In re: I.M.F.

An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored but may be permitted in accordance with

the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA

No. COA26-5

Filed 17 June 2026

Cumberland County, Nos. 24JB000153-250; 25JB010001-250

IN THE MATTER OF: I.M.F.

Appeal by juvenile from orders entered 20 May 2025 and 29 May 2025 by Judge

Toni S. King in Cumberland County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2

June 2026.

Attorney General Jeff Jackson, by Assistant Attorney General Benjamin D.

Busch, for the State.

Appellate Defender Glenn Gerding, by Assistant Appellate Defender Jillian C.

Franke, for juvenile-appellant.

DILLON, Chief Judge.

Juvenile I.M.F. appeals the trial court’s adjudication and disposition orders

adjudicating Juvenile delinquent and committing Juvenile to a youth development

center. For the reasoning below, we affirm.

I. Background

In November 2024, the trial court adjudicated Juvenile delinquent due to

Juvenile’s admissions to two felonies and imposed one year of supervised probation.

IN RE: I.M.F.

Opinion of the Court

Weeks later, on 6 December 2024, the Department of Public Safety filed a motion for

review alleging several probation violations.

The next day, the victims’ car was taken from her apartment without her

permission. Two days after the car was taken, a police officer saw the stolen vehicle

driving at night without headlights, attempted to initiate a traffic stop, and noticed

three individuals in the vehicle, two of which were wearing ski masks.

Instead of stopping, the driver of the stolen vehicle sped up, and a high-speed

chase ensued, during which police saw items being thrown out of the vehicle on its

passenger side. After about a 20-minute chase that reached speeds of 80 to 110 miles

per hour, the stolen vehicle crashed. Police removed the occupants from the vehicle,

and specifically, an officer removed a masked Juvenile from the front passenger seat.

Police filed a juvenile petition, alleging, among other charges, possession of a

stolen motor vehicle. At a hearing, Juvenile contested the possession charge but

admitted to willfully violating his November 2024 probation. Juvenile appealed.

II. Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Juvenile appeals from an adjudication order entered 20 May 2025 and a

disposition order entered 29 May 2025. Juvenile, however, did not file his notice of

appeal until 30 June 2025. Our General Statutes require a juvenile to appeal a final

order “in open court at the time of the hearing or in writing within 10 days after entry

of the order.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-2602. Admittedly, Juvenile’s notice of appeal is

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Opinion of the Court

untimely,1 and to cure this error, Juvenile filed a petition for writ of certiorari. We

grant certiorari to consider the merits of Juvenile’s appeal.

III. Analysis

Juvenile argues the trial court erred by adjudicating Juvenile delinquent due

to insufficient evidence of Juvenile’s possession of the motor vehicle and his

knowledge that the vehicle was stolen. We disagree.

This Court reviews de novo the trial court’s denial of motion to dismiss. State

v. Tucker, 380 N.C. 234, 236 (2022) (citation omitted). In conducting this review, we

consider “the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, resolving all conflicts

in the evidence in favor of the State and giving it the benefit of all reasonable

inferences.” State v. Perry, 389 N.C. 88, 92 (2026) (citation omitted). The trial court

properly denies a motion to dismiss “[i]f there is more than a scintilla of evidence,

whether direct or circumstantial, or a combination, to support a finding that the

offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it[.]” Id.

(citations and internal marks omitted). Ultimately, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss,

the State faces a ‘low bar.’ ” Id. (citation omitted).

“Any person . . . who has in his possession any vehicle which he knows or has

reason to believe has been stolen or unlawfully taken[ ]” is guilty of possession of a

1 The State points out other deficiencies with Juvenile’s notice of appeal, which we decline to

address as we have granted certiorari to assess the merits of this appeal.

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Opinion of the Court

stolen motor vehicle. N.C.G.S. § 14-71.2; see also State v. Robinson, 368 N.C. 402,

407 (2015) (citation omitted).

The State’s evidence tended to show the following: two days prior to the car

chase, the victim’s car was stolen; the night of the chase, police saw the vehicle driving

at night without headlights; the driver and Juvenile (who was seated in the front

passenger’s seat during the entire interaction) both wore ski masks; the driver began

a high-speed chase when police attempted to initiate a traffic stop; police saw

potential contraband being thrown from the passenger side of the vehicle during the

high-speed chase; the driver crashed the vehicle and the occupants surrendered;

police removed Juvenile from the front passenger seat, but police removed the other

occupants from the driver’s side of the vehicle; and finally, in addition to the damage

to the front of the vehicle, police noticed the steering column panel was missing with

wires exposed and the driver’s window was broken.

At the hearing, the State relied on the theories of recent possession and acting

in concert. After presentation of the State’s evidence, the trial court denied Juvenile’s

motion to dismiss the charge of possession of stolen motor vehicle.

A. Possession

Juvenile argues there was insufficient evidence for the trial court to conclude

Juvenile “possessed” the vehicle. We disagree.

The doctrine of recent possession permits an inference of guilt if “the State

shows beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the property . . . was stolen; (2) the stolen goods

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were found in the defendant’s [possession;] and (3) the possession was recently after

the larceny, [but] mere possession of stolen property being insufficient to raise a

presumption of guilt.” State v. Maines, 301 N.C. 669, 674 (1981) (citations omitted);

State v. McDaniel, 372 N.C. 594, 604 (2019) (“[P]ossession of recently stolen property

raises a presumption of the possessor’s guilt of the larceny of such property. The

presumption[’s strength] depend[s] [on] the circumstances of the case and the length

of time . . . between the larceny of the goods and the discovery of them in [the]

defendant’s possession.” (citation omitted)).

