BRYANT

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

RAEVIN B., )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) 1:25CV831

)

FRANK BISIGNANO, )

Commissioner of Social )

Security, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION

OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The plaintiff, Raevin B. (“Raevin”), I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

brought this action to obtain review of

a final decision of the Commissioner Raevin filed an application for

of Social Security denying her claim disability insurance benefits and a

for social security disability insurance period of disability in July of 2022,

benefits and a period of disability.1 alleging a disability onset date of June

The Court has considered the certified 15, 2022, later amended to September

administrative record and dispositive 19, 2022. (Tr. 181-87, 221, 17.) The

briefing from the parties. Because applications were denied initially and

substantial evidence supports the upon reconsideration. (Tr. 106-09,

determination of the Administrative 112-14.) After two hearings,2 the

Law Judge (“ALJ”), the Court will Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)

deny Raevin’s request for the award of determined on August 30, 2024 that

benefits or for a remand, as set forth Raevin was not disabled under the

below. Act. (Tr. 17-76.) The Appeals Council

denied a request for review, making

the ALJ’s decision the final decision

for review. (Tr. 1-6.)

1 Transcript citations refer to the in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

Administrative Transcript of Record filed 636(c). Docket Entry 11.

manually with the Commissioner’s

Answer. See Docket Entry 4. By Order of 2 A supplemental hearing was held after

Reference, this matter was referred to the technical issues ended the first hearing.

Undersigned to conduct all proceedings (Tr. 17.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The Commissioner uses a five-step

process to evaluate disability claims.”

While Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470,

United States Code “authorizes 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 20

judicial review of the Social Security C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4),

Commissioner’s denial of social 404.1520(a)(4)).

security benefits,” see Hines v.

Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. Under this process, the

2006), the scope of that review is Commissioner asks, in

specific and narrow, see Smith v. sequence, whether the

Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th claimant: (1) worked during the

Cir. 1986). Specifically, review is alleged period of disability; (2)

limited to determining if there is had a severe impairment; (3)

substantial evidence in the record to had an impairment that met or

support the Commissioner’s decision. equaled the requirements of a

42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hunter v. listed impairment; (4) could

Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. return to her [or his] past

1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d relevant work; and (5) if not,

1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In could perform any other work

reviewing for substantial evidence, in the national economy.

the Court does not re-weigh

conflicting evidence, make credibility Id. at 472. A finding adverse to the

determinations, or substitute its claimant at any of several points in

judgment for that of the this five-step sequence forecloses a

Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76 disability designation and ends the

F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Put inquiry. Id. at 473. “Through the

simply: the issue before the Court is fourth step, the burden of production

not whether Raevin is disabled but and proof is on the claimant. If the

whether the finding that she is not claimant reaches step five, the burden

disabled is supported by substantial shifts to the Secretary to produce

evidence and based upon a correct evidence that other jobs exist in the

application of the relevant law. Id. national economy that the claimant

can perform considering his age,

III. THE ALJ’S DECISION education, and work experience.” See

Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal

The ALJ followed the correct process, citations omitted).

set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, to

determine disability. See Albright v. The ALJ determined at step one that

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d Raevin had not engaged in substantial

473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). gainful activity since the alleged onset

date. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ next found the

following severe impairments at step

2

two: degenerative disc disease; (Tr. 22-23.) At the fourth step, the

depressive, bipolar, and related ALJ determined that Raevin was

disorders; anxiety and obsessive- unable to perform her past relevant

compulsive disorder; and post- work. (Tr. 30.) Last, at step five, the

traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). ALJ concluded that there were other

(Tr. 20.) At step three, the ALJ found jobs in the national economy that

that Raevin did not have an Raevin could perform. (Tr. 30.)

impairment or combination of

impairments listed in, or medically IV. DISCUSSION

equal to one listed in, Appendix 1. (Tr.

