GODFREY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

TRACEY DALE GODFREY, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00371-JRO-MJD

)

SHERIFF DEPARTMENT KNOX COUNTY )

VIN. IND., et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND

DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, AND GRANTING MOTION FOR

CASE STATUS

Plaintiff Tracey Godfrey, who is currently incarcerated at the Knox County

Jail, alleges in this case that he was wrongly denied participation in the Life After

Meth (“LAM”) Program at that facility. Because the plaintiff is a “prisoner,” this

Court must screen the complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. §

1915A(a), (c).

I. SCREENING STANDARD

When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is

frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To

determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same

standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).

Under that standard, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content

that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The

Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a “less stringent

standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720

(7th Cir. 2017).

II. THE COMPLAINT

Godfrey names the following defendants: Sheriff of Knox County,1 and

LAM Directors2 Aaron and Marsha Bishop. Godfrey’s factual allegations are

accepted as true at the pleading stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470,

472 (7th Cir. 2023).

Godfrey alleges that the LAM Directors denied him entry into the program

because of his “nervous attention deficit” disorder. The Sheriff does not require

the LAM staff not to deprive inmates of equal opportunities. Godfrey further

alleges that the defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances and

lawsuits.

III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS

Although a plaintiff need not plead legal theories in a complaint, see Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a), Godfrey has identified the theories he wishes to use—retaliation

1 Although Mr. Godfrey identifies this defendant in the caption as the Sheriff’s

Department, his allegations in the complaint are against the Sheriff individually.

2 The complaint is understood to name LAM Directors Aaron and Marshal Bishop as

defendants, rather than LAM Directors of Life After Meth Program as a distinct

defendant.

under the First Amendment and equal protection under the Fourteenth

Amendment. Where a pro se litigant has expressly stated the legal theory he

wishes to pursue, the district court is not required to analyze whether the

allegations in the complaint might state a claim under a different legal theory.

See Larry v. Goldsmith, 799 F. App’x 413, 416 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Clancy v.

Office of Foreign Assets Control of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 606-07

(7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, the court analyzes Godfrey’s claims only under the

theories he has identified.

Applying the screening standard to the facts alleged in the complaint, the

complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted.

First, any allegation against the Sherriff is dismissed. Godfrey’s only

allegation against the Sheriff is that the Sheriff failed to require his staff not to

discriminate against inmates seeking to enter the LAM Program. But “[l]iability

under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their

own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that

subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d

1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018). Godfrey does not allege that the Sheriff personally

participated in Godfrey’s allegations. Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649,

657 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[I]ndividual liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal

involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.”).

Next, any retaliation claim is dismissed. To state a First Amendment

retaliation claim, Godfrey must allege that: (1) he engaged in activity protected

by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter

First Amendment activity; and (3) the protected activity he engaged in was at

least a motivating factor for the retaliatory action. Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d

603, 618 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir.

2009) and Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287

(1977)). Godfrey’s bald claim that he was denied access to the LAM program

because he filed grievances is not enough to allow an inference that his filing of

grievances motivated the defendants’ actions. Godfrey does not allege that the

defendants knew about his grievances or any facts to support a conclusion that

they acted because of his grievances. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400,

403 (7th Cir. 2010) (a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper

that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”).

Godfrey’s claim against LAM Directors Aaron and Marshal Bishop shall

proceed as a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. To state an Equal

Protection claim, Godfrey must allege that (1) he was a member of a protected

class, (2) he was treated differently from a similarly situated member of an

unprotected class, and (3) the defendants were motivated by a discriminatory

purpose. Alston v. City of Madison, 853 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2017). Or, “[a]

plaintiff alleging a class-of-one-equal-protection claim must establish that (1) a

state actor has intentionally treated him differently than others similarly

situated, and (2) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Reget

v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010). Godfrey’s allegation that

the defendants denied him entry into the LAM program because of his attention

deficit disorder is understood to be a claim that they treated him differently

because of a disability.

“Disabled individuals, like any class, are protected by the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Stevens v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 210 F.3d

732, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, “it is a violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment for the State to discriminate against disabled persons in an

irrational manner or for an illegitimate reason.” Id. That said, courts subject

such claims only to rational basis review, not heightened scrutiny. “States are

not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for

the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.” Bd.

of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). Plaintiff’s claim may

not survive a dispositive motion filed by Defendants or trial—since only irrational

state action can be a violation. But his complaint, taken as true at this stage,

sufficiently states an Equal Protection Clause claim based on disability without

a rational purpose. See also Ostrowski v. Lake County, 33 F.4th 960, 966 (7th

Cir. 2022) (explaining that a disability-based equal protection challenge to

pension-plan offerings “qualifies . . . for rational basis review”); Mullins v.

Indiana, No. 1:20cv-02900-JPH-TAB, 2023 WL 7513693, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Nov.

13, 2023) (quoting Stevens, 210 F.3d at, 737-38).

This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the

Court. All other claims have been dismissed. If the plaintiff believes that

additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court,

he shall have through July 15, 2026, in which to file a motion to reconsider the

screening order.

IV. CONCLUSION AND SERVICE OF PROCESS

The following claims are proceeding in this action: an Equal Protection

Clause claim against LAM Directors Aaron and Marshal Bishop. All other claims

have been dismissed.

The clerk is directed to terminate the Sheriffs Department and LAM

Directors of Life After Meth Program as defendants.

The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process

to the defendants in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of

the complaint, dkt. [1], applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for

Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this

Order.

Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to

Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Godfrey’s motion for case status, dkt. [23], is GRANTED consistent with

the rulings in this Order.

SO ORDERED.

Date: June 17, 2026

\s R. Olson

United States District Judge

Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

TRACEY DALE GODFREY

2000050067

KNOX COUNTY JAIL

2375 S. Old Decker Rd.

Vincennes, IN 47591

LAM Director Aaron

KNOX COUNTY JAIL

2375 S. Old Decker Rd.

Vincennes, IN 47591

LAM Director Marsha Bishop

KNOX COUNTY JAIL

2375 S. Old Decker Rd.

Vincennes, IN 47591