The opinion
Filed 5/26/26; Certified for Publication 6/17/26 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ABRAHAM TADURAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064718
v. (Super. Ct. Case No. 30-2017-
00934037)
JAMES R. GLIDEWELL, DENTAL
CERAMICS, INC., OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
William D. Claster, Judge. Affirmed.
Stiller Law Firm, Ari J. Stiller, Ariel Still-Shulman, and Haines
Law Group, Paul K. Haines, Fletcher W. Schmidt and Andrew Rowbotham,
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Jackson Lewis, Scott C. Lacunza, Kathy A. Le, and Dylan B.
Carp, for Defendant and Respondent.
* * *
Abraham Taduran sued his former employer James R. Glidewell,
Dental Ceramics, Inc. (Glidewell) for various Labor Code violations. The trial
court awarded a total of $516,965 in civil penalties for four Labor Code
violations, reducing the maximum penalty for several violations on a per
employee basis. Taduran contends the trial court was required to reduce
penalties for Labor Code violations on a per pay period basis. As discussed
below, we conclude the Labor Code does not mandate any particular method
for reducing a maximum civil penalty. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in awarding a lesser amount of civil penalties here.
Taduran also sought $1,570,500 in attorney fees as the prevailing
party, based on a lodestar of $1.047 million and a multiplier of 1.5. The trial
court accepted the lodestar figure, but applied a modifier of 0.70, resulting in
an award of $733,440 in attorney fees. Taduran contends the court’s
reasoning for applying a negative multiplier cannot withstand “heightened
scrutiny.” We disagree and find no abuse of discretion. As discussed below,
the trial court considered the proper factors and reasonably applied a
negative multiplier. Accordingly, we affirm.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.
COMPLAINTS AND SUMMARY ADJUDICATIONS
On September 17, 2018, Taduran filed a second amended
complaint (SAC), alleging a single cause of action under the Labor Code
Private Attorneys General Act of 2024 (PAGA), Labor Code sections 2698 et
2
1
seq. The SAC alleged Glidewell committed eight categories of Labor Code
violations against its employees. It alleged: (1) minimum wage violations, (2)
overtime wage violations, (3) rest period violations, (4) meal period violations,
(5) separation earnings violations, (6) wage statement violations, (7) biweekly
payment violations, and (8) recordkeeping violations.
The parties filed motions for summary adjudication. Taduran
sought summary adjudication of the wage statement violations and the
overtime wage violations. Glidewell sought summary adjudication that its
wage statements complied with the Labor Code.
On July 10, 2020, the trial court granted in part Taduran’s
summary adjudication motion and denied Glidewell’s motion. The court noted
that “[nearly all facts relevant to [its] ruling have been stipulated to by the
parties.” As to overtime wage violations, the court noted that Glidewell
conceded nearly all the issues, except for holiday bonus pay, which it argued
was discretionary. The court therefore granted summary adjudication on the
overtime pay issue, except as to the holiday bonus pay. As to the wage
statement issue, the court concluded that in light of Glidewell’s concession of
the overtime wage issue, the wage statement necessarily did not include all of
an employee’s wage information. The remaining dispute concerned whether
the wage statement included information on an employee’s piece-rate pay.
Glidewell argued it substantially complied with the Labor Code because it
provided the piece-rate information on a separate document, a “Production
Sheet.” The court rejected the argument that an employer may avoid liability
by substantially complying with the Labor Code requirements, but stated
1
All further statutory references are to the Labor Code, unless
stated otherwise.
3
that it would consider substantial compliance when “determining appropriate
civil penalties under Labor Code [section] 2699(e)(2).”
On December 16, 2021, the parties jointly stipulated to allow
Taduran to file a Third Amended Complaint (TAC) to conform to the trial
court’s rulings on the summary adjudication motions and to other issues.
Based on the stipulation, the trial court granted Taduran permission to the
file the TAC.
The TAC, the operative complaint in this case, alleged: (1)
overtime wage violations, (2) rest period violations, (3) separation earnings
violations, (4) wage statements violations, and (5) recordkeeping violations.
II.
