Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHEASTERN DIVISION

ESTATE OF JAIDEN RASHAD

DEJARNETT, by and through its

duly-appointed administrator Reginald

McKenzie, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 5:25-cv-1273-HDM

CITY OF DECATUR,

ALABAMA, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Reginald McKenzie sues the City of Decatur, Alabama (the “City”), and

various law enforcement and public officials for the death of Jaiden Rashad

Dejarnett following a high-speed police pursuit on September 4, 2023. (Doc. 1). The

Complaint names the following as defendants: the City, Officer Mac Bailey

Marquette of the Decatur Polce Department, Mayor Tab Bowling, Police Chief Todd

Pinion, and Lieutenant Joe Renshaw (collectively, the “Defendants”). Id. at 1.

McKenzie, acting in both his own right and as the administrator of Dejarnett’s estate

(the “Estate”), has brought three claims. In Count One, Plaintiffs allege that

Defendant Officer Marquette used unconstitutionally excessive force in violation of

the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments during his pursuit of Dejarnett. Id., ¶¶ 32–

35. In Count Two, Plaintiffs allege that the City, Mayor Bowling, Police Chief Todd

Pinion, and Lieutenant Renshaw maintained customs, practices, and policies—

including inadequate training, supervision, and discipline of the City’s officers—

such that they were deliberately indifferent to Dejarnett’s constitutional rights. Id.,

¶¶ 36–41. Finally, in Count Three, Plaintiffs allege that all Defendants violated

Alabama’s wrongful death statute by engaging in conduct that a reasonable officer

or municipality would not have engaged in under the same or similar circumstances.

Id., ¶¶ 42–45.

On September 8, 2025, the City, Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw moved to

dismiss the Complaint, (doc. 8), and Marquette did the same on October 9, 2025,

(doc. 21). The Estate and McKenzie subsequently moved to convert the City,

Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw’s motion to dismiss into a motion for summary

judgment, (doc. 24), and to strike Marquette’s motion to dismiss or, in the

alternative, allow a response in opposition, (doc. 26). The court has reviewed these

motions and the related briefing. (See docs. 8–9, 12, 18, 21–22, 24–30). For the

reasons stated in this memorandum opinion and order, the court GRANTS the

motions to dismiss, (docs. 8, 21), DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiffs’ motion to convert

defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, (doc. 24),

DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Marquette’s motion to dismiss, (docs. 26), and

GRANTS the motion for leave to file a response in opposition, (doc. 26).

BACKGROUND

The Estate and McKenzie pleaded the following facts, accepted here as true:

On September 4, 2023, at approximately 3:00 a.m., sixteen-year-old Jaiden

Rashad Dejarnett was driving alone in Decatur, Alabama. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 1, 15). Officer

Marquette and other City police officers initiated a traffic stop on Dejarnett because

Dejarnett was driving without headlights and/or taillights in the dark. Id., ¶ 15.

Dejarnett did not stop his vehicle, id., ¶¶ 15–18, and a high-speed pursuit ensued, at

times reaching speeds in excess of one hundred thirty-five miles per hour, id., ¶ 18.

Dejarnett never yielded to the officers’ attempt to conduct a traffic stop, and the

pursuit ended when Dejarnett crashed. Id., ¶ 21. Plaintiffs do not allege that

Marquette or any other officer ever made contact of any kind with Dejarnett, or that

Marquette’s or any other officer’s vehicles were involved in the crash. See id., ¶¶

15–31.

Plaintiffs allege that Marquette was involved in a “separate police killing” of

another young man weeks later, which, they claim, is indicative of a “pattern of

reckless behavior” within the Decatur Police Department, but Plaintiffs offer no

details regarding this separate incident or whether it involved a vehicle pursuit. See

id., ¶ 26. They also allege that Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw all had “actual or

constructive knowledge of repeated failures by officers of the Decatur Police

Department to comply with pursuit protocols,” id., ¶ 28, but, again, offer no details

regarding what other “repeated failures” to which they are referring, see id.

