Cooper

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

LARENTA JAVON COOPER, ) CASE NO. 5:24-CV-02142-BMB

)

Plaintiff, )

) JUDGE BRIDGET MEEHAN BRENNAN

vs. ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

)

WARDEN BILL COOL, ) MAGISTRATE JUDGE

) JONATHAN D. GREENBERG

Defendant. )

) REPORT & RECOMMENDATION

)

This matter is before the magistrate judge pursuant to Local Rule 72.2. Before the Court is the

Petition of Larenta Javon Cooper (“Cooper” or “Petitioner”), for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 2254. Cooper is in the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction pursuant

to journal entry of sentence in the case State v. Cooper, Stark County Court of Common Pleas Case No.

2021 CR2429. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Petition be DISMISSED.

I. Summary of Facts

In a habeas corpus proceeding instituted by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state

court, factual determinations made by state courts are presumed correct unless rebutted by clear and

convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Franklin v. Bradshaw, 695 F.3d 439, 447 (6th Cir.

2012); Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 701 (6th Cir. 2011). The state appellate court summarized the

facts underlying Cooper’s conviction as follows:

{¶2} The following evidence is adduced from the record of the

suppression hearing on March 14, 2022, at which Ptl. Michael Brown of

the Canton Police Department was the sole witness.

{¶3} Brown testified that on October 31, 2021, he was the passenger in a

Jackson Township Police cruiser driven by an unnamed Jackson

Township Police officer.1 That evening, Brown and the Jackson officer

were participating in a joint Violence Interdiction Patrol, which Brown

described as “directed patrol overtime” in which officers increased police

presence in noted trouble areas, specifically, bars in the city of Canton and

Jackson Township. Brown and the Jackson officer were in the vicinity of

the Boom-Boom Room, which is not a bar but had a crowd that evening

because of a concert or social event.

{¶4} The Jackson officer drove while Brown ran plates on the in-car

computer. The Jackson officer asked him to run a plate reading

“KINGME3.” Brown testified the requested registration “popped up red

in the system,” i.e. the screen was red, without further explanation. Brown

testified that in a Canton police cruiser, if he runs a registration and the

information comes back red, it means there is some problem with the

registration such as a stolen vehicle, a warrant for the registered owner, or

an expired tag. The Canton cruiser computer would provide further

information including an explanation why the registration was red, such

as “stolen vehicle” or “expired registration.” In the instant case, there was

no such explanation, and Brown was not able to clarify what the red

indication meant in a Jackson Township cruiser.

{¶5} Brown told the Jackson officer to “flip around” and follow the

“KINGME3” vehicle, a blue Mazda. The cruiser made a U-turn behind the

vehicle and Brown again ran the plate. As he did so, the Jackson officer

illuminated lights and sirens to effectuate a traffic stop, but the Mazda sped

away.

{¶6} The cruiser pursued the Mazda through the crowded parking lot of

the Boom-Boom Room to an alley; the Mazda ran a stoplight at an access

road to Cleveland Avenue and proceeded toward the 1800 block. The

vehicle stopped abruptly when the driver struck steel cables connected to

a telephone pole at the side of the road.

{¶7} Appellant was the sole occupant of the vehicle; after the crash, he

got out of the car and police “felony stopped” him, meaning their weapons

were drawn and they gave appellant verbal commands to come back to the

scene. Appellant failed to obey the verbal commands and proceeded

toward the front of the wrecked car.

{¶8} A maroon vehicle pulled up beside the Mazda briefly and spoke with

appellant. An officer later contacted the occupants of the maroon vehicle

and Brown testified the driver was possibly appellant’s sister.

{¶9} Appellant was apprehended and placed in a cruiser. A large amount

of currency and a digital scale were found upon his person. A subsequent

search of the interior of the vehicle found a quantity of marijuana, and a

police sergeant found four bags of narcotics in the broken casing of the

front driver’s-side headlight of the vehicle, the smashed headlight

appellant had walked toward before he was apprehended.

Jury trial of May 10

{¶10} The evidence adduced from the record of appellant’s jury trial was

identical in many respects to the evidence at the suppression hearing.

Appellee presented the evidence of Brown’s body cam video and

presented more evidence arising from appellant’s stop and arrest. Sgt.

Slone heard over the radio that Brown was in pursuit of a vehicle and came

to the scene. He searched appellant’s vehicle and found an open container,

marijuana, and four cell phones. He walked around the exterior of the

crashed vehicle to inspect the damage and noticed the headlight housing

was torn apart when it struck the steel cable. Slone immediately observed

four bags of narcotics in the wrecked headlight and advised Brown. The

narcotics appeared to have been thrown into the housing of the headlight.