20.) In her appeal, Raevin asserts only that

“[t]he ALJ erred by failing to evaluate

The ALJ next set forth Raevin’s and account for [her] therapy animal

Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) usage in the RFC assessment.”

and determined that she could Docket Entry 8 at 4. The record

perform a reduced range of medium demonstrates otherwise, as set forth

work as follows: below.

specifically, the claimant can A. The RFC Determination

lift and/or carry up to 50

pounds occasionally and up The RFC measures the most a

and 25 pounds frequently; she claimant can do in a work setting

is [sic] sit, stand, and walk up to despite the physical and mental

six hours each in an eight-hour limitations of his or her impairments

workday; she can push/pull as and any related symptoms (e.g., pain).

much as she can lift/carry; See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); see

further, she is able to also Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x

understand, remember and 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2015)

carryout instructions by (unpublished) (claimant’s RFC is “[a]

performing simple, routine, medical assessment of what an

and repetitive tasks, but not at individual can do in a work setting in

a production rate pace (e.g., spite of the functional limitations and

assembly line work); she is able environmental restrictions imposed

to perform simple work-related by all of his or her medically

decisions; she can frequently determinable impairment(s)”)

interact with supervisors, and (internal citation omitted); Hines,

occasionally interact with 453 F.3d at 562. The RFC includes

coworkers and the public; and both a “physical exertional or strength

the claimant’s time-off task can limitation” that assesses the

be accommodated by normal claimant’s “ability to do sedentary,

breaks. light, medium, heavy, or very heavy

work,” as well as “nonexertional

3

limitations (mental, sensory, or skin components: (1) evidence, (2) logical

impairments).” Hall v. Harris, 658 explanation, and (3) conclusion”). As

F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981). noted earlier, the ALJ “must both

identify evidence that supports his

“Social Security Ruling 96-8p conclusion and ‘build an accurate and

explains that the RFC assessment logical bridge from [that] evidence to

must include a narrative discussion his conclusion.’” Woods v. Berryhill,

describing how the evidence supports 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018)

each conclusion, citing specific (alteration in original) (quoting

medical facts (e.g., laboratory Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). Failure to

findings) and nonmedical evidence do so constitutes reversible error. See

(e.g., daily activities, observations).” Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868

Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2017). Where an ALJ’s

(4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations “analysis is incomplete and precludes

omitted). An ALJ need not discuss meaningful review,” remand is

every piece of evidence in making an appropriate. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 191.

RFC determination. See Reid v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, Moreover, “[a]n ALJ assesses the

865 (4th Cir. 2014). Yet, the ALJ credibility of a claimant’s subjective

“must build an accurate and logical statements about his condition as part

bridge from the evidence to [the] of the RFC assessment,” Ladda v.

conclusion.” Brown v. Commissioner, Berryhill, 749 F. App’x 166, 170 (4th

873 F.3d 251, 269 (4th Cir. 2017) Cir. 2018) (unpublished), using a two-

(internal quotations omitted). “The part test: “First, there must be

RFC assessment must first identify objective medical evidence showing

the individual’s functional limitations ‘the existence of a medical

or restrictions and assess his or her impairment(s) which results from

work-related abilities on a function- anatomical, physiological, or

by-function basis . . . . Only [then] psychological abnormalities and

may RFC be expressed in terms of the which could reasonably be expected to

exertional levels of work, sedentary, produce the pain or other symptoms

light, medium, heavy, and very alleged,’” Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (citing

heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b),

at *1. 404.1529(b)).

The Fourth Circuit has held that If such an impairment exists, the ALJ

“meaningful review is frustrated when must then consider, as the second

an ALJ goes straight from listing prong of the test, all available

evidence to stating a conclusion.” evidence, including the claimant’s

Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, statements about pain, to determine

311 (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “a whether the claimant is disabled. Id.

proper RFC analysis has three at 595-96. In so doing, the ALJ need

4

not credit them if they conflict with (vi) Any measures [Plaintiff]

the objective medical evidence or if use[s] or [has] used to

the underlying impairment could not relieve his pain or other

reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms (e.g., lying flat

symptoms alleged. Id. Where the ALJ on [his] back, standing

has considered the relevant factors, for 15 to 20 minutes

see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), and every hour, sleeping on a

heard the claimant’s testimony and board, etc.); and

observed his or her demeanor, the

Court will defer to the ALJ’s (vii) Other factors concerning

determination regarding those [Plaintiff’s] functional

subjective complaints. Shively v. limitations and

Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. restrictions due to pain

1984). or other symptoms.

Those relevant factors include: 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3).

(i) [Plaintiff’s] daily Additionally, the longstanding

activities; requirements calling for adjudicators

to weigh medical opinions and give

(ii) The location, duration, special deference to treating source

frequency, and intensity opinions have changed. See 20 C.F.R.

of [Plaintiff’s] pain or § 404.1520c(a) (effective March 27,

other symptoms; 2017). Now, adjudicators “will not

defer or give any specific evidentiary

(iii) Precipitating and weight, including controlling weight,

aggravating factors; to any medical opinion(s) or prior

administrative medical finding(s),

(iv) The type, dosage, including those from [a claimant’s]

effectiveness, and side medical sources.” Id. Nevertheless, an

effects of any medication ALJ must consider and articulate in

[Plaintiff] take[s] or the administrative decision how

[has] taken to alleviate persuasive he or she finds each

his pain or other medical opinion or prior medical

symptoms; finding in a claimant’s case record.

