SCHNELL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

JESSICA SCHNELL, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00386-SDN

)

IDEXX LABORATORIES, INC., )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant IDEXX Laboratories, Inc. (“IDEXX”) moves to dismiss, ECF No. 4,

Plaintiff Jessica Schnell’s complaint, ECF No. 1, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Ms. Schnell alleges IDEXX violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of

1964 and the Maine Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) by discriminating against her based on

her gender and retaliating against her for opposing IDEXX’s purported unlawful

practices. IDEXX argues Ms. Schnell’s complaint should be dismissed in its entirety

because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. For the reasons discussed

below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part IDEXX’s motion to dismiss with

leave to amend Counts I, II, and III.

I. Incorporation by Reference

As an initial matter, Ms. Schnell attaches to her complaint three extrinsic

documents—ECF No. 1-1 (“Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Class Action Complaint”), ECF

No. 1-2 (“Mayhew First Amended Complaint”), and ECF No. 1-3 (“Hoisser Complaint”)—

each of which is a complaint filed by her same counsel against IDEXX in three separate

cases involving different plaintiffs. These complaints each assert a Title VII gender-based

discrimination claim against the company. Ms. Schnell requests the Court consider these

documents in deciding the motion to dismiss, contending she properly incorporated them

by reference into her own complaint. ECF No. 5 at 7. IDEXX opposes consideration of

these extrinsic documents. ECF No. 4 at 5 n.3, 8–9.

Ordinarily, a motion to dismiss “provides no occasion upon which to consider

documents other than the complaint.” Doe v. Pawtucket Sch. Dep’t, 969 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.

2020). There is, however, a narrow exception for “documents the authenticity of which

are not disputed by the parties; official public records; documents central to the plaintiff’s

claim; and documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.” Newman v. Lehman

Bros. Holdings, 901 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2018) (quotation modified). Even so, “not every

document referred to in a complaint may be considered incorporated by reference and

thus introduced by the moving party in support of a motion to dismiss.” Fudge v.

Penthouse Int’l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1015 (1st Cir. 1988).

Although Ms. Schnell represents that information contained in these three

documents is relevant to her claims, the Court may not incorporate the pleadings from

other cases into the operative complaint. See Meyer v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 21-cv-341,

2025 WL 2042360, at *14 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2025) (disallowing plaintiff’s wholesale

incorporation of allegations from a complaint in a separate case); Spirit Lake Tribe v.

Jaeger, No. 18-cv-222, 2019 WL 13299003, at *2 (D.N.D. June 17, 2019) (disallowing

plaintiff’s attempt to incorporate by reference his own complaint from another case filed

in the same district court); Blackwell v. Jones Day L. Firm, No. 20-11493, 2021 WL

764124, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 2021) (“A party cannot incorporate by reference

allegations from a pleading filed in another case . . . without re-stating the allegations at

issue.”); Getzen v. Yavapai Cnty., Dkt. No. 20-cv-08053, ECF No. 27, at *4 (D. Ariz. Jan.

25, 2021) (“Plaintiff may not incorporate by reference claims or allegations from another

case.”); 5A Charles Allen Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 1326 (4th ed. 2026) (noting “allegations in pleadings in another action, even if between

the same parties, cannot be incorporated by reference” and collecting cases prohibiting

the same).

Thus, in deciding IDEXX’s motion to dismiss, the Court is confined to the

allegations appearing on the face of Ms. Schnell’s complaint. To the extent Ms. Schnell

relies on allegations contained in the Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Class Action Complaint,

the Mayhew First Amended Complaint, and the Hoisser Complaint, the Court will not

consider them.

II. Background1

In April 2012, Ms. Schnell began working at IDEXX as a customer support

consultant. ECF No. 1 ¶ 9. IDEXX specializes in veterinary diagnostics, software, and

water microbiology testing. Id. ¶ 4. Ms. Schnell performed her job duties satisfactorily

and IDEXX promoted her several times. Id. ¶ 11. Before 2016, Ms. Schnell applied for a

role as a diagnostic support consultant. Id. ¶ 14. Initially, the company passed her over

for the position because she was “overly confident,” but IDEXX later promoted her to the

role. Id. ¶¶ 14, 16. By or around August 2019, Dr. Kristi Graham served as her manager.