Plaintiffs further allege that it was the City’s duty, by and through its

authorized agents, servants, and employees (including Marquette, Pinion, and

Renshaw), to refrain from neglectful, careless and unskilled conduct so as not to

injure Dejarnett, and that Marquette, Pinion, and Renshaw violated Dejarnett’s

federal rights by acting unreasonably and recklessly. Id., ¶¶ 23–24. Specifically,

Plaintiffs allege that the City failed to properly train or supervise its officers; Pinion,

as Chief of Police, failed to implement proper training and supervision in relation to

vehicular pursuits; Renshaw, as the on-duty supervisor, failed to intervene or call off

the pursuit of Dejarnett; and Bowling, as the mayor, failed to take meaningful action

to address deficiencies in police accountability, training, or oversight. Id., ¶¶ 27–31.

LEGAL STANDARD

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions

masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.” Wiersum v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 785

F.3d 483, 485 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is inadequate. Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

In considering the facts, courts view the allegations in the complaint in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party. Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 495 F.3d

1289, 1295 (11th Cir. 2007). To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must merely

produce enough facts to “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal

evidence” of the necessary elements of his or her claim. Miyahira v. Vitacost.com,

Inc., 715 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The

pleading standard “requires only a plausible short and plain statement of the

plaintiff’s claim, not an exposition of his legal argument.” Skinner v. Switzer, 562

U.S. 521, 530 (2011). At this stage, the issue is “not whether [the plaintiff] will

ultimately prevail . . . but whether his complaint was sufficient to cross the federal

court’s threshold.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Convert Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss into a Motion for

Summary Judgment

Plaintiffs move to convert the City, Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw’s motion

to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because they attached three exhibits

to their motion to dismiss that were not a part of the pleadings. (See Doc. 24).

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12,

[W]hen ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, a court generally

may not consider matters outside of the pleadings without treating the

motion as a motion for summary judgment, and if it treats the motion

as one for summary judgment, the court must give a reasonable

opportunity for the parties to present all evidence that is relevant to the

motion.

Johnson v. City of Atlanta, 107 F.4th 1292, 1298 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(d)). In this case, the court finds it unnecessary to consider any exhibits

outside of the pleadings to resolve the pending motions, and Plaintiffs’ motion is

DENIED AS MOOT.

II. Motion to Strike Defendant Marquette’s Motion to Dismiss, and

Alternative Motion for Leave to File Response in Opposition

Plaintiffs move to strike Marquette’s motion to dismiss because it was filed

on October 9, 2025, instead of the October 8, 2025, deadline. Marquette’s counsel

informed the court that this delay of less than 24 hours in filing was due to an

inadvertent calendaring error and was not done for the purpose of delay or any other

improper purpose. (Doc. 29 at 2). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that this

insignificant delay in filing prejudiced them in any way. The court further notes that

Marquette’s motion to dismiss is based upon Rule 12(b)(6), and not any of the

defenses provided for in Rule 12(b)(2)–(5) that would be waived if not timely

asserted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h). Accordingly, the court DENIES the motion to

strike Marquette’s motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs move in the alternative for leave to file a response in opposition, and

Plaintiffs include the response brief with the filing. (Doc. 27 at 4). The court

GRANTS this motion for leave, and the court is in receipt of Plaintiffs’ response in

opposition.1

III. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss

Marquette moves for the dismissal of Counts One and Three, while the City,

Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw move for the dismissal of Counts Two and Three.

(See docs. 8, 21). For the reasons laid out below, both motions to dismiss are

GRANTED.

Count I: 42 U.S.C § 1983 – Excessive Force/Unreasonable Seizure

(Marquette)

Plaintiffs first allege that Officer Marquette2 engaged in conduct that

constituted an unreasonable seizure and use of excessive force in violation of the

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 32–35). This is also the alleged

constitutional violation underlying the § 1983 municipal liability claims against the

City and remaining defendants.