See id. § 404.1520c(b). When a

(v) Treatment, other than medical source provides more than

medication, [Plaintiff] one opinion or finding, the ALJ will

receive[s] or [has] evaluate the persuasiveness of such

received for relief of his opinions or findings as a class. See id.

pain or other symptoms; § 404.1520c(b)(1). The ALJ is “not

required to articulate how [she]

5

considered each medical opinion or claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. §

prior administrative medical finding 404.1520b(c)(1)-(3). The regulations

from one medical source also make clear that, for such claims,

individually.” Id. “we will not provide any analysis

about how we considered such

As to persuasiveness, the ALJ must evidence in our determination or

articulate two factors: supportability decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c).

and consistency. Id. §

404.1520c(b)(2). Supportability is an Last, though there appears to be no

internal check that references binding Fourth Circuit precedent,

objective medical evidence and other courts have found that the use of

supporting explanations that come a therapy/service animal must be

from the source itself. Id. § medically necessary (for example,

404.1520c(c)(1); see also Revisions to medically prescribed or

Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. recommended) to be considered in an

Consistency is an external check that RFC assessment. See Shue v.

references evidence from other O’Malley, No. 23-1795, 2024 WL

medical and nonmedical sources. Id. § 2827936, at *3 (4th Cir. June 4, 2024)

404.1520c(c)(2); see also Revisions to (unpublished) affirming, 2023 WL

Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. The ALJ 3727935, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 30,

must only address the three other 2023) (“A prescription has reasonably

persuasiveness factors—relationship been considered adequate evidence of

with the claimant, specialization, and necessity, which would trigger a duty

the catchall “other factors”—when two for the ALJ to address the service

or more medical opinions, or prior animal’s role and impact on the

administrative medical findings about claimant’s RFC, while a lack of a

the same issue, are equally persuasive prescription or other credible medical

in terms of supportability and documentation may indicate the

consistency. Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), animal is not medically necessary.”).

404.1520c(c)(3)-(5). However, the Fourth Circuit has

noted that the medical necessity

Furthermore, “[s]tatements that standard “appears to be in tension

[claimants] are or are not disabled, . . with the requirement that the RFC be

. able to work, or able to perform based on all the relevant medical and

regular or continuing work,” are other evidence found in the record.”

statements on an issue reserved to the Shue, 2024 WL 2827936, at *3

Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § (emphasis added).

404.1520b(c)(3). And statements on

issues reserved to the Commissioner B. The RFC Is Legally Correct, Well-

are deemed evidence that “is Supported, and Susceptible to

inherently neither valuable nor Review.

persuasive to the issue of whether [a

6

Here, regardless of whether the concerning the intensity, persistence

“medical necessity” standard or the and limiting effects of these

“all the relevant medical and other symptoms are not entirely consistent

evidence” standard applies, the ALJ in with the medical evidence and other

this case adequately explained in a evidence in the record for the reasons

manner susceptible to judicial review explained in this decision.” (Tr. 24.)

why the RFC did not warrant the As shown below, the ALJ then gave

inclusion of a therapy animal. good reasons for partially discounting

Instead, the ALJ concluded, in a her subjective allegations (which

decision supported by substantial includes any purported need for a

evidence, that Raevin could perform a therapy animal in the workplace),

range of medium work with which are the same reasons that also

numerous mental limitations. (Tr. support the ALJ’s overall RFC

22.) determination.

Specifically, the ALJ began his RFC First, the ALJ accurately pointed to

assessment by summarizing at length Raevin’s sparse mental health

Raevin’s testimony. (Tr. 23-24.) And, treatment, explaining that

in pertinent part, the ALJ noted that

Raevin testified that she “lives by for her mental health

herself in an apartment with a therapy impairments, the claimant has

dog, stating that the therapy dog helps had sparse medical treatment.