COURT TRIAL
A. Joint Stipulations
On November 17, 2022, the parties informed the court that
Glidewell was stipulating to liability on the rest period claim, and they would
submit the only remaining issue (the amount of civil penalties for that claim)
to the court by way of trial briefs rather than live testimony or presentation
of evidence.
On November 28, 2022, the parties submitted a joint stipulation
regarding trial procedures and undisputed facts and conclusions for trial. The
undisputed facts included, among others, the total number of relevant wage
statements, total number of affected employees, total number of pay periods
where Glidewell underpaid, and aggregate and average amounts of
underpayment per employee for each violation.
B. Trial Briefs
On December 20, 2022, Taduran submitted his trial brief. In his
brief, Taduran asserted the trial concerned four distinct issues, and it is
4
undisputed that Glidewell is liable on each issue. Specifically, the trial court
already had summarily adjudicated three issues in his favor. It had
determined: (1) Glidewell did not include information of piece-rate pay on
wage statements from August 4, 2016 through March 1, 2019 (wage
statement issue); (2) Glidewell failed to include the value of non-discretionary
bonus pay (bonus pay issue); and (3) Glidewell failed to include in overtime
pay the value of payments for non-productive time, referred to as “Uptime” by
the parties (uptime issue). As to the fourth issue which concerns rest period
pay, Glidewell later stipulated to liability (rest period issue). Taduran also
claimed that all relevant facts have been stipulated to by parties for the
purposes of summary adjudication and trial. Thus, the only remaining trial
issue is the amount of civil penalties for the Labor Code violations. Taduran
argued the PAGA civil penalties totaled $55,985,350. He acknowledged the
trial court has discretion to reduce this number, but argued “the facts here—
including Glidewell’s failure to pay wages that it admits are owed and its
significant delay in rectifying admittedly faulty systems−do not support an
overly drastic reduction to the PAGA penalties in light of the deterrent
purposes of PAGA.” Taduran did not suggest any particular reduction.
In Glidewell’s trial brief, it agreed that “[l]iability has been
determined” in Taduran’s favor on the four remaining Labor Code claims at
issue in the lawsuit, and the parties “have stipulated to relevant facts in lieu
of presentation of trial evidence and testimony regarding the award of civil
penalties. Accordingly, the only remaining issue on the merits of [Taduran’s]
claims is for the Court to determine the amount of civil penalties to be
awarded under PAGA to [Taduran] and the Aggrieved Employees.” (Fn.
omitted.) Glidewell argued the trial court should award a lesser amount than
the maximum statutory penalties based on the facts the violations were
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“hyper-technical” or “very narrow” so they do not warrant a significant
penalty. Glidewell proposed the court award civil penalties of $65 per
aggrieved employee on the wage statement issue, for a total award of
$100,165. On the rest period issue, it proposed either $0.78 per pay period,
for a total of $172,135.86, or $98.91 per aggrieved employee, for a total of
$188,819.19. As to the uptime issue, Glidewell proposed either $3.33 per pay
period, for a total of $21,941.37, or $6.55 per aggrieved employee, or a total of
$29,929.40. As to the bonus pay issue, Glidewell suggested different amounts
of penalties for each of the bonus pay, totaling $40,303.89 when calculated
per pay period, or $40,300.47, when calculated per aggrieved employee.
In reply, Taduran recognized that the trial court would apply a
discretionary reduction to the maximum penalty, but argued “the reduction
requested by Glidewell of more than 99[percent] would be tantamount to an
outright elimination of the penalty.” It argued: “Glidewell’s violations led to
nearly $85,000 in unpaid wages and were allowed to continue for months
even after Glidewell acknowledged liability. These are clear violations of the
California Labor Code which PAGA is intended to penalize and deter, and an
overly drastic reduction of the civil penalty would frustrate the intent behind
the PAGA.”
C. Trial Court’s Rulings
Following the parties’ briefing, the trial court awarded a total of
$515,955 in civil penalties for the four Labor Code violations. It provided
detailed reasoning for its reduction from the maximum penalty.
