Norris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

CONNIE NORRIS CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS No. 26-163

MAGNOLIA WATER UTILITIES

OPERATING COMPANY, LLC, ET AL. SECTION I

ORDER AND REASONS

Pro se plaintiff Connie Norris (“plaintiff”) complains about the quality and

regulation of her water utilities. She brings claims against her private water utility

providers, defendants Magnolia Water Utilities Operating Company, LLC, Magnolia

Water Services Group, LLC, Magnolia Water Holding Company, LLC and Louisiana

Central States Water, LLC (“the “Magnolia Water defendants” or “Magnolia”) as well

as Central States Water Resources, Inc. (“CSWR”).1 She also sues public defendant

Louisiana Public Service Commission (“LPSC”) (collectively, with CSWR and

Magnolia, “defendants”).2

There are two motions before the Court, in which defendants seek dismissal of

plaintiff’s claims against them. First, CSWR filed a motion3 to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Second,

1 Plaintiff has also named Josiah Cox, the founder and Chief Executive Officer of

CSWR, in her complaint. See R. Doc. No. 1, at 1; R. Doc. No. 1-17, at 2. Cox has not

yet been served.

2 Plaintiff has also named the Louisiana Department of Health (“LDH”) in her

complaint. See R. Doc. No. 1, at 1; R. Doc. No. 1-17, at 3. Summons with respect to

LDH was returned unexecuted as it was not accepted. See R. Doc. No. 12, at 3.

3 R. Doc. No. 22.

CSWR and the Magnolia Water defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss for

lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and failure to state a

claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), along with a motion to stay the remaining claims.4

Plaintiff opposes both motions.5

On June 4, 2026, this Court denied plaintiff’s motion for a TRO and granted

LPSC’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that LPSC is

entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity.6

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a resident of St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, and her claims arise

from defendants’ provision and regulation of her water utilities.7 Plaintiff identifies

“Magnolia Water/CSWR” as the water utilities provider servicing her area.8

According to plaintiff, since becoming a “Magnolia/CSWR ratepayer

. . . approximately five years” ago, she has developed “severe medical conditions

consistent with exposure to contaminated water.”9 She submits that she has

“incurred more than $200,000 in medical expenses related to exposure” to the

contaminated water.10 She also alleges that she has incurred “approximately $10,000

in property damage” due to the contaminated, unsafe water.11

4 R. Doc. No. 32.

5 R. Doc. Nos. 35, 37.

6 See R. Doc. No. 51.

7 See generally R. Doc. No. 1.

8 Id. ¶ 5.

9 Id. ¶ 10.

10 Id. ¶ 16.

11 Id. ¶ 12.

The present matter is not the first time that plaintiff has complained of these

allegedly failing water systems. She is an intervenor in numerous proceedings before

LPSC, which she identifies as the body that “regulates Magnolia/CSWR’s rates and

acquisitions.”12 She claims that she, along with other St. Tammany residents, have

“warned” LPSC of the “existing water system failures” to no avail.13 Despite residents’

warnings, and in disregard of a resolution passed by the St. Tammany Parish Council

“urging LSPC to halt further acquisitions until existing issues were corrected,” LPSC

has allegedly continued to approve “Magnolia/CSWR expansions.”14 LPSC has also

allegedly continued to approve rate increases “despite unresolved violations” and

“without a complete financial record from Magnolia/CSWR.”15

According to plaintiff, LDH tested the allegedly contaminated water systems

and “found elevated contaminants including TTHM [Total Trihalomethanes] . . . and

chloroform[.]”16 Yet, LDH still assigned “Magnolia/CSWR a Grade A rating.”17

Plaintiff also alleges that LDH failed to conduct sanitary surveys, as is “required” by

Title 51 of the Louisiana Sanitary Code.18

Plaintiff’s complaint raises her grievance with respect to one instance in

particular, in which Magnolia “shut down” and “abandoned” one water system and

switched the residents who had previously been connected to that system to another

12 Id. ¶ 6.

13 Id. ¶¶ 18–22.

14 Id. ¶¶ 21–22.

15 Id. ¶¶ 14–15.

16 Id. ¶ 23.

17 Id. ¶ 24.

18 Id. ¶ 25.

system, causing that latter water system to fail.19 Upon failure of that system,

Magnolia then switched those residents back to the original system, which “lacked

the required sanitary surveys” and caused residents to “experience[] brown water,

bacterial contamination, and low pressure for more than a year.”20

In addition, plaintiff contends that she has been deprived of “meaningful”

participation in LPSC proceedings.21 For example, she alleges that “[e]vidence [she]

submitted was not entered into the record,” an “ALJ refused to allow [her] to speak,

correct the record, or address missing discovery,” and “[t]he docket was closed

immediately after [she] submitted supplemental evidence.”22

Plaintiff raises eight claims against defendants, without specifying for each

claim which defendants it pertains to. First, she alleges that defendants violated the

Safe Drinking Water Act (“SDWA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f et seq., for “delivering

contaminated water, failing to notify the public, and failing to comply with federal

water safety standards.”23 Second, she alleges that defendants violated Title 51 of

Louisiana’s Public Health Sanitary Code “by operating water systems without

required sanitary surveys and failing to maintain safe water quality.”24 Third,

plaintiff brings a claim for “arbitrary and capricious agency action” against LSPC for

it “approving rate increases without a complete financial record and ignoring public

19 Id. ¶ 28.

20 Id. ¶ 30.

21 Id. ¶ 35.

22 Id. ¶¶ 36–38.

23 Id. ¶¶ 39–42.

24 Id. ¶¶ 43–46.

health concerns.”25 Fourth, she alleges violations of procedural due process because

she contends that she was “denied meaningful participation in regulatory

proceedings, including exclusion of evidence and closure of the docket without proper

notice.”26

Fifth, plaintiff brings claims for negligence and gross negligence because

“[d]efendants owed a duty of care to [her] and other ratepayers to provide safe and

reliable water service,” and “[d]efendants breached that duty by failing to maintain

safe water systems and ignoring known hazards.”27 Sixth, she raises a claim based

on “[d]efendants[’] fail[ure] to protect public health by allowing unsafe water

conditions to persist” as well as defendants’ failure “to enforce regulatory

standards.”28 Seventh, plaintiff brings a claim for unjust enrichment because

defendants “received financial benefits from unsafe water service and rate increases

without providing lawful or safe service.”29 Eighth, plaintiff brings a claim pursuant

to Louisiana Revised Statute § 40:4(A)(8)(a) because, first, § 40:4(A)(8)(a) “requires

LDH to ensure that public water systems are operated, maintained, and monitored

in a manner that protects public health and prevents the distribution of unsafe

water,” second, “Magnolia/CSWR operated unsafe systems failed to prevent

25 Id. ¶¶ 47–50.

26 Id. ¶¶ 51–54.

27 Id. ¶¶ 55–59.

28 Id. ¶¶ 60–63.

29 Id. ¶¶ 64–67.

contamination and reconnected residents to an abandoned and unsurveyed[sic] well

system,” and, third, “LDH and OPH30 failed to enforce their statutory duties.”31

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as

monetary damages in the form of “refunds and billing corrections,” compensatory

damages, and “punitive and exemplary damages in an amount not less than

$1,000,000,000 . . . due to ongoing, knowing, reckless, and harmful conduct of

Magnolia/CSWR and the regulatory failures that allowed the harm to continue.”32

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(1)

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; without jurisdiction conferred

by statute, they lack the power to adjudicate claims.” In re FEMA Trailer

Formaldehyde Prod. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012). Under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “a claim is ‘properly dismissed for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to

adjudicate’ the claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Courts are to consider a Rule 12(b)(1)

jurisdictional argument before addressing any other arguments on the merits. Id.