. . . with her anxiety, depression, and Although she alleges that she

bipolar disorder. She stated that the became too limited to work as

therapy dog [provides] reminders of of September 2022, she had

[sic] during the day of things such as only been seen on three

when to go to bed, and reminds [her] occasions for mental health

to eat.” (Tr. 23.) treatment in July 2022, and did

not seek any additional mental

Nevertheless, the ALJ decided not to health treatment until

fully credit all of Raevin’s allegations, November 2023. She began

including any allegation that she consistent outpatient therapy

required a therapy animal to function sessions in January 2024, but

in the workplace. Specifically, the ALJ did not begin any medication

explained that Raevin’s “medically until June 2024.

determinable impairments could

reasonably be expected to cause some Tr. 27, 427-30 (7/1/2022), 431-34

of the alleged symptoms . . . .” (Tr. 24.) (7/7/2022), 435-38 (7/21/2022),

The ALJ thus performed the first step 369-78 (11/20/2023), 400-12, 407

of the Craig analysis. Next, the ALJ (11/20/23) (“not open to psychotropic

performed step two of the analysis, medications at this time”), 379-89

concluding that Raevin’s “statements (1/31/24), 390-91 (2/7/2024), 392-

7

94 (2/15/2024), 395-96 (2/21/2024), Second, in supporting his RFC

413-23 (1/30-31/2024), 440-42 determination and subjective

(4/12/2024), 443-45 (4/15/2024), complaints assessment, the ALJ

446-48 (4/25/2024), 449-51 pointed to Raevin’s extensive daily

(5/7/2024), 452-54 (5/14/2024), activities. For example, the ALJ

455-57 (5/21/2024), 458-60 pointed out that at a consultative

(5/28/2024), 461-63 (6/11/2024), physical examination in March 2023,

464-66 (6/18/2024), 467-68 Raevin stated that she lived

(7/7/24), 471-73 (6/21/2024) independently. (Tr. 22, 335.) She also

(“Currently w/o medications for few stated that she was able to do

years and agreed to medication household chores like cooking,

management and OPT . . . . Wants to cleaning, washing dishes, laundry,

try new medication or holistic and that she was able to take care of

remedy.”), 474-76 (7/2/2024), 477-79 her hygiene. (Tr. 21, 335.) She

(7/9/2024), 480-82 (7/16/2024), reported at another March 2023

483-85 (7/30/2024). consultative examination that her

daily routine consisted of caring for

Raevin has not challenged this her dog, completing chores, and

finding, and it supports the ALJ’s grooming. (Tr. 26, 343.) She stated

conclusion that she did not suffer that she was able to drive and could

from disabling mental health grocery shop independently although

impairments. See Lewis v. Colvin, No. she generally used Instacart. (Tr. 26,

3:12-CV-08073, 2013 WL 6145811, at 343.) Also, during therapy, she

*21 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 21, 2013) reported that she was able to live

(“Claimant’s sparse mental health independently, dated, was working

treatment is inconsistent with her towards her degree (receiving an A in

claim of severe impairment due to a class in 2024), and also started her

PTSD. The overall paucity of own business. (Tr. 21, 26-27, 379, 413,

treatment records reflecting any 427, 428, 431-32, 435-36, 455, 449.)

limiting complaints or symptoms of

PTSD undercuts Claimant’s reports of In fact, she was interviewed for this

symptoms to the consultative business, participated in the filming

examiners.”) (citing Mickles v. of a one-hour video regarding the

Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 930 (4th Cir. business, and sustained an active

1994) (holding that “it was not social medial presence and website

improper for the ALJ to consider the for her business. (Tr. 21, 24, 26-27,

level and type of treatment [the 60-62, 446, 449.) The ALJ further

claimant] sought and obtained in pointed out that Raevin also hosted a

determining what weight to accord “yoga event” in 2024. (Tr. 26, 63-64,

her allegations” of symptoms and 330, 390, 438, 452 (“She mentioned

severity). that she hosted a yoga event”), 343

(“She has attempted odd jobs like

8

teaching yoga but proved Jill J. v. Dudek, No. 8:23-CV-5536-

unsuccessful due to issues with WSB, 2025 WL 1009089, at *12

location.”).) Raevin has not (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2025) (“[N]ormal

challenged the ALJ’s assessment of mental status findings, when

her activities of daily living and these considered in combination with

extensive activities further support Plaintiff’s conservative treatment

the ALJ’s RFC determination as well during the period under review and

as his decision to partially discount Plaintiff’s daily activities, provide

her allegations of total disability, substantial evidence to support the

including any allegation that she ALJ’s decision as to Plaintiff’s mental

required a therapy animal in the limitations.”).

workplace. See Monroe, 826 F.3d at

189 (listing daily activities as the type Fourth, the ALJ addressed numerous

of non-medical evidence an ALJ may medical opinions in assessing

consider in assessing the RFC); 20 Raevin’s RFC. Specifically, the ALJ

C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (listing considered the March 2023 opinions

activities of daily living as a relevant of non-examining state agency

factor to consider in assessing medical consultant C. Leinweber, DO,

subjective allegations). as well as a December 2023 opinion of

non-examining state agency medical

Third, the ALJ pointed to Raevin’s consultant Dr. Scott Murkin, both of

generally normal mental status whom concluded that Raevin could

examinations. (Tr. 21 (“Mental status perform a full range of medium work.

examinations noted that her thought (Tr. 28, 89, 100.) The ALJ found these

process and thought content were opinions persuasive, because “they

normal, she was oriented on all had an opportunity to review the

planes, and that her immediate and entirety of [Raevin’s] medical records

remote memory seemed to be within regarding her physical impairments,

normal range. Additionally, her including the consultative physical

mental trend and thought content examinations, and their findings are

revealed no hallucinations, delusions, consistent with the relative lack of any

persecutions, obsessions, thought physical findings at these

control, unusual power, suicidal or examinations.” (Tr. 27.)

homicidal ideation.”), 22, 25, 27, 428,

372-75, 403-06, 354-57, 341, 344-47.) The ALJ next considered the medical

Raevin has not challenged the ALJ’s opinions of the non-examining state

assessment of her generally normal agency psychological consultants. (Tr.

mental status reports and this was 28.) In May 2023, Dr. Kristin Wiltrout

additional substantial evidence in concluded that Raevin could

support of both the ALJ’s RFC understand and remember at least

determination as well as the ALJ’s simple instructions, could sustain

subjective complaints analysis. See concentration and persistence for

9

simple work in a low-stress, non- had no medical treatment for any

production environment, could physical impairments and further

maintain appropriate interactions in because they were consistent with the

the workplace, and could adapt to lack of any significant findings at Dr.

occasional, predictable changes in a Flores’ examination. (Tr. 28.) Raevin

stable work environment. (Tr. 28, 89- has not challenged the ALJ’s

91.) Dr. Susan Stanton, another state assessment or Dr. Flores’ opinion.

agency psychological consultant,

came to the same conclusion in The ALJ next found the March and

January 2024. (Tr. 28, 101-03.) The December 2023 medical opinions of

ALJ found these opinions persuasive consultative examiners Warren E.

because the consultants supported Hoskins, LPA HSP, a licensed

their findings with record evidence psychological associate, and Larry

and their findings were consistent Hines, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist

with the medical and other evidence only “somewhat persuasive.” (Tr. 28-

as a whole.3 (Tr. 28.) 29, 341-48, 352-58.) In both opinions

they described Raevin as “emotionally

The ALJ next found Dr. Augustin fragile” with mild to moderate

Flores’ March 2023 opinion difficulties negotiating simple stress

persuasive, which found that Raevin in light of her history; mild difficulties

had no limitations with regards to her understanding, retaining and

ability to stand, walk, or sit and found following instructions to performing

that she would be limited to routine, repetitive tasks given her

lifting/carrying/pushing/pulling up reported short term memory

to 50 pounds occasionally and up to impairment; mild/moderate

25 pounds frequently, and that she limitations in concentration

had no postural, manipulative, or persistence and pace in light of her

environmental limitations. (Tr. 28, current functioning; and moderately

339.) He concluded the same self-sufficient, though her level of self-

following a second consultative sufficiency was likely to parallel

physical examination in December declines in mental functioning in light

2023. (Tr. 28, 365.) The ALJ found of her history of not showing up to

these opinions persuasive, because work because of depression after

they were consistent with the record mania. (Tr. 28, 347, 358.)

as a whole, which showed that Raevin The ALJ explained that these

3 Raevin has not challenged the ALJ’s the ALJ’s assessment or this Order,

assessment of the non-examining state especially in light of the remaining record

agency opinions other than to note that illustrating Raevin’s sparse mental

they are silent on the issue of the need for health treatment, extensive activities of

a therapy animal. Docket Entry 10 at 2-3. daily living, and generally normal mental

However, that does not undermine either status reports.