Id. ¶ 16. Toward the end of 2020 or beginning of 2021, IDEXX’s medical consulting

management team reorganized, and Meghan Ludka took over as Ms. Schnell’s supervisor.

Id. ¶ 17. Ms. Schnell’s position required her to manage lab service calls and customer

concerns, responsibilities that she believed IDEXX did not properly train her to handle.

Id. ¶¶ 18, 19. Feeling unsupported in her role, Ms. Schnell complained to her supervisor,

1 The Court derives these facts from Ms. Schnell’s complaint, ECF No. 1, treats them as true, and draws all

reasonable inferences in her favor for purposes of resolving IDEXX’s motion to dismiss. See Alston v.

Spiegel, 988 F.3d 564, 571 (1st Cir. 2021).

Ms. Ludka, in mid-2021. Id. ¶ 19. When Ms. Ludka failed to respond adequately to her

concerns, Ms. Schnell escalated them to a human resources (“HR”) representative, who

suggested she speak with Ms. Ludka’s supervisor, Dr. Erin Brown, which Ms. Schnell did.

Id. ¶¶ 20, 21. Shortly after reaching out to HR, Ms. Schnell received a verbal warning

concerning metrics and status codes that she alleges was pretextual. Id. Dr. Brown

followed up with Ms. Schnell during which time Ms. Schnell shared her disappointment

in HR’s response to and the company’s handling of her concerns. Id. ¶ 22.

Some time thereafter, Ms. Schnell applied for the position of product manager in

IDEXX’s hematology department. Id. ¶ 23. Ms. Schnell scheduled one-on-one meetings

with the hiring manager concerning the role, but Ms. Ludka cancelled them. Id. Ms.

Ludka later obtained that same position. Id. ¶ 24. In 2023, Ms. Schnell’s manager

changed again, this time to Dr. Kathryn Rawling. Id. ¶ 25. IDEXX continued to scrutinize

Ms. Schnell’s performance without providing the guidance she needed to succeed in her

role. Id. To better understand her customer-facing interactions, Ms. Schnell requested

recordings of her customer service calls. Id. ¶ 26. Despite those efforts, IDEXX continued

to criticize her communication style. Id. Ms. Schnell shared with her manager that she did

not know how to “request assistance and coaching at IDEXX without facing punitive

action,” and her manager agreed and confirmed that the company had a “pervasive

culture of retaliation.” Id. ¶ 27.

IDEXX instructed Ms. Schnell that she needed voice coaching and critiqued her

communication style, labeling her as “rude” and “mean.” Id. ¶ 29. The company also

accused her of being “too direct.” Id. ¶ 31. Around March 2023, IDEXX issued Ms. Schnell

a formal discipline notice, entitled “Written Expectations Summary.” Id. ¶ 32. It critiqued

her “feelings” and “negative state of mind.” Id. Ms. Schnell alleges IDEXX would not have

criticized a male employee in the same manner.2 Id. ¶¶ 28, 29, 31, 32. At some point

during her time at IDEXX, Ms. Schnell stated, “I can just shoot people” on a recorded line.

Id. ¶ 33. IDEXX was critical of this comment. Id.

In December 2023, IDEXX decided to terminate Ms. Schnell’s employment, and it

followed through in February 2024. Id. ¶¶ 34, 35. Ms. Schnell contends her firing resulted

from “repeated instances of heightened scrutiny over her actions with customers” that, in

her opinion, would not have occurred if she were male. Id. ¶ 34. During her last year of

employment at IDEXX, Ms. Schnell expressed apprehension with the “4Dx Multiplex”

test and its purportedly erroneous results; she alleges her supervisors were “particularly

retaliatory” in response to these concerns. Id. ¶ 36. She further asserts that a colleague at

the company acknowledged Ms. Schnell often posed “hard questions” and IDEXX “didn’t

like it.” Id. ¶ 37.

