Garner

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

DECARLO A. GARNER, JR., )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 3:25-CV-508-CEA-DCP

)

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case is before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the Rules of this Court

on Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs

(“Application”) [Doc. 1] and his Complaint [Doc. 2]. For the reasons more fully stated below, the

Court HOLDS IN ABEYANCE Plaintiff’s Application [Doc. 1].

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PLRA”), the Court is required to screen

complaints. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 To accomplish this end, the Court must evaluate the litigant’s

indigence, but notwithstanding indigence, a court must dismiss a matter under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) if [it] determines that . . . the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state

a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is

immune from such relief.” To survive an initial review, a complaint “must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

1 Despite the reference to prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 1915 requires the Court to screen complaints

filed by non-prisoners seeking in forma pauperis status McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F. 3d 601,

608 (6th Cir. 1997) (“Unlike prisoner cases, complaints by non-prisoners are not subject to

screening process required by § 1915A. The district court, however, must still screen the complaint

under § 1915(e)(2).”), overruled on other grounds, Jones v. Brock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007).

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v Twombly, 550 U.S.544, 570 (2007)).

Specifically, under Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must

provide:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s

jurisdiction . . .;

(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleading

is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the

alternative or different types of relief.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1)–(3). Otherwise, the complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Courts also

have a continuing duty to ensure that jurisdiction exists to hear the case. Answers in Genesis, Inc.

v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal courts have a duty

to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard to every case and may raise the issue sua

sponte.” (citations omitted)). Courts liberally construe pro se pleadings filed in civil rights cases

and hold them to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Haines v.

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

A. Summary of the Complaint

Plaintiff generally names the “Federal Government” and later names “Federal Officers of

the Eastern District of Tennessee 6 (unknown)” [Doc. 2 p. 3]. His Complaint consists of eleven

pages [See Doc. 2]. The Complaint appears to set forth a variety of individual claims against

different parties that are based on separate events with no common tie. Plaintiff first claims that

“[t]here was [a] federal security guard who on Sept[.] 15 . . . violated my privacy of information

act[] [b]y asking question[]s that violates my rights to privacy on 17th and 18th of September by

turning my phone back[] on after I turned it off” [Id. at 4].

Next, he alleges that on several dates after mailing documents or packages, he “never

received an email stating that [his] packages [were] delivered by Fed[E]x Shipping Center” [Id. at

6]. He asked a clerk for “a grievance document” and later a “breach of contract motion” but was

told that the clerk’s office did not have those documents [Id.]. Plaintiff further claims that on

August 15, he mailed documents to the Department of Justice, but he never received notification

by FedEx that it delivered his documents [Id. at 6]. He states that he “will be suing for mail fraud

and mail theft as well [as] c[yb]er crimes” [Id. at 7].

Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that he “called and left messages about housing voucher[s] and

other program[s]” offered by the Knoxville’s Community Development Corporation (“KCDC”),

noting that “the office displayed discrimination towards [him] when [he] went to both offices back

[on] August 6, 7 and Oct[.] 13th” and that “[Michael] Hodges . . . acted racist and prejudice towards

[him] when [he] asked about [his] application for Section 8 Housing voucher” [Id. at 8–10].2

Plaintiff states that he seeks “disciplinary action for the federal officer[] that violated [his]

right[]s to privacy;” that he “will be suing for mail fraud and mail theft as well [as] [cybercrimes]

going into [his] computer and changing [information] without [his] consent;” and that he [will be

filing [a] lawsuit for discrimination and communication theft as well as bigotry” [Id. at 5, 7 9].

B. Analysis

There are several deficiencies in the Complaint. As an initial matter, the undersigned notes

that Plaintiff’s Complaint violates Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule

governing joinder of defendants in federal litigation, which provides, in part, that:

2 While Plaintiff does not specifically name FedEx or KCDC as defendants, he includes two

addresses for FedEx office as well as an address for KCDC at the end of his Complaint [Doc. 2 p.

11].

Person[s] ... may be joined in one action as defendants if:

(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction,

occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and

(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in

the action.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

A review of the Complaint reveals that Plaintiff alleges distinct acts committed by unrelated

parties at different times and places. The undersigned cannot discern any single, coherent

connection between these various claims that would tie them together in any way. Without some

further articulation of a unifying thread connecting these claims, the joinder of them in a single

lawsuit is inappropriate under Rule 20 given the varied proofs and defendants that will be

associated with the different claims. While “the requirements of prescribed by Rule 20(a) are to

liberally construed in the interest of convenience and judicial economy[,] . . . Rule 20 is not a

license to join unrelated claims and defendants in one lawsuit” Proctor v. Applegate, 661 F. Supp.

2d 743, 780 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (quoting Boretsky v. Corzine, No. 08-2265, 2008 WL 2512916, *4

(D.N.J. 2008)); see also Brown v. Chambers-Smith, No. 1:24-CV-690, 2025 WL 1833132, at *3

(S.D. Ohio July 3, 2025) (“[D]iscrete events involving different parties have no bearing on one

another and cannot be grounds on which to join parties.”).

