Walker

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

ANTHONY L. WALKER CIVIL ACTION NO. 24-1181

VERSUS JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA

MONROE, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Anthony L. Walker (“Walker”) spent an almost twenty-year career working for

the University of Louisiana Monroe’s (“ULM”) College of Pharmacy. Throughout his

career, Walker served as an academic professor, moving through the ranks from

instructor to professor. Walker also held an administrative position as the

pharmaceutical lab manger (“Lab Manager”) and received an annual stipend for his

administrative duties. But Walker, who is African American, has alleged that ULM

paid him a smaller stipend than what the white administrators received. Walker also

claims that ULM retaliated against him for filing a discrimination complaint and

taking statutorily protected leave, and otherwise, created a hostile work

environment. For the following reasons, the Court grants summary judgment and

dismisses Walker’s claims.

Background

In 2005, ULM hired Walker for both an academic and an administrative

position. Walker’s Dep. 20, Record Document 42-2. Academically, Walker originally

held the title of instructor and taught three “lab sequences.” Id. at 20, 58. In his

administrative role, Walker served as the Lab Manager. Id. at 20. Importantly, ULM

structured the Lab Manager position as independent of Walker’s academic one. The

Lab Manager position required an annual contract extension and provided an

administrative stipend of $2,500. Id. at 21.

As Lab Manager, Walker had primary responsibility for overseeing the school’s

“mock pharmacy” where students learned how to counsel patients, interact with

doctors, compound medicines, and dispense medicines. Walker’s Dep. 26-27. Walker

handled purchasing, inventorying, and maintaining equipment used in the mock

pharmacy. Id. at 27. Walker also ensured medications were secured when not being

used or were returned after they had been dispensed. Id. at 24.

Since the beginning, one of Walker’s duties as Lab Manager had been acting

as the Pharmacist-in-Charge for the mock pharmacy. Walker’s Dep. 18 (“All I know

is I’ve done that work from the beginning until the end that I was there.”). According

to Walker, the Pharmacist-in-Charge is a regulatory requirement of the Louisiana

Board of Pharmacy. Id. at 22. To purchase and dispense medication, a pharmacy must

designate a registered pharmacist to act as the Pharmacist-in-Charge. Id. And

because the mock pharmacy, which Walker managed, purchased and dispensed

medication, Walker was designated as the Pharmacist-in-Charge. See id. at 17.

Around two years after he started, Walker pushed to have his job description

changed. Walker’s Dep. 17. Walker said that “nobody” acknowledged that he had been

designated as the Pharmacist-in-Charge, and he advocated to have that duty listed

in the Lab Manager’s job description. Id. at 17, 161 (“I asked that they add pharmacist

in charge to it.”). Sometime later, Walker’s supervisors acquiesced and updated the

job description to specifically identify the Pharmacist-in-Charge role as a duty of the

Lab Manager. See id. at 161. Under the revised job description, the Lab Manager

performed “5%” administrative work, including serving “as Pharmacist-in-Charge of

the mock pharmacy.” Record Document 34-9, at 1. Walker’s administrative stipend

did not change when his job description was updated. Id. at 16, 169.

Over a decade later, on October 1, 2017, Glenn Anderson, the Dean of

Pharmacy, announced a faculty retention plan. Walker’s Dep. 97, 109. Under the

plan, Anderson created five program director positions that received an annual

administrative stipend of $15,000. Id. at 148. The administrative duties of each

position varied, but all included a significant time commitment to administrative

tasks, ranging from 90% to 25% of their workload. See Record Documents 34-10 – 34-

14. Notably, Walker’s direct supervisor, Connie Smith, was selected as the Program

Director of Experiential Education, and her workload consisted of 90% administrative

duties. Record Document 34-11; Walker’s Dep. 79, 162. Although Walker alleged that

Anderson discriminated against him by selecting five white employees for the

program director positions, Walker did not file an EEOC charge of discrimination.

Walker’s Dep. 18, 153.

Less than a year later, a College of Pharmacy committee rejected Walker’s

application for promotion from assistant professor to associate professor. Walker’s

Dep. 43. After the rejection, on September 18, 2018, Walker filed a discrimination

complaint with ULM’s human resources department. Id. at 45. In his complaint,

Walker alleged that he had been better qualified than two white candidates who had

received a promotion. Id. ULM performed an investigation and determined that the

committee had applied the wrong guidelines to Walker’s application. The same

committee then reconsidered Walker’s application and granted his promotion. See id.

at 45-46; Record Document 34-6, at 1.