Ms. Schnell filed complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) and the Maine Human Rights Commission (“MHRC”). Id. ¶ 6. She

received a right to sue letter from the MHRC on or about April 22, 2025. Id. On July 21,

2025, Ms. Schnell filed a complaint in this Court, alleging three counts: (1) sex-based

discrimination in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; (2) retaliation after

opposing a practice made unlawful by Title VII; and (3) discrimination and retaliation in

violation of the MHRA, 5 M.R.S. § 4571 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 41–60. IDEXX moved to dismiss all

three counts. ECF No. 4.

2 In this factual background section, the Court has included allegations from Ms. Schnell’s complaint that,

like this one, fall into the category of speculation, legal conclusions, labels, or recitations of the elements of

a cause of action. Here, for example, Ms. Schnell does not identify an instance where IDEXX treated a male

employee differently; she simply speculates that it would have. In the discussion section below, the Court

addresses which allegations it considers and which it sets aside, as they are relevant to the parties’ legal

arguments.

III. Motion to Dismiss Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) motions test the legal sufficiency of a complaint and require a court

to determine whether the facts alleged are sufficient to show the plaintiff has pleaded a

plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Plausible

“means something more than merely possible,” Schatz v. Republican State Leadership

Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir. 2012), but is “not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. To resolve a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts employ a structured,

two-step inquiry. Cardigan Mountain Sch. v. N.H. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 82, 84 (1st Cir.

2015). First, the Court must “isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply

offer legal labels and conclusions.” Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. It need not credit legal or

factual allegations that are “too meager, vague, or conclusory to remove the possibility of

relief from the realm of mere conjecture.” Douglas v. Hirshorn, 63 F.4th 49, 55 (1st Cir.

2023) (quotation modified). Then, the Court must “take the complaint’s well-pled (i.e.,

non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the

pleader’s favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief.” Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55.

If the plaintiff fails to “nudge[ her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,

[those claims] must be dismissed.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

Plausibility requires “something more than merely possible or merely consistent with a

defendant’s liability.” Germanowski v. Harris, 854 F.3d 68, 71–72 (1st Cir. 2017)

(quotation modified).

IV. Discussion

IDEXX moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety. The company first contends

Ms. Schnell’s claims are time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. IDEXX next

argues that even if Ms. Schnell’s causes of action are timely, she has failed to state claims

upon which relief may be granted. The Court considers each argument in turn.

A. Statute of Limitations

IDEXX first argues that Ms. Schnell’s claims are time-barred because she failed to

file her administrative complaint within three hundred (300) days of the date on which

the purportedly violative acts occurred. ECF No. 4 at 10–11 n.6. Ms. Schnell does not

directly address this contention in her response. See generally ECF No. 5. An aggrieved

employee alleging unlawful discrimination must first file an administrative complaint

with the EEOC or parallel state agency before bringing suit in court. Thornton v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 587 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2009). For Title VII claims to be timely, the

employee alleging a violation must file an administrative claim with the appropriate state

agency within three hundred days of the alleged action that constitutes an unlawful

employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); see also Thornton, 587 F.3d at 31. This

is a mandatory timeliness requirement and “failure to file within the time period means a

potential plaintiff ‘lose[s] the ability to recover for [the alleged discrimination].’”

Frederique-Alexandre v. Dep’t of Nat. & Env’t Res. P.R., 478 F.3d 433, 437 (quoting Nat’l

R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002)). Claims under Maine’s

antidiscrimination and retaliation protection laws are also subject to an administrative

exhaustion requirement and three-hundred-day limitation period. 5 M.R.S. §§ 4611; see

also Burnett v. Ocean Props., Ltd., 327 F. Supp. 3d 198, 231–32 (D. Me. 2018). At the

motion to dismiss stage, dismissal based on a statute of limitations defense is appropriate

only “when the pleader’s allegations leave no doubt that an asserted claim is time-barred.”

LaChapelle v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 142 F.3d 507, 509 (1st Cir. 1998).

Here, while Ms. Schnell alleges that she filed her administrative complaint with the

MHRC and EEOC, the only relevant date she provided is the one on which she received

MHRC’s right to sue letter: April 22, 2025. ECF No. 1 ¶ 6. Neither party attached the

administrative complaint. See Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1993) (allowing

consideration at the motion to dismiss stage of documents whose authenticity is

undisputed). The Court cannot conclude on the record before it that Ms. Schnell missed

the statutory period within which to file her administrative complaint. See Cavanagh v.

