Lana Patrick v. Pasco County Florida Tax Collector

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-14234

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

LANA PATRICK,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

PASCO COUNTY FLORIDA TAX COLLECTOR,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:25-cv-01690-WFJ-TGW

____________________

Before NEWSOM, BRASHER, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Plaintiff Lana Patrick is a self-described

“Journalist/Activist.” This case arises from Patrick’s attempt to

record a video inside the Pasco County Tax Collector’s (“Tax

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-14234

Collector”) office near Dade City, Florida.1 An employee within the

office, Lisa McGuire, informed Patrick of the office policy that

prevented recording inside the office without prior approval of the

Tax Collector. Patrick initially refused to stop recording or leave

the premises. McGuire called the police, who responded and

provided Patrick with a trespass warning.

Patrick has filed two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuits about the

same incident. Patrick first sued McGuire and two Dade City police

officers in their individual capacities, but the district court

dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice. In this second lawsuit, Patrick

has sued defendant Mike Fasano in his official capacity as Tax

Collector. In both lawsuits, Patrick asserted that the Tax

Collector’s recording policy violated the First Amendment.

Here, in this second lawsuit, Patrick appeals the district

court’s dismissal order, which (1) found res judicata barred her suit

based on the dismissal of Patrick’s prior lawsuit against McGuire

arising from the same incident; (2) concluded Patrick failed to state

a claim under the First Amendment and the Florida Sunshine Law;

1 Far from a rookie at her craft, Patrick has made a habit of entering

government-owned property to video matters of interest for her stories.

Patrick has responded to her subsequent trespass warnings, arrests, or criminal

charges by filing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuits in federal courts across this circuit.

See Patrick v. Maertz, No. 3:24-CV-197 (M.D. Fla. dismissed Feb. 9, 2026); Patrick

v. Graham, No. 3:24-CV-580 (M.D. Fla. dismissed Mar. 12, 2025), appeal docketed,

No. 25-10895 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2025); Patrick v. Noel, No. 1:24-CV-23653 (S.D.

Fla. dismissed June 27, 2025); Patrick v. Moore, No. 4:24-CV-242 (S.D. Ga. filed

Oct. 24, 2024); Patrick v. Lewey, No. 2:25-CV-1700 (N.D. Ala. filed Oct. 3, 2025).

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and (3) dismissed Patrick’s claims with prejudice and without leave

to amend. After careful review, we affirm.

I. PATRICK’S FIRST LAWSUIT

In April 2024 Patrick pro se filed her first lawsuit (“Patrick I”)

arising from events at the Tax Collector’s office.2 See Patrick v.

McGuire et al., No. 8:24-CV-999 (M.D. Fla.).

A. First Complaint Against McGuire and the Police Officers

Patrick’s first complaint alleged as follows. On May 16, 2023,

Patrick sought to video record employees of the Tax Collector’s

office. Once at the Dade City branch office, Patrick remained in

public areas of the office. Lisa McGuire, an office manager, handed

Patrick the office’s recording policy. That policy required the Tax

Collector’s approval before any videotaping, photographing, or

recording would be allowed within Tax Collector facilities.

McGuire asked Patrick to stop recording or leave. Patrick

refused the request but agreed to wait outside until police arrived.

McGuire called the Dade City Police Department, whose

officers responded and provided Patrick with a trespass warning.

The officers informed Patrick that she would be arrested if she

re-entered the Tax Collector’s office. Patrick alleged the officers

2 We take judicial notice of the district court’s docket and filings therein from

Patrick’s first lawsuit, Patrick v. McGuire, No. 8:24-CV-999 (M.D. Fla.). See

Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1075 n.9 (11th Cir. 2013) (taking

judicial notice of court documents from a state-court eviction action).

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further threatened her with arrest for her failure to produce

identification.