Several years later, in 2022, Walker filed a pay grievance asserting that ULM

should increase his administrative stipend to match the $15,000 stipend of the

program directors. Id. at 74-75. Following an investigation, ULM found that Walker

was not entitled to a higher stipend because he held a lower rank within the

organizational structure, and in effect, sought the same stipend that his supervisor

had received. See id. at 84-85, 96.

Not long after ULM rejected his demand, Walker requested extended leave

under the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). According to Walker, the grievance

process had caused him anxiety, and he needed time to care for his mental health.

Walker’s Dep. 114, 194. ULM approved his FMLA leave request. Id. at 137. Then,

around the same time, Walker informed Anderson that he would no longer serve as

the Pharmacist-in-Charge, and Walker also notified the Board of Pharmacy that he

had withdrawn from the role. Id. at 69; Record Document 34-7 at 1.

When Walker withdrew as the Pharmacist-in-Charge, Anderson did not

reappoint him as the Laboratory Manager. Anderson’s Decl. 2, Record Document 34-

17. In his declaration, Anderson explained the Pharmacist-in-Charge role is a

“required duty of any person seeking to serve as Lab Manager.” Id. at 1. Moreover,

according to Anderson, Walker “no longer met the requirements of the Lab Manager

position” because he “resigned his Pharmacist-in-Charge” role and thereby “refused

to undertake the full responsibilities, duties, and requirements of the Lab Manager

position[.]” Id. at 2. Given the timing of Walker’s withdrawal as the Pharmacist-in-

Charge, Walker had still been on FMLA leave when Anderson decided not to renew

his contract. Walker’s Dep. 137.

Ultimately, about a year after his demotion, Walker retired from ULM and

filed a charge of discrimination with the United States Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). Walker’s Dep. 36, 61-62; Record Document 34-3.

He filed the EEOC charge on May 24, 2024 and alleged that ULM discriminated

against him when it demoted him from Lab Manager. Record Document 34-3. After

the EEOC issued its determination and notice of rights, Walker filed this lawsuit

against ULM, Anderson, and others. Record Document 1. Previously, this Court

dismissed with prejudice Walker’s claims arising under the Americans with

Disability Act. Record Document 48. And now, ULM has filed a motion for summary

judgment on Walker’s remaining claims. Record Document 34.

Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires a court to “grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” When the burden at

trial will rest on the nonmovant, the movant need not produce evidence to negate the

elements of the nonmovant’s case; rather, it need only point out the absence of

supporting evidence. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). If the movant

satisfies its initial burden, the nonmovant must demonstrate a genuine dispute exists

by “going beyond the pleadings” and “designating specific facts.” Little v. Liquid Air

Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). This burden requires more than

metaphysical doubt, conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations, or a mere scintilla of

evidence. Id.

Analysis

Walker’s remaining causes of action arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., (“Title VII”), Louisiana Employment

Discrimination Law, La. Rev. Stat. § 23:301 (“LEDL”), and the Family Medical Leave

Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (“FMLA”). Walker has alleged race-based violations of

Title VII through discrimination, retaliation, and harassment. See Record Document

1 at 5. Because LEDL “is substantively similar to Title VII,” the Court considers these

claims together and reaches the same outcome on the LEDL claims as it does the

Title VII claims. Vidrine v. Guillot, No. 21-30203, 2022 WL 3544396, at *2 (5th Cir.

Aug. 18, 2022) (quoting McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 n.4 (5th Cir.

2007)). In addition, Walker has asserted a retaliation claim under the FMLA. See

Record Document 1, at 7; Record Document 42 at 9.

I. Title VII Discrimination

Title VII makes it unlawful to “discriminate against any individual with

respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because

of such individual’s race[.]” Hamilton v. Dallas Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2023)

(abrogating requirement that an employee show “an ultimate employment

decision[.]”). A burden shifting framework applies to Title VII discrimination claims,

and the employee must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Lee v. Kan.