On the wage statement issue, the court noted that the
noncompliant wage statements did not result in any unpaid wages. Moreover,
when the incomplete weekly wage statements were supplemented by the
Production Sheets that Glidewell provided to its employees, the combination
6
satisfied the purpose of the Labor Code wage statement requirements.
Additionally, the maximum penalty of $33,199,250 (based on $250 per pay
period) was “enormous” because Glidewell provided weekly rather than bi-
weekly pay check. Glidewell also corrected the wage statements beginning on
March 1, 2019, which was 16 months before the trial court granted summary
adjudication. Based on these circumstances, the trial court concluded “a
penalty of $100,165 is appropriate and that any penalty beyond this amount
qualifies as ‘unjust, arbitrary[, and] oppressive.’”
On the rest period issue, the court explained this issue concerned
how Glidewell calculated pay based on fractional rest periods. For example,
an employee who took 20 minutes of rest would be credited with 0.33 hours,
while an employee who took 40 minutes would be credited with 0.67 hours.
Based on rounding, the employee who took 20 minutes of rest would be
penalized. Over the relevant five-year period, employees were underpaid an
average of $0.26 per pay period, for a total of $63,464 in unpaid wages. The
parties agreed the maximum penalty for this violation was $22,068,700. The
court applied a discretionary reduction because it concluded Glidewell’s
method of calculation of rest period wages for piece-rate employees was
established and applied in good faith. Other facts supporting reduction
include Glidewell’s willingness to change the system prior to adjudication,
and its apparent willingness to pay the affected employees by March 31,
2023. Based on these circumstances, the court concluded that “a penalty of
$190,900 (1,909 employees x $100 per employee) is appropriate.”
As to the uptime issue, the court explained the violation
occurred because Glidewell paid overtime wages based on the regular hourly
pay and does not include uptime pay. Thus, in weeks where the uptime rate
is higher than the regular hourly rate, the overtime wages are underpaid. A
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total of $7,310 in lost wages occurred, translating to $6.55 per employee or
$1.11 per pay period. The parties agreed the maximum penalty for this
violation is $658,900. The court concluded the relatively minimal amount of
unpaid wages and Glidewell’s willingness to repay those wages support a
reduction. It determined “a penalty of $167,400 or $150 per affected employee
serves both the deterrence and punishment function[s] of PAGA.”
Finally, as to the bonus pay issue, Glidewell did not include the
bonuses in the regular rate calculation. A total of $13,433 in lost wages
occurred, and the maximum penalty is $58,500. Although Glidewell
suggested a reduction to $40,303, the trial court declined to reduce the
penalty and imposed the full $58,500 penalty.
III.
ATTORNEY FEE MOTION
On May 30, 2017, Taduran filed a motion for attorney fees and
costs. He requested $1,571,658.75 in attorney fees, consisting of a 1.5
multiplier on a lodestar amount of $1,047,772.50, plus $98,138.21 in costs.
Taduran argued the 1.5 multiplier was warranted based on the novelty of his
legal theory concerning the rest pay issue, counsel’s skill and experience,
counsel’s lost opportunity to work on other matters, and contingency risk.
Glidewell opposed the attorney fee motion, arguing the lodestar
amount was excessive and unreasonable given the nature of the claims. It
asserted the reasonable lodestar amount is $261,943.13, or 25 percent of the
requested amount. It further argued no fee enhancement multiplier was
warranted because the two primary claims (wage statement issue and rest
period issue) were relatively straightforward from an evidentiary and proof
standpoint, and the civil penalty award was well below what Taduran sought
in his trial brief.
8
In reply, Taduran argued the lodestar amount was reasonable,
noting Glidewell has not identified a single billing entry that it contends is
vague, duplicative, excessive or unnecessary. Taduran contingency risk for “a
case that has lasted seven years, involving over 1,500 attorney hours and
nearly $100,000 in actual out-of-pocket litigations costs.”
