William Martin v. Mauricio Duran

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-10957

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

WILLIAM MARTIN,

MICHAEL MARTIN,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

MIAMI DADE COUNTY,

a Florida County and Political Subdivision,

of the State of Florida,

Defendant.

MAURICIO DURAN,

Miami-Dade County Police Office,

in his individual and official capacity,

BRIDGET DOYLE,

Miami-Dade County Police Office,

in her individual and official capacity,

Defendants-Appellants.

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10957

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-22107-PCH

____________________

Before JORDAN, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Two brothers, Michael and William Martin (the “Martins”),

sued Lieutenant Mauricio Duran and Officer Bridget Doyle for

stopping and arresting them on January 10, 2018. Following dis-

covery, the Officers moved for summary judgment, and they now

appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Lieuten-

ant Duran for his stop of both brothers and to Officer Doyle for her

second taser deployment on William. For the reasons discussed

below, we reverse the district court’s denial of summary judgment

to Lieutenant Duran as to the unlawful stop and we affirm the dis-

trict court’s denial of qualified immunity to Officer Doyle as to her

second taser deployment.

I

This is the Officers’ second qualified immunity appeal. In

resolving their first—an appeal from an order on a motion to dis-

miss—we recounted the facts alleged in the amended complaint in

the light most favorable to the Martins, and affirmed the district

court’s partial denial of qualified immunity at the Rule 12(b)(6)

stage. See Martin v. Miami Dade Cnty., No. 23-10841, 2024 WL

1434329 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2024). Rather than recant those specific

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allegations again, we refer to our prior decision and supplement

with the summary judgment record as needed.

II

Relevant to this appeal are Lieutenant Duran’s initial stop of

both brothers and Officer Doyle’s second use of a taser on William.

The district court denied qualified immunity as to both incidents.

In Count I of their amended complaint, the Martins brought

a “false arrest/false imprisonment” claim against both Officers un-

der 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a portion of which involved allegations of an

unlawful stop. At the summary judgment stage, the district court

ruled that Lieutenant Duran was not entitled to qualified immunity

because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he

had arguable reasonable suspicion to stop the Martins. See D.E. 143

at 8–11.

In so ruling, the district court first identified several facts not

in dispute. Lieutenant Duran observed the Martins walking

around 2:49 a.m., wearing backpacks and dark-colored clothes,

through the parking lot of a government complex located in a high-

crime area, where all buildings except the police station were

closed. Located nearby were unattended government-owned ve-

hicles and a library book-drop box that could be used at that time

of day. See id. at 9–10. The court then determined that an addi-

tional material fact remained in dispute: whether the Martins con-

cealed themselves or attempted to evade Lieutenant Duran when

he made his presence known. See id. at 10. And it concluded that

“whether . . . Duran violated Plaintiffs’ clearly established rights by

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-10957

stopping them depends upon whether Plaintiffs concealed them-

selves or attempted to evade . . . Duran, or simply refused to coop-

erate with him.” Id. at 11. Thus, the court denied summary judg-

ment to Lieutenant Duran on Count I as to the unlawful stop.

Lieutenant Duran appeals that ruling.

Officer Doyle, for her part, arrived on the scene after Lieu-

tenant Duran stopped the Martins. She tased William twice, and

he alleged that this constituted excessive force in Count II of the

amended complaint.

The district court, construing the record and bodycam foot-

age in William’s favor, explained that Officer Doyle first tased Wil-

liam while Michael was struggling on the ground with Lieutenant

Duran; that Officer Doyle ordered William to back up from the

struggle; that William reached toward Lieutenant Duran and

placed his left hand on the Lieutenant’s left arm; that William had,

moments before, pulled his arm from Lieutenant Duran’s grip; and

that Officer Doyle did not know what William’s intention was

when William was bent over Lieutenant Duran. See D.E. 143 at 20.