(citing Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001)).

When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, a court may dismiss an action for lack

of subject matter jurisdiction “on any one of three separate bases: (1) the complaint

30 Plaintiff’s complaint does not define “OPH.” See generally id. The Court surmises

that plaintiff means to refer to LDH’s Office of Public Health.

31 Id. ¶¶ 68–73.

32 Id. at 6.

alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record;

or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of

disputed facts.” Spotts v. United States, 613 F.3d 559, 565–66 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting

St. Tammany Par., ex rel. Davis v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 556 F.3d 307, 315

(5th Cir. 2009)). “The burden of proof for a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss is on the

party asserting jurisdiction.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161. When a court determines

that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over an action, the action is dismissed

without prejudice. See, e.g., id.; Hitt v. City of Pasadena, 561 F.2d 606, 608

(5th Cir. 1977).

b. Personal Jurisdiction, Rule 12(b)(2)

The power of the Court to require a nonresident defendant to appear before it

and to submit to its will is a great power—one that the Court may exercise only within

constitutional and statutory bounds. As the Fifth Circuit has explained, “[a] federal

court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if (1) the forum

state’s long-arm statute confers personal jurisdiction over that defendant; and (2) the

exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” McFadin v. Gerber, 587 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 2009). “In

determining whether a defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction, a district court

must accept as true the uncontroverted factual allegations in the plaintiff’s

complaint; a prima facie showing is all that is required.” Companion Prop. & Cas.

Ins. Co. v. Palermo, 723 F.3d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

Louisiana’s long-arm statute “extends personal jurisdiction of courts sitting in

Louisiana, including federal courts, to the limits permitted under the due process

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 624

(5th Cir. 1999); see also LA. REV. STAT. § 13:3201 (Louisiana’s long-arm statute). Thus,

whether the Court possesses personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendants

in this case “depends on the parameters of federal due process.” Telephone Elec. Corp.

v. S. Pac. Telecomm. Co., No. 95-31037, 1996 WL 556856, at *2 (5th Cir. Sep. 10,

1996).

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “protects an individual’s

liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which

he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations.” Guidry, 188 F.3d at

624 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.

“Personal jurisdiction comports with due process when first, the defendant has the

requisite minimum contacts with the forum state and second, requiring the defendant

to submit to jurisdiction in the forum state would not infringe on ‘traditional notions

of fair play and substantial justice.’”33 Companion Prop. & Cas., 723 F.3d at 559

33 “In determining whether or not exercise of jurisdiction is fair and reasonable,

defendants bear the burden of proof and it is rare to say the assertion [of jurisdiction]

is unfair after minimum contacts have been shown.” McFadin, 587 F.3d at 759-60

(internal quotation marks omitted). When conducting the fairness inquiry, courts

consider “(1) the burden on the nonresident defendant, (2) the forum state’s interests,

(3) the plaintiff’s interest in securing relief, (4) the interest of the interstate judicial

system in the efficient administration of justice, and (5) the shared interest of the

several states in furthering fundamental social policies.” Luv N’ care, Ltd. v. Insta-

Mix, Inc., 438 F.3d 465, 473 (5th Cir. 2006).

(quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 105 (1987); Int’l Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).

“The ‘minimum contacts’ prong of the due process analysis may be subdivided

into two different classifications of personal jurisdiction depending on the types of

contacts the nonresident defendant has with the forum state”—namely, “specific”

personal jurisdiction and “general” personal jurisdiction. Telephone Elec. Corp., 1996

WL 556856, at *2.

For specific personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff makes a prima facie

showing of minimum contacts when his claim arises from the

defendant’s contact with the forum. For general personal jurisdiction, a

plaintiff makes the requisite showing when that defendant’s contacts

are “continuous and systematic,” so that the exercise of jurisdiction is

proper irrespective of the claim’s relationship to the defendant’s contact

with the forum.

Companion Prop. & Cas., 723 F.3d at 559.

Ultimately, the “touchstone” of the minimum contacts inquiry “is whether the

defendant’s conduct shows that it reasonably anticipates being haled into court.”

McFadin, 587 F.3d at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted). “The defendant must

not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated

contacts, or of the unilateral activity of another party or third person.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted).

c. Failure to state a claim, Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal of a complaint for

“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” To survive a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint must meet the requirement

in Rule 8(a)(2), requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). While this short and plain statement does not require

“detailed factual allegations,” it “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 678 (internal

quotations and citations omitted). A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility standard is not

akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a

defendant has acted unlawfully.” Culbertson v. Lykos, 790 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir.

2015) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

“[T]he face of the complaint must contain enough factual matter to raise a

reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of each element of the

[plaintiff’s] claim.” Hi-Tech Elec., Inc v. T&B Constr. & Elec. Servs., Inc., No. 15-3034,

2017 WL 615414, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 2017) (Vance, J.) (citing Lormand v. US

Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 255–57 (5th Cir. 2009)). A complaint is insufficient if it

contains “only labels and conclusions, or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action.” Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 638 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation and

internal quotations omitted). The complaint “must provide the defendant with fair

notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Dura

Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346 (2005) (citation and internal quotations

omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, a court views the complaint “in the light

most favorable to [the] plaintiff, accepting as true all well-pleaded factual allegations

and drawing all reasonable inferences in [the] plaintiff’s favor.” Lovick v. Ritemoney

Ltd., 378 F.3d 433, 437 (5th Cir. 2004). A court must limit its review to “the complaint,

any documents attached to the complaint, and any documents attached to the motion

to dismiss that are central to the claim and referenced by the complaint.” Lone Star

Fund V (U.S.), L.P. v. Barclays Bank PLC, 594 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing

Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498–99 (5th Cir. 2000)).

“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . matters outside the pleadings are

presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for

summary judgment under Rule 56.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). “When a party bases a

motion to dismiss on matters outside the pleadings, the court has discretion either to

accept the extraneous material and convert the motion to dismiss into a motion for

summary judgment, or to decide the motion, as defendant styled it, under the

principles of Rule 12(b)(6).” McDonald v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., No. 16-15975, 2017

WL 1709353, at *2 (E.D. La. May 3, 2017) (Vance, J.).

III. ANALYSIS

a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1. Safe Drinking Water Act (“SWDA”)

Plaintiff’s first claim is for violations of the SDWA.34 “The Safe Drinking Water

Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300f et seq., was passed in 1974 to establish uniform quality

34 R. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 39–42.

standards for the approximately 240,000 public water systems in the United States

to reduce contamination in drinking water.” Hussey v. Total Env’t Sols., Inc., No. 14-

2186, 2015 WL 7282073, at *1 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2015) (quoting Robert W. Vinal,

J.D., Citizens’ Suits Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 67 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts

3d 95 (2002)). “Public drinking water suppliers in the United States are under a duty

to provide their customers with drinking water that meets federal quality standards

established under the provisions of the SDWA.” Id. For example, “[a]mong other

requirements, the [SWDA] imposes maximum permissible levels for certain drinking

water contaminants.” Spotts, 613 F.3d at 570.

“The SDWA does not create a private civil action under which damages can be

recovered for violation of a provision of the SDWA.” Hussey, 2015 WL 7282073, at *1

(quoting 67 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 95 § 1). However, it permits “citizens’ civil

actions where the government has failed to pursue an action against a violator.” Id.

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(a)(1)). Section 300j-8(a)(1) states: “Except as provided in

subsection (b) of this section, any person may commence a civil action on his own

behalf . . . against any person (including (A) the United States, and (B) any other

governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the eleventh

amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in violation of any requirement

prescribed by or under this subchapter.”