In her first lawsuit, Patrick sued McGuire and the two Dade

City police officers, all in their individual capacities. Patrick’s

complaint contained these 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims: (1) all

defendants violated her First Amendment rights (Count I); (2) all

defendants engaged in impermissible First Amendment retaliation

(Count II); (3) the police officer defendants subjected her to an

unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth

Amendment (Count III); and (4) all defendants violated her due

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment (Count IV).

Patrick sought money damages.

B. 2024 Dismissal of First Lawsuit

In November 2024, the district court dismissed Patrick’s first

complaint with prejudice pursuant to the defendants’ motions to

dismiss. The district court determined that Patrick’s complaint

failed to state a claim and that the defendants were protected by

qualified immunity.

The district court quoted the Tax Collector’s recording

policy as providing:

The Pasco County Tax Collector’s Office (hereafter

“PCTC”) will make every effort to accommodate

journalists or any other individual(s) who wish to

video, photograph, record, film, or interview within

the interior of any PCTC facility. This policy is in

place to protect the confidentiality of records and

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documents exempt from public disclosure, to prevent

disruptions of the PCTC’s legitimate public business

and rendering of public services, and to foster a safe

and orderly environment for PCTC customers and

employees.

...

No videotaping, photographing, recording, filming,

or interviewing may be conducted inside any PCTC

facility by anyone without prior approval of the tax

collector. Violators will be requested to cease such

activity immediately and/or leave the facility . . . .

All requests for approval to videotape, photograph,

record, film, or interview must be submitted as far in

advance as possible [to the Assistant Tax Collector for

Communications and Special Projects] . . . .

Identification numbers and documents, such as

passports, driver licenses, ID cards, and Social

Security cards or numbers, are confidential in nature

and therefore exempt from public disclosure by the

PCTC. Videotaping, photographing, recording, or

filming personal documents or conversation that

contain information exempt from public record is

prohibited.

As to Patrick’s First Amendment claims, the district court

reasoned, inter alia, that (1) at best for Patrick, the Tax Collector’s

office was a limited public forum; and (2) speech restrictions in such

forums are constitutional if they are viewpoint neutral and

“reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.” See

McDonough v. Garcia, 116 F.4th 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2024) (en banc)

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(quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819,

829 (1995)).

The district court found the Tax Collector’s recording policy

was a reasonable restriction because it (1) protected confidential

citizen information, such as passports, driver licenses, Social

Security cards, etc.; (2) allowed employees to efficiently serve

customers in a main lobby area, free from burdensome

confidentiality measures; (3) allowed video recording with prior

approval; and (4) “reserv[ed] the [o]ffice for its intended purpose.”

Because the Tax Collector’s recording policy was viewpoint

neutral and reasonable, the district court concluded the policy “did

not violate [Patrick’s] constitutional rights.”

Even if video recording was not communicative conduct

and a forum analysis did not apply, the district court determined

that the policy was still valid because it was viewpoint neutral and

reasonable.

Finding amendment of the complaint would be futile, the

district court dismissed Patrick’s first lawsuit with prejudice.

Patrick’s appeal of that decision was dismissed for want of

prosecution.

II. PATRICK’S SECOND LAWSUIT

In June 2025, shortly after that dismissal, Patrick filed a

second lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Patrick II”) arising from the

same events. See Patrick v. Fasano, No. 8:25-CV-1690 (M.D. Fla.).

This time, Patrick sued Fasano in his official capacity as Tax

Collector. Because Patrick sued Fasano in his official capacity as

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Tax Collector, Patrick II was in effect a lawsuit against Pasco

County. Barnett v. MacArthur, 956 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020);

Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

A. Second Complaint

In Patrick II, Patrick’s pro se complaint did not expressly

repeat the factual allegations of Patrick I. Instead, Patrick generally

alleged the Tax Collector’s recording policy violated her “right of

access to gather information under the [First] Amendment.”

Patrick alleged (1) many “citizen journalists” had been denied the

ability to record within the Tax Collector’s offices and detained for

trespass; and (2) Tax Collector Fasano “misapplie[d] his [S]unshine

[L]aw obligations.”