IDEXX Lab’ys, Inc., No. 23-cv-00273, 2024 WL 2724195, at *4 (D. Me. May 28, 2024)

(stating the same). Accordingly, at this point, the issue of timeliness cannot be resolved,

and Ms. Schnell’s complaint survives IDEXX’s motion to dismiss based on the statute of

limitations.

B. Discrimination Claims

IDEXX next argues Ms. Schnell failed to state a sex-based discrimination claim

under either Title VII or the MHRA.3 ECF No. 4 at 11–12. Ms. Schnell’s complaint

advances a Title VII discrimination theory grounded in both gender stereotyping and

disparate treatment. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 44–47.

The Court first addresses her gender stereotyping claim, which arises “when an

individual suffers an adverse employment action because she either conforms or fails to

conform to some stereotype or stereotypes attributable to her gender.” Morales-Cruz v.

Univ. of P.R., 676 F.3d 220, 224–25 (1st Cir. 2012). Ms. Schnell contends IDEXX

criticized her for communicating in a manner that is “stereotypically male” and asserts

3 Ms. Schnell’s third count alleges unlawful sex-based discrimination under the MHRA. ECF No. 1 at 10–11.

Because such claims under the MHRA are “concurrent with Title VII,” the Court considers them together

without separately analyzing Ms. Schnell’s MHRA claim. Roy v. Correct Care Sols., LLC, 914 F.3d 52, 62

(1st Cir. 2019) (quoting Watt v. UniFirst Corp., 2009 ME 47, ¶ 22, 969 A.2d 897, 902–03).

IDEXX’s criticism of her “voice, personality, and communication style” reflects gender

stereotyping and bias. She cites instances in which supervisors described her as “overly

confident,” told her she needs “voice coaching,” and labeled her “mean,” “rude,” and “too

direct.” She argues these descriptors are seen as traits stereotypically associated with the

masculine and asserts that such behavior “would be applauded coming from a male

employee,” but, because she was a woman, it was used as a basis for discrimination. ECF

No. 1 ¶ 31. Ms. Schnell argues that she suffered adverse employment action as a result

when she was passed over for a promotion for being “overly confident.” She further argues

that IDEXX leveraged these gendered critiques to subject her to heightened performance

scrutiny and formal discipline. Ms. Schnell contends that IDEXX’s biased discipline

practices ultimately resulted in her alleged wrongful termination under the pretext of

unprofessional behavior. In response, IDEXX avers the language Ms. Schnell’s

supervisors used is not gender stereotyping because the terms are gender-neutral and,

thus, cannot form the basis of a sex stereotyping claim.

By themselves, the descriptors Ms. Schnell cites do not carry gendered meaning.

However, Title VII reaches not only overt bias but also “stereotyping, cognitive bias, and

certain other ‘more subtle cognitive phenomena which can skew perceptions and

judgments.’” Burns v. Johnson, 829 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting Thomas v.

Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999)). In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the

Supreme Court described gender stereotyping as “evaluat[ing] employees by assuming or

insisting that they match[] the stereotype associated with their group.” 490 U.S. 228, 251

(1989) (plurality opinion). The Court identified the employer’s comments that an

“aggressive female employee” required “a course at charm school” as paradigmatic

evidence of gender stereotyping. Id. at 256. Here, Ms. Schnell alleges IDEXX penalized

female employees who were “overly confident” or “too direct,” while treating male

employees who displayed similar personality characteristics more favorably. Accepting

these allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Ms. Schnell’s favor, the

complaint plausibly alleges that IDEXX took adverse action because Ms. Schnell did not

conform to gender-based stereotypes. Accordingly, her Title VII claim survives IDEXX’s

motion to dismiss.

The Court next turns to Ms. Schnell’s disparate treatment theory of sex-based

discrimination. To make out a prima facie case of sex-based discrimination, Ms. Schnell’s

allegations must plausibly show she: (1) belongs to a protected class; (2) performed her

job satisfactorily; (3) experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) was treated less

favorably than similarly situated employees who were outside of her protected class.