On July 15, 2024, the trial court awarded Taduran $733,440 in
attorney fees and $98,138.21 in costs. The court accepted the lodestar
amount, but noted the amount was based on current billing rates for three
attorneys even for legal work performed many years before their billing rates
increased. Specifically, the court noted that in 2020 in another case, the same
attorneys had claimed billing rates of $650, $595, and $425, but for work in
this case which began in 2017, Taduran used rates of $850, $750, and $650,
respectively. This represented an upward multiplier of 1.3, 1.26, and 1.53
respectively for time billed in 2020. The court noted it would take the billing
rates into consideration when setting the final fee amount.
As to the multiplier, the court considered: (1) the relatively
straightforward, records-based nature of the claims, (2) the reasonable and
expected skill in prosecuting the claims, (3) that the civil penalty award was
less than 1 percent of what Taduran sought, and (4) the contingency risk,
which “weigh[ed] in favor of an upward multiplier but only slightly given that
liability of certain claims was established over four years ago.” Based on all
these factors, the trial court concluded a 0.70 multiplier was appropriate.
A final judgment awarding $515,965.00 in civil penalties, plus
$733,440 in attorney fees and $98,138.21 in litigation costs, was entered on
September 13, 2024. Taduran appealed.
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DISCUSSION
I.
CIVIL PENALTIES UNDER PAGA
Taduran acknowledges the trial court may reduce the maximum
amount of civil penalties under section 2699, subdivision (e)(2), but argues
the court was required to apply the reduction on a per pay period basis, not a
per employee basis. We review the trial court’s reduction of civil penalties
under section 2699, subdivision (e)(2) for an abuse of discretion. However,
“judicial discretion must be exercised within the confines of the statute that
grants the discretion . . . [and] in the context of section 2699, subdivision
(e)(2) . . . a court can only exercise its discretion to award lesser penalties
based on the enumerated considerations.” (Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2
(2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1157, 1213.) Accordingly, we apply a de novo
standard of review to determine the scope of the trial court’s authority to
reduce civil penalties under section 2699, subdivision (e)(2) before reviewing
the trial court’s exercise of that authority for an abuse of discretion. (See
Thurman v. Bayshore Transit Management, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th
1112, 1135 (Thurman), disapproved on another point by ZB, N.A. v. Superior
Court (2019) 8 Cal.5th 175, 196, fn. 8 [noting the appellate court would
review “the trial court’s award of civil penalties in an amount less than the
statutory maximum [for] abuse of discretion—i.e., whether the trial court
reasonably determined that imposition of the maximum statutory penalty
amount would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary, oppressive, or
confiscatory based on the facts and circumstances of this case”].)
Section 2699, subdivision (e)(2) provides: “In any action by an
aggrieved employee seeking recovery of a civil penalty available under
subdivision (a) or (f), a court may award a lesser amount than the maximum
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civil penalty amount specified by this part, including the penalty amounts in
subdivisions (g) and (h), or may, notwithstanding the limitations set forth in
subdivisions (g) and (h) exceed the limitations set forth in those subdivisions,
if, based on the facts and circumstances of the particular case, to do otherwise
would result in an award that is unjust, arbitrary and oppressive, or
confiscatory.”
Section 2699, subdivision (a) does not provide a formula for
calculating the amount of civil penalty, but section 2699, subdivision (f)
provides that civil penalties are computed based on a fixed amount “for each
aggrieved employee per pay period.” (See, e.g., § 2699, subd. (f)(2)(A) [civil
penalty is “One hundred dollars ($100) for each aggrieved employee per pay
period”].) Section 2699, subdivisions (g) and (h) limit the civil penalty under
certain circumstances to not more than “15 percent of the penalty sought
under subdivision (a) or (f),” (§ 2699, subd. (g)(1)), and “30 percent of the
penalty sought under subdivision (a) or (f).” (§ 2699, subd. (h)(1).) Thus,
under the plain language of the statute, the trial court is not constrained to
the civil penalty formula set forth in those statutory provisions.
Taduran argues a reduction must be applied on a per pay period
basis because PAGA imposes civil penalties on a per pay period basis. We
disagree. Section 2699, subdivision (e)(2) does not provide a formula for
reducing the maximum civil penalty; it merely states that the court may
award a “lesser amount.” The initial step of calculating the maximum civil
penalty is set forth in section 2699, subdivision (f), which provides for
calculation on a per pay period basis. Section 2699, subdivision (f), however,
does not reference reduction of a civil penalty, let alone provide any
mandatory formula for reduction. Thus, after calculating the maximum civil
penalty on a per pay period basis, the trial court is not precluded from using
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any reasonable method to reduce that amount, including applying a reduction
on a percentage, per pay period or per employee basis.
