Liggins

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

RANDALL DAWON LIGGINS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 25-CV-0253-CVE-SH

)

STEPHEN KUNZWEILER, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Randall Dawon Liggins, a self-represented litigant, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, claiming constitutional deprivations by five Tulsa police officers, two district attorneys, and

the City of Tulsa. Dkt. # 1. Liggins generally claims that the defendants, after arresting him

pursuant to an arrest warrant, fabricated additional charges unsupported by probable cause, leading

to an increased bond amount and unlawful detention. See id. Defendants Steve Kunzweiler1 and

Dalinda Jeffers move to dismiss Liggins’s complaint, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Dkt. # 22. Liggins responded in opposition to the motion. Dkt. # 25. For

the following reasons, the Court grants Kunzweiler and Jeffers’ motion.

I. Standard of review

Rule 12(b)(1) permits the Court to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction.” “Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, we presume no jurisdiction

exists absent an adequate showing by the party invoking federal jurisdiction.” Siloam Springs

1 Liggins identifies Kunzweiler as “Stephen Kunzweiler.” Dkt. # 1, at 1. The entry of

appearance and motion to dismiss filed by Kunzweiler’s counsel reflects that his first name

is Steve. Dkt. ## 20, 21, 22. The Court therefore directs the Clerk of Court to correct the

name of party defendant Stephen Kunzweiler to: Steve Kunzweiler, Tulsa County D.A.,

previously named as Stephen Kunzweiler, Tulsa County D.A.

Hotel, L.L.C. v. Century Surety Co., 906 F.3d 926, 931 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v.

Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999)). “Rule 12(b)(1) motions

generally take one of two forms: (1) a facial attack on the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations

as to subject matter jurisdiction; or (2) a challenge to the actual facts upon which subject matter

jurisdiction is based.” Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002). Here, defendants

have facially attacked the sufficiency of the complaint’s allegations as to the existence of subject

matter jurisdiction by asserting Eleventh Amendment immunity. Dkt. # 22, at 6-8; see Hughes v.

Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1231 (D. Colo. 2009). In addressing a facial attack

under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must “presume all of the allegations contained in the [] complaint

to be true.” Ruiz, 299 F.3d at 1180. Dismissal is proper where “the complaint fails to allege any

basis for subject matter jurisdiction over the claims raised therein.” Harrison v. United States, 329

F. App’x 179, 181 (10th Cir. 2009).2

Dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the facts alleged in the complaint

fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible if the facts alleged “raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the conduct necessary to establish

plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 556; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). The complaint need

not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain “more than labels and conclusions”

2 The Court cites all unpublished decisions herein as persuasive authority. FED. R. APP. P.

32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.

When considering the sufficiency of the complaint, a court must accept as true all the well-pleaded

factual allegations and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. But the court may disregard legal

conclusions or conclusory statements devoid of factual support. Id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

Further, when a plaintiff appears without counsel, the Court must liberally construe the

complaint. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But even self-represented

litigants bear the burden to “alleg[e] sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be

based.” Id. And the rule of liberal construction neither permits nor requires a court to assume the

role of the unrepresented litigant’s advocate by “supply[ing] additional factual allegations to round

out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct[ing] a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New

Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997).

At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a “well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a

savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable.” Straub v. BNSF Ry. Co., 909

F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Nonetheless, dismissal

is appropriate “when the allegations in [the] complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of

entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 558.

II. Background

On March 15, 2024, Liggins was arrested in Tulsa, Oklahoma pursuant to a felony warrant.

Dkt. # 1, at 1.3 Liggins alleges that because he refused to be interviewed by detectives, Tulsa

police officers charged him with additional false charges to increase his bond amount and

unlawfully detain him. Id. at 2, 12. After the preliminary hearing, “the false charges were

demurred for a lack of evidence cause to support the charge.” Id. at 3. Liggins’s complaint largely

3 The Court’s citations refer to the CM/ECF header pagination.

focuses on the conduct of the Tulsa police officer defendants and the City of Tulsa. See Dkt. # 1.

However, Liggins also advances claims against Kunzweiler and Jeffers for negligence, conspiracy,

abuse of process and failure to intervene. Id., at 11-16. Liggins generally alleges that Kunzweiler

and Jeffers allowed the false charges to be brought against him and allowed him to be prosecuted

in violation of his constitutional rights. See id.

Kunzweiler and Jeffers allege in their motion that they are entitled to: 1) sovereign

immunity; 2) absolute prosecutorial immunity; and 3) qualified immunity. Dkt. # 22, at 6-12.

Additionally, Kunzweiler and Jeffers contend that Younger4 abstention bars Liggins’s claims, that

Liggins failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that they are exempt from

liability for punitive damages and the claims asserted. Id. at 12-18. Liggins, in response to the

motion, argues that Kunzweiler and Jeffers are not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity or

qualified immunity. Dkt. # 25, at 4-9. Furthermore, Liggins contends that Younger does not bar

his claims, and he stated claims upon which relief may be granted. Id. at 9-11. The Court now

considers the parties’ positions.

