In the Matter of the Commitment of M.G.B.

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3891-24

IN THE MATTER OF

THE COMMITMENT OF M.G.B.1

Submitted June 1, 2026 – Decided June 16, 2026

Before Judges Sabatino and Walcott-Henderson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Sussex County, Indictment No. 14-01-0006.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for

appellant M.G.B. (Ruth E. Hunter, Designated Counsel,

on the brief).

Daniel M. Perez, Sussex County Prosecutor, attorney

for respondent State of New Jersey (Shaina Brenner,

Deputy First Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on

the brief).

PER CURIAM

1

Initials are used pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(a)(2) to protect the confidentiality of

appellant's mental health diagnoses. See also N.J.S.A. 30:4-24.3.

Appellant M.G.B., an involuntarily committed person, appeals from the

denial of her motion to have the judge presiding over her ongoing Krol2 hearings

("the motion judge") recuse himself from her case. More specifically, appellant

contends that the motion judge applied the incorrect standard in denying her

motion for his recusal. She further argues that the judge erred in determining

that his continued involvement in her case would not create an "appearance of

impropriety," given his prior service on the foundation board of a hospital

against which she had filed a tort claim years before. Having considered

appellant's arguments in light of the applicable law, we affirm the motion judge's

decision.

The background pertinent to appellant's appeal may be concisely stated as

follows. On January 9, 2014, appellant was charged by a Sussex County Grand

Jury with first-degree murder (N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)) and other related weapons

offenses (N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)). Approximately two years

later, appellant was found to be not guilty by reason of insanity on November

2

See State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 255-56 (1975).

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12, 2015. She was subsequently placed on Krol review status, pursuant to

N.J.S.A. 2C:4-8.3

Over the course of the ensuing decade, appellant appeared for periodic

Krol review hearings before a series of different judges, and her continued

commitment was repeatedly ordered. At one such hearing held before the

motion judge on June 4, 2025, appellant's counsel, acting sua sponte without

formal notice and briefing, moved for the judge to recuse himself from

appellant's case, stating:

My understanding is that in 2022, [appellant] had

filed a tort claim. And in that tort claim, it was named

against one of the parties of [the hospital]. It was

brought to my attention that at that time, Your Honor

had a role as the [hospital]'s board chairman and held

the position as it relates to that [hospital].

In responding to counsel's assertions, the motion judge notified appellant

and her counsel as to the following facts and circumstances:

Okay. So first of all, I was never on the

governing board for [the hospital]. Ever. I was never

the chairman of any board at [the hospital]. I was on

the foundation board, which is a separate corporation

3

A criminal defendant acquitted by reason of insanity may be involuntarily

committed or conditionally released under judicial supervision, with periodic

hearings ("Krol hearings") to determine whether continued commitment or

supervision is warranted, based on the defendant's mental illness and risk of

danger to self or others. See Krol, 68 N.J. at 255-56; see also In re commitment

of M.M., 377 N.J. Super. 71, 76 (App. Div. 2005).

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from the hospital. I was never the chairman of the

foundation board. I think I might have been the

secretary.

I resigned from that board effective when I

became a judge in 2014. And I have had no dealings

with the hospital as a board member or any type of

governance or fund-raising since 2014.

The governing board that used to govern the

[hospital] transitioned to an advisory board when [the

hospital] merged with [a different hospital] sometime,

I think, around 2011 or 2012. So even that governing

board lost its governance powers when it became an

advisory board and the [new hospital's] board now

oversees the medical center.

So under those facts and circumstances, I don't

see anything that would suggest to a reasonable person

who is fully aware of all of those facts that anything

would cause me to need to recuse myself, or that a

reasonable person would think that I would not be able

to be fair and impartial when dealing with [appellant].

I have no idea whatsoever about the underlying

facts that are involved in some tort claim notice that she

had – that she filed. And I hadn't been involved with

the hospital at that point for at least eight years.

[(Emphasis added).]

After appellant's counsel confirmed at the hearing that she was

nevertheless making a formal application for the motion judge to recuse himself

from her client's case, the judge denied the application for the reasons he had

previously articulated. A corresponding order denying appellant's recusal

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motion was issued the following day, June 5, 2025, and an appeal of that order

was filed with this court the next month on August 7, 2025.