Patrick’s complaint did not include separate counts clearly

stating her causes of action but rather contained only the above

references to the First Amendment and the Florida Sunshine Law.

Patrick sought $100,000 in punitive damages and that “the policy

[be] removed as unconstitutional as a prior restraint[].”

B. 2025 Dismissal of Second Lawsuit

In November 2025, pursuant to Fasano’s motion to dismiss,

the district court dismissed Patrick’s claims in Patrick II with

prejudice.

First, the district court determined Patrick’s “bare-boned”

complaint failed to state a claim. Incorporating the First

Amendment analysis from Patrick I, the district court concluded

that the Tax Collector’s recording policy was constitutional

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because it was a reasonable, viewpoint neutral restriction within a

limited public forum or nonpublic forum. As to Patrick’s state-law

claim, the district court ruled the Florida Sunshine Law applied

only to “government meetings at which official acts are to be

taken,” meaning Patrick’s allegations of events at the Tax

Collector’s office did not state a violation of the statute.

Second, the district court determined Patrick’s lawsuit was

barred by res judicata based on Patrick I. The district court found

every element for res judicata was satisfied because the dismissal in

Patrick I “(1) was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2)

was final; (3) involved the same parties or their privies; and (4)

involved the same causes of action.” Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta

Bd. of Educ., 110 F.4th 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting TVPX

ARS, Inc. v. Genworth Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 959 F.3d 1318, 1325

(11th Cir. 2020)).

For the same party or privity element in particular, the

district court acknowledged Fasano was not a defendant in Patrick

I. 3 But the district court reasoned Fasano was in privity with the

Tax Office’s employee Lisa McGuire such that he could invoke res

judicata. The district court (1) relied on the fact that McGuire and

Fasano “share the job-related goal of carrying out the [recording]

policy,” and (2) considered their relationship to be “sufficiently

close so a judgment for or against [McGuire] should bind or protect

3 In its res judicata analysis, the district court stated Fasano had been sued in

the second lawsuit in his individual capacity. Patrick’s complaint, however,

explicitly lists Fasano as being sued in his official capacity as Tax Collector.

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[Fasano].” NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1560 (11th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, the district court found dismissal of Patrick I precluded

Patrick’s claims in Patrick II.

Lastly, the district court addressed Patrick’s passing

reference to the Tax Collector’s recording policy as a “prior

restraint.” The district court ruled that the recording policy is not

an unconstitutional prior restraint because it does not penalize

unconsented recording and, instead, penalizes “the subsequent

refusals to stop recording without consent or leave [government

property] because they disrupt the purpose of the forum.” Sheets v.

City of Punta Gorda, 415 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1126 (M.D. Fla. 2019).

The district court found amendment to the complaint

would be futile and dismissed Patrick II with prejudice. Patrick

timely appealed.

III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to

dismiss for failure to state a claim. Beazer v. Richmond Cnty.

Constructors, LLC, 169 F.4th 1082, 1086 (11th Cir. 2026).

“We review de novo a district court’s decision to dismiss an

action due to res judicata.” Milner v. Baptist Health Montgomery, 132

F.4th 1354, 1357 (11th Cir. 2025). However, a district court’s

determination that two parties are in privity for res judicata

purposes is reviewed for clear error. Rodemaker, 110 F.4th at 1327.

We review de novo a district court’s denial of leave to amend

due to futility. Whitesell Corp. v. Electrolux Home Prods., Inc., 154

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F.4th 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2025); Freeman v. First Union Nat’l., 329

F.3d 1231, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003).

IV. RES JUDICATA

On appeal, Patrick argues the district court erred in holding

res judicata bars Patrick II.