1 By granting this motion, the court is not permitting additional briefing. Rather, the court accepts

and takes into consideration Plaintiffs’ response in opposition that was previously filed. (Doc. 27

at 4).

2 Plaintiffs also named “other unknown officers of the City of Decatur” and asserted this count

against “other officers,” but, since fictitious party practice is generally not allowed in federal court,

these claims are dismissed against the fictitious officers. Richardson v. Johnson, 598 F.3d 734,

738 (11th Cir. 2010).

A. Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment covers only “searches and seizures.” Cnty. of

Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844 (1998). No one suggests there was a search,

and Plaintiffs have not plausibly alleged a seizure under Supreme Court and

Eleventh Circuit precedent. In Brower v. County of Inyo, the Supreme Court made

clear that a seizure occurs only through means intentionally applied to terminate

freedom of movement, and no Fourth Amendment seizure would take place where

a “pursuing police car [seeks] to stop the suspect only by the show of authority

represented by flashing lights and continuing pursuit”—even if there is a subsequent

crash. 489 U.S. 593, 596–97 (1991). Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has explicitly held

that mere pursuit while attempting to seize a suspect is not a “seizure.” See e.g.,

Sanders v. City of Union Springs, 207 F. App’x 960, 964 (11th Cir. 2006) (per

curiam) (“A police pursuit in attempting to seize a person does not amount to a

‘seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”). And without an

affirmative act leading to a seizure, “there cannot be a Fourth Amendment claim of

unreasonable force.” Id. at 965. Plaintiffs do not point this court to any case law to

the contrary. (Doc. 12 at 4–5).3

3 The Estate and McKenzie assert that, in the Eleventh Circuit, “a high-speed pursuit . . . can

constitute a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment,” but only cite to one case in support of that

proposition. (Doc. 12 at 4). They cite and quote from Carr v. Tatangelo, 338 F.3d 1259, 1269–70

(11th Cir. 2003), claiming that the Eleventh Circuit “held that a high-speed chase ending in a crash

could be an unreasonable seizure if the officer’s actions were ‘so reckless as to manifest an intent

to stop the suspect by any means necessary, including means that would lead to a crash.’” (Doc.

It is clear from the face of the Complaint that Marquette initiated a traffic stop

on Dejarnett after observing a traffic violation around 3:00 a.m. Dejarnett led

Marquette in a high-speed pursuit after failing to yield to Marquette, but at no point

did Marquette make physical contact of any kind with Dejarnett. The Complaint

does not allege how Dejarnett crashed his car or whether a City police vehicle was

even near Dejarnett at the time of this crash. All the Complaint alleges is that

Marquette and/or other City officers pursued Dejarnett, and a police pursuit alone

does not amount to a seizure under precedent from both the Supreme Court and the

Eleventh Circuit. Brower, 489 U.S. at 596–97; Sanders, 207 F. App’x at 964.

Because the Complaint does not plausibly allege a seizure, the court dismisses

the Fourth Amendment claim against Marquette.

B. Fourteenth Amendment

It is unclear from the Complaint whether Count One alleges excessive force

in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or a violation of Dejarnett’s substantive

due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, so the court will discuss both.

First, claims of excessive force during an arrest, investigatory stop, or

attempted seizure are governed by the Fourth Amendment. Albright v. Oliver, 510

12 at 4). The court reviewed Carr and found that the court held no such thing. In fact, Carr involves

a case about an officer-involved shooting, not a high-speed pursuit or a crash. The word “crash”

does not even appear in the opinion. This is a gross misrepresentation of law by the Estate and

McKenzie which is addressed more thoroughly in the court’s order to show cause. (Doc. 31).

U.S. 266 (1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); Corbitt v. Vickers,

929 F.3d 1304, 1313 (11th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 590 U.S. 992 (2020); Piazza v.

Jefferson Cnty, 923 F.3d 947, 952 (11th Cir. 2019); J W by & through Tammy

Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 904 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2018). The

Supreme Court has held that Fourteenth Amendment claims for excessive force are

reserved for pretrial detainees, not arrestees. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S.