City R.R. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009). If he does, the burden shifts to the

employer “who must offer an alternative non-discriminatory explanation for the

adverse employment action.” Id. Once an employer has offered a non-discriminatory

explanation, “the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the

employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for racial bias.” Id.

Although unclear, Walker seemingly articulated two theories of racial

discrimination. First, Walker stated a “failure to promote” claim, alleging ULM

should have named him a program director alongside the five white employees who

were promoted on October 1, 2017. See Record Document 1 at 5. Second, Walker

pleaded a “wage discrimination” claim, arguing that he should have received a

stipend equal to the allegedly “similarly situated” program directors. See id.

A. Failure to Promote

Before considering the merits of Walker’s failure to promote claim, the Court

must determine whether it is time barred. The United States Court of Appeals for the

Fifth Circuit “has long required plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies

before bringing suit under Title VII.” Price v. Choctaw Glove & Safety Co., 459 F.3d

595, 598 (5th Cir. 2006). In Louisiana, a plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination

within 300 days of the allegedly discriminatory act. Hartz v. Adm’r of Tulane Educ.

Fund, 275 F. App’x 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2008). Failing to do so means that “the employee

may not challenge the alleged discrimination in court.” See, e.g., id. at 287 (barring a

college professor’s failure to promote claim because he did not timely file a charge of

discrimination).

In this case, Anderson announced the faculty retention plan that created the

program director positions on October 1, 2017. Walker’s Dep. 109, 147-48. Walker

learned at the time of announcement that he had not been chosen as a program

director. Id. at 150. Had Walker filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC

within thirty days of that announcement then his claim would have been timely.

Instead, Walker waited more than six years, filing his EEOC charge on May 24, 2024.

Record Document 34-3, at 1. Therefore, Walker’s failure to promote claim is time

barred under Title VII.

B. Wage Discrimination

Walker also alleged that ULM paid him less of an administrative stipend than

what the allegedly “similarly situated” white program directors received. Record

Document 1 at 5. To survive summary judgment, Walker must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination and prove that (1) he is a member of a protected class,

and (2) he is paid less than a non-member for work requiring substantially the same

responsibility. Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984).

Walker, who is African American, satisfies the first element, so the central issue is

whether ULM paid him less than white employees who had substantially the same

responsibility. See Lyles v. Tex. Alcohol Beverage Com’n, 379 F. App’x 380, 383 (5th

Cir. 2010) (recognizing an African American plaintiff as “a member of a protected

class.”).

In determining whether Walker had substantially the same responsibility as

his comparators, the Court considers whether the employees were similarly situated.

See Shahrashoob v. Tex. A&M Univ., 125 F.4th 641, 651 (5th Cir. 2025). Although

the employees need not have “identical” circumstances, the circumstances must still

be “nearly identical.” Id. Nearly identical circumstances exist where the employees

“held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their

employment status determined by the same person[.]” Id.

Here, the Court finds that Walker has failed to prove that he is similarly

situated to the five white program directors who received a higher administrative

stipend. To start, the Court is not persuaded by Walker’s attempt at manufacturing

“nearly identical” circumstances, because he described his position and those of the

comparators at an exceedingly general level. See, e.g., Record Document 42 at 16-17.

According to Walker, he is nearly identical to the comparators because they were:

registered pharmacists, professors in the same department, worked under the same

decision maker, and performed administrative duties. Id. Walker’s generalized claim

of nearly identical circumstances fails for several reasons.

First, that Walker and his comparators are all pharmacists and professors is

immaterial for the stipend at issue. As Walker explained throughout his deposition,

he received a regular salary as a professor but the complained of stipend resulted

from his administrative role as the Lab Manager. Walker’s Dep. 57, 72. Walker does

not argue that ULM paid him a discriminatory salary as a professor, only that his

administrative stipend was less than his comparators. See Walker’s Dep. 199.

Accordingly, the administrative duties of Walker and the comparators, not their

professorial roles, matter for determining whether they were similarly situated.

Second, Walker’s conclusory statement that the comparators all “performed

administrative duties” does not reflect that his role had significantly less

administrative responsibility than the better paid program directors. Walker received

his stipend because he held the title of “Manager, Pharmaceutical Care Lab,” Record

Document 34-9 at 1; Walker’s Dep. 71-72. Based on his job description, which Walker

helped create, only 5% of his work involved administrative duties. Record Document

34-9, at 2; Walker’s Dep. 18.