Well-established principles and governing law guide our decision-making

in the present matter. "Generally, recusal motions are 'entrusted to the sound

discretion of the judge and are subject to review for abuse of discretion.'"

Goldfarb v. Solimine, 460 N.J. Super. 22, 30 (App. Div. 2019), aff'd as modified

and remanded on other grounds, 245 N.J. 326 (2021) (quoting State v. McCabe,

201 N.J. 34, 45 (2010)). "A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes

public confidence in the independence, integrity and impartiality of the

judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety." Code

of Jud. Conduct canon 2.1. (Emphasis added).

With regard to the judicial conduct of a judge, an

appearance of impropriety is created when a

reasonable, fully informed person observing the judge's

conduct would have doubts about the judge's

impartiality.

With regard to the personal conduct of a judge, an

appearance of impropriety is created when an

individual who observes the judge's personal conduct

has a reasonable basis to doubt the judge's integrity and

impartiality.

[Code of Jud. Conduct r. 2.1 cmt. 3 (emphasis added);

see also DeNike v. Cupo, 196 N.J. 502, 517 (2008).]

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While judges are required to recuse themselves for any reason "which

might preclude a fair and unbiased hearing and judgment" of a party's case, R.

1:12-1(g), "[i]t is improper for a judge to withdraw from a case upon a mere

suggestion that [he or she] is disqualified 'unless the alleged cause of recusal is

known by [the judge] to exist or is shown to be true in fact.'" Panitch v. Panitch,

339 N.J. Super. 63, 66-67 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Hundred E. Credit Corp.

v. Eric Shuster Corp., 212 N.J. Super. 350, 358 (App. Div. 1986)) (emphasis

added).

Whether a trial judge applied the proper legal standard in a recusal case is

a matter to be reviewed on appeal de novo. See Goldfarb, 460 N.J. Super. at 30.

Applying such de novo review to appellant's arguments on appeal, we are

satisfied that the motion judge applied the correct appearance of impropriety

standard here.

In his oral decision denying appellant's motion for recusal, the motion

judge explicitly considered whether a "reasonably, fully informed person"

standing in observation of his conduct would harbor legitimate "doubts about

[his] impartiality," as the standard for assessing the appearance of impropriety

so requires. Ibid.; see also Code of Jud. Conduct canon 2.1. While the judge

did not elaborate upon the conclusion exhaustively, the judge sufficiently set out

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his reasons for concluding that his continued involvement in appellant's case

would not be improper.

The motion judge noted that he had served only as secretary of the

foundation board of the hospital, a corporation apparently separate from the

hospital's governing board, which itself was no longer the hospital's principal

authority at the time that appellant filed her tort claim. He also emphasized that

he had resigned from the foundation board in 2014 upon his judicial

appointment—eight years before appellant's claim was even filed—and that he

had a complete lack of knowledge regarding the factual circumstances

underlying appellant's tort claim. Consequently, the "cause of recusal" alleged

by appellant was neither known to the judge at the time of the Krol hearing on

June 4, 2025, nor were many of the underlying facts asserted by appellant's

counsel shown to be true or completely accurate. Panitch, 339 N.J. Super. at

66-67.

Given this factual background, the motion judge's conclusion that "no

reasonable person would infer that [he could not] be fair and impartial" in

continuing to preside over appellant's periodic Krol review hearings does not

constitute an abuse of discretion. The judge's limited service on a seemingly

vestigial board of a hospital nearly a decade before appellant filed an unspecified

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tort claim against that same hospital does not so clearly create any appearance

of impropriety as to require the motion judge's recusal from appellant's case

either then or in a future hearing. See Goldfarb, 460 N.J. Super. at 30; see also

Amato v. Twp. of Ocean Sch. Dist., 480 N.J. Super. 239, 245 (App. Div. 2024).

In sum, the motion judge reasonably denied appellant's motion for recusal

under the applicable standards. We therefore affirm the denial of appellant's

motion and the court's merits determination continuing appellant's confinement .

Affirmed.

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