Opinion

Roberts

Court
District Court, E.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Jun 17, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.0%

noting that a “minor offense . . . support[s] the use of minimal force”

How later courts described this case

  • noting that a “minor offense . . . support[s] the use of minimal force”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MICHAEL ROBERTS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-cv-218-DES

)

CITY OF ATOKA, OKLAHOMA, )

DRAKE SMITH, and )

KODY SIMPSON, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Kody Simpson’s (“Defendant Simpson”)

and Defendant Drake Smith’s (“Defendant Smith”), Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended

Complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (Docket Nos. 25 & 26). For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

On July 2, 2025, Plaintiff Michael Roberts (“Plaintiff”) filed his Complaint alleging violations

of the United States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, and Oklahoma law arising out of his

traffic stop and arrest in February of 2024. (Docket. No. 2). Plaintiff filed his First Amended

Complaint on August 29, 2025. (Docket No. 20). Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint alleges that,

at or around 4:30 pm on February 25, 2024, Plaintiff was pulled over by Drake Smith (“Defendant

Smith”) for allegedly speeding. Id. at 2-3. Plaintiff provided Defendant Smith with his license and

proof of insurance as requested and remained calm and ordinary. Id. Plaintiff alleges Defendant

Smith returned to his patrol car to verify Plaintiff’s documents, check for warrants, and determine

who owned the vehicle. Id. at 3. Dispatch reported to Defendant Smith that Plaintiff had no

warrants and that he owned the car. Id. At this time, Kody Simpson (“Defendant Simpson”)

arrived on the scene and, according to Plaintiff, despite finding nothing to justify an arrest or an

extended detention, nonetheless suggested to Defendant Smith that he perform a Standard Field

Sobriety Test on Plaintiff.1

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Simpson asked Defendant Smith if he smelled marijuana and

Defendant Smith responded he did not. Id. at 3. Despite this, Plaintiff alleges the two officers

approached either side of Plaintiff’s car and Defendant Smith asked Plaintiff to step out of the car.

Id. at 4. Plaintiff alleges the officers did not provide a reason why Plaintiff was being asked to

step out of the car, but that Defendant Smith then asked Plaintiff if he had been smoking marijuana

that day to which Plaintiff responded that he does not smoke. Id. Plaintiff then alleges Defendant

Simpson unreasonably escalated the situation by walking to the driver’s side door and reaching

into the vehicle to open the door. Id. Plaintiff, fearing for his safety, rolled up the window and

stopped three quarters of the way up. Id. Defendant Simpson then attempted to break Plaintiff’s

window by slamming his hand against the glass twice. Id. Plaintiff requested to speak to a

supervisor, but Defendant Simpson reached into the vehicle again, grabbed his pepper spray

canister and “held it directly in front of Plaintiff’s face and doused him in pepper spray.” Id.

According to Plaintiff, Defendant Simpson then instructed Defendant Smith to break the

driver’s side window and Defendant Smith complied by using his baton. Id. Defendant Simpson

reached through the broken window, unlocked Plaintiff’s door, and “grabbed Plaintiff by only his

hair and pulled him bending his body significantly and attempting to drag him out of the car but

was unsuccessful due to Plaintiff’s seatbelt still being on.” Id. at 5. After unbuckling the seatbelt,

Defendant Simpson “for a second time grabbed Plaintiff solely by the hair and violently tugged,

twisting Plaintiff’s neck downward.” Id. After Plaintiff was removed from the vehicle he was taken

1 According to Defendant Smith, he observed Plaintiff as having glazed over eyes, slow reactions and irritation and

irritability which is what led him want to perform the field sobriety test. (Docket No. 24 at 4).

to the Atoka County Jail but was not charged with any offense related to driving under the

influence. Id. Plaintiff alleges that under the circumstances, the use of violent force on Plaintiff

was objectively unreasonable and excessive. Id. at 6.