Berry v. City of S. Portland, 525 F. Supp. 2d 214, 228 (D. Me. 2007). While a Title VII

claim ultimately requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of discrimination,

such a showing is not required to survive a motion to dismiss. See Rodríguez-Reyes v.

Molina-Rodríguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013) (“It is not necessary to plead facts

sufficient to establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage.”); Cavanagh, 2024 WL

2724195, at *7 (on motion to dismiss, the plaintiff does not have to “‘establish’ the

elements of her claim; she must simply plead facts that plausibly allege that she was

subjected to illegal discrimination”). Even so, the plaintiff is required to plausibly allege

facts sufficient to raise “a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of

the necessary element. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.

Here, IDEXX focuses on the final element, contending Ms. Schnell failed to

identify similarly situated male comparators and instead relies on speculation regarding

how IDEXX would or would not treat various unidentified male employees under the

same circumstances.4 While “comparator evidence may provide powerful support for a

claim of disparate treatment, the existence of a similarly situated employee is not a

required element of a Title VII discrimination claim.” Frith v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 38

F.4th 263, 274 n.10 (1st Cir. 2022). IDEXX also points to the fact that “at all relevant

times,” Ms. Schnell “reported to female supervisors,” and the company “hired a female

for the product manager position” for which Ms. Schnell “applied but was not hired.” ECF

No. 4 at 6 n.4. But Ms. Schnell need not prove that an individual with the same protected

attribute filled the job, nor that she was supervised by an individual outside of her

protected class, to satisfy the fourth element on a motion to dismiss. See Cumpiano v.

Banco Santander P.R., 902 F.2d 148, 155 (1st Cir. 1990) (a plaintiff “can make out the

fourth element of her prima facie case without proving that her job was filled by a person

not possessing the protected attribute”).

Even so, Ms. Schnell’s complaint largely relies on allegations of how IDEXX would

have treated a hypothetical male employee; rather than identify instances where IDEXX

handled similar behavior by a male employee differently, she simply speculates that the

company would have.5 See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15, 28, 29, 31, 32. Although “some latitude may

be appropriate where a plausible claim may be indicated based on what is known, at least

where, as here, some of the information needed may be in control of the defendants,”

simply including “information and belief” in the complaint does not permit “pure

4 IDEXX alternatively contends that even if the Court were to consider the attached extrinsic exhibits, the

examples of similar bad behavior by male employees that Ms. Schnell alleges via the Mayhew First Amended

Complaint and Hoisser Complaint are not valid comparators because the referenced male employees work

in different departments, report to different supervisors, and operate under distinct circumstances. Because

the Court already declined to incorporate by reference these extrinsic exhibits, it need not address this

argument.

5 For example, Ms. Schnell alludes to “IDEXX tolerat[ing] bad behavior from male employees without

terminating them,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 38, but does not detail any such bad behavior.

speculation.” Menard v. CSX Transp., Inc., 698 F.3d 40, 44–45 (1st Cir. 2012) (quotation

modified). Ms. Schnell alleges she was heavily scrutinized and eventually terminated for

her communication style and a single recorded comment that she made in frustration (“I

can just shoot people”), while IDEXX did not similarly critique or punish male employees

who engaged in egregious threats of violence or harassment. Here, the complaint falls

short because it does not identify any egregious actions by male employees,6 nor any other

facts supporting a plausible inference that IDEXX’s actions were motivated by Ms.

Schnell’s gender or gender-based characteristics instead of, as IDEXX points out, gender-

neutral safety concerns. Without sufficient allegations related to the male employees, the

Court cannot infer Ms. Schnell was treated less favorably.

In sum, the Court DENIES IDEXX’s motion to dismiss Count I to the extent that

it proceeds under a gender stereotyping theory of sex-based discrimination, but

GRANTS the motion to the extent that Count I proceeds under a disparate treatment

theory. Because claims under the MHRA are concurrent with Title VII, the same

disposition applies to Count III.