Meanwhile, the administrative work of the program directors involved far

more of their time. The workload of the Program Director of Experiential Education

consisted of 90% administrative duties, including overseeing the daily operations of

the office. Record Document 34-11 at 1,3. Similarly, the Program Director of Student

Success devoted 80% of his time to administrative work like supporting the

university’s admissions committee. Record Document 34-12 at 1-2. Even the two

program director positions with the lightest administrative workloads devoted one-

quarter of their time to administrative tasks, far exceeding Walker’s 5% percent.

Record Document 34-10 at 1 (“The Director of Faculty Development will be a 25%

position.”); “Record Document 34-14 at 1 (“The Information Services Director is a 25%

position.”). Moreover, as for the tasks themselves, Walker admitted that each

program director had individualized duties, and he did not know their specific

functions. See Walker’s Dep. 79-80.

Third, Walker mischaracterizes the evidence in claiming that he and the

comparators “worked under the same decision maker.” Record Document 42 at 17. To

the contrary, Walker did not share a direct supervisor with the other program

directors, and he held a lower administrative rank than them. As the Lab Manager,

Walker reported to the Program Director of Experiential Education, Connie Smith.

Record Document 34-9 at 1; Walker’s Dep. 96. Walker even acknowledged in his

deposition that the higher stipend he desired “would equate to that of [his]

supervisor” who was a program director. Walker’s Dep. 96. Near his retirement,

Walker “appealed” to have a different supervisor because Smith did not “advocate”

for him. See Walker’s Dep. 59. Consequently, Walker’s supervisor became Jessica

Brady, an associate clinical director. Walker’s Dep. 133-34.

Even after his supervisor changed to an associate clinical director, Walker still

did not share a supervisor with or the rank of the program directors. Walker himself

explained the leadership structure: dean of pharmacy, associate dean, clinical

director, associate clinical director, and then program director. See Walker’s Dep. 135.

While Walker reported to the associate clinical director, the program directors

reported to someone two tiers higher. Id. Each of the program directors reported to

the associate dean of academic affairs, not the lower ranked associate clinical

director. See, e.g., Record Document 34-11 at 1 (stating that the Program Director of

Experiential Education “reports to Associate Dean, Academic Affairs.”).

In short, Walker has not shown a genuine dispute of material fact that he is

similarly situated to the white program directors. Walker performed less

administrative work than the program directors, held a lower rank within the

organizational structure, did not share a direct supervisor, and otherwise, Walker

offered no evidence that he and the comparators performed the same administrative

tasks. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Shaw Group, Inc., 250 F. App’x 603, 606-07 (5th Cir. 2007)

(holding employees were not similarly situated where one worked in a senior

management position whereas the plaintiff worked in a lower ranking managing

position). Therefore, Walker’s claim of wage discrimination fails.

II. Title VII Retaliation

An employer cannot discriminate against an employee for engaging in conduct

protected by Title VII. Thomas v. Tex. Dep’t Crim. Just., 220 F.3d 389, 394 (5th Cir.

2000). The familiar burden shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas applies to Title

VII retaliation claims. Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996). Under

the McDonnell Douglas framework, the employee must first establish a prima facie

case of retaliation. Id. If the employee does so, the burden shifts to the employer who

must “articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment

action.” Id. at 305. Then, the ultimate burden shifts back to the employee who “bears

the burden of proving that the employer’s reason is a pretext for the actual retaliatory

reason.” Davis v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 448 F. App’x 485, 492 (5th Cir. 2011).

A prima facie case of retaliation requires that Walker establish three elements:

(1) he participated in a Title VII protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse

employment action by his employer, and (3) there is a causal connection between the

protected activity and the adverse action. Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Com’n, 586 F.3d

321, 331 (5th Cir. 2009). If Walker cannot satisfy all three elements, summary

judgment is appropriate. Id.

In this case, Walker has satisfied the first element of his prima facie case. The

Fifth Circuit has held: “[a]n employee that files an internal complaint of

discrimination engages in a protected activity.” Rodriguez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

540 F. App’x 322, 328 (5th Cir. 2013). ULM does not dispute that Walker engaged in

a protected activity when he filed an internal discrimination complaint with the

human resources department on September 20, 2018. Record Document 34-1 at 24;

Record Document 34-5 at 1. Accordingly, Walker has satisfied the first element of a

prima facie discrimination claim.