{¶11} Appellant was not the vehicle’s registered owner. The owner did

appear on the crash scene, but Brown was not aware how she was notified

of the crash.

Indictment, suppression, trial, and conviction/acquittal

{¶12} Appellant was charged by indictment as follows: one count of

trafficking in heroin pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and/or

(A)(2)(C)(6)(e) [Count I], a felony of the second degree; and one count of

possession of heroin pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(6)(d) [Count II], a

felony of the second degree; one count of trafficking in a fentanyl-related

compound [Count III], a felony of the second degree; one count of

possession of a fentanyl-related compound pursuant to R.C.

2925.11(A)(C)(11)(d) [Count IV], a felony of the second degree; one

count of aggravated trafficking in drugs pursuant to R.C.

2925.03(A)(2)(C)(1)(c) [Count V], a felony of the third degree; one count

of aggravated possession of drugs pursuant to R.C. 2925.11(A)(C)(1)(b)

[Count VI], a felony of the third degree; one count of trafficking in cocaine

pursuant to R.C. 2925.03(A)(2)(C)(4)(a) [Count VII], a felony of the fifth

degree; one count of possession of cocaine pursuant to R.C.

2925.11(A)(C)(4)(a) [Count VIII], a felony of the fifth degree; and one

count of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer

pursuant to R.C. 2921.331(B)(C)(5)(a)(i) and/or (ii) [Count IX], a felony

of the third degree. Appellant entered pleas of not guilty.

{¶13} On February 17, 2022, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence

flowing from the traffic stop, which he argued was not premised upon

reasonable suspicion. Appellee responded with a memorandum in

opposition. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on March 14, 2022,

and overruled the motion to suppress by judgment entry dated March 31,

2022.

{¶14} The matter proceeded to trial by jury. Appellant was found not

guilty of the trafficking offenses [Counts I, III, V, and VII] and guilty of

the remaining counts [Counts II, IV, VI, VII, VIII, and IX].

{¶15} Appellant appeared before the trial court for sentencing on May 16,

2022. The trial court imposed a total aggregate indefinite prison term of

11 to 14 years.

State v. Cooper, 2023-Ohio-2897, 2023 WL 5321088, at **1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2023).

II. Procedural History

A. Trial Court Proceedings

On December 23, 2021, the Stark County Grand Jury indicted Cooper on the following charges:

trafficking in heroin in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03(A)(1) and/or (A)(2), (C)(6)(e) (Count 1);

possession of heroin in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11(A), (C)(6)(d) (Count 2); trafficking in a

fentanyl-related compound (Count 3); possession of a fentanyl-related compound in violation of Ohio Rev.

Code § 2925.11(A), (C)(11)(d) (Count 4); aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §

2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(c) (Count 5); aggravated possession of drugs in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §

2925.11(A), (C)(1)(b) (Count 6); trafficking in cocaine in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03(A)(2),

(C)(4)(a) (Count 7); possession of cocaine in violation of Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.11(A), (C)(4)(a) (Count

8); and failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer in violation of Ohio Rev. Code §

2921.331(B), (C)(5)(a)(i) and/or (ii) (Count 9). (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 1.) Cooper entered pleas of not guilty

to all charges. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 2.)

On February 17, 2022, Cooper filed a motion to suppress evidence arising from the traffic stop,

which he argued lacked the support of reasonable suspicion. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 3.)

On March 14, 2022, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress. (Doc. No.

7-1, Ex. 6; Doc. No. 7-2.)

After the hearing, Cooper filed a written closing argument (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 4), to which the State

responded. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 5.)

On March 31, 2022, the trial court denied Cooper’s motion to suppress. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 6.)

The case proceeded to jury trial. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 7-9.) On May 11, 2022, the jury acquitted

Cooper of the trafficking counts but found him guilty of the remaining counts. (Id.)

On May 16, 2022, the state trial court held a sentencing hearing. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 9.) The trial

court sentenced Cooper to a total aggregate sentence of eleven (11) to fourteen (14) years. (Id.)

On August 5, 2022, the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc Judgment Entry of convictions and

sentence. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 10.)

B. Direct Appeal

Cooper, through counsel, filed a timely notice of appeal to the Fifth District Court of Appeals. (Doc.

No. 7-1, Ex. 11.) In his appellate brief, he raised the following assignments of error:

I. Appellant’s constitutional rights as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment of the

United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution were

violated when the trial court overruled Appellant’s motion to suppress.