The recent possession doctrine requires “exclusive possession” which includes

“joint possession of co-conspirators or persons acting in concert in which case the

possession of one criminal accomplice would be the possession of all.” Id. at 606

(citation omitted). “[U]nder the doctrine of acting in concert, when two or more

persons act together in pursuance of a common plan or purpose, each is guilty of any

crime committed by any other in pursuance of the common plan or purpose.” State v.

Facyson, 367 N.C. 454, 459–60 (2014) (cleaned up). The evidence need only show the

defendant “is acting together with another who does the acts necessary to constitute

the crime pursuant to a common plan or purpose to commit the crime.” State v. King,

343 N.C. 29, 36 (1996) (citation omitted).

We have held that when a defendant is merely a passenger in a stolen vehicle

there is insufficient evidence of possession because there is no evidence that the

defendant is acting in concert with another occupant. See, e.g., State v. Franklin, 16

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N.C. App. 537, 540–41 (1972) (“From the face of the record it could just as easily be

inferred that [the] defendant [ ] was a hitchhiker or an innocent friend just along for

the ride.”); In re Owens, 22 N.C. App. 313, 315 (1974); In re Dulaney, 74 N.C. App.

587, 589 (1985); State v. Bartlett, 77 N.C. App. 747, 750–52 (1985); State v. Quinones,

258 N.C. App. 559, 562 (2018) (“[M]erely being in [a] stolen vehicle is not sufficient,

standing alone, to satisfy the element of possession.” (citation omitted)).

But when there is evidence of culpable conduct, the fact-finder may conclude

there is possession based on the acting in concert doctrine. State v. Frazier, 268 N.C.

249, 251–52 (1966) (on-foot flight of both driver and passenger after officer merely

approached the men was sufficient to support jury finding of joint possession); In re

Ashby, 37 N.C. App. 436, 439–40 (1978) (juvenile’s flight was a circumstance “giving

rise to a permissible inference . . . [of] a guilty mind”).

Juvenile was not merely a passenger. Rather, the evidence shows he was

acting together with the driver in pursuit of a common plan to possess the stolen

motor vehicle. Facyson, 367 N.C. at 459–60; see also State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364,

459–60 (2000) (holding there was sufficient evidence the defendants “acted with a

common purpose in possessing the stolen vehicle” and thus acted in concert). When

viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, see Perry, 389 N.C. at 92

(citation omitted), during the vehicle’s flight in the high-speed chase, a passenger on

the right side of the stolen vehicle threw potential contraband out of the vehicle, and

Juvenile was the only occupant removed from the passenger’s side. The conduct here,

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IN RE: I.M.F.

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while not precisely the same as the flight in Frazier and Ashby, indicates Juvenile

participated in the driver’s flight by throwing potentially incriminating items out of

the window while wearing a mask, and tended to show he acted in concert with the

driver. Thus, the State presented sufficient evidence of possession.

B. Knowledge

Next, Juvenile argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence that

Juvenile “knew or should have known the car was stolen.” We disagree.

General Statute 14-71.2 requires evidence “that [the] defendant knew or had

reason to know the car was stolen.” State v. Suitt, 94 N.C. App. 571, 573 (1989)

(citation omitted). “Whether the defendant knew or had [reason to know] the [vehicle]

was stolen must necessarily be proved through inferences drawn from the evidence.”

State v. Brown, 85 N.C. App. 583, 589 (1987) (citation omitted).

Here, when viewed in a light most favorable to the State, see Perry, 389 N.C.

at 92 (citation omitted), the evidence supports the inference that Juvenile, at the very

least, had reason to know the vehicle was stolen. In addition to the facts that someone

took the victim’s car without her permission and that Juvenile participated in the

high-speed chase by throwing out potential contraband, both the driver and Juvenile

had ski masks over their faces. Moreover, the steering column panel was missing

with the wires exposed, which, coupled with the fact the car was taken without

permission, permits the inference that the car was started not by a key but by

tampering with the vehicle. See id. (duty to draw reasonable inferences in favor of

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the State). Thus, Juvenile’s proximity to the tampered-with steering column (as he

sat in the front passenger’s seat) and his attempt to conceal his identity by the mask

indicated that Juvenile had at the very least, reason to know the car was stolen.

Juvenile urges us to consider the fact that the damage to the steering column

may have occurred during the crash, precluding the conclusion Juvenile knew the car

was stolen. Considering Juvenile’s mask, that the vehicle was taken without

permission, the missing, and not merely damaged, steering column panel, and our

duty to “resolv[e] all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the State and giving it the

benefit of all reasonable inferences[,]” see id., the State presented sufficient evidence

of Juvenile’s knowledge.

IV. Conclusion

The State presented sufficient evidence of Juvenile’s possession and

knowledge. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders.2

AFFIRMED.

Judges ZACHARY and HAMPSON concur.

Report per Rule 30(e).

2 Our resolution of the issue above also resolves Juvenile’s contention that the trial court

erroneously elevated Juvenile’s disposition level based on its consideration of the new adjudication.

While the State argues the trial court’s elevation is sustainable even if the court erred at the

adjudication stage due to Juvenile’s unrelated probation violations, we conclude the trial court did not

err in entering the disposition order.

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