Citing these facts, the court granted qualified immunity to Officer

Doyle for her first taser deployment against William. It reasoned

that the initial tasing constituted “reasonable force used to subdue

an individual who posed an immediate threat and was not comply-

ing with police instructions.” Id. at 21.

In contrast, the district court ruled that Officer Doyle was

not entitled to qualified immunity for the second deployment of

her taser on William because, once the first tase brought him to the

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ground, he was screaming in pain, lying with his arms extended

over his torso, and no longer a threat to the officers. See id. At that

point, the court reasoned, “a reasonable jury could find that [her]

decision to continue tasing . . . William when he was no longer an

active threat nor resisting was excessive.” Id. Officer Doyle appeals

that ruling.

III

We first address our appellate jurisdiction. The Martins ar-

gue that we lack jurisdiction to review this interlocutory appeal be-

cause the officers do not identify a legal issue separate from the

merits and, instead, challenge the district court’s findings on the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting their claims. We disagree.

“Generally, we may only hear appeals from a district court’s

final order.” Aguirre v. Seminole Cnty., 158 F.4th 1276, 1291 (11th

Cir. 2025) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291). An exception exists, however,

in certain qualified-immunity cases. See id. As we have explained,

“we have interlocutory jurisdiction over legal issues that are the

basis for a denial of summary judgment on qualified immunity

grounds.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir. 1996)

(collecting cases). “The denial of qualified immunity is ‘purely le-

gal where it concerns only the application of established legal prin-

ciples to a given set of facts,’ which enables appellate jurisdiction[.]”

Koch v. Rugg, 221 F.3d 1283, 1296 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Steadman

v. Texas Rangers, 179 F.3d 360, 365 (5th Cir. 1999) (internal citation

omitted)). In contrast, “[w]e lack interlocutory jurisdiction ‘where

the only issues appealed are evidentiary sufficiency issues.’” English

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-10957

v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2023) (citing Cot-

trell, 85 F.4th at 1484). And, “when the appeal implicates both an

issue of fact and an issue of law[,]” we retain jurisdiction. Aguirre,

158 F.4th at 1291. In determining our appellate jurisdiction, our

review is de novo. See id. at 1292.

Citing Barnes v. Felix, 605 U.S. 73 (2025), which was issued

after the district court’s order, Officer Doyle argues that the district

court improperly denied her qualified immunity for her second

taser employment. Specifically, she contends that the district court

erred by analyzing only the circumstances that existed in the mo-

ment that she employed the taser the second time instead of more

generally considering the events leading to that deployment.

Whether the court erred by applying a narrower standard than per-

mitted in Barnes to deny qualified immunity is a legal question for

which we have jurisdiction. See Prospero v. Sullivan, 153 F.4th 1171,

1181 (11th Cir. 2025) (exercising jurisdiction over appeal where the

defendants “argue[d] that the district court failed to apply the cor-

rect legal standards governing qualified immunity”).

As to Lieutenant Duran, we also have appellate jurisdiction.

He contends that he did not violate clearly established law by stop-

ping the Martins and, as a result, is entitled to qualified immunity.

He argues, for example, that our decision in United States v.

Briggman, 931 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1991), could reasonably have led

him to believe that the stop was lawful. Whether Lieutenant Du-

ran’s stop of the Martins violated clearly established law is an issue

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over which we can exercise jurisdiction. See Jackson v. City of At-

lanta, 97 F.4th 1343, 1352, 1355–60 (11th Cir. 2024) (exercising ap-

pellate jurisdiction over “the issue of whether the law was clearly

established that [the officer] lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the

vehicle in which [the plaintiff] was riding”).

IV

Having confirmed our jurisdiction, we proceed to the mer-

its. “[E]ach defendant is entitled to an independent qualified-im-

munity analysis as it relates to his or her actions and omissions.”

Alcocer v. Mills, 906 F.3d 944, 951 (11th Cir. 2018). “[I]n considering

whether each officer is entitled to summary judgment based on

qualified immunity, we review de novo.” Aguirre, 158 F.4th at 1297.

In analyzing qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage,

we of course resolve any conflicts in the evidence in favor of the

Martins. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656–67 (2014).

A

We turn, first, to Officer Doyle. She contends that the dis-

trict court improperly denied her qualified immunity as to her sec-

ond taser deployment on William. Specifically, she argues that the

court’s temporal view of the second deployment was too narrow

because it focused only on William’s conduct at the instant that

Officer Doyle pressed the trigger on the taser for the second time

(rather than also considering the events leading to that deploy-

ment). She maintains that under the totality of circumstances,

properly viewed, the force she used was reasonable. Additionally,

Officer Doyle argues that, even if “William persuasively argue[s]

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-10957

that [her] conduct violated the Fourth Amendment, she is never-

theless entitled to qualified immunity” because “[t]he violative na-

ture of her particular conduct was not clearly established.” Appel-

lants’ Br. at 51.

As support for her argument that her second taser deploy-

ment was reasonable, Officer Doyle cites the Supreme Court’s

2025 decision in Barnes. There, the Supreme Court rejected the so-

called moment-of-threat rule, under which a court “looks only to

the circumstances existing at the precise time an officer perceived

the threat inducing him to shoot.” 605 U.S. at 76. That approach,

the Supreme Court held, “improperly narrow[s] the requisite

Fourth Amendment analysis.” Id. The Supreme Court explained:

“To assess whether an officer acted reasonably in using force, a

court must consider all the relevant circumstances, including facts

and events leading up to the climactic moment.” Id. See also id. at

83 (“[A] court cannot . . . ‘narrow’ the totality-of-the circumstances

inquiry, to focus on only on a single moment. It must look too, in

. . . all excessive-force cases, at any relevant events coming be-

fore.”).

Although Barnes was decided after the district court issued

its order, it applies here. See Bradley v. Sch. Bd. of City of Richmond,

416 U.S. 696, 711 (2006) (“[A] court is to apply the law in effect at

the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in man-

ifest injustice . . . .”) (citing United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1

Cranch) 103 (1801)). So we consider that case and our precedent in

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reviewing the record, including Officer Doyle’s body camera foot-

age, and in concluding that Officer Doyle is not entitled to qualified

immunity on Count II as to her second taser deployment on Wil-

liam.

“Under Graham v. Connor, objectively unreasonable uses of

force violate the Fourth Amendment.” Teel v. Lozada, 99 F.4th

1273, 1282 (11th Cir. 2024) (citing 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989)). “De-

termining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is

‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful bal-

ancing of ‘the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s

Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing govern-

mental interests at stake.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (quoting Ten-

nessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)) (internal quotation omitted).

“The test for objective reasonableness ‘depends on the “facts and

circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to

the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resist-

ing arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.”’” Teel, 99 F.4th

at 1282 (citing Helm v. Rainbow City, 989 F.3d 1265, 1273 (11th Cir.

2021) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)). “We have also high-

lighted other factors for consideration, including: ‘the need for ap-

plication of force, the relationship between the need and amount

of force used, and the extent of the injury inflicted by the arresting

officer.’” Id. (citing Helm, 989 F.3d at 1273).

“Since at least 2014, this Circuit has found that officers can-

not continue to use gratuitous force on an individual who does not

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10 Opinion of the Court 25-10957

pose a threat to officers’ safety, even if that individual previously

posed a threat.” Castro-Reyes v. City of Opa-Locka, 166 F.4th 886, 903

(11th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases). Likewise, we have held that the

subsequent tases of immobilized persons or motionless suspects

can constitute excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. See,

e.g., Helm, 989 F.3d at 1276; Piazza v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947,

954–55 (11th Cir. 2019); Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905–07 (11th

Cir. 2009).

Barnes and our precedent, as discussed, require us to “con-

sider all the relevant circumstances” when assessing if an officer

acted reasonably in using force. 605 U.S. at 76. Officer Doyle first

tased William when he reached toward Lieutenant Duran, who

was then on top of his brother Michael. See Body Camera at

2:51:08–09. When he was tased, William screamed in pain; fell on

his back; landed on top of Lieutenant Duran; rolled down Lieuten-

ant Duran’s back and legs; and landed on the street. See id. at

2:51:08-2:51:12. There he laid, on his back with both arms extended

over his torso, still screaming in pain, when Officer Doyle tased

him for a second time. Id. at 2:51:13. During that period, there had

been no change in circumstances between Lieutenant Duran and

Michael. See id. Based on our review of the record, nothing oc-

curred in the time leading up to the first taser deployment that

would go towards justifying the second taser use. Nothing about

the stop itself suggested multiple tase uses would be necessary, and

neither did the activity leading up to the first tase. Lieutenant Du-

ran initially had told Officer Doyle to “tase him, tase him, tase

him,” referring to William. Id. at 2:51:03–05. Officer Doyle, for her

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part in the time leading up to the tasing, told William to “get away

from him, you piece of sh**,” id. at 2:51:01–02, and to “get the f**k

out of here,” id. at 2:51:06, before asking him to “back up,” id. at

2:51:08.

Ultimately, based on our review of the totality of circum-

stances—including but not limited to that William was not resist-

ing and did not pose an immediate threat to officer safety at the

time of the second tase—Officer Doyle is not entitled to qualified

immunity for tasing William a second time. See Glasscox v. City of

Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1219 (11th Cir. 2018) (“In light of this clearly

established law [in the Eleventh Circuit], no objectively reasonable

officer in Officer Moses’s position [in July of 2014] could have

thought it was lawful to use a taser repeatedly on an arrestee who

was not resisting, even if that arrestee had previously offered re-

sistance and was not yet restrained.”).

Thus, we affirm the portion of the order denying qualified

immunity to Officer Doyle on Count II as to the second taser de-

ployment.

B

We turn next to Lieutenant Duran. The Martins allege in

Count I that they were unlawfully stopped by Lieutenant Duran.

The district court, as noted above, determined that whether Lieu-

tenant Duran violated the Martins’ clearly established rights by

stopping them depended on a genuine dispute of a material fact—

namely, whether the Martins concealed themselves or attempted

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to evade the lieutenant. The court denied summary judgment to

Lieutenant Duran as to the unlawful stop.

“[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,

conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasona-

ble, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30

(1968)). “While ‘reasonable suspicion’ is a less demanding standard

than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than

preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires

at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the

stop.” Id. (citing United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). The

officer must have a “particularized and objective basis for suspect-

ing criminal wrongdoing.” District of Columbia v. R.W., 608 U.S. __,

2026 WL 1052344, at *2 (April 20, 2026) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted).

“A law enforcement official who reasonably but mistakenly

concludes that reasonable suspicion is present is still entitled to

qualified immunity. When an officer asserts qualified immunity,

the issue is not whether reasonable suspicion existed in fact, but

whether the officer had ‘arguable’ reasonable suspicion to support

an investigatory stop.” Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1165–66

(11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). See also Meshal v. Comm’r, Ga.

Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 117 F.4th 1273, 1287–88 (11th Cir. 2024); Whit-

tier v. Kobayashi, 581 F.3d 1304, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2009).

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“If an official was acting within his discretionary authority,

the plaintiff must establish that the official is not entitled to quali-

fied immunity by showing the official’s conduct (1) violated a con-

stitutional right (2) that was clearly established at the time of the

official’s conduct.” Martin, 2024 WL 1434329, at *3 (citing Roberts

v. Spielman, 643 F.3d 899, 904 (11th Cir. 2011)). We are “permitted

to exercise [our] sound discretion in deciding which of the two

prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first

in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson

v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). We start here with the second

prong.