389, 393 (2015); Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d 1232, 1246 (11th Cir. 2021). The

Complaint confirms Dejarnett was not in custody but was fleeing in his vehicle,

making a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim inapplicable.

Second, the allegations also fall short of stating a substantive due process

claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. A substantive due process violation

requires conduct that is “arbitrary, or conscience shocking, in a constitutional sense.”

Wilcox v. Fenn, 380 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at

847). The Eleventh Circuit has rejected such claims even in cases involving physical

contact by police vehicles, which is not alleged here. See Wilcox, 380 F. App’x at

839; Barnwell v. Douglas Cnty, 390 F. App’x 862 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). “In

the context of high-speed chases, ‘only a purpose to cause harm unrelated to the

legitimate object of arrest will satisfy the element of arbitrary conduct shocking to

the conscience, necessary for a due process violation.’” Sanders, 207 F. App’x at

965 (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836).

This shock-the-conscience test has not been satisfied even when an officer

initiated a traffic stop, pursued suspects at speeds of over 100 miles per hour, and

accidentally crashed into and killed one of the suspects. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836–37,

854–55. Here, Plaintiffs have not alleged conduct on behalf of Marquette that would

shock the conscience, much less that Marquette intended to cause harm to Dejarnett.

There is no allegation that Marquette or his vehicle were involved in any way with

Dejarnett’s crash, or that Marquette or any other officer made any contact with

Dejarnett. Plaintiffs emphasize the high speed of the pursuit, but do not allege any

facts from which the court could find Marquette did anything to cause Dejarnett’s

high speed driving in the first place. Accordingly, the allegations in the Complaint

do not state a substantive due process claim.

Count II: Municipal Liability (The City, Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw)

In Count II, Plaintiffs claim that the City, Mayor Bowling, Chief Pinion, and

Lieutenant Renshaw have municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Specifically,

they claim that the City maintained customs, practices, and policies—including

inadequate training, supervision, and discipline of its officers—demonstrating

deliberate indifference to Dejarnett’s constitutional rights. They further claim that

Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw had direct supervisory and policymaking roles and

failed to ensure adequate training, supervision, or discipline related to vehicular

pursuits and use of force.

A. The City of Decatur

In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, the

Supreme Court held that a “municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a

respondeat superior theory.” 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Instead, a municipality, such

as the City of Decatur, is only liable under § 1983 when a municipal employee

undertakes an action in “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether

made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to

represent official policy.” Id. at 694. Accordingly, “to impose § 1983 liability on a

municipality, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated;

(2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate

indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom caused the

violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). The

Complaint fails to plausibly allege all three of these elements.

At the outset, the factual allegations in the Complaint do not show an

underlying constitutional violation. As previously explained, Plaintiffs failed to state

a claim for any use of force or seizure-related claims, as no force was ever used on

Dejarnett, and he was never “seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

There is also a lack of plausible factual allegations in the Complaint to state a claim

under the Fourteenth Amendment. The failure to adequately plead a constitutional

violation alone forecloses this § 1983 claim.

However, the Complaint also fails to plausibly allege a custom or policy

supporting Monell liability, or that the policy or custom caused the violation. A

plaintiff seeking municipal liability under § 1983 must show either (1) a formal

policy or (2) a “‘custom’ that has not been formally approved by an appropriate

decisionmaker . . . so widespread [within the municipality] as to have the force of

law.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690–91). Without this identification, a § 1983 claim is

subject to dismissal. See, e.g., Harvey v. City of Stuart, 296 Fed. App’x 824, 826

(11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claim against

municipality because plaintiff “failed to identify any policy or custom that caused a

constitutional violation, and his vague and conclusory allegations were insufficient

to support the Complaint”).

