invoking a harmless error standard in this context
How later courts described this case
- invoking a harmless error standard in this context
- “[D]istrict courts are entitled to treat an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief as waived.”
- adding that “once the meager threshold has been crossed our inquiry ends”
- concluding that description in a disciplinary report is “some evidence”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EMMANUEL HENDERSON,
Petitioner,
v. Case No. 24-CV-1860-NJR
DAN SPROUL,
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
ROSENSTENGEL, District Judge:
Petitioner Emmanuel Henderson is a federal inmate who brings this petition for
writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge his loss of 41 days of good
conduct time. At the time he filed this petition, he was housed at FCI Marion, a Bureau
of Prisons (BOP) facility located within the Southern District of Illinois. Respondent filed
a response to the petition (Doc. 10), to which Henderson replied (Doc. 12). For the reasons
set forth below, the petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
Henderson is serving a 101-month sentence imposed by Chief Judge Staci M.
Yandle in 2020. See United States v. Henderson, No. 19-30077-SMY (S.D. Ill.). His projected
release date is December 7, 2026. See BOP Inmate Search, www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last
visited May 26, 2026). Although he is now in pre-release custody, he resided at
FCI Marion at the time he filed this petition.
On August 13, 2023, Henderson was charged in an incident report with possessing
drugs. (Doc. 10-2, pp. 1-16). According to the incident report, while Officer Tyler
Huckelberry was escorting Henderson from his cell to be searched, Henderson pulled a
small plastic bag from his waist area and threw it behind him, towards a set of stairs.
(Id. at p. 1). Huckelberry retrieved the bag and determined that it contained a smaller
plastic bag filled with folded pieces of paper, which enclosed several pieces of a film-like
substance, labeled either “A8” or “N8.”1 Prison medical staff determined that the
substance was Suboxone, a medication that Henderson had not been prescribed. (Id. at
p. 14).
After the Federal Bureau of Investigation declined to pursue criminal charges, the
prison’s Unit Discipline Committee (UDC) referred the matter to a Discipline Hearing
Officer (DHO). (Id. at p. 15). On August 17, 2023, Henderson received a notice informing
him that the DHO would schedule a hearing and advising him of his rights. (Doc. 10-1,
¶ 6).
The hearing took place on September 1, 2023. Henderson waived his right to have
a staff representative or to call any witnesses. (Doc. 10-2, p. 18). He also denied the charge
but did not provide a statement in his defense. (Id. at p. 19). Based on the evidence
presented at the hearing, which consisted of the incident report, the statement identifying
the substance as Suboxone, and chain of custody documentation, the assigned DHO
concluded that Henderson had possessed drugs in violation of institution rules and
sanctioned him with the loss of 41 days good time credit, seven days in disciplinary
1 Photographs of the bag and its contents are in the record. (Doc. 10-1, pp. 5-13).
segregation, and a loss of his commissary, email, and visiting privileges for 30 days. (Id. at
pp. 20-21).
Henderson appealed the decision through the BOP’s internal review process,
arguing the DHO had violated his due process rights by failing to consider an
exculpatory video of the incident. (Id. at pp. 23-24). On October 16, 2023, the BOP’s
Regional Director agreed that the DHO had erred by not properly addressing
Henderson’s request to review video evidence and ordered a re-hearing. (Id. at pp. 27-
28).
The DHO conducted a new hearing on December 7, 2023. (Id. at p. 36). This time,
Henderson made use of a staff representative. According to the DHO report, Henderson’s
staff representative reviewed video footage of the incident and characterized it as follows:
I see the inmate walk in front of the stairs with his hand in his left pocket,
and his hand drops out of his pocket. Huckleberry [sic] then immediately
picks something up of [sic] the ground. I cannot confirm what was dropped
and/or picked up. They then pat search inmate Henderson.
(Id.). Henderson also provided a statement denying that he possessed the drugs, which
the DHO transcribed as follows:
I am innocent and it was not me that had the drugs. During and prior to the
situation there were other inmates in the dayroom. When he was searching,
I was pushing my drawers out of my crouch and my behind. I was just
fixing myself. Those were not my drugs. He turned out of the blue and
found them. If I had thrown drugs, they would have tackled me. I got
searched when I first walked out of my cell.
(Id.).
After reviewing the video evidence, the DHO assigned to the case, Evelyn Keller,
summarized the footage for her report. She noted that when Henderson walked under
the staircase, he “drop[ped] [his] arm from [his] pocket at which time SIS Tech
Huckleberry [sic] bends down . . . and picked something up off the floor.” Based on her
review of the video evidence, Huckelberry’s statement in his incident report, and
Henderson’s explanation, Keller determined that the drugs “more than likely” were
Henderson’s. (Id. at p. 39). She re-issued the sanctions imposed previously. (Id.).
Henderson again appealed, this time arguing that the evidence considered by the
DHO did not support the charge and that the video did not show him throwing anything
or reaching toward his waist. (Id. at p. 46). He asserted that the DHO should have
weighed in on Huckelberry’s credibility and made clear why she was rejecting his
account. (Id.). The BOP’s Regional Appeal Office denied the appeal after concluding that
the DHO report clearly addressed what the video depicted and that the hearing afforded
Henderson due process. Henderson then appealed to the BOP’s central office, which also
affirmed the DHO’s decision. (Id. at p. 52).
On August 12, 2024, Henderson filed this habeas petition. The Government
responded to the petition and furnished the video evidence to the Court for in camera
review. (Doc. 11). The Government explains that the footage cannot be released publicly
because of the risk that inmates could learn how to evade the prison’s camera system.
(Doc. 10-1, p. 5).
APPLICABLE LAW
Federal inmates must be given due process before their good time credit can be
rescinded. Brooks–Bey v. Smith, 819 F.2d 178, 180 (7th Cir. 1987). Inmates can challenge the
loss of good conduct credit through a petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 842 (7th Cir. 2011).
In a disciplinary hearing, inmates retain certain due process rights such as: (1) a
receipt of written notice of the charges in advance of the hearing; (2) an opportunity to be
heard before an impartial decision maker; (3) the right to call witnesses and present
evidence where the same will not be unduly hazardous to safety or correctional goals;
and (4) a written statement as to the evidence relied on and the reason for the decision.
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66 (1974); Henderson v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 13 F.3d
1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1994); Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939 (7th Cir. 2007). Along with
these safeguards, due process requires that the findings of the DHO be supported by
“some evidence from which the conclusion of the administrative tribunal could be
deduced.” Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985) (quoting United States ex rel.
Vajtauer v. Comm’r of Immigr., 273 U.S. 103, 106 (1927)); see also Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 941.
The “some evidence” standard is a low bar, which the Seventh Circuit has described as a
“meager threshold.” Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 941 (adding that “once the meager threshold has
been crossed our inquiry ends”). A habeas court can overturn the decision “only if no
reasonable adjudicator could have found [petitioner] guilty of the offense on the basis of
the evidence presented.” Henderson, 13 F.3d at 1077.
DISCUSSION
Henderson’s only argument for reversing the DHO’s finding is that her decision
failed to properly consider and address what the video footage of the incident depicted.
Specifically, he says that the video shows him being patted down as he was taken from
his cell, suggesting that officers did not locate anything on him at that time. Then, when
he was escorted by the stairway, the footage shows that his hands were not in his pockets
and that nothing dropped out his pants or from his hand before Officer Huckelberry
located the drugs on the ground.
Due process, in a prison disciplinary hearing, only requires “that there be some
evidence to support the findings made in the disciplinary hearing.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 457.
The relevant question under this standard is “whether there is any evidence in the record
that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board.” Id. at 456-57. The
Court cannot “assess the comparative weight of the evidence underlying the disciplinary
board’s decision.” Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2000). Instead, the “some
evidence” standard is satisfied so long as “the record is not so devoid of evidence that the
findings of the disciplinary board were without support or otherwise arbitrary.” Hill,
472 U.S. at 457.
Henderson takes the position that the video footage is exculpatory, so the DHO’s
decision is faulty.2 The Court disagrees. The footage depicts two correctional officers
walking behind Henderson and another inmate through the prison’s dayroom. The
group is walking away from the camera, towards an area of the room that is partially
blocked from view by a staircase. From the Court’s review, Henderson appears to have
one of his hands in a pants pocket or near his waist. As Henderson passed in front of the
staircase, he becomes obscured from view, and the Court cannot discern what, if
anything, he did with his hands. It is apparent that Officer Huckelberry retrieves
2 Henderson states that he has no objections to the Government’s decision to submit the video to the Court
for in camera review. (Doc. 12). He notes, however, that he does not know how long the video is or what
time it starts and stops.
something on the floor in front of the stairs a few seconds later.3 After viewing the
footage numerous times, the Court finds that it sheds little light on whether Henderson
was—or was not—the source of the drugs Huckelberry located.
The DHO and Henderson’s staff representative were apparently able to discern
additional details from the footage. The staff representative reported that he saw
Henderson’s hand leave his pocket as he walked in front of the stairwell. (Doc. 10-2,
p. 36). The DHO also claimed to see Henderson drop his arm from his pocket shortly
before Officer Huckelberry bends down. (Id. at p. 39). That detail is not obvious to the
Court from its review of the footage, but the Court is not prepared to say that other views
are erroneous. At a minimum, it is apparent that the footage is not exculpatory. That is,
it does not definitively establish that the drugs were not Henderson’s.
Besides, the DHO’s finding also relied on Officer Huckelberry’s own account, as
documented in the incident report. (Id. at p. 38). Huckelberry reported that Henderson
“pulled out a small plastic bag from his waist area and threw it behind him.” (Id.). The
Seventh Circuit has held that an officer’s conduct report alone may provide “some
evidence” to support a hearing officer’s decision. See McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784,
786 (7th Cir. 1999) (concluding that description in a disciplinary report is “some
evidence”); Isby-Israel v. Finnan, 347 F. App’x 253, 254 (7th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, even
without the video footage, the DHO’s decision would be sufficient to meet the “meager
threshold” required in this context. Scruggs, 485 F.3d at 941. To the extent Henderson
3 The footage continues for approximately seven more minutes, but no party has suggested that any of that
period is relevant here.
views Huckelberry as unreliable, it is notable that he never attempted to call him as a
witness, despite having the opportunity to do so at two hearings.
Henderson also suggests that there exists video footage of him being patted down
by the officers as he left his cell. He believes that the fact the officers found nothing on
him at that time is exculpatory evidence that the DHO should have considered. The pat-
down Henderson describes is not clearly depicted on the footage provided to the Court,
which begins about 17 seconds before Officer Huckelberry retrieved the bag of drugs
from the ground. In his reply brief, Henderson makes clear he has never seen the video
footage that the DHO considered, so it is unsurprising that he was not aware the pat-
down is not included. (Doc. 12). The Court therefore will treat this portion of Henderson’s
argument as a claim that he was denied due process because the DHO failed to locate
and consider that earlier footage, which might have been exculpatory.
“[D]ue process requires that prisoners receive access to exculpatory evidence,
including video recordings, ‘unless its disclosure would unduly threaten institutional
concerns.’” Hudson v. Knight, 751 F. App’x 897, 899 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Piggie v.
McBride, 277 F.3d 922, 925 (7th Cir. 2002)). If, as here, security concerns prevent an inmate
from reviewing exculpatory video evidence himself, prison officials still must review
relevant footage for possibly exculpatory evidence if an inmate requests it. Id.