II. In order for a defendant to be convicted of felony failure to comply with the order

or signal of a police officer, the trial court must use a verdict form that either (a)

states the degree of the offense, or (b) includes the “willful” mens rea language

from R.C. 2921.33 l(B)-merely referencing the code section in the verdict form is

insufficient as a matter of law.

III. The trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences without making the

required findings pursuant to R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) depriving Appellant of due

process contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

and corresponding rights under the Ohio Constitution.

IV. As amended by the Reagan Tokes Act, the Ohio Revised Code’s sentences for first

and second degree qualifying felonies violates the Constitutions of the United

States and the State of Ohio.

(Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 12.) The State filed a brief in response. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 13.)

On August 18, 2023, the state appellate court affirmed Cooper’s convictions. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex.

14.) See also State v. Cooper, 2023-Ohio-2897, 2023 WL 5321088, at *11.

On October 2, 2023, Cooper, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal with the Supreme Court of

Ohio. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 16.) In his Memorandum in Support of Jurisdiction, Cooper raised the following

Proposition of Law:

I. A police officer lacks reasonable, articulable suspicion to seize a motorist, under

the United States and Ohio Constitutions, when after performing a random license

plate check, the officer receives a possible “hit”, with no other specific information

known to the officer at the time of the seizure.

(Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 17.) The State filed a response. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 18.)

On December 12, 2023, the Supreme Court of Ohio declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal

pursuant to S.Ct. Prac.R. 7.08(B)(4). (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 19.)

On December 22, 2023, Cooper, through counsel, moved the Supreme Court of Ohio for

reconsideration of its decision declining jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 20.) The State opposed the motion

for reconsideration. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 21.)

On February 6, 2024, the Supreme Court of Ohio denied the motion. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 22.)

C. Federal Habeas Petition

On December 10, 2024, Cooper, through counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in this

Court and asserted the following ground for relief:

GROUND ONE: Petitioner seeks relief on the ground that law enforcement conducted a

traffic stop based solely on a vague “red” computer screen indicator—absent any specific,

articulable facts suggesting criminal activity.

Supporting Facts: The officer relied solely on a vague “red” indicator from a

computer system unfamiliar to him. No specific information such as the registered

owner’s name, physical description, or outstanding warrants, was provided before

the stop. The officer did not observe any traffic violations prior to initiating the

seizure. No verification through additional database checks (LEADS or teletype)

was sought to confirm criminal activity. The “red” indicator could have meant

multiple, non-criminal issues such as expired tags. Without further details, the

officer’s suspicion was purely speculative and unsubstantiated.

(Doc. No. 1.)

III. Non-cognizable Claim

Respondent argues that Cooper’s Fourth Amendment claim is non-cognizable under the Stone v.

Powell bar. (Doc. No. 7 at 10-11.) Respondent maintains that “Cooper does not claim that he was prevented

from raising his Fourth Amendment issues at the suppression hearing or on appeal.” (Id. at 10.) According

to Respondent, “[s]ince Cooper merely disputes the correctness of the state court’s decision on the Fourth

Amendment claim and does not point to any impediment frustrating the presentation of the claim,” Cooper

cannot overcome the State v. Powell bar. (Id. at 10-11.)

Cooper responds that the traffic stop at issue “involved an egregious constitutional error, warranting

federal habeas relief under the principles articulated in Riley v. Gray. . . .” (Doc. No. 9 at 2.) Cooper

maintains that “[b]ecause the state courts failed to apply controlling Fourth Amendment principles and

permitted a seizure based purely on speculation, Cooper’s case satisfies the egregious error exception

recognized in Riley.”1 (Id. at 6.) Cooper argues that his claim is more than “mere disagreement with the

1 The Court notes that in Riley, in dicta, the Sixth Circuit commented that “When a petitioner alleges

egregious error in the application of fourth amendment principles, of a magnitude and nature similar to the

state court error present in Gamble, however, a federal habeas court might be justified in concluding that

an opportunity for a full and fair hearing had not been afforded the petitioner.” Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522,

526 (6th Cir. 1982) (emphasis added). In Gamble v. State of Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (10th Cir.

