Hardy

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

EL DORADO DIVISION

RAYMOND DOUGLAS HARDY PLAINTIFF

v. Civil No. 1:26-cv-01019

CAPTIAN LISA WORLEY

and SHERIFF RICKY ROBERTS DEFENDANT

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Raymond Douglas Hardy, currently an inmate of the Union County Detention

Center (“UCDC”) filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This is a civil rights action filed

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was directly assigned to the undersigned Magistrate Judge

pursuant to General Order 2024-02, but not all parties to the action have consented to the

jurisdiction of the undersigned. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Accordingly, for the purpose of

preservice review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), the case will automatically be reassigned to

a United States District Judge and referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation

pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1) and (3).

The case is currently before the Court for preservice screening under the provisions of 28

U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Pursuant to § 1915A(a), the Court has the obligation to screen any complaint

in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a

governmental entity.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on April 16, 2026, along with an application to proceed in

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forma pauperis (“IFP”). (ECF Nos. 1-2). Plaintiff was granted IFP status on the same day.

(ECF No. 3). In his Complaint, Plaintiff names two Defendants: (1) Captain Lisa Worley of the

UCDC; and (2) Sheriff Ricky Roberts of Union County. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff alleges one claim

in his Complaint against each Defendant: that Defendant Worley and Defendant Roberts

improperly handled his “legal mail” on one occasion in June 2024. Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff

specifically states:

Captain Lisa Worley Answered mail that wasn’t sent to her. A good faith motion

was sent to District Courts and Captain Lisa Worley Answered it when it was not

address to her it was sent to district court. I was injured cause it was legal mail.

That wasn’t address to her and address to different people and not to her.

(ECF No. 1, pp. 4-5) (errors in original). Plaintiff then states in his claim against Defendant

Roberts:

Captain Lisa Worley answered mail that wasn’t address to her. She returned with

I was asking District for which the letter wasn’t address to her returned it on a letter

head stating Ricky Robert Union County Letter head bringing the Sheriff into this

matter and sign it jail administrator when she was not yet I was injured when she

answered mail that was not address to her my legal mail. That was address to some

where else.

(ECF No. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff also asserts official capacity claims against both Defendants

requesting the post master general be informed of Defendants actions and he be awarded monetary

damages. (ECF No. 1, pp. 5, 7).

II. APPLICABLE STANDARD

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), the Court must dismiss a

complaint, or any portion of it, if it contains claims that: (1) are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state

a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seek monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

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A claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or fact.” Neitzke v.

Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action is malicious when the allegations are known to be

false, or it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing or disparaging the named defendants rather

than to vindicate a cognizable right. In re Tyler, 839 F.2d 1290, 1293-94 (8th Cir. 1988); Spencer

v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 464 (E.D.N.C. 1987). A claim fails to state a claim upon which

relief may be granted if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the Defendants acted

under color of state law, and that the actor violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the

Constitution. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Dunham v. Wadley, 195 F.3d 1007, 1009

(8th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, the deprivation must be intentional; mere negligence will not

suffice to state a claim for deprivation of a constitutional right under section 1983. Daniels v.

Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986). Lastly, Defendants

must have been personally involved and caused the violation alleged. “Liability under section

1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the deprivation of rights. To establish

personal liability of the supervisory defendants, [Plaintiff] must allege specific facts of personal

involvement in, or direct responsibility for, a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” Clemmons

v. Armontrout, 477 F.3d 962, 967 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Mayorga v. Missouri, 442 F.3d 1128,

1132 (8th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s claims shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears

beyond a doubt the Plaintiff’s complaint can prove no set of facts to support the plaintiff’s

purported cause of action. See Schaller Tel. Co. v. Golden Sky Sys., Inc., 298 F.3d 736, 740 (8th

Cir. 2001).

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“In evaluating whether a pro se plaintiff has asserted sufficient facts to state a claim, we

hold ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded . . . to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Jackson v. Nixon, 747 F.3d 537, 541 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). However, even a pro se Plaintiff must allege specific

facts sufficient to support a claim. Martin v. Sargent, 780 F.2d 1334, 1337 (8th Cir. 1985).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff has failed to state any cognizable constitutional claims in his Complaint. Rule

8(a) contains the general pleading rules and requires a complaint to present “a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “A

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court will consider well plead factual allegations in the

Amended Complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of

the non-moving party. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986). However, while

the Court will liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s complaint, the plaintiff must allege sufficient

facts to support his claims. See Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2004).

Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable constitutional violation related to his mail against

either Defendant.1 The mail at issue does not qualify as legal mail requiring constitutional

protections. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, (1974), the Supreme Court concluded that

1 As Plaintiff focuses on the status of his mail as legal mail, the Court does not interpret Plaintiff’s

Complaint to assert any First Amendment claims regarding the ability to send and receive mail.

See generally, Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (inmates have a First Amendment right to

receive mail, but that right may be limited by prison regulations that are reasonably related to

legitimate penological interests).

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prison officials may open and inspect a prisoner's mail outside his presence unless the mail is

privileged legal mail. Id. at 576-77. Thus, the threshold question for the Court is whether

correspondence to or from the United States District Court is privileged legal mail. This Court

finds it is not.

Privileged legal mail is narrowly defined as “mail to or from an inmate’s attorney and

identified as such.” Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir. 1997). Other District

Courts have found mail that is related to legal matters, but not sent from the inmate’s attorney,

does not constitute “legal mail” as defined in Gardner. See Barron v. Jones, No. 3:20-CV-00311-

DPM-PSH, 2020 WL 6200187 at * 2 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 22, 2020) (“Mail to and from a court or

opposing counsel does not fall under this narrow definition of privileged legal mail and, therefore,

may be opened outside of the inmate’s presence.”), report and recommendation adopted by 2020

WL 6750353 at *1 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 17, 2020), see also Moore v. Rowley, 126 F. App’x 759, 760

(8th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (concluding that prisoner had no constitutional right to have his

bankruptcy petition mailed without first being inspected). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts to

indicate the subject mail was privileged mail from his attorney. Accordingly, the Court finds

Plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation regarding the opening or responding to mail,

to or from the United States District Court.

Finally, all official capacity claims asserted by Plaintiff against any Defendant must fail as

a matter of law. Under Section 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or

in his official capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his

official capacities. The type of conduct that is actionable and the type of defense available depend

on whether the claim is asserted against a defendant in his official or individual capacity. See

Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 914 (8th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted). “Claims against

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individuals in their official capacities are equivalent to claims against the entity for which they

work; they require proof that a policy or custom of the entity violated the plaintiff’s rights, and the

only type of immunity available is one belonging to the entity itself.” Id. Here, that means

Plaintiff needed to allege a policy, procedure, or custom of Union County caused his alleged

constitutional violations. Plaintiff has failed to do so here as he has not alleged any facts regarding

the policy, procedures, or customs of Union County, nor has he stated a cognizable constitutional

violation.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is recommended the case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); and that Plaintiff be warned that, in the future, this dismissal

may be counted as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Referral Status: Referral in this case should terminate at the filing of this Report and

Recommendation.

The parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of the Report and Recommendation

in which to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The failure to file

timely objections may result in waiver of the right to appeal questions of fact. The parties

are reminded that objections must be both timely and specific to trigger de novo review by

the district court.

DATED this 15th day of May 2026.

Spencer G. Singleton

/s/

HON. SPENCER G. SINGLETON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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