Here, Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegation that the City maintained some

“policies, practices, customs,” (doc. 1, ¶ 27), is insufficient to state any Monell claim

against the City. Because Plaintiffs fail to identify any officially promulgated policy

of the City that allegedly violated Dejarnett’s constitutional rights, Plaintiffs must

sufficiently allege an informally-adopted custom that was the “moving force” behind

the purported constitutional deprivation, Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, but they fail to do

so.

As with the generic allegations regarding “policies, practices, customs” of the

City, the Complaint also concludes in a similarly ambiguous manner that the City

failed to train, supervise, and discipline its officers. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 25, 27). Only in

extremely limited circumstances may a municipality be liable under § 1983 for

constitutional violations resulting from a failure to train its police officers. See City

of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). “[T]he inadequacy of police training

may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the failure to train amounts to

deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into

contact.” Id. (emphasis added). That is, “[o]nly where a failure to train reflects a

‘deliberate’ or ‘conscious’ choice by a municipality—a ‘policy’ as defined by our

prior cases—can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983.” Id. at 389.

Here, Plaintiffs have not plausibly pleaded that the City had an unofficial

custom or practice of inadequately training or supervising its police officers that was

the moving force behind Dejarnett’s alleged constitutional deprivation. The

Complaint fails to allege a pattern of similar constitutional violations that provided

notice of a need to train or supervise, as Plaintiffs do not allege a single prior incident

giving the City notice of such a need. Similarly, Plaintiffs have not offered any

allegations to explain why additional training or supervision was obviously

necessary. Nor do they provide any details as to what they claim would have been

constitutionally adequate training. The Complaint’s conclusory allegations

regarding a single incident does little to provide any factual enhancement and

certainly is insufficient to establish a widespread “pattern of similar constitutional

violations” sufficient to show notice to the City of training insufficiency and

deliberate indifference. See Keith v. DeKalb Cty., 749 F.3d 1034, 1053 (11th Cir.

2014) (finding one prior incident insufficient notice of constitutionally deficient

officer training); Vielma v. Gruler, 808 F. App’x 872, 881–84 (11th Cir. 2020) (per

curiam) (finding the plaintiffs’ second amended Complaint did not plausibly plead

that city was deliberately indifferent to constitutional rights since the allegations

were conclusory); Denham v. Corizon Health, Inc., 675 F. App’x 935, 942–43 (11th

Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (finding two prior incidents insufficient to support failure to

train theory); Stephens v. City of Tarrant, No. 2:16-cv-274, 2017 WL 2797080, at

*7 (N.D. Ala. June 28, 2017) (same).

As Plaintiffs have not pleaded sufficient facts to indicate that any failure to

train or supervise on the part of the City had a direct causal link to any deprivation

of Dejarnett’s constitutional rights, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against the City

for direct violations of §1983.

B. Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw

The allegations against Mayor Bowling, Chief Pinion, and Lieutenant

Renshaw in the Complaint consist of little more than a few barebones conclusions

against them. The Complaint alleges that Pinion “failed to implement proper training

and supervision procedures, including as to vehicular pursuits[.]” (Doc. 1, ¶ 29). As

to Renshaw, the Complaint concludes that he “failed to intervene or call off” the

allegedly “unlawful pursuit,” without any corresponding factual allegations that

Renshaw had any reason to know about the pursuit or any other facts as to how he

was supposedly in a position to intervene. Id., ¶ 30. The Complaint vaguely asserts

that Bowling “failed to take meaningful action to address longstanding deficiencies

in police accountability, training, or oversight[.]” Id., ¶ 31. Within Count II, the

Complaint broadly contends that these defendants “failed to ensure adequate

training, supervision, or discipline related to vehicular pursuits and use of force.”

Id., ¶ 38.

These conclusory, formulaic allegations render the § 1983 claim legally

insufficient under Iqbal and Twombly. There is a complete absence of allegations in

the Complaint about any individual acts of Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw, which

reinforces the conclusory nature of the Estate’s and McKenzie’s Complaint. No facts

alleged in the Complaint indicate that Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw deprived

Dejarnett of any constitutional rights, and therefore the Estate and McKenzie have

not stated a claim for relief against Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.