Second, Walker must show that he suffered an adverse employment action.

Walker claims that he experienced an adverse action when Glenn Anderson, the Dean

of Pharmacy, removed his administrative stipend on three occasions: October 2017,

June 2019, and August 2023. Record Document 1, at 4. ULM argues that two of these

actions are barred, because he did not file an EEOC charge within 300 days of the

act. Record Document 34-1 at 24. Meanwhile, Walker claims that all three actions

“fall under the continuing violation doctrine” and none should be barred. Record

Document 42 at 17.

The continuing violation doctrine holds that “where the last act alleged is part

of an ongoing pattern of discrimination and occurs within the filing period, allegations

concerning earlier acts are not time-barred.” McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of

Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 865 (5th Cir. 1993). However, “discrete actions, even if serial,

are not entitled to the shelter of the continuing violation doctrine.” Doe v. United

States, 853 F.3d 792, 802 (5th Cir. 2017) (internal quotations omitted). At least one

other court has recognized that a reduction in pay is a “discrete act” and not a

continuing violation. See, e.g., Webb v. HMSHost, Inc., No. 24-3111, 2026 WL 886626,

at *8 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2026).

Here, the Court finds that Walker has alleged a series of discrete acts, not one

continuing violation. Anderson’s decisions to remove Walker’s stipend on three

different occasions constitute three independent acts, and thus, three separate

adverse employment actions. Although each removal had a continuing effect in

reducing Walker’s compensation with every paycheck, the continuing violation

doctrine applies to ongoing acts not ongoing effects. See Del. State Co. v. Ricks, 449

U.S. 250, 258 (1980) (noting that continuing violation theory did not apply because

denial of tenure was discrete act despite having an ongoing effect); see also McGregor

v. La. State Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 867 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he continuing

violation theory [cannot] resurrect claims about discrimination concluded in the past,

even though its effects persist.”) (internal quotations and alternations omitted); see,

e.g., Baldwin v. Extended Stay Am. Co., No. 16-604, 2016 WL 4386098, at *4 (W.D.

Tex. Aug. 17, 2016) (“[T]he continuing violations doctrine does not apply to ongoing

effects.”)

Having decided that the continuing violation theory does not apply, the Court

must determine which adverse employment actions Walker can use to establish a

prima facie case of retaliation. As explained already, actions that did not occur within

300 days of the filing of an EEOC charge of discrimination are time barred. Hartz,

275 F. App’x at 287. Walker filed his EEOC charge on May 24, 2024, so the removal

of his stipend on August 29, 2023 is the only adverse employment action that occurred

within 300 days of that date. Record Document 34-2 at 1; see also Record Document

1 at 4. Moreover, ULM has conceded that the removal of Walker’s stipend constitutes

an adverse employment action for purposes of Title VII. Record Document 34-1 at 24.

Therefore, Walker’s prima facie case of retaliation depends entirely on the removal of

his stipend on August 29, 2023.

Third, Walker must establish a causal connection exists between his internal

discrimination complaint on September 20, 2018 and the removal of his

administrative stipend on August 29, 2023. The Court finds that he has not done so.

Almost five years elapsed between the date of Walker’s internal complaint and the

removal of his stipend, and considering similar gaps in time, the Fifth Circuit has

held them “far too long” to establish a causal connection “without other evidence of

causation.” Heath v. Bd. of Supervisors for S. Univ. and Agric. And Mech. Co., 850

F.3d 731, 741-42 (5th Cir. 2017) (rejecting that the continuing violation theory

applied to older adverse actions and holding that a “three-year period is not the very

close in time connection we require to establish causation by timing alone.”). Because

Walker has offered no other evidence of a causal connection aside from a lengthy time

gap, his prima facie case of retaliation fails.

III. Title VII Harassment

Title VII guarantees employees “the right to work in an environment free from

discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,

477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). As such, an employee “may establish a violation of Title VII

by proving that discrimination based on [race] has created a hostile or abusive work

environment.” Id. To establish a hostile work environment claim, an employee must

prove he:

(1) belongs to a protected group; (2) was subjected to

unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of

was based on race; (4) the harassment complained of

affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; (5)

the employer knew or should have known of the

harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial

action.