Taduran argues that only a per pay period method satisfies
PAGA’s purpose of deterring Labor Code violations because “[a]n employer
faced with a per-person award has no incentive to discontinue committing
violations because it will be penalized the same whether a violation occurs in
one pay period or one thousand pay periods.” However, such an employer has
no foreknowledge the trial court would apply any particular reduction
method, let alone apply any reduction at all. For example, in this case the
trial court awarded the full amount of civil penalties, which was calculated on
a per pay period basis, on the bonus pay issue. Thus, there remains sufficient
deterrence notwithstanding this particular award of civil penalties.
Taduran’s reliance on several cases which applied a reduction on
a per pay period is misplaced because, as he acknowledges, none of those
cases hold that applying a reduction on per employee basis is prohibited. We
have reviewed those cases, and they did not address a limitation on the
method of applying a reduction under section 2699, subdivision (e)(2). (See
Thurman, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th 1112; Carrington v. Starbucks Corp. (2018)
30 Cal.App.5th 504, 517; Bernstein v. Virgin America, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2019)
365 F.Supp.3d 980.) As stated above, a trial court may apply a reduction on a
per pay period basis, but that discretionary choice does not preclude other
trial courts from applying a reduction on a per employee basis.
Finally, citing Moniz v. Adecco USA, Inc. (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
56, disapproved on another point by Turrieta v. Lyft, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
664, 709, Taduran argues that because civil penalties are subsequently
allocated 75 percent to the Labor and Workforce Development Agency
(LWDA) and 25 percent to the aggrieved employees, applying a reduction on
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a per employee period would be disproportionate and unjust because “[t]hose
who worked for Glidewell for the full liability period would have their share
diluted and those who worked for a short period would receive a windfall.”
Moniz is factually distinguishable. There, the appellate court concluded the
trial court abused its discretion in approving a settlement of a PAGA action
involving two class of employees (Associates and Colleagues), wherein, of the
25 percent to the aggrieved employees, “88 percent was allocated to the
Associates and 12 percent was allocated to the Colleagues.” (Id. at p. 68.)
Here, there was no allocation of a settlement among classes of aggrieved
employees. Rather, there is a single common fund from which all aggrieved
employees can be compensated proportionately. In sum, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in calculating a reduction to the maximum civil
penalty on a per employee basis.
Aside from the method of reducing the maximum amount of civil
penalties, Taduran’s only challenge to the trial court’s consideration of the
various factors and its final determination of the proper amounts of penalties
is that the reduction is too drastic, approaching zero percent. But this
challenge ignores the factors leading to the reduction and examines only the
final result divorced from the facts and circumstances of this case. Moreover,
the exact result could still occur if the trial court reduced the penalties on a
per pay period basis. Glidewell proposed reductions on both a per pay period
basis and a per employee basis, and the reduction can be mathematically
calculated to result in the same amount of penalties. Here, the trial court
could reasonably determine the amount of civil penalties for the main
violations (wage statements and rest period issues) should be drastically
13
2
reduced for the reasons stated in its written ruling. There was no abuse of
discretion. Accordingly, the award of civil penalties is affirmed.
II.
AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER PAGA
Section 2699, subdivision (k)(1) provides that “[a]ny employee
who prevails in any action shall be entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs.” Here, the parties and the trial court applied the
lodestar method to calculate reasonable attorney fees. “The lodestar method,
or more accurately the lodestar-multiplier method, calculates the fee ‘by
multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by counsel by a
reasonable hourly rate. Once the court has fixed the lodestar, it may increase
or decrease that amount by applying a positive or negative “multiplier” to
take into account a variety of other factors, including the quality of the
representation, the novelty and complexity of the issues, the results obtained,
and the contingent risk presented.’” (Laffitte v. Robert Half Internat. Inc.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 480, 489 (Laffitte).) The trial court awarded Taduran the full
amount of requested costs, but applied a 0.7 multiplier to the requested
lodestar. Taduran challenges the trial court’s application of a negative
multiplier to the lodestar.