10

opinions were not entirely supported Phillip’s letter did not contain any

by the medical evidence, which vocationally relevant functional

showed that, at the time of the initial assessment. (Tr. 29.)

consultative examination, Raevin was

not receiving any mental health Likewise, the ALJ noted that Dr.

treatment, that she opted not to take Tasha Holland-Kornegay, with Our

any medication until June of 2024 for Treatment Center, wrote in May 2023

her conditions, and that despite her that, upon evaluation, Raevin was

mental health impairments, she was “limited [in] one or more major life

able to work on college classes, live activities or major bodily functions,

alone, and establish and maintain her including the ability to care for one’s

own business. (Tr. 29.) Raevin has not self and within their work.” (Tr. 29.)

challenged the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Holland-Kornegay thus

these opinions. recommended an emotional support

animal. (Tr. 29, 426.) However, the

The ALJ then noted that Nizae Phillip, ALJ found that this recommendation

MSW, LCSWA, with B&D Integrated was not persuasive either, because

Health Services, wrote that in there was no vocationally relevant

November 2023 Raevin was functional assessment, and there were

diagnosed with bipolar disorder, no treatment notes from Dr. Holland-

generalized anxiety disorder, and Kornegay to verify these statements.

major depressive disorder, and that (Tr. 29.)

outpatient therapy services and

medication management had been In light of all this, the ALJ limited

recommended. (Tr. 29, 425.) The ALJ Raevin to, in pertinent part, a reduced

found that, to the extent this range of medium work performing

statement could be considered a simple, routine, and repetitive tasks,

medical opinion under the but not at a production rate pace;

regulations, it was unpersuasive performing simple work-related

because there was no vocationally decisions; and only frequent

relevant functional assessment. (Tr. interactions with supervisors, and

29.) The ALJ further noted that only occasionally interaction with

Phillip also wrote in a June 2024 coworkers and the public. (Tr. 22-23.)

letter that Raevin was disabled and The ALJ also considered all the

was eligible for an emotional support material evidence related to Raevin’s

animal to help alleviate her mental alleged need for a therapy animal in

health challenges and improve her the workplace (i.e., Raevin’s

ability to live independently. (Tr. 29, testimony and the two letters from

439.) The ALJ found this medical providers, neither of which

unpersuasive, noting that the issue of were persuasive) but concluded that

disability is one reserved for the this alleged need did not warrant

Commissioner and noting further that inclusion in the RFC in light of

11

Raevin’s sparse mental health the letter written by therapist Phillip,

treatment, her extensive activities of both of whom recommended a

daily living, her mental status reports therapy animal (Tr. 426, 439) and she

upon examination, and the persuasive challenges the ALJ’s decision to find

medical opinion evidence. This is them unpersuasive because they

substantial evidence to support the lacked “any vocationally relevant

ALJ’s RFC determination as well as functional assessment” (Tr. 29).

the omission of a therapy animal from However, under both the old and new

the RFC. regulations describing how an ALJ is

to evaluate medical opinions,

C. Raevin’s Objections to the vagueness in assessing vocational

Contrary Are Not Persuasive. limitations constitutes a permissible

ground for an ALJ to discount a

Nevertheless, Raevin contends that medical opinion in whole or in part.4

the ALJ erred by failing to either The Court is unaware of any law that

include the use of a therapy animal in would change this general principle

the RFC or to explain why he omitted when it comes to a therapy animal and

the use of one. Docket Entry 8 at 6. In ample persuasive case law supports

support, she points to the letter this conclusion.5 See also 20 C.F.R. §

written by Dr. Holland-Kornegay and 404.1513(a)(2) (providing that “[a]

4 See, e.g., Wesley v. Kijakazi, No. reversible error where “Dr. Stromberg

1:20CV364, 2021 WL 4129234, at *11 did not opine that Plaintiff required an

(M.D.N.C. Sept. 9, 2021) (“Vagueness emotional support animal in order to

constitutes a permissible grounds for an perform any work-related functions, nor

ALJ to discount a medical opinion.”) did he discuss what Plaintiff could do in

(collecting cases); Betty C. v. Comm’r, a work setting despite her symptoms and

Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:23-CV-00246- diagnoses”); Angela H. v. Comm’r, SSA,

JMC, 2023 WL 7386206, at *5 (D. Md. No. 2:22-cv-4461, 2024 WL 1259875, at

Nov. 8, 2023) (collecting cases); Samuel *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2024) (holding

P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-5881, that a letter recommending that the

2021 WL 5769404, at *6 (W.D. Wash. plaintiff obtain an emotional support

Dec. 6, 2021); Langford v. Comm’r of Soc. animal to help alleviate issues with social

Sec. Admin., No. 1:22-CV-00665-CEH, interaction, stress, and anxiety and to

2023 WL 3058160, at *26 (N.D. Ohio Apr. enjoy the use of her dwelling was not a

24, 2023); Chiccola v. Comm’r of Soc. medical opinion because it did not

Sec., No. 1:18 CV 2940, 2020 WL describe the work functions she could

1031488, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2020) perform despite her symptoms); Ashley

(internal citations omitted) (collecting D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 22-

cases). 11344, 2023 WL 5266849, at *10 (E.D.