Hernandez v. Yellow Transp., Inc., 670 F.3d 644, 651 (5th Cir. 2012). In this case,

Walker alleged that he endured harassment through unequal treatment when

Anderson removed his administrative stipend thrice, demoted him from Lab

Manager, and refused to raise his administrative stipend. Record Document 42 at 13.

Even assuming this disparate treatment is a cognizable hostile work environment

claim, which is doubtful, Walker’s claim fails because it did not affect a term,

condition, or privilege of his employment.

Harassment only affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment when

its “either severe or pervasive.” Hernandez, 670 F.3d at 651. In evaluating severity,

courts “look to the totality of the circumstances” and consider factor like “the

frequency of the discriminatory conduct…whether its physically threatening or

humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance[, and] whether it unreasonably interferes

with an employee’s work performance.” Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 586 F.3d

321, 330 (5th Cir. 2009).

In this case, the alleged conduct of Anderson “is not sufficiently harassing to

make out a hostile work environment claim.” See, e.g., Smith v. Miss. Dep’t of Child

Protective Serv., No. 18-4418802, 2019 WL 4418802, at *3 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 16, 2019)

(rejecting claim about unequal treatment in work assignments). Harassing conduct

requires “discriminatory verbal intimidation, ridicule, and insults[.]” Walker v.

Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 626 (5th Cir. 2000). Walker has offered no evidence of

hostile or abusive behavior from Anderson or others. See, e.g., Akanno v. Med. City

McKinney, No. 23-1054, 2024 WL 4272936, at *6 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 2024) (rejecting

hostile environment claim where “[p]laintiff does not identify any other instance of

intimidation, ridicule, or insult.”). Moreover, Anderson’s alleged conduct occurred

only a few times across several years, and such isolated incidents are not enough to

sustain a hostile work environment claim. West v. City of Houston, Tex., 960 F.3d 736,

742 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding plaintiff cannot show pervasive harassment where “the

complained of actions were isolated or infrequent[.]”). Accordingly, Walker’s Title VII

harassment claim does not survive summary judgment.

IV. FMLA Retaliation

The FMLA “guarantees eligible employees 12 weeks of leave in a 1-year period

following certain events: a disabling health problem; a family member’s serious

illness; or the arrival of a new son or daughter.” Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide,

Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86 (2002). Furthermore, the FMLA “protects employees from

retaliation or discrimination for exercising their rights under the FMLA.” Mauder v.

Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., Tex., 446 F.3d 574, 580 (5th Cir. 2006). In his

complaint, Walker alleged that ULM and Anderson retaliated against him while on

FMLA leave when it decided to not renew his Lab Manager appointment. Record

Document 1 at 4, 7.

A. Sovereign Immunity

As a threshold, the Court finds that ULM1 is entitled to sovereign immunity

for Walker’s FMLA claim. Federal courts do not have jurisdiction for “suits against a

state, a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity unless that state has

waived its sovereign immunity or Congress has clearly abrogated it.” Bryant v. Tex.

Dep’t of Aging and Disability Serv., 781 F.3d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 2015). Here, ULM is

entitled to sovereign immunity, because Louisiana has not waived its sovereign

immunity for FMLA claims and ULM is an “arm of the state” as a member of the

University of Louisiana system. See Allain v. Bd. of Supervisors of Univ. of La. Sys.,

No. 13-2754, 2015 WL 6554440, at *2 (W.D. La. Oct. 29, 2015) (“Per Fifth Circuit

1 The Court’s finding of sovereign immunity applies equally to defendants named in their official

capacity.

precedent, ULM is an ‘arm’ of the state and not subject to suit absent waiver or

congressional abrogation.”).

Nevertheless, Walker argues that Congress has abrogated immunity for

“family care” claims under the FMLA. Record Document 42 at 28-29. Walker is

correct that Congress has abrogated sovereign immunity for family care claims, but

it has not done so for self-care claims. Bryant, 781 F.3d at 769 (“Congress has validly

abrogated states’ sovereign immunity with respect the FMLA’s family-care provision.