“The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, bars the

filing of claims which were raised or could have been raised in an

earlier proceeding.” Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d

1498, 1501 (11th Cir. 1990). Res judicata applies when “the prior

decision (1) was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;

(2) was final; (3) involved the same parties or their privies; and

(4) involved the same causes of action.” Rodemaker, 110 F.4th at

1324 (quoting TVPX ARS, Inc., 959 F.3d at 1325).

Plainly, the district court’s dismissal in Patrick I resulted in a

final judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction. And,

as explained below, we (1) readily determine Patrick’s lawsuits

involve the same causes of action, but (2) explain why privity is a

closer issue.

A. Same Causes of Action

A case involves the same causes of action as a prior case

when it “arises out of the same nucleus of operative facts, or is

based upon the same factual predicate, as a former action.” TVPX

ARS, Inc., 959 F.3d at 1325 (quoting Griswold v. Cnty. of Hillsborough,

598 F.3d 1289, 1293 (11th Cir. 2010)). Lawsuits can arise out of a

common nucleus of operative fact even if they involve different

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legal theories, different defendants, and different requested

remedies. See Rodemaker, 110 F.4th at 1330; In re Piper Aircraft Corp.,

244 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2001) (“It is well settled that res

judicata turns primarily on the commonality of the facts of the prior

and subsequent actions, not on the nature of the remedies

sought.”).

Patrick I and Patrick II plainly arise out of the same nucleus

of operative facts. Despite Patrick’s attempt to plead at a higher

level of generality in Patrick II, the Tax Collector’s enforcement of

its recording policy underlies both lawsuits. That Patrick’s lawsuits

may involve different causes of action (as-applied vs. facial

challenge), different defendants (McGuire vs. Fasano), and

different remedies (damages vs. injunctive relief) matters not.

Patrick’s assertion that “continued application of an

unconstitutional policy . . . creates a new claim” does not alter our

res judicata analysis. As this Court has said before: “Factual

allegations do not need to be identical to arise out of the same

nucleus of operative fact. The nucleus is the core, not the core and

every layer, crack, and fissure.” Rodemaker, 110 F.4th at 1330. The

core of Patrick’s allegations in both lawsuits is the enforcement of

the Tax Collector’s recording policy, regardless of whether the

allegations focus on Patrick’s treatment or enforcement against

other unidentified citizen journalists over an unspecified time

period.

Both lawsuits effectively involve the same cause of action

for res judicata purposes. This leaves the privity issue.

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B. Same Parties or Privies

Because Fasano was not a defendant in Patrick I, Fasano

must show he was in privity with a defendant in Patrick I. See

Rodemaker, 110 F.4th at 1328-29; Citibank, 904 F.2d at 1502-03.

Generally, parties are in privity when the “relationship

between one who is a party of record and a nonparty . . . is

sufficiently close so a judgment for or against the party should bind

or protect the nonparty.” Rodemaker, 110 F.4th at 1327 (quoting

Hunt, 891 F.2d at 1560). Courts may consider a “non-exhaustive list

of facts or factors” that favor a finding of privity:

(1) the nonparty agreed to be bound by the litigation

of others; (2) a substantive legal relationship existed

between the person to be bound and a party to the

judgment; (3) the nonparty was adequately

represented by someone who was a party to the suit;

(4) the nonparty assumed control over the litigation

in which the judgment was issued; (5) a party

attempted to relitigate issues through a proxy; or (6) a

statutory scheme foreclosed successive litigation by

nonlitigants.

Id. at 1327-28 (quoting Griswold, 598 F.3d at 1292).

At this early stage, four of these factors appear inapplicable

to this case. Nothing in the record suggests (1) Fasano agreed to be

bound by the litigation in Patrick I; (2) Fasano assumed control over

the litigation; (3) any party tried to relitigate through a proxy; or

(4) a statutory scheme foreclosed successive litigation by

non-litigants. While not inconceivable that Fasano and/or Pasco

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County would defend an employee like McGuire for a job-related

lawsuit, there is no record evidence such coordination occurred.