Plaintiffs bringing citizens’ civil actions must still “prior to filing the action

. . . timely perform[] certain pre-suit notice procedures.” Hussey, 2015 WL 7282073,

at *2. With respect to notice, § 300j-8(b)(1)(A) states that “[n]o [citizens’] civil action

may be commenced . . . prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of such

violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to any alleged violator of such requirement and

(iii) to the State in which the violation occurs.” See also Hussey, 2015 WL 7282073, at

*2 (stating that the SDWA’s citizens’ civil suit authorization “is governed by certain

procedural requirements . . . i.e. . . . proper notice of the intent to sue properly served

on the EPA, prospective defendant and the government of the subject state, at least

60 days prior to the filing of the civil action”). “This notice requirement has been held

to constitute a jurisdictional prerequisite and a subsequent SDWA citizen’s civil

complaint will be dismissed if the notice is not properly served or if the action is

commenced prior to the expiration of the 60 day period.” 67 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts

3d 95 § 37 (citing ACORN v. Edwards, 842 F. Supp. 227, 230 (E.D. La. 1993)

(Schwartz, Jr., J.) (treating the SDWA’s 60-day notice requirement as matter of

subject matter jurisdiction)); see also Concerned Pastors for Soc. Action v. Khouri, 194

F. Supp. 3d 589, 597 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (same). Federal regulations set forth the

required contents of the notice. See 40 C.F.R. § 135.12;35 see also § 300j-8(b).

35 40 C.F.R. § 135.12(a) states: “Notice regarding an alleged violation of any

requirement prescribed by or under the Act shall include sufficient information to

permit the recipient to identify the specific requirement alleged to have been violated,

the activity alleged to constitute a violation, the person or persons responsible for the

alleged violation, the location of the alleged violation, the date or dates of the alleged

violation, and the full name, address, and telephone number of the person giving

notice.”

The Magnolia Water defendants contend that plaintiff has failed to comply

with the SWDA’s 60-day notice requirement and, consequently, her SWDA claim

should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.36

In response, plaintiff seems to argue that because her claims involve “ongoing

violations” she may “proceed without pre-suit notice.”37 She cites no caselaw in

support of her position.38 Cf. Henriquez v. 42 U.S.C. 654(3) Texas Child Support Div.,

744 F. App’x 234, 235 (5th Cir. 2018) (“While this court may liberally construe a pro

se appeal, we will not search the record and related caselaw to create arguments on

an appellant’s behalf.”). Because plaintiff has not given the statutorily required

notice, the Court dismisses plaintiff’s SDWA claim without prejudice.

2. Rate-related claims

Both LPSC’s motion and the Magnolia Water defendants’ motion argue that

this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s “claims pertaining to

rates.”39

36 See R. Doc. No. 32-1, at 6 (“No such notice was provided in this case, nor does

plaintiff allege that she satisfied this requirement.”).

37 R. Doc. No. 37, at 5.

38 Id. The Court notes that plaintiff may be referring to the SDWA’s jurisdictional

requirement that she “allege that the defendant’s illegal actions are ongoing and are

resulting in a continuing violation of an SDWA requirement.” 67 Am. Jur. Proof of

Facts 3d 95 § 26; see also Jones v. Dow Chem. Co., 885 F. Supp. 905, 910 (M.D. La.

1994) (“[B]ecause the plaintiffs’ petition does not allege an ‘ongoing’ violation—a

jurisdictional prerequisite to the maintenance of a SDWA claim—the Court

determines that it lacks federal question jurisdiction under the SDWA.”). The Court

has found no caselaw suggesting that plaintiff’s satisfaction of one jurisdictional

requirement somehow excuses another jurisdictional requirement.

39 R. Doc. No. 32-1, at 3–6; R. Doc. No. 26-1, at 8–12. The Magnolia Water defendants

also seem to argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s

Plaintiff’s complaint seeks injunctive relief related to “rate hikes.”40 However,

she explicitly rejects in her response that her claims amount to “rate-setting

disputes.”41 Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff’s complaint attempted to bring

claims for injunctive relief relating to orders approving rate increases, such have been

abandoned. See McClelland v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 63 F.4th 996, 1010 (5th Cir.

2023) (“This circuit’s well-settled precedent instructs that a party abandons a claim

claims because Louisiana state law vests exclusive jurisdiction in LPSC for cases

involving the services provided by water utilities in Louisiana. See R. Doc. No. 32-1,

at 4–5 (citing Richards v. Baton Rouge Water Co., No. 2013-0873, 142 So. 3d 1027

(La. App. 2014)). This Court’s jurisdiction over plaintiff’s clams arises from federal

law, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. “State law cannot strip a federal court of jurisdiction

that federal law otherwise provides.” Mignott v. State Bar of Georgia Found., Inc.,

146 F.4th 1095, 1097 (11th Cir. 2025) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2) (holding that

Georgia law vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the state supreme court could not

override federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to § 1331, over the

plaintiff’s federal cause of action); cf. Tercero v. Texas Southmost Coll. Dist., 989 F.3d

291, 298 (5th Cir. 2021) (“However extensive their power to create and define

substantive rights, the states have no power directly to enlarge or contract federal

jurisdiction. This rule is a consequence of the exclusive power of Congress to control

the jurisdiction of the federal courts and the Supremacy Clause implications of a

state’s suggestion that it might somehow (even indirectly) provide otherwise.”

(internal quotation and citation omitted)); but see Scherer v. MGM Resorts Int’l, No.

22-258, 2023 WL 2776675, at *5 (S.D. Miss. Apr. 4, 2023) (honoring state law vesting

exclusive jurisdiction in the state commission because federal jurisdiction was based

on diversity jurisdiction); see id. (“Because this Court, sitting in diversity, must apply

state substantive law, it lacks jurisdiction over a Mississippi state-law claim where

all Mississippi state courts would find that they likewise lack jurisdiction over the

same claim.”). Magnolia’s arguments therefore fail.

40 R. Doc. No. 1, at 6 (seeking injunctive relief in the form of “[a]n immediate halt on

all new rate hikes” and “[a] partial reversal of current rate hikes, restoring rates to a

lawful and reasonable level”).

41 R. Doc. No. 37, at 3 (“Defendants repeatedly assert that [p]laintiff’s lawsuit

concerns ‘rates’[,] ‘services[,]’ [and] ‘regulatory appeals’ . . . This is incorrect.”).

by failing to defend it in response to motions to dismiss and other dispositive

pleadings.”).42

b. Personal Jurisdiction

CSWR alleges that this Court lacks both general and specific personal

jurisdiction over it.43 First, it notes that plaintiff’s complaint “contains no

jurisdictional allegations regarding” CSWR at all, and is therefore “deficient for this

reason alone.”44 With respect to general personal jurisdiction, it contends that this

Court lacks personal jurisdiction over it because it is a Missouri corporation with its

principal place of business in Missouri.45

As for specific personal jurisdiction, CSWR argues that plaintiff seems to be

“poorly attempting to allege that she is a [CSWR] ratepayer” and may “incorrectly

believe” that CSWR is “responsible for her drinking water services.”46 CSWR asserts

that this is false; CSWR “does not provide [p]laintiff’s drinking water services and

42 The Court also notes, without deciding, that it appears the Johnson Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1342, would deprive this Court of jurisdiction over any “challenges to orders

affecting rates.” See Turnage, 29 F.4th at 240 (“The Johnson Act . . . states that

district courts may not ‘enjoin, suspend or restrain . . . any order affecting rates

chargeable by a public utility’ when four criteria are met: (1) Jurisdiction is based

solely on diversity of citizenship or repugnance of the order to the Federal

Constitution; and, (2) The order does not interfere with interstate commerce; and, (3)

The order has been made after reasonable notice and hearing; and, (4) A plain, speedy

and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”); see also id. at 241 (“The

Act aimed to ‘channel normal rate litigation into the state courts.’”). Because plaintiff

abandons any such claims, the Court need not determine whether the Johnson Act

divests this Court of federal jurisdiction.

43 R. Doc. No. 22-1, at 2.

44 Id.

45 Id. at 2, 3–4.

46 Id. at 2.

further does not have any other contact with the State of Louisiana.”47 CSWR also

attached an affidavit of Josiah Cox, the current President of CSWR, which states that

CSWR “has no physical presence in Louisiana,” “provides no services in Louisiana,”

and “conducts no business in Louisiana.”48 Therefore, CSWR argues, plaintiff has not

alleged the requisite “minimum contacts” necessary to confer specific personal

jurisdiction on this Court.49

At this Court’s request, CSWR also filed a supplemental memorandum in

support of its motion discussing whether this Court may assert jurisdiction over

CSWR as the parent company to the Magnolia Water defendants.50 CSWR argues

that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a foreign parent company cannot be

based “solely upon the contacts with the forum state” made by its subsidiaries.51

Furthermore, although there exist “some circumstances where the relationship

between a parent and subsidiary are so close that they could justify a finding that the

parent does business in a jurisdiction due to the local activities of its subsidiary,

47 Id. at 5.

48 R. Doc. No. 22-2, at 1.

49 See R. Doc. No. 22-1, at 5.

50 See R. Doc. No. 28 (ordering additional briefing “on the issue of whether CSWR’s

status as a parent company to other defendants in this matter affects this Court’s

personal jurisdiction analysis”); see also R. Doc. No. 31, at 1 (“Although not alleged in

[p]laintiff’s Complaint, [CSWR] discloses that it is a corporate affiliate of other

defendants in this case, namely, Magnolia Water Utilities Operating Company, LLC,

Magnolia Water Holding Company, LLC, Magnolia Water Services Group, LLC, and

Louisiana Central States Water, LLC (referred to collectively herein as the ‘Magnolia

Water Defendants’).”).

51 R. Doc. No. 31, at 1–2 (quoting Freudensprung v. Offshore Tech. Servs., Inc., 379

F.3d 327, 346 (5th Cir. 2004)).

[p]laintiff has made no such agency or alter ego allegation in this case.”52 Indeed,

CSWR avers that plaintiff has not provided “any facts, or even allegations to

overcome the presumption of corporate separateness” recognized in the Fifth

Circuit.53

In response, plaintiff does not contest that this Court does not have general

personal jurisdiction over CSWR.54 Plaintiff’s response instead argues that the

Magnolia Water defendants are “wholly-owned subsidiar[ies]” of CSWR, which exist

“solely to carry out CSWR’s business operations in Louisiana.”55 Plaintiff contends

that the Magnolia Water defendants do not “function independently” of CSWR and

that CSWR “exercises complete control over [the Magnolia Water defendants’]

operations, finances, policies, and decision-making.”56

In support of her position, plaintiff points out that CSWR’s “website and

corporate materials describe [the Magnolia Water defendants] as one of its operating

divisions.”57 According to plaintiff, the Magnolia Water defendants do “not maintain

separate branding, separate corporate leadership, or independent operational

decision-making.”58 As further evidence of CSWR’s control over the Magnolia Water

defendants’ operations, plaintiff submits that CSWR has participated in LPSC

52 Id. at 2.

53 See id. at 2–3.

54 See generally R. Doc. No. 35.

55 Id. at 3, 6 (“CSWR created Magnolia for the specific purpose of acquiring and

operating Louisiana water systems.”).

56 Id. at 2.

57 Id. at 3; see also R. Doc. No. 35-6.

58 R. Doc. No. 35, at 3.

proceedings on behalf of the Magnolia Water defendants and has identified itself

therein as the “owner and operator of the systems at issue.”59 Plaintiff states that

CSWR has purposefully availed itself of Louisiana’s regulatory framework and

argues that “CSWR cannot claim it is a stranger to Louisiana while simultaneously

invoking Louisiana’s regulatory protections and benefits.”60

CSWR is correct that “[g]enerally, a foreign parent corporation is not subject

to the jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its subsidiary is present or doing

business there.” Conti 11. Container Schiffarts-GMBH & Co. KG M.S., MSC Flaminia

v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A., 91 F.4th 789, 800 (5th Cir. 2024) (quoting

Hargrave v. Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983)). “‘This

presumption of institutional independence . . . may be rebutted, however, by clear

evidence’ that the two corporations are ‘fused . . . for jurisdictional purposes.’” Id. at

800–01 (quoting Diece-Lisa Indus., Inc. v. Disney Enters., Inc., 943 F.3d 239, 251 (5th

Cir. 2019) (quoting Freudensprung, 379 F.3d 327 (5th Cir. 2004))). When analyzing

this issue, courts consider the following factors: “(1) the amount of stock owned by the

59 Id. at 4. Plaintiff does not attach any documents from LPSC proceedings in which

CSWR identifies itself as the parent company to the Magnolia Water defendants, and

she does not direct the Court to any specific dockets in her response. See generally R.

Doc. Nos. 35-2–35-9. Review of the LPSC dockets referenced in plaintiff’s motion for

temporary restraining order, R. Doc. No. 46, at 2, show filings made by Magnolia

Water Utility Operating Company, LLC, which identify CSWR as its parent company

and explain that they are “part of an affiliate group . . . which operate small water

and/or wastewater utilities in Missouri, Kentucky, Louisiana, Texas, Tennessee,

Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, Arizona, and Arkansas.” See

Magnolia Water Utility Operating Company, LLC, ex parte filing in U-37584 (filed on

May 16, 2025) and in U-37570 (filed on May 1, 2025).

60 R. Doc. No. 35, at 7.

parent of the subsidiary; (2) whether the entities have separate headquarters,

directors, and officers; (3) whether corporate formalities are observed; (4) whether the

entities maintain separate accounting systems; and (5) whether the parent exercises

complete control over the subsidiary’s general policies or daily activities.” Id. at 801

(quoting Diece-Lisa, 943 F.3d at 251 and citing Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1160).

The party invoking jurisdiction bears “the burden of showing, by clear

evidence,” that the parent company and its subsidiary “are not distinct corporate

entities.” Id.; see also Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 338 (5th

Cir. 1999) (“This presumption of corporate separateness, however, may be overcome

by clear evidence. . . . [T]he burden of making a prima facie showing of such symbiotic

corporate relatedness is on the proponent of the agency/alter ego theory.”). “[T]he

court may consider the contents of the record before the court at the time of the

motion, including affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any

combination of the recognized methods of discovery.” Savoie v. Pritchard, 122 F.4th

185, 190 (5th Cir. 2024) (internal quotations omitted). “When considering the host of

allegations and evidence, we accept as true plaintiff’s uncontroverted,

nonconclusional factual allegations and resolve all controverted allegations in the

plaintiff’s favor.” Id. (internal quotations omitted).

Plaintiff’s complaint makes no jurisdictional allegations.61 Instead she merely

uses “Magnolia Water/CSWR” when alleging actions pertaining to the provision of

61 See R. Doc. No. 1.

her water systems.62 The fact that CSWR is the parent company to the Magnolia

Water defendants, standing alone, is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction

over CSWR. See Conti, 91 F.4th at 800.

However, the exhibits attached to plaintiff’s response reveal a more

intertwined relationship than either the face of her complaint or CSWR’s motion to

dismiss suggest. Plaintiff first attaches Magnolia Water Utility Operating Company,

LLC’s articles of organization, which identify CSWR as “manager.”63 She next

attaches an article titled “Magnolia Water defends rate hikes, citing costly

compliance projects,”64 which explains that Josiah Cox, “CEO of Central States Water

Resources, Magnolia’s parent company,” appeared before LPSC on behalf of Magnolia

at a hearing regarding rate increases.65 Cox is quoted therein as telling “regulators

[that] the company has inherited failing systems often absent of investment in

decades,” and stating that “‘when we buy these systems, you have got to remember,

they often had not had rate increases for decades . . . it was a chronic lack of

investment.’”66 The article also states that Cox responded to LPSC Commissioners’

questions regarding “customer complaints about water quality in neighborhoods such

62 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 5, 10–11, 15, 31–33.

63 R. Doc. No. 35-2, at 3.

64 See Frank v. P N K (Lake Charles) L.L.C., 947 F.3d 331, 334 n.1 (5th Cir. 2020)

(considering a “2005 Houston Chronicle Article” when discussing the defendant’s

contacts with the forum state); see also id. (“Outside of the fact that the majority of

this evidence provides little to no jurisdictional support, we still consider the contents

of the record at the time of the motion.” (internal quotations omitted)).

65 See R. Doc. No. 35-3, at 1.

66 Id.

as . . . St. Tammany Parish.”67 Cox is quoted therein as stating that “[s]ince starting

operations here, going on six years ago, we’ve run at a cash loss the entire time. . . .

Even with the rate increases we’ve had, we still have a $9 million cash loss that has

not been recovered from this state. We’ve invested $400 million in this state and not

pulled $1 out.”68

Plaintiff’s third exhibit contains a public records search which reveals that

defendant Magnolia Water Utility Operating Company, LLC’s mailing address is the

same as CSWR’s “principal address.”69 Plaintiff also directs the Court to filings made

in LPSC proceedings,70 in which CSWR is mentioned multiple times.71 One such

filing, dated May 18, 2026, is Magnolia’s “petition” to acquire the water system assets

currently operated by Parks Waterworks, Inc., and it states:

Through its relationship with CSWR . . . Magnolia has access to highly

skilled technical, managerial, and financial experts and resources not

usually available to smaller water and wastewater companies.

Magnolia’s access to CSWR’s personnel provides extensive experience in

technical, managerial, and financial aspects of the utility industry,

particularly small systems, and also innovative operational, marketing,

and customer service programs that provide high quality advanced

services at fair and reasonable rates.

See LPSC Docket No. S-37934.

67 Id.

68 Id.

69 Compare R. Doc. No. 35-4, at 2, with Magnolia Water Utility Operating Company,

LLC, ex parte filing in U-37570 (filed on May 1, 2025), p. 2.

70 R. Doc. No. 35, at 15.

71 See, e.g., Magnolia Water Utility Operating Company, LLC, ex parte filing in U-

37570 (filed on May 1, 2025).

Plaintiff’s fourth exhibit is a letter from a CSWR “Customer Service Experience

Escalation Specialist” responding to a Magnolia Water customer’s complaint.72 Her

fifth exhibit is a screenshot showing that Magnolia Water appears on CSWR’s

website.73

Finally, plaintiff attaches a “Consumer Confidence Report” (“CCR”) that she

received in the mail from Magnolia.74 Under a section titled “OUR MISSION,” the

CCR states: “Central States Water Resources . . . is working to bring safe, reliable,

and environmentally responsible water sources to every community in the U.S.”75 In

a section titled “Violation Summary,” in the column labeled “Corrective Actions,” the

CCR notes that “CSWR – Louisiana has corrected the issue by ensuring the report

includes all required information to properly inform our customers about their

drinking water quality.”76

The facts and evidence presented by plaintiff noticeably contradict the notion

that CSWR “conducts no business in Louisiana.”77 The evidence also seems favorable

toward establishing some of the Hargrave factors. With respect to the first factor,

plaintiff asserts, and CSWR does not contest, that “Magnolia is a wholly-owned

subsidiary of CSWR.”78 See Croom v. Bristow Grp. Inc., No. 23-5092, 2024 WL

4542503, at *5 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 2024) (Guidry, J.) (stating that an entity being a

72 See R. Doc. No. 35-5.

73 R. Doc. No. 35-6, at 2–3.

74 See R. Doc. No. 35-7, at 1.

75 Id.

76 Id. at 3.

77 R. Doc. No. 22-2, at 1.

78 R. Doc. No. 35, at 2.

“wholly-owned subsidiary, indicates alter ego jurisdiction”). With respect to the

second factor, there is evidence of commonality of at least one officer, Josiah Cox, who

is the president of both CSWR and Magnolia Water Utility Operating Company,

LLC,79 however, there is also evidence that CSWR and Magnolia have different

headquarters.80 The second factor is therefore, at most, only slightly favorable to

plaintiff. Evidence supporting the fifth factor suggests that CSWR exerts some

control over Magnolia’s policies and “day to day activities,” such as responding to

consumer complaints and appearing on behalf of Magnolia in LPSC proceedings.

Diece-Lisa, 943 F.3d at 252. But it is not clear from the evidence that CSWR “exercises

complete control” over Magnolia, as plaintiff alleges in her response brief. See

Gonzalez v. Bank of Am. Ins. Servs., Inc., 454 F. App’x 295, 301 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding

“no evidence or allegation” suggesting that the parent company had “any greater

influence over [its subsidiary] than would be normal for a significant shareholder in

a company”); see also Edwards v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 18-138, 2019 WL

1061670, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 6, 2019) (citation modified) (quoting Barrett v.

Lombardi, 239 F.3d 23, 27 (1st Cir. 2001)) (“Allegations in a . . . brief or legal

memorandum are insufficient, even under the relatively relaxed prima facie

79 See Magnolia Water Utility Operating Company, LLC, ex parte filing in U-37584

(filed on May 16, 2025), “Pre-filed Direct Testimony of Josiah Cox,” p. 2.

80 R. Doc. No. 35-4, at 2 (listing Magnolia Water Utility Operating Company, LLC’s

address as 10761 Perkins Rd Ste A, Baton Rouge, LA 70810-1694); see also Magnolia

Water Utility Operating Company, LLC, ex parte filing in U-37584 (filed on May 16,

2025), p. 2 (“The principal address of Central States and CSWR is 1630 Des Peres

Road, Suite 140, Des Peres, MO 63131. The principal address of Magnolia is 10761

Perkins Road, Suite A, Baton Rouge, LA 70810.”).

standard, to establish jurisdictional facts.”); see also Pearson v. Shriners Hosps. for

Child., 736 F. Supp. 3d 521, 524 (S.D. Tex. 2024) (“The court is not obligated to credit

conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted.”).

Notwithstanding any favorable weight carried by the first, second, and fifth

factors, there is a lack of evidence supporting the existence of other Hargrave factors,

which have the potential to weigh heavily against plaintiff. For example, plaintiff

makes no allegations and supplies no evidence with respect to whether “corporate

formalities are observed,”81 the third Hargrave factor, or “whether the entities

maintain separate accounting systems,” the fourth Hargrave factor.82 Lack of

evidence and allegations with respect to the third factor is significant in this Court’s

weighing of the Hargrave factors. See Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund v. Ipsen, S.A.,

450 F. App’x 326, 331 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Where a parent and subsidiary observe

corporate formalities, the plaintiff has a heavy burden to establish a degree of control

sufficient to impute the subsidiary’s jurisdictional contacts to the parent.”).

Furthermore, although the Court determined that the first and second Hargrave

factors are favorable to plaintiff, the Fifth Circuit has been clear that those two

factors alone cannot rebut the presumption of corporate separateness. See Hargrave,

81 See, e.g., Jackson v. Tanfoglio Giuseppe, S.R.L., 615 F.3d 579, 587-88 (5th Cir. 2010)

(finding that there was “absolutely nothing to suggest that the corporate formalities

were not observed at all times” based on the fact that there was no evidence of:

“undocumented transfers of funds between the . . . entities;” “unclear allocation of

profits and losses;” and director and shareholder meetings being held jointly); see also

id. (noting that although the entities shared an office, “the office space of each entity

was separate within the buildings”).

82 See generally R. Doc. No. 35.

710 F.2d at 1160 (“We have noted often that 100% stock ownership and commonality

of officers and directors are not alone sufficient to establish an alter ego relationship

between two corporations.”).

On balance, the Court finds that plaintiff has not presented sufficient

uncontroverted allegations and evidence establishing personal jurisdiction over

CSWR on an alter ego theory. Cf. Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1363

(5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the parent was not the alter ego of its subsidiaries

despite the parent: “own[ing] 100% of its subsidiaries,” “remain[ing] responsible for

general policy,” “offer[ing] benefit plans to its subsidiaries’ employees;” and “fil[ing] a

consolidated federal tax return” with its subsidiaries because, among other reasons,

“these factors are outweighed . . . by the fact that [the parent] observes corporate

formalities”); Freudensprung, 379 F.3d at 346–47 (“[The plaintiff] only offers as

evidence various printouts from websites—primarily SEC filings related to all the

[defendant] entities, which are collectively referred to in these documents as ‘The

Company.’ While such documents might arguably establish the existence of some

corporate relationship between [the] entities, they are insufficient to overcome the

presumption of corporate separateness.”).

Plaintiff has not requested jurisdictional discovery,83 and absent such a

request, the Court will not establish on plaintiff’s behalf her burden of demonstrating

that jurisdictional discovery is necessary or would uncover facts sufficient to support

exercise of personal jurisdiction over CSWR. See Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter,

83 See generally id.

768 F.3d 429, 434 (5th Cir. 2014) (stating that the party requesting jurisdictional

discovery “bear[s] the burden of demonstrating the necessity of discovery”); see also

Pace v. Cirrus Design Corp., 93 F.4th 879, 902 (5th Cir. 2024) (stating that a plaintiff

must support her request for jurisdictional discovery with “factual allegations that

suggest with reasonable particularity the possible existence of the requisite

contacts”). Plaintiff has also not established that this Court should, in its discretion,

allow her to conduct jurisdictional discovery. See Freudensprung, 379 F.3d at 347

(“Matters relating to discovery are committed to the discretion of the trial court, and

we therefore review a district court’s decision to deny a discovery request for abuse of

discretion.”); Getagadget, L.L.C. v. Jet Creations Inc., No. 19-51019, 2022 WL 964204

(5th Cir. Mar. 30, 2022) (“It is not an abuse of discretion for a district court to deny

jurisdictional discovery when the plaintiff does not identify how the discovery would

show that the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state.”

(alterations and quotations omitted)); see also Croom, 2024 WL 4542503, at *6

(declining to permit jurisdictional discovery where the plaintiff’s evidence and

allegations supported only two of the Hargrave factors). Consequently, CSWR’s

motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted.

c. Failure to state a claim

Because this Court has already dismissed plaintiff’s SDWA claims for a lack of

subject matter jurisdiction, the Court will not reach the merits of plaintiff’s SDWA

claim.84 The Court will address the remainder of plaintiff’s claims that the Magnolia

Water defendants seek to dismiss in turn.85

1. Procedural Due Process

“A procedural due process claim consists of two elements: (i) deprivation by

state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or property, and (ii) inadequate

state process.” Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236 (2023). With respect to the first

element, procedural due process claims require a plaintiff to “show that any

deprivation of their rights was caused by “conduct that may be fairly characterized

as ‘state action.’” Divine v. Securix, LLC, No. 23-196, 2024 WL 4245421, at *7 (S.D.

Miss. Sept. 19, 2024); see also Lindke v. Freed, 601 U.S. 187, 194 (2024) (stating that

§ 1983, like the Fourteenth Amendment, “protects against acts attributable to a

State, not those of a private person”); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488

U.S. 179, 191 (1988) (“Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a

dichotomy between state action, which is subject to scrutiny under the Amendment’s

Due Process Clause, and private conduct, against which the Amendment affords no

shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be.”).

Magnolia Water defendants argue that, as private entities, plaintiff’s

procedural due process claim does not apply to them.86 It also notes that plaintiff’s

due process clam does not allege that the Magnolia Water defendants “engaged in

84 See supra Part III(a)(1).

85 See generally R. Doc. No. 32.

86 See R. Doc. No. 32-1, at 8.

any state action.”87 In fact, Magnolia Water defendants aver that plaintiff’s due

process claim seems to solely relate to LPSC’s “actions in regulatory proceedings.”88

Plaintiff in response insists that her due process claims are against the

Magnolia Water defendants and are proper because she is alleging “joint action

between Magnolia and state regulators.”89

“A private entity can qualify as a state actor in a few limited circumstances.”

Pearson v. Shriners Hosps. for Child., Inc., 133 F.4th 433, 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,

146 S. Ct. 329 (2025) (quoting Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 587 U.S.

802, 809 (2019)). One such circumstance includes “when the government acts jointly

with the private entity.” See id. “Joint action requires ‘an agreement or meeting of

the minds between the state actor and the private actor to engage in a conspiracy to

deprive the plaintiff of a constitutional right, and that the private actor was a willing

participant in joint activity with the state or its agents.’” Id. (quoting Hernandez v.

Causey, 124 F.4th 325, 337 (5th Cir. 2024)).

“Deciding whether a deprivation of a protected right is fairly attributable to

the State ‘begins by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’”

Cornish v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 402 F.3d 545, 550 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Am. Mfrs.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999)). “That is because a defendant ‘may

be a state actor for some purposes but not for others.’” Pearson, 133 F.4th at 444

(quoting Cornish, 402 F.3d at 550)).

87 Id.

88 Id.

89 R. Doc. No. 37, at 6.

Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim alleges that she “was denied

meaningful participation in regulatory proceedings, including exclusion of evidence

and closure of the docket without proper notice.”90 The count does not identify the

defendant, or defendants, against whom the claim is brought.91 Within the

“procedural due process violations” subsection of the complaint’s statement of facts,

plaintiff alleges that she: “was denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in

LPSC proceedings;” that “[e]vidence [she] submitted was not entered into the record;”

“[t]he [administrative law judge] refused to allow [p]laintiff to speak, correct the

record, or address missing discovery;” and “[t]he docket was closed immediately after

[p]laintiff submitted supplemental evidence.”92

None of plaintiff’s allegations specify any conduct by the Magnolia Water

defendants, much less a “conspiracy” between the Magnolia Water defendants and

LPSC to deprive plaintiff of her procedural due process rights in LPSC proceedings.

Cf. Pearson, 133 F.4th at 444. It is difficult to see how she could allege that the due

process violations are attributable to the Magnolia Water defendants; it appears

LPSC controls participation in the proceedings before it.93 Because plaintiff fails to

90 See R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 52.

91 See id. ¶¶ 51–54.

92 Id. ¶¶ 35–38.

93 See, e.g., R. Doc. No. 29-5 (letter from LPSC Executive Secretary rejecting plaintiff’s

filings); see also LPSC Rules of Practices and Procedures Rule 3 (“All initial filings to

be instituted before the Louisiana Public Service Commission, except those instituted

by the Commission itself, shall be filed with the Secretary.”) and Rule 14 (“Upon the

filing of any pleading with the Secretary, he shall forthwith examine the same and

determine its sufficiency under these Rules. If he finds that it does not comply in all

material respects with these Rules, he may return it to the person who filed it, along

with his statement of the reasons for rejecting same.”).

allege conduct by the Magnolia Water defendants that constitutes “state action”

which deprived her of her procedural due process rights, her procedural due process

allegations fail to state a claim against Magolia. Cf. id. Plaintiff’s due process claim

is dismissed.

2. Arbitrary and Capricious Agency Action

Pursuant to Louisiana’s Administrative Procedure Act (the “Louisiana

APA”),94 § 49:978.1, “a party who is aggrieved by a final decision or order in an

adjudication proceeding is entitled to judicial review.”95 The reviewing court “may

reverse or modify the [agency] decision if substantial rights of the appellant have

been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or

decisions are . . . [a]rbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or

clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion[.]” § 49:978.1(G)(5).

Plaintiff asks this Court to reverse the “rate increases and injunctive orders”

of LPSC, because LPSC allegedly “acted arbitrarily and capriciously by approving

rate increases without a complete financial record and ignoring public health

94 The Court understands plaintiff to allege a Louisiana APA claim, rather than a

federal APA claim. See R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 1 (asserting federal jurisdiction solely through

the “Safe Drinking Water Act and the United States Constitution”). Even were the

Court to construe this count as a federal APA claim, the federal APA “by its own

terms . . . does not apply to state agencies.” Roberson v. Rowlett TX Police Dep’t, No.

20-3578, 2020 WL 13857070, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2020), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. Roberson v. Rowlett Texas Police Dep’t, No. 20-

3578, 2021 WL 141181 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2021).

95 It appears this judicial review is meant to be conducted by parish district court. See

La. Stat. § 49:978.1(B) (“Proceedings for review may be instituted by filing a petition

in the district court of the parish in which the agency is located within thirty days

after the transmittal of notice of the final decision by the agency or, if a rehearing is

requested, within thirty days after the decision thereon.” (emphasis added)).

concerns.”96 It appears that this claim is directed solely at LPSC.97 Because this Court

has already dismissed plaintiff’s claims against LPSC for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction,98 plaintiff’s “arbitrary and capricious agency action” claim against LPSC

is therefore dismissed.

To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to bring a claim against the Magnolia

Water defendants, such claim fails because, among other reasons, the Magnolia

Water defendants are not “agencies” within the meaning of Louisiana’s

Administrative Procedure Act.99 Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.

3. “Failure to Protect Public Health and Safety”

Plaintiff’s sixth count alleges that “[d]efendants failed to protect public health

by allowing unsafe water conditions to persist and failing to enforce regulatory

standards.”100 She does not identify the federal or state source of this cause of

action.101

96 See R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 48 (“The Louisiana Public Service Commission acted arbitrarily

and capriciously by approving rate increases without a complete financial record and

ignoring pubic health concerns.” (emphasis added)).

97 See id. (mentioning only LPSC).

98 See R. Doc. No. 51.

99 Louisiana Revised Statute 40:951(3) defines “agency” as “each state board,

commission, department, agency, officer, or other entity which makes rules,

regulations, or policy, or formulates, or issues decisions or orders pursuant to, or as

directed by, or in implementation of the constitution or laws of the United States or

the constitution and statutes of Louisiana, except the legislature or any branch,

committee, or officer thereof, any political subdivision, as defined in Article VI,

Section 44 of the Constitution of Louisiana, and any board, commission, department,

agency, officer, or other entity thereof, and the courts.”

100 R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 61.

101 See id. ¶¶ 60–63.

Indeed, the Magnolia Water defendants raise in their motion to dismiss that it

is “unclear what the underlying theory of liability is for this specific claim, as

[p]laintiff failed to cite any statute or actionable legal theory.”102 Counsel for

Magnolia also represents that “extensive legal research” was conducted by Magnolia,

“but [it] has uncovered no standalone state or federal cause of action for failure to

protect public health and safety.”103 Magnolia contends that dismissal for failure to

state a claim is therefore warranted.104

Plaintiff does not address Magnolia’s arguments or identify a cause of action

in her response.105 She merely reiterates that she “alleges . . . failure to protect public

health.”106 This is insufficient to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and Fed.

R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief”). Accordingly, this claim is dismissed.

4. Louisiana Title 51 Public Health Sanitary Code & Violations of

Louisiana Revised Statute § 40:4(A)(8)(a)

Count II of plaintiff’s complaint alleges that defendants violated Title 51 of

Louisiana’s Sanitary Code “by operating water systems without required sanitary

surveys and failing to maintain safe water quality.”107 Count VIII alleges that

Louisiana Revised Statute 40:4(A)(8)(a) “requires LDH to ensure that public water

102 R. Doc. No. 32-1, at 8.

103 Id. (internal quotations omitted).

104 Id. at 9.

105 See generally R. Doc. No. 37.

106 Id. at 6. To the extent that this claim is meant to allege a violation of

§ 40:4(A)(8)(a), the Court finds infra Part III(c)(4) that plaintiff has abandoned her

claim.

107 See R. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 43–46.

systems are operated, maintained, and monitored in a manner that protects public

health and prevents the distribution of unsafe water.”108 She also alleges under this

count that “Magnolia/CSWR operated unsafe systems, failed to prevent

contamination, and reconnected residents to an abandoned and unsurveyed well

system” and that “LDH and OPH failed to enforce their statutory duties[.]”109

Magnolia moved to dismiss these counts, arguing that plaintiff “lacks statutory

standing” to bring these claims pursuant to Louisiana law.110 Plaintiff did not

respond to these arguments or otherwise defend these claims in her response.111 The

Court finds that plaintiff has abandoned these claims. See McClelland, 63 F.4th at

1010. Accordingly, these claims are dismissed.

5. Unjust Enrichment

Louisiana Civil Code article 2298 states that “[a] person who has been enriched

without cause at the expense of another person is bound to compensate that person.”

Article 2298 further explains that an unjust enrichment remedy “is subsidiary and

shall not be available if the law provides another remedy for the impoverishment or

declares a contrary rule.” “The unjust enrichment remedy is only applicable to fill a

gap in the law where no express remedy is provided.” Walters v. MedSouth Rec.

Mgmt., LLC, No. 2010-0351, 38 So. 3d 245, 246 (La. 2010). Put simply, “[u]nder

Louisiana law, when a legal cause of action exists, unjust enrichment does not.”

Orinoco Nat. Res., Inc. v. Mod. Am. Recycling Serv., Inc., No. 19-865, 2019 WL

108 Id. ¶ 69.

109 Id. ¶¶ 70–71.

110 R. Doc. No. 32-1, at 9.

111 See generally R. Doc. No. 37.

6036712, at *6 (E.D. La. Nov. 14, 2019) (Vance, J.). The Louisiana Supreme Court in

Walters held, for example, that a “plaintiff is precluded from seeking to recover under

unjust enrichment” where he has pleaded “negligent and tortious conduct.” Walters,

38 So. 3d at 246.

Moreover, “[t]he mere fact that a plaintiff does not successfully pursue another

available remedy does not give the plaintiff the right to recover under the theory of

unjust enrichment.” Perez v. Util. Constructors, Inc., No. 15-4675, 2016 WL 5930877,

at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 12, 2016) (Africk, J.). “[T]he important question is whether

another remedy is available, not whether the party seeking a remedy will be

successful.” Orinoco, 2019 WL 6036712, at *6 (quoting Ferrara Fire Apparatus, Inc.

v. JLG Indus., Inc., 581 F. App’x 440, 443–44 (5th Cir. 2014)). These principles hold

true even in light of the fact that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow a party to

plead in the alternative. See Perez, 2016 WL 5930877, at *1 (acknowledging that Rule

8(d) allows alternative pleading, but recognizing that “[t]he question is whether

Louisiana law bars [the plaintiff] from asserting an unjust enrichment claim,”

notwithstanding Rule 8(d)).

The Magnolia Water defendants do not seek dismissal of plaintiff’s negligence

and gross negligence claims and, therefore, contend that plaintiff has another

available remedy.112 Cf. Orinoco, 2019 WL 6036712, at *6 (noting that the plaintiff’s

cause of action “survive[d] th[e] motion to dismiss” in part because the defendant did

not move to dismiss those claims). As such, Magnolia argues that plaintiff’s unjust

112 R. Doc. No. 32-1, at 10.

enrichment claim should be dismissed.113 Plaintiff’s only response is that she has

pleaded her unjust enrichment claims in the alternative, pursuant to Rule 8(d).114

Considering the existence of plaintiff’s other tort claim, which survives dismissal, and

Louisiana law, the Court dismisses plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim.

IV. Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)

For the foregoing, articulated reasons, this Court has dismissed plaintiff’s

constitutional and SDWA claims against the moving defendants,115 which formed the

basis of this Court’s federal question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s claims.116 The only count of plaintiff’s complaint that survives against the

Magnolia Water defendants after the Court’s rulings herein is her state law claim for

negligence and gross negligence.117 This claim does not confer original jurisdiction

on this Court.118

Defendants Josiah Cox and LDH have not yet been served and, as expected,

have not moved to dismiss any claims that plaintiff has alleged against them. It is

difficult to decipher which claims pertain to Cox and LDH, yet, for the same reasons

articulated supra Part III(a), the Court would lack jurisdiction over any SDWA claims

against them. See Carver v. Atwood, 18 F.4th 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2021) (holding that

113 See id.

114 See R. Doc. No. 37, at 6.

115 See supra Part III(a)(1), (2), and Part III(c)(1).

116 R. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 1–2.

117 Id. ¶¶ 55–59.

118 “Diversity jurisdiction” pursuant to § 1332, “requires complete diversity—if any

plaintiff is a citizen of the same State as any defendant, then diversity jurisdiction

does not exist.” Flagg v. Stryker Corp., 819 F.3d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff and

Magnolia are not completely diverse. See R. Doc. No. 1 ¶ 4; R. Doc. No. 35-4, at 2.

the district court could sua sponte dismiss claims for lack of jurisdiction). Therefore

the only possible remaining federal claim against Cox and LDH would be plaintiff’s

claim for alleged violations of due process,119 which the Court notes are doubtful to

succeed for the same reasons articulated supra Part III(c)(1).

Pursuant to § 1367(c), “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim . . . if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State

law, (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the

district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims

over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are

other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.”

In addition, when determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

courts should consider “the common-law factors of judicial economy, convenience,

fairness, and comity.” Manyweather v. Woodlawn Manor, Inc., 40 F.4th 237, 246 (5th

Cir. 2022). “If the federal claim is deleted early on in the case, judicial economy almost

always favors remand.” Marshall v. MarOpCo, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 3d 562, 572 (N.D.

Tex. 2017).

With respect to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), “[a] federal court will find substantial

predominance when it appears that ‘a state claim constitutes the real body of a case,

to which the federal claim is only an appendage.’” United Disaster Response, L.L.C.

v. Omni Pinnacle, L.L.C., 569 F. Supp. 2d 658, 667 (E.D. La. 2008) (Lemelle, J.)

(quoting United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966)). “[I]f it

119 See R. Doc. No. 1 ¶¶ 51–54.

appears that the state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof,

of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought,

the state claims may be dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state

tribunals.” Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726–27.

With no SDWA claim remaining, the body of this case pertains to whether

defendants were negligent or grossly negligent and violated state law when providing

and regulating plaintiff’s water utilities, resulting in her inability to access clean

water.120 Her allegations relating to violations of due process, namely, that she was

denied “meaningful opportunity to participate in LPSC proceedings,”121 is only an

appendage. The proof supporting plaintiff’s due process claim, which will involve

discovery into the notice and opportunity to participate in LPSC proceedings given to

plaintiff, will not substantially overlap with the evidence necessary to prove her

negligence and other state claims regarding water quality. Additionally, it appears

plaintiff seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to her due process

claims,122 whereas, she seeks over $ 1 billion relating to her state claims.123 The Court

finds that plaintiff’s remaining state claims substantially predominate over her sole

federal claim. See Marshall, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 574 (holding that “the number of

claims” can “favor[] remand”).

120 See generally R. Doc. No. 1.

121 Id. ¶ 35.

122 Id. at 6; R. Doc. No. 29, at 4.

123 See R. Doc. No. 1, at 6.

Judicial economy also weighs against exercising jurisdiction. This matter is at

the pleading stage, no discovery has been conducted, and “[a]ny trial is a distant

possibility.” Manyweather, 40 F.4th at 246 (finding no abuse of discretion in the

district court’s decision to remand where “[t]he district court remanded during the

pleading stage;” “[n]o discovery had taken place;” and “[a]ny trial was a distant

possibility—months, if not years away—if it would happen at all”). To be sure, this

matter has only been pending before this Court for a few months, and a trial date has

not yet been set. The Court finds that “hardly any federal judicial resources, let alone

a significant amount of resources, have been devoted” to this Court’s “consideration

of these claims.” Harmon v. Fat Cat Boatworks, LLC, No. 22-74, 2023 WL 6370240,

at *4 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2023). Judicial economy favors remand. Cf. Don’t

Dismyabilities, Inc. v. City of Dallas, No. 17-3026, 2017 WL 5626330, at *3 (N.D. Tex.

Nov. 21, 2017) (declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and dismissing the

plaintiff’s remaining claims without prejudice because the action was “in its early

stages of litigation” and the district court could “think of no legal harm or prejudice

to [the plaintiff] if the state law claims are handled by a state court”).

Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

plaintiff’s state law claims. The Court dismisses plaintiff’s state claims without

prejudice. The Magnolia Water defendants’ motion to stay plaintiff’s remaining

negligence claim “pending the [LPSC’s] adjudication of Plaintiff’s other claims,”124 is

denied as moot.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons,

IT IS ORDERED that CSWR’s motion125 to dismiss for lack of personal

jurisdiction is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims against CSWR are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magnolia Water defendants’ motion126

to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), and

failure to state a claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), is GRANTED IN PART AND

DENIED IN PART, consistent with the Court’s rulings herein.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Magnolia Water defendants’ motion127

for a stay plaintiff’s negligence claim is DENIED AS MOOT.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’s SDWA and state law claims

against unserved defendants Josiah Cox and Louisiana Department of Health are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

124 See R. Doc. No. 32-1, at 10–12. Magnolia Water defendants appear to be referring

to the claims related to “rates and services” which they contend “are subject to the

exclusive jurisdiction of” LPSC. See id. at 11. As this Court has already discussed

supra Part III(a)(2), plaintiff seems to have abandoned any claim related to rate-

setting. Additionally, the Court has already rejected the Magnolia Water defendants’

contention that this Court’s jurisdiction is limited by state law conferring exclusive

jurisdiction on LPSC, see supra n.38.

125 R. Doc. No. 22.

126 R. Doc. No. 32.

127 R. Doc. No. 32.

New Orleans, Louisiana, June 8, 2026.

LANCE M. AFRICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Al