III. Sovereign immunity

The Court agrees with defendants that they are entitled to sovereign immunity as it relates

to Liggins’s official capacity claims. Dkt. # 22, at 6-8. “The Eleventh Amendment is a

jurisdictional bar that precludes unconsented suits in federal court against a state and arms of the

state.” Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013) (citation and internal quotation

marks omitted). Claims against a state official in his or her official capacity are construed as claims

against the state and, so, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (holding that a suit against an individual acting in an official capacity is

4 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971).

properly treated as a suit against the state itself and “the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages

action against a State in federal court”). “Eleventh Amendment immunity applies regardless of

whether a plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief, or money damages.” Steadfast Ins. Co.

v. Agric. Ins. Co., 507 F.3d 1250, 1252 (10th Cir. 2007).

Here, Liggins seeks damages. Dkt. # 1, at 16-17. Accordingly, Liggins’s claims against

Kunzweiler and Jeffers, in their official capacities, are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.

See Butler v. Rainbolt, Case No. 23-7091, 2024 WL 3548936, at *2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2024)

(unpublished) (noting that in Oklahoma, a district attorney is an arm of the state). The Court

dismisses without prejudice Liggins’s official capacity claims against Kunzweiler and Jeffers.

Polaski v. Colo. Dep’t. of Transp., 198 F. App’x. 684, 685-86 (10th Cir. 2006) (dismissal on

grounds of Eleventh Amendment immunity is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

and must be without prejudice) (citing Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th

Cir. 2006)).

IV. Prosecutorial immunity

Concerning Liggins’s individual capacity claims against Kunzweiler and Jeffers, the

defendants assert that they are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. Dkt. # 22, at 8-10.

Liggins responds that they are not because the conduct he complains of was “investigative and

administrative in nature,” and, thus, not entitled to protection. Dkt. # 25, at 2, 4-6.

“Absolute prosecutorial immunity is a complete bar to a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983.” Mink v. Suthers, 482 F.3d 1244, 1258 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976)). To the extent a prosecutor is “initiating and presenting a case”—that

is, acting as an officer of the court in a quasi-judicial role—he is absolutely immune, id. at 1259,

for the activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,”

Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. But a prosecutor can lose that immunity if his activities “cast him in the

role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.” Id. at 430–31. “Still,

to the extent a prosecutor has to conduct administrative or investigative activities as part of his

duties as an officer of the court, he is still entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.” Sandberg

v. Englewood, Co., 727 F. App’x 950, 955 (10th Cir. 2018). “[T]here is no bright line between

advocacy and investigation[.]” Mink, 482 F.3d at 1261. In looking at the prosecutor’s role in the

case, courts must apply the “functional approach,” id. at 1259, to examine “the nature of the

function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it,” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S.

219, 229 (1988).

A. Liggins’s allegations

In support of his negligence claim, Liggins alleges that Kunzweiler and Jeffers

impermissibly delegated their prosecutorial functions to defendant Darin Howse, a Tulsa police

detective. Dkt. # 1, at 11. Specifically:

Defendants Stephen Kunzweiler and [] Dalinda Jeffers allowed Det. Howse to

participate and facilitate in the initiation and presentation of a criminal prosecution

against the claimant. Defendant[] Darin Howse was appointed to the position as

“Case Agent” in the criminal prosecution and given duty to perform numerous

prosecutorial functions such as but not limited to preparing the State’s case,

communicating with witnesses and potential witnesses, prepping them for

testimony and participating in the cross examination of the witnesses.

Id. Liggins contends that Howse, in his role as case agent, engaged in various inappropriate

conduct such as “recycle[ing] criminal charges and evidence from closed cases[.]” Id. Therefore,

Kunzweiler and Jeffers failed “to properly train or supervise [] Howse in his prosecutorial duties”

and “failed to intervene.” Id. at 12. Liggins states that “[t]he authorization of duties given to []

Howse by [Kunzweiler and Jeffers] were administrative in nature and the moving force that

resulted in the negligence and violations of [Liggins’s] constitutional rights.” Id.

Furthermore, as to his abuse of process claim, Liggins alleges that “the process used against

[him] was unconstitutional and was abused to achieve a purpose not within the scope of the

process, which led to extensive legal cost and consequences for [Liggins].” Dkt. # 1, at 13. Liggins

also alleges that, as part of the purported conspiracy, Kunzweiler filed false charges against

Liggins, Jeffers was appointed the assistant district attorney on the case “with the understanding

that she would advance [Liggins’s] frivolous prosecution[,]” and Kunzweiler and Jeffers

“continued to present false, distorted, misleading and perjurious testimony to the courts to procure

a criminal prosecution in the absence of probable cause.” Id. at 14-15. Finally, in support of his

failure to intervene claim, Liggins alleges that Kunzweiler and Jeffers “stood by without

intervening to prevent the violation of [Liggins’s] rights[.]” Id. at 15.

With these allegations in mind, the Court next employs the required functional approach to

ascertain if Kunzweiler and Jeffers are entitled to prosecutorial immunity.