During the initial disciplinary hearing, Henderson urged the DHO to review video
footage of Huckelberry finding the drugs. He emphasized, “I did not pull anything from
my waistband or throw anything. The camera will show that.” (Doc. 10-2, p. 21). The BOP
sustained his administrative appeal and ordered another hearing so that the DHO could
consider the footage. (Id. at p. 27). But after reviewing that footage, the DHO ruled against
him. Now, Henderson contends the DHO should have considered video footage of a pat-
down that took place at some time before the footage here. However, the record contains
no indication Henderson clearly requested the hearing officer review footage of the pat-
down as opposed to the moment Huckelberry allegedly saw him toss the bag of drugs to
the ground. See Piggie, 277 F.3d at 925 (stating that a prisoner would not be denied due
process based on a lack of access to potentially exculpatory video footage if he failed to
make a request before or during the hearing); Renth v. Sproul, No. 18-2116, 2021 WL
1169556, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 26, 2021) (“[T]he Seventh Circuit has clarified that due process
does not require a disciplinary officer to consider or review evidence that was never
requested by the prisoner.”).
And even if the footage depicts what Henderson says it does—a pat-down that
yielded no drugs—the DHO’s failure to consider it would be harmless. See Nelson v.
Stevens, 861 F. App’x 667, 669 (7th Cir. 2021) (“The denial of potentially exculpatory
evidence at a prison disciplinary hearing is subject to harmless-error review; the prisoner
must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the deprivation.”); see also Piggie v. Cotton,
344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003) (invoking a harmless error standard in this context). For
one, the DHO was already aware Henderson had been patted down prior to the events
in the video: Henderson told her so at the hearing. (Doc. 10-2, p. 39 (“I got searched when
I first walked out of my cell.”)). Other than corroborating that a pat-down, in fact, took
place, it is difficult to see how video footage of that pat-down would make a meaningful
difference. At most, the footage would show that Huckelberry did not find drugs on
Henderson—not that Henderson did not possess them. True, Huckelberry’s failure to find
drugs on Henderson is somewhat exculpatory,4 but the Court’s review of exculpatory
evidence is limited to evidence that “directly undercuts the reliability of the evidence on
which the disciplinary authority relied or there are other extra-ordinary circumstances.”
Viens v. Daniels, 871 F.2d 1328, 1335 (7th Cir. 1989). Here, video footage of a prior pat-
down would not directly undermine the evidence relied on by the DHO, principally
consisting of Huckelberry’s statement in the incident report that Henderson threw the
bag to the floor and the evidence that the bag contained Suboxone, which he was not
permitted to possess. Because this Court cannot say that “no reasonable adjudicator could
have found [Henderson] guilty of the offense on the basis of the evidence presented,”
Henderson, 13 F.3d at 1077, his petition must be denied.5
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
filed by Petitioner Emmanuel Henderson (Doc. 1) is DENIED.
If Henderson wishes to appeal this Order, he must file a notice of appeal with this
Court within 60 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). If Henderson
chooses to appeal, he will be liable for the $605.00 appellate filing fee irrespective of the
4 The exculpatory value of this potential evidence is further limited by the reality that a quick pat-down
search plausibly would not turn up the contraband at issue here: a small bag filled with pieces of a paper-
like substance.
5 In his reply brief, Henderson also raises concerns regarding a label on the bag of drugs and whether the
drugs were properly tested. (Doc. 12, pp. 4-5). He also argues that he did not have a reason to possess drugs
because of his participation in the prison’s RDAP program. Because Henderson did not raise these points
in his original petition, they are waived. See O’Neal v. Reilly, 961 F.3d 973, 974 (7th Cir. 2020) (“[D]istrict
courts are entitled to treat an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief as waived.”); Thompson v.
Battaglia, 458 F.3d 614, 616 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting that a habeas petition must “specify all the grounds for
relief available to [the petitioner].”).
outcome of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 3(e); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Ammons v. Gerlinger,
547 F.3d 724, 725-26 (7th Cir. 2008). If Henderson files a motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis, he must include in his motion a description of the issues he intends to
present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C).
It is not necessary for Henderson to obtain a certificate of appealability from this
disposition of his § 2241 petition. Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 638 (7th Cir. 2000).
This entire action is DISMISSED with prejudice, and the Clerk of Court is
DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 26, 2026
wef pions!
NANCY J. ROSENSTENGEL |
United States District Judge
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