McGuire and Fasano did employ the same attorney, but control

requires more. See Cannon v. Armstrong Containers Inc., 92 F.4th 688,

711 (7th Cir. 2024) (“It is well established, however, that shared

counsel alone does not amount to control and cannot alone justify

preclusion of a nonparty.”); Perez v. Volvo Car Corp., 247 F.3d 303,

311 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The law is settled, however, that the

appearance of common counsel, without more, does not prove

substantial control.”).

McGuire’s possible “adequate representation” of Fasano’s

interests—the third factor—is weak at best. The Supreme Court

has indicated adequate representation arises in representative

lawsuits, such as “properly conducted class actions” and “suits

brought by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries.” Taylor v.

Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894 (2008). Patrick I fits into neither category.

The closer issue is whether there was a substantive legal

relationship between Fasano and McGuire that could support a

finding that they were in privity. For example, an

employer-employee relationship may create privity for purposes of

res judicata when a claim is based upon vicarious liability. See

Citibank, 904 F.2d at 1502-03. In such a case, where an employer’s

liability is derivative of the employee’s liability, the application of

res judicata prevents re-litigation of grounds for liability applicable

to both defendants and avoids inconsistent adjudications. Id.

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But Patrick has never made a claim that Fasano was liable

for the acts of McGuire. In any event, under § 1983, Fasano cannot

be vicariously liable for the acts of McGuire merely because of his

role as her employer or supervisor. See Roy v. Ivy, 53 F.4th 1338,

1351-52 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[S]upervisory officials are not liable

under § 1983 for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates

based on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.”). 4

The fact that McGuire and Fasano were sued in different

capacities further counsels against a finding of privity. This Court

has said, “[G]enerally, a government official sued in his or her

official capacity is considered to be in privity with the government,

but a government official sued in his or her individual capacity is

not.” Rodemaker, 110 F.4th at 1328 (quoting Lozman v. City of Riviera

Beach, 713 F.3d 1066, 1075 n.7 (11th Cir. 2013)). This lawsuit against

Fasano in his official capacity is in effect a lawsuit against Pasco

County. And McGuire, as a county employee sued in her individual

capacity, generally cannot be in privity with Pasco County. See id.

The district court based its privity determination, in part, on

its finding that McGuire and Fasano “share[d] the job-related goal

of carrying out the [recording] policy.” But a shared goal alone

generally cannot support a finding of privity. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at

4 This analysis applies with equal force if McGuire’s employer is Pasco County

and this lawsuit against Fasano in his official capacity is in effect a lawsuit

against Pasco County. Pasco County cannot be vicariously liable for the acts

of its employee, like McGuire. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New

York, 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978).

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886-88, 904-06 (determining that two plaintiffs in separate lawsuits

were not in privity even though both had sought disclosure of same

records from Federal Aviation Administration); Griswold, 598 F.3d

at 1293 (acknowledging that “a court may no longer find privity

based solely on a similarity of interests”).

At bottom, based on this limited record at the dismissal

stage, we need not decide whether McGuire and Fasano were in

privity for res judicata purposes, because the Patrick II complaint

was nonetheless properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.

V. FLORIDA SUNSHINE LAW CLAIM

On appeal, Patrick does not raise any arguments relating to

the district court’s treatment of her Florida Sunshine Law-related

allegations. Therefore, Patrick abandoned any challenge to the

dismissal of her possible Florida Sunshine Law claim. See Sapuppo

v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014).

VI. FIRST AMENDMENT CLAIM

On appeal, Patrick only cursorily challenges the district

court’s First Amendment analysis.

First, Patrick argues that the district court impermissibly

copied the reasoning from Patrick I by a different judge and failed

to perform its own First Amendment analysis. We disagree.

Nothing prevented the district court from adopting the reasoning

of Patrick I in Patrick II.

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Second, Patrick argues the recording policy is content based

and subject to strict scrutiny. We readily conclude Patrick’s

arguments lack merit.

