915A(b)(1), (2).

The standard for failure to state a claim under the screening statutes is

largely the same as Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). And under Rule

12(b)(6), a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” but it must

provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint

may not rest on “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.2 Instead, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise

a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

Likewise, a complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the court discerns

from its face “that the factual allegations are clearly baseless or that the legal

theories are indisputably meritless.” Davis v. Kvalheim, 261 F. App’x 231, 235

(11th Cir. 2008).

III. Discussion

Plaintiff seeks relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Doc. 1 at 3.) Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a

criminal prosecution, and “the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such

proceedings does not apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). In

Wolff, the Supreme Court described the minimum procedural due process

requirements for prisoners who receive discipline that results in the loss of

good-time credits or the imposition of solitary confinement. These protections

include advance written notice of the charges, adequate time to prepare a

defense, an opportunity to present witnesses and evidence, and a written

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have

been omitted in this and subsequent citations.

statement by the factfinder explaining the reasons for the decision. Id. In

addition, the decision-maker must be sufficiently impartial so as not to present

“a hazard of arbitrary decision making.” Id. at 571.

Here, the extent of the process Plaintiff received in the disciplinary

proceeding is unclear from the complaint. But what is clear is that Plaintiff

successfully availed himself of the right to appeal, a protection not mandated

by Wolff. Thus, from the allegations in the complaint, it appears that the

process he was afforded actually protected, rather than harmed, him.

Nevertheless—even if Plaintiff did not receive advance notice of the

disciplinary hearing and was unable to properly prepare a defense to the

charges against him—a defendant’s mere failure to comply with Wolff’s

procedural protections does not give rise to a due process claim in every

situation. The Supreme Court has explained that Wolff due process claims are

limited to situations in which a defendant’s actions caused an “atypical

significant deprivation” in which a State might conceivably have created a

liberty interest. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995). In short, a

defendant’s failure to follow each Wolff procedural requirement violates the

Constitution only when the failure resulted in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s

interest in life, liberty, or property. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 220

(2009) (“The 14th Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects persons against

deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its

procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.”).

Thus, unless Plaintiff was deprived of a liberty interest, no due process

protection is triggered.

Plaintiff alleges that he was placed in confinement from July 21 until

August 7.3 A short term of segregation rarely implicates a liberty interest

protected by the Due Process Clause. See Smith v. Deemer, 641 F. App'x 865,

868 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Generally, atypical and significant hardships must exist

for a significant period of time.”). Moreover, temporary periods of segregation

(such as the 17-day period of administrative confinement alleged here) do not

present an “atypical, significant deprivation in which a State might

conceivably create a liberty interest.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486; see also Rodgers

v. Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998) (concluding that spending

two months in administrative confinement did not constitute a deprivation of

a constitutionally protected liberty interest); Woodson v. Whitehead, 673 F.

App’x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2016) (“The Due Process Clause does not create an

enforceable liberty interest in freedom from restrictive confinement while a

prisoner is incarcerated.”); Al-Amin v. Donald, 165 F. App’x 733, 738 (11th Cir.

2006) (finding that there is no right inherent in the Constitution to be free from

3 Plaintiff also alleges that he was temporarily deprived of gain time. But, as the gain time

was completely restored, this allegation does not implicate due process concerns.

confinement in administrative segregation). Simply put, the sanction imposed

on Plaintiff did not implicate problematic due process concerns.

Plaintiff’s failure to establish that any defendant deprived him of a

constitutionally protected liberty interest requires dismissal of his due process

claims.

IV. Conclusion

Because Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that he was deprived of a

constitutionally protected liberty interest, he does not state a claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. And on the facts present here,

a more carefully drafted complaint would still not state a plausible claim. See

Cornelius v. Bank of Am., NA, 585 F. App'x 996, 1000 (11th Cir. 2014) (“While

a pro se litigant generally must be given at least one opportunity to amend his

complaint, a district judge need not allow an amendment where amendment

would be futile.”). Thus, his complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim

on which relief could be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

1. This case is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a

claim on which relief may be granted.

2. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate any pending motions, close

this case, and enter judgment accordingly.

ENTERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February 23, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge