The opinion
06/12/2026
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
Assigned on Briefs June 2, 2026
DEVAN DENTON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
No. 12-02872 Carlyn L. Addison, Judge
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No. W2025-01111-CCA-R3-HC
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A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Devan Denton, of several crimes, including
three counts of aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective
sentence of fifteen years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and the
Petitioner was subsequently housed in the Turney Center Industrial Complex in Hickman
County, Tennessee. However, he was temporarily moved to the Shelby County Jail for
proceedings stemming from his post-conviction petition. While being held in Shelby
County, the Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, which the habeas corpus
court denied after a hearing. It is from this habeas corpus proceeding that the Petitioner
appeals. We affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.
Tenn R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed
CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JILL BARTEE
AYERS and JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.
Lance R. Chism, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Devan Denton.
Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Caroline Weldon, Assistant Attorney
General; Steven J. Mulroy, District Attorney General; and Monica A. Timmerman,
Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION
In December 2015, a Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner of multiple
crimes, including three counts of aggravated rape. The Petitioner was ordered to serve an
effective sentence of fifteen years in the Tennessee Department of Correction, and he was
subsequently housed in Only, Hickman County, Tennessee, at the Turney Center Industrial
Complex (“Turney Center”).
On December 18, 2024, the Shelby County Criminal Court ordered the Petitioner to
be transferred to the Shelby County Jail in order that he be present for proceedings being
held on January 7, 2025, relevant to the Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction relief. On
February 27, 2025, the court ordered the Petitioner returned to Turney Center. Also on
February 27, 2025, while the Petitioner was still in the Shelby County Jail, the Petitioner
filed a petition for habeas corpus relief, alleging that three counts in his indictment, each
alleging aggravated rape, were so defective as to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction,
rendering void his convictions on those counts. The State responded that habeas corpus
relief was not warranted on the grounds that the petition for habeas corpus relief had not
been filed in the correct court, and that the challenged counts of the indictment were not so
defective as to have deprived the trial court of jurisdiction.
The Shelby County Criminal Court (“the habeas corpus court”) set a hearing and,
on May 15, 2025, ordered the Petitioner to be transported from Turney Center to the Shelby
County Jail to be present for the hearing. The habeas corpus court subsequently granted
the Petitioner’s motion to be allowed to remain in the Shelby County Jail until June 18,
2025.
On June 17, 2025, the habeas corpus court held a hearing on the Petitioner’s petition
for habeas corpus relief. After hearing argument from both the Petitioner’s lawyer and the
State, and after considering the wording of the challenged counts of the indictment, the
habeas corpus court denied relief on the bases that (1) the Petitioner failed to prove that his
confinement is illegal and (2) his petition was not filed in the most convenient court. The
Petitioner timely filed his appeal, and we now consider whether the habeas corpus court
properly denied relief.
“The determination of whether habeas corpus relief should be granted is a question
of law.” Faulkner v. State, 226 S.W.3d 358, 361 (Tenn. 2007) (citing Hart v. State, 21
S.W.3d 901, 903 (Tenn. 2000)). Accordingly, our review is de novo without a presumption
of correctness. Summers v. State, 212 S.W.3d 251, 255 (Tenn. 2007) (citing State v.
Livingston, 197 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tenn. 2006)).
A prisoner is guaranteed the right to habeas corpus relief under Article I, section 15
of the Tennessee Constitution. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 15; see Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-21-101
to -130. The grounds upon which a writ of habeas corpus may be issued, however, are very
narrow. Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). “Habeas corpus relief is available
in Tennessee only when ‘it appears upon the face of the judgment or the record of the
proceedings upon which the judgment is rendered’ that a convicting court was without
jurisdiction or authority to sentence a defendant, or that a defendant’s sentence of
imprisonment or other restraint has expired.” Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn.
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1993) (quoting State v. Galloway, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 326, 337 (1868)). A habeas corpus
petition challenges void and not merely voidable judgments. Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 255
(citing Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992)). “A void judgment is one in which
the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render
the judgment or because the defendant’s sentence has expired.” Taylor, 995 S.W.2d at 83
(citing Dykes v. Compton, 978 S.W.2d 528, 529 (Tenn. 1998); Archer, 851 S.W.2d at 161-
64). Moreover, it is the petitioner’s burden to demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the judgment is void or that the confinement is illegal. Wyatt v. State, 24
S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tenn. 2000). If this burden is met, the Petitioner is entitled to immediate
release. State v. Warren, 740 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986) (citing Ussery v.
Avery, 432 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tenn. 1968)).
If the habeas corpus court determines from the petitioner’s filings that no
cognizable claim has been stated and that the petitioner is not entitled to relief, the petition
for writ of habeas corpus may be summarily dismissed. See Hickman v. State, 153 S.W.3d
16, 20 (Tenn. 2004). Further, the habeas corpus court may summarily dismiss the petition
without the appointment of a lawyer and without an evidentiary hearing if there is nothing
on the face of the judgment to indicate that the convictions are void. Summers, 212 S.W.3d
at 261; Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 20. “The petitioner bears the burden of providing an
adequate record for summary review of the habeas corpus petition, including consideration
of whether counsel should be appointed.” Summers, 212 S.W.3d at 261.
The Petitioner alleged that Counts 2, 3, and 6 of his indictment were so defective as
to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, rendering void his convictions on those Counts.
Those Counts provided as follows:
Count 2
THE GRAND JURORS of the State of Tennessee, duly selected,
empaneled, sworn and charged to inquire for the body of the county of
Shelby, Tennessee, upon their oath, present that:
BRIAN NORWOOD
[THE PETITIONER]
LEON DENTON
JAMES KERRIGAN
ANTONIO HOWARD
on October 16, 2011 in Shelby County, Tennessee, and before the finding of
this indictment, did unlawfully and intentionally sexually penetrate [L. R. G.]
by the use of force or coercion, while armed with a weapon or an article used
or fashioned in a manner to lead [L. G.] reasonably to believe it to be a
weapon: in that [THE PETITIONER] did unlawfully sexually penetrate [L.
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R. G.] and ANTONIO HOWARD, BRIAN NORWOOD, LEON DENTON,
and JAMES KERRIGAN did act with intent to promote or assist in the
commission of an offense, to wit: Aggravated Rape, and further did aid [THE
PETITIONER] in his unlawful sexual penetration of [L. R. G.], in violation
of T.C.A. 39-13-502, against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.
Count 3
THE GRAND JURORS of the State of Tennessee, duly selected,
empaneled, sworn and charged to inquire for the body of the county of
Shelby, Tennessee, upon their oath, present that:
BRIAN NORWOOD
[THE PETITIONER]
LEON DENTON
JAMES KERRIGAN
ANTONIO HOWARD
on October 16, 2011 in Shelby County, Tennessee, and before the finding of
this indictment, did unlawfully and intentionally sexually penetrate [L. R. G.]
by the use of force or coercion, while armed with a weapon or an article used
or fashioned in a manner to lead [L. G.] reasonably to believe it to be a
weapon: in that LEON DENTON did unlawfully sexually penetrate [L. R.
G.] and ANTONIO HOWARD, BRIAN NORWOOD, [THE PETITIONER],
and JAMES KERRIGAN did act with intent to promote or assist in the
commission of an offense, to wit: Aggravated Rape, and further did aid
LEON DENTON in his unlawful sexual penetration of [L. R. G.] in violation
of T.C.A. 39-13-502, against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee.
Count 6
THE GRAND JURORS of the State of Tennessee, duly selected,
empaneled, sworn and charged to inquire for the body of the county of
Shelby, Tennessee, upon their oath, present that:
BRIAN NORWOOD
[THE PETITIONER]
LEON DENTON
JAMES KERRIGAN
ANTONIO HOWARD
on October 16, 2011 in Shelby County, Tennessee, and before the finding of
this indictment, did unlawfully and intentionally sexually penetrate [L. R. G.]
by the use of force or coercion, in that LEON DENTON did unlawfully
sexually penetrate [L. R. G.] being aided and abetted by ANTONIO
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HOWARD, BRIAN NORWOOD, [THE PETITIONER], and JAMES
KERRIGAN, in violation of T.C.A. 39-13-502, against the peace and dignity
of the State of Tennessee.
The Petitioner argues that Counts 2 and 3 each set forth more than one theory of
committing the offense of aggravated rape and that these two Counts “are so poorly written
that the reader cannot ascertain precisely which theory of aggravated rape is being
charged.” The Petitioner claims that the language of Counts 2 and 3 did not “adequately
place [him] on notice of his charges” and that Counts 2 and 3 are so defective as to deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction. As to Count 6, the Petitioner argues that “[a] reasonable
person reading [C]ount 6 would think that only Leon Denton is being charged with
aggravated rape . . . and that the co-defendants were simply listed as his aiders and
abettors,” leaving him without notice of his charges and being so defective as to deprive
the trial court of jurisdiction.
We disagree. The United States Constitution and the Tennessee Constitution state
that a defendant is entitled to knowledge of “the nature and cause of the accusation.” U.S.
Const. amend. VI; Tennessee Const. art. I, § 9. The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated
that an indictment is valid if it contains sufficient information “(1) to enable the accused to
know the accusation to which answer is required, (2) to furnish the court adequate basis for
the entry of a proper judgment, and (3) to protect the accused from double jeopardy.” State
v. Hill, 954 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tenn. 1997) (citing State v. Byrd, 820 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tenn.
1991); VanArsdall v. State, 919 S.W.2d 626, 630 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Smith,
612 S.W.2d 493, 497 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)). In addition, pursuant to Tennessee Code
Annotated section 40-13-202, the indictment must
state the facts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language,
without prolixity or repetition, in such a manner so as to enable a person of
common understanding to know what is intended, and with that degree of
certainty which will enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper
judgment.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-202 (2006). Counts 2, 3 and 6 satisfy these requirements. Each
Count notified the Petitioner that he was being charged with the aggravated rape of a
particular victim at a particular time while accompanied by particular persons and
committed in Shelby County. All three Counts charge the Petitioner and his co-defendants
with unlawfully and intentionally sexually penetrating the victim by the use of force or
coercion. Each Count adds additional details specific to that Count. The allegations
contained in each Count were sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the trial court. Had the
Petitioner deemed that he needed clarification in order to prepare his defense against these
charges, he was free to seek it prior to trial. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 12(b) (stating that
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motions alleging a defect in the indictment must be made before trial). We affirm the
habeas corpus court’s conclusion that the Petitioner failed to establish that he is entitled to
habeas corpus relief on this basis.
The habeas corpus court also concluded that the Petitioner filed his petition for
habeas corpus relief in the wrong court. We agree. Our statutes provide that a petition for
habeas corpus relief “should be made to the court or judge most convenient in point of
distance to the applicant, unless a sufficient reason be given in the petition for not applying
to such court or judge.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-105. As the Tennessee Supreme Court
has recognized, “the procedural provisions of the habeas corpus statutes are mandatory and
must be followed scrupulously.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 19 (citation omitted). “Filing
with the nearest court or judge generally means the county where the petitioner is being
held,” Carter v. Bell, 279 S.W.3d 560, 562 (Tenn. 2009), that is, where he is incarcerated.
While it is true that the Petitioner was physically in Shelby County on the day he filed his
petition for habeas corpus relief, he was normally incarcerated in Hickman County and was
physically present in Shelby County only for the purposes of attending court matters
pertaining to his petition for post-conviction relief. Thus, under the habeas corpus statute,
the Petitioner should have filed his petition for habeas corpus relief in Hickman County. A
habeas corpus court “may properly choose to dismiss a petition for failing to comply with
the statutory procedural requirements.” Hickman, 153 S.W.3d at 21.
The Petitioner contends that the “sufficient reason” for filing in Shelby County
rather than in Hickman County was the fact that, when he filed his Petition, he was
physically in Shelby County. We disagree. This approach would encourage forum
shopping by incarcerated felons who, for some reason or another, find themselves
temporarily in a county other than the one to which they are assigned to serve their
sentences. We are not inclined to foster this practice.
The Petitioner also asserts that he had sufficient reason to file his habeas corpus
petition in Shelby County because that is where the original indictment is located. He
asserts that the “court hearing the habeas corpus petition will need to review the original
indictment to determine whether it fails to state an offense.” Again, we disagree. The
Petitioner has demonstrated no meaningful differences between the original indictment and
the copy provided in conjunction with this proceeding. Modern technology renders this
assertion specious. Moreover, this court has previously determined that a habeas corpus
petition alleging a fatally defective indictment may not be filed in a county other than the
one where the petitioner is normally housed. See State v. Green, No. E2013-02425-CCA-
R3-CD, 2014 WL 2957716, at *5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 30, 2014) (holding that the county
of conviction is not the proper venue for a habeas corpus petition alleging a defective
indictment as the grounds for relief).
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Finally, the Petitioner contends that, because he is being represented by the same
lawyer in both his post-conviction proceeding and this habeas corpus proceeding, and
because that lawyer is based in Shelby County, “it ma[kes] perfect sense to allow current
counsel to handle the habeas corpus case in Shelby County [as] more practical than
requiring current counsel to travel to Hickman County [to pursue a claim for] habeas corpus
relief.” While we are sympathetic to counsel’s concern with efficiency, his argument is
better addressed to our legislature. This court has previously determined that, under the
current legislation, “filing in the county which is more economical for counsel is not a
‘sufficient reason’ under [Tennessee Code Annotated] section 29-21-105 for filing a
petition for habeas corpus relief in the court of conviction instead of the court most
convenient to the petitioner.” Coury v. Westbrooks, No. M2003-01800-CCA-R3-PC, 2004
WL 2346151, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 19, 2004).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the habeas corpus court’s denial of relief to the Petitioner on his petition
for habeas corpus relief.
S/ Camille R. McMullen____________
CAMILLE R. MCMULLEN, JUDGE
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