Defendants raise four (4) issues for the Court’s consideration in their Motions to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint: (1) whether the Court should take Judicial Notice of the

body-camera footage as a public record; (2) whether Plaintiff has adequately pled an excessive

force claim against Defendant Simpson; (3) whether Plaintiff has adequately pled a failure to

intervene claim against Defendant Smith; and (4) whether Plaintiff has adequality pled wrongful

arrest. Furthermore, both Defendants raise qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth below,

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. Analysis

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Courts would generally embrace a liberal

construction of this pleading requirement and allow complaints containing only conclusory

allegations to move forward unless factual impossibility was apparent from the face of the

pleadings. Robbins v. Oklahoma 519 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2008). However, the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), announced a

new standard and held that to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain enough

allegations of fact to state a claim in which relief is plausible on its face. Id at 570. This does not

mean all facts must be presented at the time of the complaint, but merely that the complaint must

“give the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Id. at

555 (quotation omitted). Therefore, “if [allegations] are so general that they encompass a wide

swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs have not nudged their claims across the

line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins, 519 F. 3d at 1247. Courts are to construe the

allegations of a complaint in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff; however, “the court will not

read causes of action into the complaint which are not alleged.” Arnold v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma,

No. 09CV811, 2010 WL 3860647, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2010) (quotation omitted).

It is not enough for the plaintiff to plead facts “merely consistent” with the defendant’s

liability – “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Instead, a plaintiff must

state enough facts to nudge his claims “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. “A complaint is ‘plausible on its face’ if its factual allegations allow the court to

‘draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’” Doe v.

Sch. Dist. No. 1, 970 F.3d 1300, 1309 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

a. The Court will not take Judicial Notice of the Body-Camera Footage.

Defendants request the Court take Judicial Notice of the footage taken from both officer’s

body worn cameras with audio. (Docket Nos. 24 & 26 at 3). Defendants argue that a Court may

take judicial notice of facts which are a matter of public record without converting a motion to

dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. Id. citing Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co.,

390 F.3d 1276, 1279 n.1 (10th Cir. 2004). While the Court is generally limited to reviewing the

“four corners” of the pleadings on a motion to dismiss, the “district court may consider documents

referred to in the complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do

not dispute the documents’ authenticity.” Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th

Cir. 2002). Despite Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff “quotes from or references the footage

content in at least eighteen paragraphs” of his Amended Complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiff

does not reference the body-camera footage, make the contents of body-camera footage central to

his claims, or attach anything related to the body-camera footage as an exhibit to his Amended

Complaint. See Walbridge v. City of Oilton, Oklahoma, 785 F.Supp.3d 978, 989 (N.D. Okla. 2025).

And while the Court in Walbridge noted that a court may take judicial of facts which are a matter

of public record, the Tenth Circuit has determined that ‘“those documents may only be considered

to show their contents and not to prove the truth of the matters asserted therein.’” Id. (quoting Tal

v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1265 n.24 (10th Cir. 2006)). Because the Plaintiff has not incorporated

the contents of the body-camera footage by reference nor made it central to his Amended

Complaint, and because at this stage the Court’s function is “to assess whether the Plaintiff’s

complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted,” Sutton v.

Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted), the

Court declines to consider the body-camera footage in deciding the Motions to Dismiss. The Court

will not convert Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss into Motions for Summary Judgment.

b. Plaintiff has Stated a Plausible 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Excessive Force Claim

Excessive force claims arising under the Fourth Amendment must be analyzed under an

objective reasonableness standard. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). The

question to be asked is “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”

Id. at 397. “The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective

of a reasonable officer on the scene, and its calculus must embody an allowance for the fact that

police officers are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force necessary

in a particular situation.” Id. at 387. Under this test, the court considers the totality of the

circumstances. Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 774 (2014). In evaluating the totality of the

circumstances, courts weigh three factors: 1 ) the severity of the crime at issue, 2) the immediate

threat that the suspect posed to officers and others, and 3) any active resistance or attempt to flee

by the suspect. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.

In the present case, both parties agree Plaintiff was stopped for a minor traffic violation.

(Docket No. 26 at 10 and Docket No. 35 at 9). Furthermore, both parties agree that this minor

offense supports only the use of minimal force. See Perea v. Baca, 817 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir.

2016) (noting that a “minor offense . . . support[s] the use of minimal force”). The Court therefore

agrees the first factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.

The second factor, immediate threat posed to the officers and others, “is undoubtedly the

most important and fact intensive factor in determining the objective reasonableness of an officer's

use of force.” Pauly v. White, 874 F.3d 1197, 1216 (10th Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted). This

factor looks at the immediate threat the suspect poses to officers and others. The Tenth Circuit has

held “[u]nder the second factor, an officer may use increased force when a suspect is armed,

repeatedly ignores police commands, or makes hostile motions towards the officer or others.”

Donahue v. Wihongi, 948 F.3d 1177, 1196 (10th Cir. 2020).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff ignored repeated requests by Officer Smith to get out of the

car. (Docket No. 26 at 12). However, when looking at Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, there is no

indication that Plaintiff posed an immediate threat to the officers or others, nor is there any

indication that Plaintiff was hostile. (Docket No. 20 at 3). While Defendants argue that Plaintiff

ignored police commands to get out of the vehicle, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint indicates that

Plaintiff asked why he was being directed to exit the vehicle as such a command was unwarranted,

which was when Defendant Simpson escalated the situation. Id. at 4. While Plaintiff partially rolled

up his window during the interaction, Plaintiff was terrified for his safety and asked to speak with

a supervisor. Id. Construing the facts most favorable to the Plaintiff, as the Court must do at this

stage, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled facts that state a claim in which relief is plausible on its face.

Accordingly, at this stage the second factor weighs in favor of Plaintiff.

The third Graham factor is whether the suspect was actively resisting arrest or attempting

to flee. There are no indications from the Amended Complaint or Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

that Plaintiff was attempting to flee. While Defendants seem to allege that Plaintiff was actively

resisting arrest, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not indicate Plaintiff was ever told he was

under arrest. Id. Based on the facts presented in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was told to exit

the vehicle without any explanation as to why or for what purpose; then, after being questioned

about using marijuana and informing Defendant Smith that he does not smoke, Defendant Simpson

escalated the situation by trying to open Plaintiff’s door then, when unsuccessful, tried to break

Plaintiff’s window using his hand. Id. Plaintiff was “passively resisting – at most- for mere

seconds” when Defendant Simpson began using force. (Docket No. 35 at 11). Under the totality

of the circumstances and in viewing the facts most favorable to the Plaintiff, Plaintiff has

sufficiently alleged that Defendant Simpson’s use of force was excessive.

These facts, taken in context with the rest of the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, present

sufficient information to give fair notice to Defendants Smith and Simpson of the nature of the

claims, and the grounds on which the claims rest. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Furthermore, Plaintiff

has alleged fact sufficient to allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Excessive Force Claims are DENIED.

c. Plaintiff has Stated a Plausible Failure to Intervene Claim

To state a failure to intervene claim, Plaintiff must allege that 1) a government officer

violated his constitutional rights, 2) a different government actor (the defendant) observed or had

reasons to know about that constitutional violation, and 3) the defendant had a realistic opportunity

to intervene but failed to do so. See Jones v. Norton, 809 F.3d 564, 576 (10th Cir. 2015); Est. of

Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 422-23 (10th Cir. 2014). “[E]ven “if a single deputy’s use of force

was not excessive, ‘a law enforcement official who fails to intervene to prevent another law

enforcement official’s use of excessive force may be liable under § 1983.’” Krueger v. Phillips,

No. 24-7035, 2025 WL 2424209, at *29 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 2025) (quoting Estate of Booker v.

Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 422 (10th Cir. 2014)). This is true even where the officer does not ‘“actually

participate in the use of excessive force,’” so long as the officer is “‘present at the scene and…fails

to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive force.’” Id.

(quoting Mascorro v. Billings, 656 F.3d 1198, 1204 n.5 (10th Cir. 2011)).

As noted above, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled an excessive force claim

against Defendant Simpson. Plaintiff has further alleged that Officer Smith was present at all

relevant times, including when Officer Simpson used excessive and unreasonable force and that

Smith failed to take reasonable steps to protect Plaintiff from Officer Simpson’s use of excessive

and unreasonable force. (Docket No. 20 at 10). Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a

failure to intervene claim against Defendant Smith, and Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

failure to intervene claim are DENIED.

d. Plaintiff’s Wrongful Arrest Claim is Dismissed.