“For a constitutional right to be clearly established, ‘existing

precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional ques-

tion confronted by the official beyond debate.’” Martin, 2024 WL

1434329, at *3 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard, 572 U.S. 765, 779

(2014)). “Because only clearly established law gives an officer ‘fair

notice that her conduct was unlawful,’ the Supreme Court has held

that the contours of the constitutional right at issue ‘must be suffi-

ciently clear [so] that a reasonable officer would understand that

what he is doing violates that right.’” Crocker v. Beatty, 995 F.3d

1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal citations omitted) (quoting

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) and Hope v. Pelzer, 536

U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).

“A right may be clearly established in one of three ways: (1)

‘case law with indistinguishable facts clearly establishing the con-

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14 Opinion of the Court 25-10957

stitutional right’; (2) ‘a broad statement of principle within the Con-

stitution, statute, or case law that clearly establishes a constitu-

tional right’; or (3) ‘conduct so egregious that a constitutional right

was clearly violated, even in the total absence of case law.’” Baxter

v. Roberts, 54 F.4th 1241, 1263 (11th Cir. 2022) (citing Lewis v. City of

West Palm Beach, 561 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2009)). “[T]he

second and third paths are rarely-trod ones,” however, since “the

Supreme Court has warned us not to ‘define clearly established law

at a high level of generality.’” See Crocker, 995 F.3d at 1240 (quoting

Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at 779). Given their rarity, “if a plaintiff cannot

show that the law at issue was clearly established under the first . .

. method, that usually means qualified immunity is appropriate.”

Hughes v. Locure, 166 F.4th 121, 128 (11th Cir. 2026) (quoting King

v. Pridmore, 961 F.3d 1135, 1146 (11th Cir. 2020)). 1

Under the first method of demonstrating clearly established

law, a plaintiff must point to “materially similar precedent from the

Supreme Court, this Court, or the highest state court in which the

case arose.” Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018).

“The prior case ‘need not be directly on point,’ but it ‘must have

placed the constitutional question beyond debate.’” Baxter, 54

F.4th at 1263 (quoting Wade v. United States, 13 F.4th 1217, 1226

(11th Cir. 2021)). And, we have said, it must involve “a violation

based on materially similar facts.” Id. (citing Cantu v. City of Dothan,

1 But not always. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 144 F.4th 1246, 1258,

1264 (11th Cir. 2025) (en banc) (denying qualified immunity for a strip search

of a prison visitor under the obvious clarity method).

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974 F.3d 1217, 1232 (11th Cir. 2020)). “[P]ut simply[,]” the question

is “whether the officer would know after reading prior case A that

what he was doing in instant case B was against the law.” Id.

The district court here did not identify a case involving “a

violation based on materially similar facts.” Id. (citing Cantu, 974

F.3d at 1232). The court relied on Briggman, which we decided in

1991, but that case involved the constitutionally permissive behav-

ior of a police officer—not a “violation.” 931 F.2d at 709. And alt-

hough the Martins cite other cases, including some in their re-

sponse to the summary judgment motion below, none demon-

strate clearly established law. Many of the cited cases, for example,

are from Florida district courts of appeal, which are insufficient to

constitute clearly established law for federal qualified immunity

cases. See Gates, 884 F.3d at 1296. See also D.E. 135 at 10–11. And

the other cited cases are materially distinguishable. See, e.g., Reid v.

George, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (finding no reasonable suspicion

where the circumstances in part “describe[d] a very large category

of presumably innocent travelers” at the airport); United States v.

Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 707 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding no reasonable sus-

picion to stop a car where the occupants “matched a few nondis-

tinguishing characteristics contained on a drug courier profile and,

additionally, because [the officer] was bothered by the way the

driver of the car chose not to look at him”); Jessup v. Miami-Dade

Cnty., 440 F. App’x 689, 694 (11th Cir. Sept. 2011) (holding that of-

ficers had no basis to prolong a Terry stop once they learned that

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16 Opinion of the Court 25-10957

no basketball had been stolen, which was the basis of their investi-

gation).2

We turn next to the second method of demonstrating clearly

established law, under which the Martins must identify a “broad

statement of principle within the Constitution, statute, or case law”

that clearly establishes a constitutional right in this situation. See

Baxter, 54 F.4th at 1268 (quotation and citation omitted). On ap-

peal, the Martins do not argue that a particular principle clearly es-

tablishes their constitutional right to not be stopped in the circum-

stances at issue here. Under a liberal reading, we might read their

brief as relying on the principle that “[u]nder the Fourth Amend-

ment, an individual has a right to be free from unreasonable

searches and seizures.” Appellees’ Br. at 26 (citing Stephens v. De-

Giovanni, 852 F.3d 1298, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2017) (quotation omit-

ted)). That principle, however—or a variation as cited in their

2 Our prior decision in this case, affirming in part the denial of the motion to

dismiss, does not constitute law of the case because of the different undisputed

facts that were later revealed during discovery. See Oladeinde v. City of Birming-

ham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e may reconsider an issue al-

ready decided by this court in the same case if, since the prior decision, new

and substantially different evidence is produced[.]”); United States v. Schwarz-

baum, 127 F.4th 259, 287 (11th Cir. 2025) (explaining that the law of the case

doctrine does not apply if there is new and substantially different evidence).

See also D.E. 104 and D.E. 136 (reflecting, as undisputed, that Lieutenant Duran

stopped the Martins in a high-crime area; had never previously seen a pedes-

trian walking down the auxiliary road or through the complex’s lots at night;

and knew that County vehicles and personal vehicles of County employees

were parked unsecured and unattended in the lots at the other end of the aux-

iliary road and that no police patrolled those lots).

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25-10957 Opinion of the Court 17

brief—is too general to demonstrate a clearly established law. See

District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63–64 (2018) (“We have

repeatedly stressed that courts must not ‘define clearly established

law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids the crucial

question whether the officer acted reasonably in the particular cir-

cumstances that he or she faced.’”) (quoting Plumhoff, 572 U.S. at

779). Ultimately, such a generalized principle would not “put every

reasonable officer” in Lieutenant Duran’s position on notice that

he could not stop the Martins under the circumstances. See Baxter,

54 F.4th at 1268. See also Gates, 884 F.3d at 1302 (“[T]he ‘clearly

established’ inquiry . . . asks whether the preexisting law was so

clear that, given the specific facts facing a particular officer, one

must say that ‘every reasonable official would have understood

that what he is doing violates’ the Constitutional right at issue.”)

(citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

Finally, “this is not the rare case where a constitutional vio-

lation is ‘so egregious’ that it is clear ‘even in the total absence of

the case law.’” Baxter, 54 F.4th at 1268 (quoting Lewis, 561 F.3d at

1292). Cf. Gilmore, 144 F.4th at 1264 (finding the unconstitutional-

ity of a strip search of a prison visitor was of “obvious clarity”

where “[t]here was no suspicion whatsoever; the consent was co-

erced; there was no option to leave; the strip search was not admin-

istratively approved; and the strip search involved physical touch-

ing of intimate areas and a visual body-cavity inspection”). At the

very least, Lieutenant Duran had arguable reasonable suspicion for

the stop. This is so even if the Martins did not conceal themselves

or did not refuse to speak to him.

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18 Opinion of the Court 25-10957

The Martins have not shown that Lieutenant Duran violated

their clearly established rights by stopping them. Thus, Lieutenant

Duran was entitled to qualified immunity. We reverse the district

court’s denial of summary judgment on Count I as to that issue.

VII

We affirm the district court’s denial of qualified immunity

to Officer Doyle on Count II as to her second taser deployment.

We reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Lieu-

tenant Duran on Count I as to the unlawful stop.

REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.