It has not done so with respect to the statute’s self-care provision; thus, states may

still assert an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense against claims based on that

provision.”). Here, Walker asserted a self-care claim, not a family care claim, under

the FMLA, because he used the FMLA’s extended leave to care for himself and his

mental health. Walker’s Dep. 194 (testifying that “I went on family medical leave in

’23…because my mind wasn’t in the right place.”). Accordingly, ULM is entitled to

sovereign immunity for Walker’s FMLA claim.

B. Qualified Immunity

Walker asserted an FMLA retaliation claim against Anderson in his individual

capacity, and in response, Anderson pleaded qualified immunity. See Record

Document 1 at 4; Record Document 5 at 2. Qualified immunity is a legal doctrine

“shield[ing] federal and state officials from money damages.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 735 (2011). As a threshold, the defendant must show that “he is a

government official whose position involves the exercise of discretion[.]” See Pierce v.

Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1997). Here, Anderson was a dean of ULM

handling employment decisions, and as such, he was an official working for an arm

of the state whose position involved the exercise of discretion. See, e.g., Babinski v.

Sosnowsky, 79 F.4th 515 (5th Cir. 2023) (allowing university professor to raise

qualified immunity). Therefore, Anderson may invoke the affirmative defense of

qualified immunity.

Qualified immunity is a two-part inquiry. Modica v. Taylor, 465 F.3d 174, 179

(5th Cir. 2006) (applying qualified immunity to an FMLA claim). First, the district

court determines whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish a violation of a clearly

established right. Id. Second, the district court must decide whether the official’s

conduct was objectively reasonable. Id. If an official’s conduct was objectively

reasonable, even if he had violated a clearly established right, he is entitled to

qualified immunity. Id. The plaintiff has the burden “to demonstrate the

inapplicability of the defense.” Babinski, 79 F.4th at 520. In this case, Anderson has

conceded that Walker alleged a violation of a clearly established right because he

argued only that his conduct was objectively reasonable. Record Document 34-1 at

41-42; see Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (noting that

failure to raise an argument forfeits it).

The Court finds that Anderson’s decision to not reappoint Walker as Lab

Manager was objectively reasonable. As Anderson explained in his declaration,

Walker “no longer met the requirements of the lab manager position” because he

refused to fulfill the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge. Anderson’s Decl. 2. Although

Walker claims the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge had been independent of the Lab

Manager position, his own testimony belies that argument. Walker admitted that he

had performed the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge since the “beginning” of his time as

the Lab Manager. Walker’s Dep. 18. Moreover, the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge had

been specifically identified as a responsibility of the Lab Manager in its description.

Record Document 34-9 at 2. Even more telling, Walker himself pushed himself to

have the role of Pharmacist-in-Charge listed as a duty of the Lab Manager. Walker’s

Dep. 161. According, the Court holds that removing Walker from a position when he

refused to complete a duty of that position is objectively reasonable.

Nevertheless, Walker claims that Anderson’s reason for removing him as Lab

Manager was pretext for retaliation. See Record Document 42 at 19-23. According to

Walker, Anderson replaced him as Pharmacist-in-Charge with Jessica Brady

(“Brady”) who did not hold the position of Lab Manager. Id. at 20. Walker argues that

installing someone other than the Lab Manager as the Pharmacist-in-Charge

constitutes an “inconsistent,” pretextual explanation. Id. at 22-23

The Court finds his argument unavailing and insufficient to create a genuine

dispute of material fact. Even if the Court accepted that only the Lab Manager could

serve as the Pharmacist-in-Charge, which is doubtful, Anderson effectively satisfied

that condition when he named Brady as the replacement. Brady held the title of

associate clinical director, and her responsibilities included supervising all registered

pharmacists and the College of Pharmacy’s Monroe facility, including its mock

pharmacy. Walker’s Dep. 133-135. Brady also served as Walker’s direct supervisor at

the time of his demotion from Lab Manager. Walker’s Dep. 133. Until ULM hired

another Lab Manager, Brady functioned as the closest equivalent because she had

supervisory authority over Walker, the mock pharmacy, and all registered

pharmacists. Under these circumstances, Anderson’s decision to replace Walker with

Brady as the Pharmacist-in-Charge was an objectively reasonable, non-pretextual,

action, and therefore, Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants summary judgment and dismisses

Walker’s remaining claims with prejudice.

DONE AND SIGNED at Shreveport, Louisiana, this 6th day of May, 2026.

Uy ©. Ve

ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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