Count III: Wrongful Death (All Defendants)

Federal district courts “have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising

under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

They also have “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to

claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same

case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. §

1367(a). But a district court has discretion to decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over state-law claims when the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Raney v. Allstate

Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has

“encouraged district courts to dismiss any remaining state claims when . . . the

federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Id. at 1089.

Having dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims under federal law (Counts I–II), all that

remains is Plaintiffs’ state-law wrongful death claim. The court finds that Plaintiffs’

state-law claim is best left for state courts to decide. See United Mine Workers of

America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1966). So the court declines to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), GRANTS the Defendants’

motions to dismiss with respect to Count III, and dismisses Plaintiffs’ wrongful

death claim without prejudice.

Qualified Immunity

Lastly, the court addresses Defendants’ assertion that they are entitled to

qualified immunity. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ failure to allege sufficient facts that,

if true, state a claim under § 1983 against the City, Marquette, Bowling, Pinion, and

Renshaw, this court concludes that Defendants Marquette, Bowling, Pinion, and

Renshaw, in their individual capacities, possess qualified immunity against

Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against them.

Qualified immunity from § 1983 actions protects government defendants sued

in their individual capacities if their conduct “does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A motion to dismiss based upon

qualified immunity will be granted if the “complaint fails to allege the violation of a

clearly established constitutional right.” Chesser v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121

(11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Williams v. Ala. State Univ., 102 F.3d 1179, 1182 (11th

Cir. 1997)). A complaint must contain “specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact

that will enable the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, will

overcome the defense of qualified immunity.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996

(11th Cir. 2003).

It is not alleged in this case that Marquette, Bowling, Pinion, or Renshaw had

physical contact of any kind with Dejarnett, and the Complaint is entirely devoid of

facts that explain how Dejarnett crashed his car. No constitutional violation has been

plausibly alleged. However, even if Plaintiffs could prove a constitutional violation

by Marquette, Bowling, Pinion, or Renshaw, such that they would be liable to

Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this court further concludes that it has not been

adequately alleged that Marquette, Bowling, Pinion, or Renshaw “violate[d] clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would

have known.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. In the Eleventh Circuit, “the law can be

‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity purposes only by decisions of the U.S.

Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, or the highest court of the state

where the case arose.” Jenkins v. Talladega City Bd. of Educ., 115 F.3d 821, 827 n.4

(11th Cir. 1997). No such “clearly established law” existed in this case to give

Marquette, Bowling, Pinion, or Renshaw fair notice that any behavior on their part

would violate Dejarnett’s constitutional rights, and Plaintiffs have not cited relevant

case law from the Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, or Alabama Supreme Court to

suggest otherwise.

For these reasons, the court concludes that Marquette, Bowling, Pinion, and

Renshaw are entitled to qualified immunity from Section 1983 liability in their

individual capacities, as no constitutional violation has been adequately alleged and

no “clearly established law” indicated an unconstitutional nature of their behavior

when they acted or refrained from acting.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated in this memorandum opinion, the court ORDERS as

follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ motion to strike Marquette’s motion to dismiss is DENIED, (doc.

26);

2. Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a response in opposition to Marquette’s

motion to dismiss is GRANTED, (doc. 26);

3. Plaintiffs’ motion to convert defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for

summary judgment is DENIED AS MOOT, (doc. 24);

4. Defendants City of Decatur, Bowling, Pinion, and Renshaw’s motion to

dismiss is GRANTED, and the claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE, (doc. 8); and

5. Defendant Marquette’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the claims are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, (doc. 21).

The court will allow Plaintiffs thirty (30) days to amend their complaint to

cure the pleading deficiencies raised herein. If Plaintiffs do not file an amended

complaint, the Clerk of Court will close this case without further notice.

DONE and ORDERED this 15th day of June, 2026.

HAROLD D. A Hil

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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