Second, turning to the focus of Plaintiff’s Complaint, which appears to be an alleged

violation of privacy by a federal court security officer, there are additional deficiencies. For

instance, he does not name the officer himself, but rather, he names the Federal Government as a

Defendant [Doc. 2 pp. 1–5]. “[T]o the extent [Plaintiff] sues the United States, his suit [may be]

barred by sovereign immunity.” Miller v. Fed. Gov’t, No. 1:13-CV-967, 2013 WL 5329758, at *2

(W.D. Mich. Sept. 23, 2013). The Sixth Circuit has provided that “[a]bsent a waiver, sovereign

immunity shields the Federal Government and its agencies from suit.” Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d

548, 544 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Dep’t of the Army v. Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 259 (1999); see

Richards v. F.B.I., No. 1:12-cv-1027, 2012 WL 5386563, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 1, 2012) (quoting

Gao for same). “A waiver of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed in favor of the

sovereign.” Richards, 2012 WL 5386563, at *2 (citing Gao, 185 F.3d at 544)). Furthermore, “a

waiver of sovereign immunity must also be ‘unequivocally expressed’ in the statutory text.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff has neither identified a specific governmental entity he is attempting to sue nor a

waiver of sovereign immunity for his claim. Further, while he names “6 (unknown)” individuals

who he contends are “federal officers of the Eastern [D]istrict of Tennessee” [Doc. 2 p. 3], he

includes no allegations of how each officer was personally involved in the activities form the basis

of his claim. “A complaint must allege that the defendants were personally involved in the alleged

deprivation of federal rights to state a § 1983 claim.” Frazier v. Mich., 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th

Cir. 2002).

Specifically, a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that

a person acting under color of state law deprived him a federal right, or in a Bivens3 context for

actions of a federal officer. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, courts analyze

“Bivens and § 1983 actions under the same legal principals, except for the requirement of federal

action under Bivens and state action under § 1983.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 614 (6th

Cir. 2014). “A plaintiff must prove two elements to prevail on either type of claim: (1) that he or

3 “A Bivens action is analogous to an action under § 1983—the only difference being that

§ 1983 applies to constitutional violations by state, rather than federal officials.” See Evans v. Ball,

168 F.3d 856, 863 n.10 (5th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds, Castellano v. Fragozo, 352

F.3d 939, 948–49 & n.36 (5th Cir. 2003).

she was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that

the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law.” Id. As previously noted, Plaintiff

does not identify the employing agency of the court security officer4 nor does he identify the

alleged actions of the six unknown officers that would allow a proper analysis of his claim.

Moreover, Plaintiff seeks disciplinary action against the court security officer but cites no

supporting authority for that proposition.

Finally, briefly addressing the remaining claims that appear not to be properly joined in

one lawsuit as explained above, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to assert a housing

discrimination claim, his general claims of discrimination and bigotry are insufficient to establish

a prima facie case of disparate treatment based on race. To demonstrate a plausible federal housing

discrimination claim, a plaintiff must “make out a prima facie case by showing ‘(1) that he or she

is a member of a racial minority, (2) that he or she applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase

certain property or housing, (3) that he or she was rejected, and (4) that the housing or rental

property remained available thereafter.’” Lindsay v. Yates, 498 F.3d 434, 438–39 (6th Cir. 2007)

(citing Mencer v. Princeton Square Apts., 228 F.3d 631, 634–35 (6th Cir. 2000)).

Further, to the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring any federal criminal charges for mail fraud,

mail theft, or cybercrimes under statutes not providing a right to civil relief through the initiation

of a private action, his efforts are misplaced. Kafele v. Frank & Wooldridge Co., 108 F. App’x

4 Plaintiff does not identify whether the court security officer is a governmental or private

entity employee. See Buell ex rel. Buell v. Bruiser Ken, No. 97 CV 1131, 1999 WL 390642, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1999) (“The Special Deputy Marshals, also known as Court Security Officers,

are not federal agents themselves, but employees of private security firms who are deputized by

the Director of the United States Marshals Service to provide courtroom security for the Federal

judiciary and to perform the functions of a Deputy U.S. Marshal.” (citing 28 C.F.R. § 0.112)).

307, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[A] private citizen . . . has no authority to initiate a federal criminal

prosecution of the defendants for their alleged unlawful acts.”).

Although the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, he is not excused from complying with the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Buckner v. Hilton Glob., No. 3:24-CV-375 2025 WL

890175, at *13 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 21, 2025), aff’d sub nom. Buckner v. Hilton Worldwide Holdings

Inc., No. 25-5354, 2025 WL 4693129 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025) (“The fact that [a] civil action is

pursued pro se does not relieve [a] party from compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure.”); Mooney v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 184 F.R.D. 588, 590 (N.D. Ohio 1999)

(finding that pro se litigants are required to follow the rules of civil procedure).

Instead of recommending dismissal, the Court will allow Plaintiff an opportunity to amend

his Complaint in light of his pro se status. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff shall provide a short

and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting his claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Plaintiff’s

amended complaint should provide, to the extent applicable, the following details:

a) the names and titles of all [defendants if known];

b) . . . all relevant events, stating the facts that support Plaintiff’s

case including what each defendant did or failed to do;

c) . . . the dates and times of each relevant event or, if not known,

the approximate date and time of each relevant event;

d) . . . the location where each relevant event occurred;

e) . . . how each defendant’s acts or omissions violated Plaintiff’s

rights and . . . the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and

f) . . . what relief Plaintiff seeks from the Court, such as money

damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.

Polite v. VIP Cmty. Servs., No. 20-CV-7631, 2020 WL 6064297, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2020).

“Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original

complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wishes to maintain must be included in the amended

complaint.” /d.; see also E.D. Tenn. L.R. 15.1 (explaining that an amended complaint cannot

incorporate the original complaint by reference). Plaintiff SHALL file his amended complaint on

or before July 10, 2026.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ENTER:

Debra C. Poplin \

United States Magistrate Judge