The parties dispute how the trial court’s downward adjustment of
the lodestar should be reviewed. Generally, “[w]e review attorney fee awards
on an abuse of discretion standard. ‘The “experienced trial judge is the best
2
For example, specifically as to the wage statements, the trial
court noted the employees received all the required wage information, albeit
in two separate documents, and no employee lost any wages. As to the rest
period issue, the court explained it resulted from a method of rounding
minutes to fractional hours that was not determined to be illegal until this
litigation and the resulting lost wages were minimal.
14
judge of the value of professional services rendered in his court, and while his
judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed unless the
appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’” (Laffitte, supra, 1
Cal.5th 480, 488.) As to the multiplier, “[n]o established criteria calibrate the
precise size and direction of the multiplier, thus implying considerable
deference to trial court decisionmaking about attorney fee awards.” (Karton v.
Ari Design & Construction, Inc. (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 734, 745 (Karton).)
The dispute concerning appellate review arises from a trial
court’s “‘across-the-board percentage cut,’” such as a negative multiplier to
the lodestar. In Kerkeles v. City of San Jose (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 102, the
appellate court applied what it called “‘heightened scrutiny’”—a term
borrowed from federal cases—to the trial court’s application of reduced hourly
rates to calculate the lodestar and a subsequent 0.5 multiplier to that
lodestar. (See id. at pp. 101–102.) The appellate court reversed the attorney
fee award, concluding “the reasoning expressed in the court’s order does not
meet the federal criterion of a clear and specific explanation [of the reduced
attorney fees award] sufficient for meaningful appellate review. Indeed, it is
not at all evident that the court independently reviewed the parties’
submissions before signing the order drafted by defense counsel.” (Id. at p.
104.) In Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24
(Warren), the appellate court applied “heightened scrutiny” to a trial court’s
application of a 0.33 multiplier. The Warren court explained this standard of
review means the trial court “must clearly explain its reasons for choosing
the particular negative multiplier that it chose; otherwise, the reviewing
court is unable to determine that the court had valid, specific reasons for its
across-the-board percentage reduction.” (Id. at p. 41.)
15
The appellate court in Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 24, however, disagreed with the Warren court’s holding that
“a heightened standard is appropriate for appellate review of fee awards.”
(Morris. at p. 37, fn. 6.) The Morris court concluded that under California
law, the “‘trial court has no sua sponte duty to make specific factual findings
explaining its calculation of the fee award and the appellate courts will infer
all findings to support the trial court’s determination.’” (Ibid.) Whether to
apply heightened scrutiny to across-the-board cuts to fee awards is pending
before the California Supreme Court. (See Cash v. County of Los Angeles
(2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 741, review granted, August 20, 2025, No. S291827.)
We need not resolve this dispute because we conclude the trial court here
provided specific explanations for its choice of a 0.7 multiplier. We thus
review that reasoning to determine whether the court’s reduction constituted
3
an abuse of discretion.
The trial court found one factor supported an upward adjustment
of the lodestar—the contingency risk. The skill of the attorneys was a neutral
factor. However, multiple factors supported a downward adjustment,
3
We reject interpreting “heightened scrutiny” as requiring the
trial court to explain why it chose a 0.70 multiplier instead of another
multiplier, such as a 0.75 multiplier. There is no legal principle to support
such precision in the abuse of discretion standard of review, which
contemplates a range of permissible behavior. (See, e.g., Cahill v. San Diego
Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 957 [“Under that standard,
there is no abuse of discretion requiring reversal if there exists a reasonable
or fairly debatable justification under the law for the trial court’s decision or,
alternatively stated, if that decision falls within the permissible range of
options set by the applicable legal criteria”].)
16
including the complexity of the legal issues, the relative success, and the
upward adjusted billing rates “baked” into the lodestar. Based on these
factors, the court concluded a 0.7 multiplier was appropriate. Aside from the
court’s reasoning, we note the same trial judge who awarded the reduced
attorney fees has presided over the case from its inception and the court’s
reasoning did not adopt Glidewell’s opposition, which sought a reduction of
the lodestar amount and a multiplier of 0.25.
Taduran challenges the consideration of past, usually lower
hourly attorney rates to justify a negative multiplier. Citing PLCM Group,
Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, he argues the reasonableness of the
hourly rates should reflect the prevailing market hourly rate, not whether
they were higher than several years ago. We disagree. In PLCM, the
California Supreme Court stated: “The reasonable hourly rate is that
prevailing in the community for similar work. [Citations.] The lodestar figure
may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in
order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.”
(Id. at p. 1095.) Thus, the trial court may consider lower past hourly rates to
calculate the lodestar figure to “fix the fee at the fair market value” as long as
it does not use the same factor to reduce the lodestar amount. (Ibid.; Cf.
Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 156
(Graciano) [“If the court had decided that a lesser hourly rate should apply
because of the lack of novelty or complexity of issues, then its reduction
would be improperly duplicative, since the court had already considered and
declined to apply a positive multiplier for those factors”].) Here, the trial
court declined to calculate the “correct” hourly rate for legal work performed
in 2020 and before, and instead considered the fact that lower rates were
charged during that period in applying a negative multiplier. We find no
17
abuse of discretion in doing so. Generally, the prevailing market rate for legal
work performed by an inexperienced associate is lower than that performed
by a seasoned partner. Thus, the trial court does not abuse its discretion in
determining that current hourly rates do not necessarily reflect the market
value for prior work.
Taduran also challenges the relative success factor, arguing the
trial court improperly relied on proportionality considerations to reduce the
attorney fees. We disagree. “[T]he trial court rightly sought an appropriate
relationship between the result achieved and the size of the fee. For a century
or more, California courts have considered the success or failure of attorney
efforts when evaluating attorney fee requests.” (Karton, supra, 61
Cal.App.5th at p. 746.) Specifically in representative actions to vindicate
public rights, such as the PAGA action here, the percentage of recovery can
be used to support a negative multiplier. (See Lealao v. Beneficial California,
Inc. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 19, 53 (Lealo) [“[T]he ‘reasonableness’ of a fee in a
representative action will often require some consideration of the amount to
be awarded as a percentage of the class recovery”]; accord, Chavez v. Netflix,
Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 43, 63 [percentage calculation may be used to
determine a lodestar multiplier]; see also Gunther v. Alaska Airlines, Inc.
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 334, 358 [noting that “courts have considered the
amount of the monetary award in assessing the reasonableness of fees”].)
Here, the trial court expressly considered the amount of the monetary award
in determining how to adjust the lodestar. (Cf. Gunther, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at p. 359 [in that case, “[t]he trial court did not place significant
reliance on the extent of Gunther’s monetary success in this litigation” when
calculating the multiplier. “On this record, we see no likelihood the trial court
18
would have exercised its discretion differently in the absence of the error
regarding the civil penalties”].)
Taduran’s reliance on Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 24, and
Graciano, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th 140, to preclude consideration of the
amount of monetary recovery is misplaced. Those cases did not involve a
representative action. (See Graciano, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 164 [“This was
not a representative action, and the underlying rationales expressed in
[Lealao] are inapplicable”]; Warren, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 37 [applying
Graciano to an action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Civ.
Code § 1790 et seq.].) In sum, the trial court properly considered various
relevant factors and reasonably arrived at a negative multiplier. There was
no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The Final Judgment is affirmed. Respondent is entitled to its
costs on appeal.
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
19
Filed 6/17/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ABRAHAM TADURAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064718
v. (Super. Ct. Case No. 30-2017-
00934037)
JAMES R. GLIDEWELL, DENTAL
CERAMICS, INC., ORDER
Defendant and Respondent.
Respondent has requested that our opinion, filed May 26, 2026,
be certified for publication. It appears that the opinion meets the standards
set forth in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). The request is
GRANTED.
The opinion is ordered published in the Official Reports.
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.