1978), the Tenth Circuit found that the petitioner had not been afforded the opportunity for a full and fair

hearing, and therefore the Stone v. Powell bar did not apply, where the state courts “did not recognize or

apply” controlling Supreme Court precedent. In finding that “a federal court is not precluded from

considering Fourth Amendment claims in habeas corpus proceedings where the state court wilfully refuses

to apply the correct and controlling constitutional standards,” the Tenth Circuit explained that “[d]eference

to state court consideration of Fourth Amendment claims does not require federal blindness to a state court’s

wilful refusal to apply the appropriate constitutional standard.” Id. at 1165. The Tenth Circuit noted Gamble

had argued the application of the controlling Supreme Court precedent to the state courts of appeal. Id. at

1163. Cooper makes no such argument here. While in an unpublished Table decision—a case Cooper does

not cite—the Sixth Circuit described the Riley inquiry as “a review of whether the state provided an adequate

state courts’ conclusions”; rather, the constitutional harm “involves a breakdown of the adjudicative process

that denied Cooper the substantive protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.” (Id.)

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have set forth binding precent regarding the

cognizability of Fourth Amendment claims brought for habeas review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494

(1976); Lawrence v. 48th Dist. Court, 560 F.3d 475, 483 n.7 (6th Cir. 2009). “Ordinarily, we do not

recognize Fourth Amendment claims in Section 2254 actions if the state proceedings provided the petitioner

full and fair opportunity to litigate that claim.” Lawrence, 560 F.3d at 483 n.7 (citing Powell, 428 U.S. at

494). Specifically, in Powell, the Supreme Court found that “where the State has provided an opportunity

for a full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas

corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced

at his trial.” Id. at 494.

In considering a Fourth Amendment claim on habeas review, a district court must “make two distinct

inquiries... [First,] whether the state procedural mechanism, in the abstract, presents the opportunity to raise

a fourth amendment claim.... Second, ... whether presentation of the claim was in fact frustrated because of

a failure of that mechanism.” Riley v. Gray, 674 F.2d 522, 526 (6th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). If a

petitioner cannot demonstrate both elements, then his Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable. Id.

In Riley, the Sixth Circuit held that by providing for the filing of a pretrial motion to suppress and the

opportunity to directly appeal any ruling denying a suppression motion, Ohio has a mechanism in place for

the resolution of Fourth Amendment claims, which “is, in the abstract, clearly adequate.” Riley, 674 F.2d

at 526. Therefore, the determination whether Powell applies turns solely on the resolution of the

mechanism to address Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claims, absent proof of ‘egregious error in the

application of fourth amendment principles....,’” Abdul–Mateen v. Hofbauer, No. 98–2323, 2000 WL

687653, at *3 (6th Cir. May 19, 2000), subsequent cases examining Riley, discussed infra, do not recognize

any such exception.

second Riley inquiry. See Hillman v. Beightler, No. 5:09-cv-2538, 2010 WL 2232635, at *5 (N.D. Ohio

May 26, 2010). “[T]he Powell ‘opportunity for full and fair consideration’ means an available avenue for

the prisoner to present his claim to the state courts, not an inquiry into the adequacy of the procedure actually

used to resolve that particular claim.” Good v. Berghuis, 729 F.3d 636, 639 (6th Cir. 2013). The question

before the Court is this: “Did the state courts permit the defendant to raise the claim or not?” Id. at 640.

As another district court within this circuit has explained:

Under Stone, however, the correctness of the state courts’ conclusions is

simply irrelevant. The courts that have considered the matter “have

consistently held that an erroneous determination of a habeas petitioner’s

Fourth Amendment claim does not overcome the Stone v. Powell bar.”

Gilmore v. Marks, 799 F.2d 51, 57 (3d Cir.1986); see also, Willett, 37 F.3d

at 1270 (citing cases). An argument directed solely at the correctness of

the state court decision “goes not to the fullness and fairness of his

opportunity to litigate the claim[s], but to the correctness of the state court

resolution, an issue which Stone v. Powell makes irrelevant.” Siripongs v.

Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994). Again, as succinctly put by

the Seventh Circuit, “‘full and fair guarantees the right to present one’s

case, but it does not guarantee a correct result.” Cabrera, 324 F.3d at 532.

Brown v. Berghuis, 638 F. Supp. 2d 795, 812-13 (E.D. Mich. 2009).

Turning to the two inquiries discussed in Riley, this Court agrees with Respondent that Petitioner’s

Fourth Amendment claim is not cognizable on habeas review. The record shows Cooper filed a motion to

suppress with the state trial court. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 3.) The state trial court held a hearing on the motion

to suppress and ordered post-hearing briefing. (Doc. No. 7-2; see also Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 6.) The state trial

court then issued a reasoned decision denying the motion to suppress. (Doc. No. 7-1, Ex. 6.) Cooper then

appealed his Fourth Amendment claim to both the state appellate court and the Ohio Supreme Court. (Doc.