Mich. July 17, 2023) (finding no error

5 See Leticia B. v. King, No. CV 24-116 where “Dr. Cousineau’s letter [does not]

MV/GJF, 2025 WL 289420, at *10 indicate how the use of an emotional

(D.N.M. Jan. 24, 2025) (finding no support dog would bear on Plaintiff’s

12

medical opinion is a statement from a the dwelling unit you own and/or

medical source about what you can administer.” (Tr. 426.) She states,

still do despite your impairment(s) “My client’s emotional support

and whether you have one or more animal helps them deal with the stress

impairment-related limitations or and pain associated with their

restrictions in [specified] abilities”). disability.” (Tr. 426.)

More specifically, Dr. Holland- The ALJ did not err here. The

Kornegay’s letter references generic question of disability is reserved to

“mental health conditions,” asserts in the Commissioner and the ALJ

a conclusory fashion that Raevin is accurately stated the same. See 20

disabled, and then asserts vaguely C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3). Nor, in light

that she is “substantially limit[ed in] of the ample case law cited above,

one or more major life activities or supra note 5, and the ALJ’s evaluation

major bodily functions, including the of the overall record, did the ALJ err

ability to care for [her] self and within in finding this vague, conclusory, and

[her] work.” (Tr. 426.) Dr. Holland- unsupported letter unpersuasive,

Kornegay then “recommend[s] an especially where there are no

emotional support animal” as treatment notes in the record from Dr.

“necessary to provide therapeutic Holland-Kornegay.

emotional support that alleviates

symptoms of [her] client’s Therapist Nizae Phillip’s letter is

impairment, and to enhance [her] similar to Dr. Holland-Kornegay’s.

client’s ability to function and live Phillip’s letter asserts that “[b]ased on

independently and fully use and enjoy my evaluation of [Raevin’s] mental

ability to work.”) (citations omitted); 3:19-CV-47, 2019 WL 6257994, at *19

Horne v. Saul, No. 2:19-CV-013-DCP, (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 4, 2019) (“[T]he ALJ

2020 WL 1547068, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. does not need to consider the use of a

Mar. 31, 2020) (“[T]he Court finds that service dog in Plaintiff’s RFC as there has

Plaintiff has failed to establish that a been no testimony regarding . . . whether

service animal was medically necessary. Plaintiff requires the service dog to

The referenced letter . . . does not . . . perform work[.]”) (collecting cases);

provide an opinion on the impact of a Payano v. Colvin, No. 2:15-cv-00294-

service animal on Plaintiff’s ability to RFB-GWF, 2017 WL 4778593, at *4 (D.

work.”); Nancy J. M. v. Saul, No. ED CV Nev. Oct. 23, 2017) (finding that a letter

19-01144-RAO, 2020 WL 1975364, at *14 from a VA psychiatrist recommending

(C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020) (“[T]he ALJ the use of a service dog when out in

gave no weight to Dr. Reid’s opinion that public “alone does not support an

Plaintiff requires an emotional support assessment that the dog is necessary for

animal because the opinion did not Plaintiff to work, nor describe how she

provide specific information regarding would need any dog in a work setting”)

[Plaintiff’s] work-related abilities.”) adopted in pertinent part in, 2017 WL

(citation omitted); Cordell v. Saul, No. 4778593, at *9 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2017).