C. Retaliation Claims

IDEXX also moves to dismiss Ms. Schnell’s claims under the anti-retaliation

provisions of Title VII and the MHRA.7 ECF 1 at 9–10. To prove retaliation, Ms. Schnell

must plausibly show: (1) protected activity under Title VII; (2) a materially adverse action;

6 In her complaint, Ms. Schnell asserts IDEXX did not discipline various male employees for “egregious

behavior” the way it did Ms. Schnell “for far less egregious behavior,” ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 30, 33, and it “excus[ed]

far more egregious and serious threats of actual violence by male employees, or sexually harassing behavior

by them,” id. ¶ 33—but she does not include specific, well-pleaded facts about what that egregious conduct

entails within the four walls of her complaint.

7 Ms. Schnell’s third count alleges unlawful retaliation under the MHRA. ECF No. 1 at 10–11. As with her

first count for unlawful sex-based discrimination, the Court’s retaliation analysis under Title VII also

applies to her retaliation claim under the MHRA because they are concurrent. See Roy, 914 F.3d at 62.

and (3) a causal connection between her protected activity and the materially adverse

action. Deangelis v. Hasbro, Inc., 165 F.4th 646, 652 (1st Cir. 2026). The first element—

protected activity—can be established through allegations of oppositional conduct,

including “informally opposing an employment activity that might violate Title VII” with

complaints to one’s superiors. Donovan v. Nappi Distribs., 703 F. Supp. 3d 135, 265–66

(D. Me. 2023) (internal citation omitted). Furthermore, “the complained-of conduct need

not actually be illegal, but the employee must prove that a reasonable person might have

believed that it was.” Tripp v. Cole, 425 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2005) (quotation modified).

Even so, the statute does not provide protections against “arbitrary or unfair treatment in

private employment,” it only protects against “actions motivated by listed prejudices,

such as . . . gender.” Sabinson v. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll., 542 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008).

The second element—materially adverse action—“is not limited to discriminatory

actions that affect the terms and conditions of employment.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe

Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006). Rather, it extends to all materially adverse

actions that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge

of discrimination.” Id. at 57.

The third and final element—causal connection—can be established if the

protected activity “was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Ing

v. Tufts Univ., 81 F.4th 77, 84 n.5 (1st Cir. 2023) (internal citation omitted). In addition,

the Court may infer causation where there is temporal proximity between the purported

protected conduct and adverse action, but such an inference requires proof that the

decision maker knew about the protected conduct at the time of the adverse action.

Stratton v. Bentley Univ., 113 F.4th 25, 45 (1st Cir. 2024). Moreover, as with her

discrimination claims, Ms. Schnell need not put forth all elements of the prima facie case

in her complaint; she “must simply allege facts that give rise to a plausible inference that

retaliation occurred.” Frith, 38 F.4th at 277. At any rate, courts utilize “the elements of a

prima facie case . . . as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.” Deangelis,

165 F.4th at 653 (quoting Rodríguez-Reyes, 711 F.3d at 54).

Because IDEXX only contests the first element of Ms. Schnell’s retaliation claim—

protected activity—the Court focuses its analysis there. Ms. Schnell contends she

repeatedly complained to her supervisors and HR about how she was being treated. Her

factual allegations include:

• Ms. Schnell “complained to her supervisor . . . that she did not feel

supported in her role or properly trained for the various customer concerns

that she was required to mitigate.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 19.

• She informed a supervisor that she “felt disappointed and frustrated,

because she went to HR for guidance and support, and was disciplined very

soon after, suggesting retaliation.” Id. ¶ 22.

• She “told her manager that she did not know how to request assistance and

coaching at IDEXX without facing punitive action” and her manager

“agreed with this concern, confirming that IDEXX has a pervasive culture

of retaliation.” Id. ¶ 27.

But these allegations8 are all divorced from gender-based discrimination or other

practices that Title VII prohibits.9 In her response to IDEXX’s motion to dismiss, Ms.

Schnell argues her allegations are sufficient because her manager agreed with her

concerns, thus satisfying the plausibility standard. ECF No. 5 at 13. But a Title VII

retaliation claim requires allegations that Ms. Schnell engaged in statutorily protected

activity, which her complaint does not plausibly allege. As pleaded, Ms. Schnell’s

communication with her manager concerned her “not know[ing] how to request

assistance and coaching at IDEXX without facing punitive action.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 27. It does

not include allegations that she complained of, opposed, or otherwise raised concerns

about “disparate treatment based on her gender” as she contends in her response to the

motion to dismiss. ECF No. 5 at 13. Nor do her other factual assertions support an

inference that she was voicing concerns related to gender-based disparate treatment in

the other instances alleged.