No. 7-1, Ex. 12, 17.) Cooper does not assert any failure of the procedural mechanism that denied him an

opportunity for a full and fair hearing. (Doc. No. 10.) Instead, it is clear from the record that Cooper was

able to litigate his Fourth Amendment claim fully and fairly in the state courts and that he is unhappy with

the result.

This Court recently rejected a similar argument:

Fourth Amendment claims relating to alleged warrant defects are barred

from federal habeas corpus review where a petitioner “had available [an]

avenue...to present his claim to the state courts.” Good v. Berguis, 729

F.3d 636, 639 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Powell, 428 U.S. at 494). In Powell,

the Supreme Court held that, “where the State has provided an opportunity

for full and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner

may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that

evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced

at his trial.” Powell, 428 U.S. at 494. To evade this clearly established

legal principle, Petitioner instead argues that the adequacy of available

State court review mechanisms effectively foreclosed review or, more

accurately, only permitted superficial review. (ECF No. 12, PageID

#2694–97.) Specifically, Petitioner argues that “the Ohio courts

misapplied federal constitutional standards by upholding a warrant that

failed to expressly incorporate the affidavit as required by Groh v.

Ramirez,” 540 U.S. 551, 557–58 (2004). (ECF No. 12, PageID# 2697.)

But Petitioner’s quarrel lies with the merits of the State courts’

adjudication. “An argument directed solely at the correctness of the state

court decision ‘goes not to the fullness and fairness of his opportunity to

litigate the claim[s], but to the correctness of the state court resolution, an

issue which Stone v. Powell makes irrelevant.’” Brown v. Berghuis, 638

F. Supp. 2d 795, 812–13 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (quoting Siripongs v.

Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1321 (9th Cir. 1994)). “[A]n erroneous

determination of a habeas petitioner’s Fourth Amendment claim does not

overcome the Stone v. Powell bar.” Id. (quoting Gilmore v. Marks, 799

F.2d 51, 57 (3d Cir. 1986)).

Under the law of this Circuit, “the Powell ‘opportunity for full and fair

consideration’ means an available avenue for the prisoner to present his

claims to the state courts, not an inquiry into the adequacy of the procedure

actually used to resolve that particular claim.” Good, 729 F.3d at 639. In

the absence of a sham proceeding, which Petitioner has not alleged and

the record does not support in any event, there is no need to question the

rigor of the State courts’ proceedings. Id. Accordingly, Petitioner’s

dissatisfaction with the State courts’ adjudication does not equate to lack

of “full and fair” review. Powell, 428 U.S. at 494. As the record shows,

Petitioner raised his Fourth Amendment argument at the State trial court

level, to the State appellate level, and at the Ohio Supreme Court, though

it declined review. (ECF No. 8-1, PageID #297–311, #596–671 & #408.)

He had ample opportunity to raise, develop, and pursue the constitutional

issue at the heart of his habeas petition and objections. Accordingly,

Petitioner has received “full and fair” review, therefore, his Fourth

Amendment claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. Stone, 428

U.S. at 494.

Bugno v. Hunsinger-Stuff, Case No. 4:24-cv-348, 2025 WL 2101828, at **1, 4-5 (N.D. Ohio July 28, 2025).

Again, “[a]n argument directed solely at the correctness of the state court decision “goes not to the

fullness and fairness of his opportunity to litigate the claim[s], but to the correctness of the state court

resolution, an issue which Stone v. Powell makes irrelevant.” Brown v. Berghuis, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 812-13

(citation omitted). See also Machacek v. Hofbauer, 213 F.3d 947, 952 (6th Cir. 2000) (“In this case, the

record reflects that petitioner was able to present his Fourth Amendment claims to the Michigan courts and

that these claims were carefully considered and rejected at the trial level and on appeal. Machacek may be

disappointed with his inability to persuade the Michigan courts that his statement was the product of an

illegal arrest, but the record clearly shows that he received all the process he was due. Accordingly, any

claims concerning the validity of his arrest are not cognizable on habeas review under the doctrine of Stone

v. Powell.”).

For all of the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends the Court find that Cooper’s Fourth

Amendment claim is non-cognizable under Stone v. Powell.

V. Conclusion

For all the reasons set forth above, it is recommended that the Petition be DISMISSED.

Date: April 30, 2026 s/ Jonathan Greenberg

Jonathan D. Greenberg

United States Magistrate Judge

OBJECTIONS

Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Courts

within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this document. Failure to file objections

within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Berkshire v.

Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2019).