Plaintiff additionally alleges a wrongful arrest claim against Defendants Smith and

Simpson. Both Defendants argue in their Motions to Dismiss that Plaintiff is collaterally estopped

from arguing Defendant Smith and Defendant Simpson lacked probable cause to arrest him and

that the arrest was proper. (Docket Nos. 24 at 9-13 and 26 at 14). Plaintiff concedes Defendants’

arguments; therefore, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Wrongful Arrest Claim are

GRANTED.

e. Defendants Are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity at This Stage.

Finally, Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s § 1983

claims based on qualified immunity. Qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from

liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555

U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). This doctrine is

intended “to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their

duties reasonably,” while also ensuring that officials who “exercise power irresponsibly” are held

accountable. Id. Defendants are “entitled to qualified immunity unless it is demonstrated that their

conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person in their

positions would have known.” Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 1999).

Defendants argue that since Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible § 1983 claim against them in

their individual capacities, they are entitled to qualified immunity. (Docket Nos. 24 at 13 and 26

at 14).

“When qualified immunity is asserted in the context of a motion to dismiss, the factual

allegations of the complaint are assumed to be true, and the court’s analysis generally aligns with

the analysis applied with determining the sufficiency of a claim.” Harper v. Woodward Cnty. Bd.

of Cnty. Comm’rs, No. CIV-11-0996-HE, 2014 WL 7399367, at *8 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 29, 2014)

citing Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d1152, 1162-64 (10th Cir. 2011) and Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666, 673-

75, 677-84. The Court scrutinizes “the defendant’s conduct as alleged in the complaint . . . for

objective legal reasonableness” at the motion to dismiss stage. Turner v. Oklahoma Cnty. Bd. of

Cnty. Comm’rs, No. 19-6092, 804 F. App’x 921, 924 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished). Thus, when

a defendant raises a qualified immunity defense in response to a motion to dismiss, the court uses

a two-part test to determine whether the plaintiff: (1) plausibly pleaded that the defendant violated

a constitutional right, and (2) shows that the constitutional right was clearly established at the time

of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. A.N. ex rel. Ponder v. Styling, 928 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th

Cir. 2019). As indicated above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations, if true, sufficiently state

a plausible claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment and a plausible claim of failure

to intervene. These allegations, if true, show actions that were unconstitutional under clearly

established law.

In order for a law to be clearly established, ‘“there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth

Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other circuits must

have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.’” Est. of Booker, 745 F.3d at 411 (quoting

Fogarty v. Gallegos, 523 F.3d 1147, 1161 (10th Cir. 2008)). “[An officer’s] conduct violates

clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, ‘[t]he contours of [a] right

[are] sufficiently clear’ that every ‘reasonable [officer] would [have understood] that what he is

doing violates that right.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2001) (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). A case directly on point is not required, “but existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. The Tenth

Circuit has developed “‘a sliding scale to determine when law is clearly established’ in which

‘[t]he more obviously egregious the conduct in light of prevailing constitutional principles, the less

specificity is required from prior case law to clearly establish the violation.’” Est. of Booker, 745

F.3d 405 at 427 (quoting Casey v. City of Federal Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2014).

Accepting the allegations as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the

Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged conduct that would violate a Fourth

Amendment right that was clearly established in February 2024. Therefore, Defendants’ Motions

to Dismiss based on qualified immunity are DENIED.

III. Conclusion

Construing the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court concludes that

Plaintiff has plausibly stated claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force against Defendant

Simpson and for failure to intervene against Defendant Smith, and that Defendants are not entitled

to qualified immunity at this stage. However, Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest claim is dismissed based

on his concession and the applicability of collateral estoppel. Additionally, the Court declines to

take judicial notice of the body camera footage at the motion to dismiss stage. Accordingly,

Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED IN PART as to the wrongful arrest claim and

DENIED IN PART as to the excessive force, failure to intervene claims and qualified immunity.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17th day of June, 2026.

____________________________________

D. Edward Snow

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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