“The First Amendment protects the right to gather

information about what public officials do on public property, and

specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.” Smith v.

City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). But the right

to record is not absolute, because “the Constitution does not

require the government to ‘grant access to all who wish to exercise

their right to free speech,’ no matter the setting, ‘without regard to

the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused

by the speaker’s activities.’” McDonough, 116 F.4th at 1322 (quoting

Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788,

799-800 (1985)). Instead, the validity of a regulation depends on the

forum in which it applies: a traditional public forum, a designated

public forum, a limited public forum, or a nonpublic forum. Id.

Patrick does not challenge the district court’s

characterization of the Tax Collector office’s lobby as either a

limited public forum or a nonpublic forum.5 In either forum, the

recording policy is constitutional if it is reasonable in light of the

purposes of the forum and viewpoint neutral. See id. at 1324, 1328.

Patrick has shown no error in the district court’s reasoning

that the recording policy was reasonable. Although the public may

5 There are arguments for why the lobby is really a nonpublic forum. But we

need not address them here.

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have an interest in the proper functioning of a county tax office, the

First Amendment “does not guarantee access to property simply

because it is owned or controlled by the government.” Id. at 1323

(quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Loc. Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37,

46 (1983)). The recording policy here reasonably served to

(1) protect sensitive documents or conversations from disclosure;

(2) prevent distractions; and (3) allow county employees to service

a high volume of customers free from more burdensome

confidentiality measures.

The recording policy is also viewpoint neutral. The

recording policy prevents all video recording within the interior of

a Tax Collector facility without the Tax Collector’s prior approval,

regardless of the speaker or videographer’s purpose, goal, or

viewpoint.

Patrick’s attack on the recording policy as a content-based

restriction is misplaced. Even if that restriction is a content-based

restriction, content-based restrictions are constitutionally

permissible in limited public forums or nonpublic forums so long

as they are reasonable and viewpoint neutral. See Rosenberger, 515

U.S. at 829-30 (limited public forum); Minn. Voters All. v. Mansky,

585 U.S. 1, 12 (2018) (nonpublic forum). As explained above, the

policy here satisfies both criteria.

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On the merits of Patrick’s First Amendment claim, the

district court properly upheld the recording policy as a reasonable,

viewpoint neutral restriction.6

VII. LEAVE TO AMEND

A pro se plaintiff “must be given at least one chance to amend

the complaint before the district court dismisses the action with

prejudice,” at least where a more carefully drafted complaint might

state a claim. Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir.

1991), overruled in part on other grounds by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy

Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc). Leave to

amend need not be granted, however, when amendment would be

futile. Hall v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 367 F.3d 1255, 1262-63 (11th

Cir. 2004).

The district court properly determined amendment of

Patrick’s complaint would be futile. Patrick’s claims fail, not for her

failure to allege sufficient facts, but because her claims fail as a

matter of law. The Tax Collector employed a reasonable,

viewpoint neutral restriction on recording in his facilities—no

6 The district court also dismissed Patrick’s prior restraint claim, reasoning that

the recording policy did not function as a prior restraint. In her opening brief,

Patrick never uses the term “prior restraint” and never explains the basis for

any prior restraint claim. In her reply brief, Patrick does discuss her prior

restraint claim, but her failure to address the district court’s dismissal of that

claim in her initial brief means she forfeited those arguments. See Sapuppo, 739

F.3d at 680; McKiver v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 991 F.3d 1357, 1364 n.1 (11th

Cir. 2021) (“[A]rguments raised for the first time in a party’s reply brief are

waived.”).

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amendment to Patrick’s pleading will change that analysis. The

district court properly dismissed Patrick’s claims with prejudice.

VIII. CONCLUSION

Because Patrick’s allegations fail to state a First Amendment

claim, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Patrick’s

complaint with prejudice.

AFFIRMED.7

7 Fasano’s Motion for Sanctions, filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 38, is DENIED.