B. Application of prosecutorial immunity defense to allegations

Liggins’s allegations regarding Howse’s conduct present as a supervisory liability claim.

Critically, prosecutorial immunity extends to supervising attorneys. See Van de Kamp v.

Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009). The plaintiff, in Van de Kamp, claimed that the district attorney

and the chief deputy district attorney failed to adequately train and supervise their deputy district

attorneys on the production of potential impeachment material about informants. Id. at 343-44.

The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that absolute prosecutorial

immunity barred the claim even though the claim addressed administrative functions. Id. at 344,

349. The Supreme Court focused on “a certain kind of administrative obligation—a kind that itself

is directly connected with the conduct of a trial.” Id. at 344. The Supreme Court found these

functions to be distinct from “administrative duties concerning . . . workplace, hiring, payroll

administration, the maintenance of physical facilities, and the like” which are not given absolute

immunity. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that the failure to supervise and train

claim at issue relied upon underlying misconduct by the deputy prosecutors at trial, who were

themselves entitled to absolute immunity. Id. at 344-46.

Van de Kamp is instructive here. Liggins specifically complains that Howse, in his role as

case agent, prepared the state’s case, communicated with witnesses, prepared witnesses for

testimony and participated in cross-examination. Dkt. # 1, at 11. Howse’s conduct, as alleged,

was “directly connected with the conduct of a trial” and, thus, the defendants are entitled to

prosecutorial immunity. Van de Kamp, 555 U.S. at 344. Furthermore, as held in Van de Kamp,

Kunzweiler and Jeffers are also entitled to immunity from Liggins’s claim that they failed to train

and/or supervise Howse. Id. at 344-46; see also Bryson v. Macy, 611 F. Supp. 1234, 1262-63

(W.D. Okla. 2009) (district attorney was “entitled to absolute immunity from plaintiff’s claim that

he failed to train and supervise his subordinates.”). Therefore, Kunzweiler and Jeffers, as Howse’s

alleged supervisors, are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity.

To the extent Liggins challenges Kunzweiler’s filing of charges, Jeffers’s appointment as

the assistant district attorney, and both defendants’ prosecution of the case (Dkt. # 1, at 14),

“[p]rosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity for their decisions to prosecute, their investigatory

or evidence-gathering actions, their evaluation of evidence, their determination of whether

probable cause exists, and their determination of what information to show the court.” Nielander

v. Board of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Republic, Kan., 582 F.3d 1155, 1164 (10th Cir. 2009). The

alleged conduct Liggins identifies “clearly involve[s] the prosecutor[s’] role as advocate for the

State,” Mink, 482 F.3d at 1259 (italics in original), and was “intimately associated with the judicial

phase of the criminal process,” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. Accordingly, the Court dismisses with

prejudice Liggins’s claims against Kunzweiler and Jeffers, in their individual capacities, pursuant

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on the basis of absolute prosecutorial immunity. See

Smith v. Glanz, 662 F. App’x 595, 596 (10th Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal with prejudice based

on judicial immunity).5

V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the defendants’ motion to dismiss shall

be granted, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants Kunzweiler and Jeffers’ motion to

dismiss (Dkt. # 22) is granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed, in part, as to all claims

against Kunzweiler and Jeffers, without prejudice as to lack of subject matter jurisdiction and with

prejudice based on absolute prosecutorial immunity.

5 Even if the Court did not conclude Kunzweiler and Jeffers were entitled to absolute

prosecutorial immunity, Liggins fails to state a claim against these defendants upon which

relief may be granted. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 requires a party to “make clear

exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair

notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective

allegations[.]” Robbins v. Oklahoma, ex rel., Dept. of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1250

(10th Cir. 2008) (italics in original). Further, “[i]n order for liability to arise under § 1983,

a defendant’s direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a constitutional

right must be established.” Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1227 (10th Cir. 2006).

Liggins must “identify specific actions taken by particular defendants.” Pahls v. Thomas,

718 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d

504, 532 (10th Cir. 2011)).

Here, Liggins’s allegations against Kunzweiler and Jeffers fail to provide the requisite level

of clarity. Instead, Liggins opts to attribute conduct to both Kunzweiler and Jeffers. See,

e.g., Dkt. # 1, at 11 (“Kunzweiler and [] Jeffers allowed Det. Howse to participate[.]”), 12

(“Kunzweiler and [] Jeffers negligently failed to intervene.”). These allegations fail to

identify each defendant’s direct personal responsibility. For this additional reason, the

Court dismisses Liggins’s claims against Kunzweiler and Jeffers.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall correct the name of party

defendant Stephen Kunzweiler to: Steve Kunzweiler, Tulsa County D.A., previously named as

Stephen Kunzweiler, Tulsa County D.A.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants Steve Kunzweiler and Dalinda Jeffers are

terminated as party defendants in this matter. The parties are directed to correct the case caption

accordingly on future pleadings.

DATED this 15th day of June, 2026.

By lee

CLAIRE V.EAGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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