13

health condition and considering her obligation to determine whether

history and functional limitations Raevin’s alleged therapy dog use

stemming from emotional/mental qualified as medically necessary. See

health barriers, it is evident that [she] supra note 5. Thus, if the medical

qualifies as having a disability[.]” (Tr. necessity standard were to apply here,

439.) Phillip notes that Raevin is Raevin’s objection would fail for this

“eligible to have an emotional support reason alone. See id. But even if the

animal” “[t]o help alleviate [her] medical necessity standard does not

challenges and improve her ability to apply here, Raevin’s objection still

live independently” and fails in light of the ALJ’s discussion of

“recommend[s] an animal [to] assist all of the evidence in the record,

[her] in managing her disability.” (Tr. including Raevin’s sparse mental

439.) health treatment, her extensive

activities of daily living (including

Again, the ALJ did not err here. As going to college and running a

noted, the question of disability is business), her mental status reports

reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 upon examination, and the medical

C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3). Nor, in light opinion evidence. See id.

of the authorities cited above, supra

note 5, and the ALJ’s evaluation of the In support of her challenge to the

overall record, did the ALJ err in ALJ’s decision, Raevin also points to

finding this vague, conclusory, and her testimony at the administrative

unsupported letter (which does not hearing. Docket Entry 8 at 4-5

reference the workplace or assert any referencing Tr. 49 (“[S]he helps with

functional limitation) unpersuasive. my anxiety, depression, the

See also Sandra A. v. O’Malley, No. symptoms of my bipolar disorder. She

3:23-CV-417-SLS, 2024 WL 4351441, does help me kind of keep my daily

at *8 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2024) needs. She she’ll let me know if it is

(finding insufficient “evidence of any time to get up or time to go to bed.

need for a service dog in the She’ll let you know that I need to eat

workplace” where “Nurse Practitioner sometimes or sit down if my anxiety is

Moore-Zierow recommended that getting a little out of whack.”).

Plaintiff use an emotional support However, the ALJ specifically

animal in her home and during referenced this testimony as part of

aircraft travel to alleviate her his summation of Raevin’s allegations

emotional difficulties and enhance (Tr. 23) and then went on to provide

her ability to live independently.”). good reasons for not fully crediting all

of her purported limitations. Again,

Because the ALJ gave good reasons these reasons include Raevin’s sparse

for finding the two letters mental health treatment, her

recommending a therapy animal extensive activities of daily living

unpersuasive, he satisfied any (including going to college and

14

running a business), her mental status words, the Court is not left to guess

reports upon examination, and the why the ALJ declined to include a

persuasive medical opinion evidence. therapy animal in the RFC. See

These are good reasons to partially Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 637

discount her allegations. (4th Cir. 2015) (observing that a

remand is proper where a court if “left

The remainder of Raevin’s challenge to guess about how the ALJ arrived at

to the ALJ’s decision amounts to a his conclusions”). The ALJ addressed

recitation of evidence that if fully all the material evidence on the issue

credited in her favor, would render and gave good reasons backed by

her disabled. Docket Entry 8 at 5-11. substantial evidence in support of the

However, the ALJ evaluated the RFC. For all of these reasons, the

relevant and material evidence in this Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

case, reconciled it when necessary,

and reasonably concluded that Racvin V. CONCLUSION

was not disabled under the Act. While After careful consideration of the

Raevin disagrees and points to evidence of record, the Court finds

evidence that the ALJ already that the Commissioner’s decision is

considered to argue for the inclusion legally correct, supported by

of a therapy animal in the RFC, this substantial evidence, and susceptible

does not mean that the ALJ’s decision to judicial review. Accordingly, IT IS

was erroneous or that she can ask this HEREBY ORDERED that the final

Court to reweigh the evidence to decision of the Commissioner is

arrive at a different conclusion. upheld.

In the end, remand is not warranted,

given that the ALJ already provided a JoAnna Gibsdn McFadden

logical bridge connecting substantial United States Magistrate Judge

evidence to an RFC that did not

include a therapy animal.® In other June 12, 2026

6 Citing SSR 11-2p, the Commissioner an accommodation, then an ALJ is not

contends that “the ALJ was also not permitted to consider any limitations

required to consider [Raevin’s] alleged posed by the need for a service animal or

need for a service animal,” Docket Entry ESA.”) (collecting cases). However,

9 at 7 citing SSR, 11-2P, 2011 WL because the Fourth Circuit has not

4055665, and there is some support in definitely resolved this issue, Shue, 2024

the caselaw for this, see W.D. v. Dudek, WL 2827936, at *4, the Court has not

No. 1:24-CV-00444-SBP, 2025 WL disposed of this case on that ground and

947533, at *6 n.8 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, has instead fully entertained the merits

2025) (“Several courts have entertained of Raevin’s challenge and found them to

the notion that if a service animal or be unpersuasive for the reasons

[emotional support animal] is considered described herein.

15