Ms. Schnell further argues her complaints of retaliation to supervisors were

protected by Title VII merely because those complaints concerned retaliation. But Title

VII is limited to protecting retaliation “motivated by listed prejudices.” Sabinson, 542

F.3d at 4; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (making it unlawful to discriminate based on

“race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). Even though Ms. Schnell understood a

colleague’s comment that she was “one of the [employees] who asked hard questions and

8 Ms. Schnell also alleges that she “opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII by making complaints to

HR about how she was being treated.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 52. The Court disregards this allegation as a legal

conclusion because it merely recites elements of a retaliation cause of action. See Ocasio-Hernández v.

Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Unlike factual allegations, legal conclusions contained

within a complaint are not entitled to a presumption of truth.”).

9 Ms. Schnell alleges she “experienced gender-based discrimination and retaliation for opposing practices

made unlawful by Title VII while working for IDEXX, which were similar to the experiences of other female

employees,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 13, but she does not elaborate on the experiences of those other female employees

beyond her attempts to incorporate the outside complaints.

[IDEXX] didn’t like it” to be a “direct acknowledgement that IDEXX retaliates against

employees who assert their rights, ask difficult questions, or speak out against illegal

practices,” ECF No. 1 ¶ 37 (alterations in original), the conclusory statement lacks

supporting allegations of protected activity under Title VII.

The Court is “not suggesting that she had to throw around buzzwords like ‘sex’ or

‘sexual’ harassment,” but Ms. Schnell does not plausibly allege she communicated

“something to put [IDEXX] on notice that the complained-of harassment was sex-based.”

Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 138 (1st Cir. 2013). Absent such supporting

allegations, the Court cannot conclude that Ms. Schnell’s complaints amounted to

protected activity for purposes of a Title VII retaliation claim. See, e.g., Harris v. Off. of

N.Y. State Comptroller, No. 20-cv-8827, 2022 WL 814289, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17,

2022) (dismissing a Title VII retaliation claim where the plaintiff “failed to allege that he

engaged in protected activity” because the plaintiff did “not allege that he ever explicitly

raised the issue of gender discrimination when he complained”).

Further, to the extent Ms. Schnell argues IDEXX retaliated after she complained

about perceived issues with the company’s 4Dx Multiplex test and the labs it produced,

while such claims may have been sufficient under a state whistleblower statute, the

conduct does not constitute protected activity under Title VII. See, e.g., Galouch v. Me.

Dep’t of Pro. & Fin. Regul., 856 F. Supp. 2d 244, 252 (D. Me. 2012) (retaliation claims

unrelated to discrimination should have been brought under a whistleblower statute, not

Title VII).

The complaint, even when viewed in a favorable light, lacks factual allegations

supporting an inference of protected activity under Title VII. Thus, the Court GRANTS

IDEXX’s motion to dismiss Count II. And because claims under the MHRA are concurrent

with Title VII, the Court also DISMISSES Ms. Schnell’s Count III retaliation claim

without prejudice.

V. Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court DENIES IDEXX’s motion to dismiss Counts I and III

to the extent that those counts proceed under a gender stereotyping theory of sex-based

discrimination, and it GRANTS the motion to dismiss Counts I and III to the extent those

counts proceed under a disparate treatment theory of sex-based discrimination. The

Court further GRANTS IDEXX’s motion to dismiss Count II for retaliation and Count III

to the extent that it proceeds under a theory of retaliation. ECF No. 4.

Although Ms. Schnell has not requested leave to amend her complaint, the Court

affords her the opportunity to do so in the interest of justice. See Fed. R. Civ. P 15(a).

Accordingly, Ms. Schnell has 21 days within which to file an amended complaint. If Ms.

Schnell fails to file an amended complaint by July 2, 2026, the Court will DISMISS

without prejudice Count I insofar as it alleges disparate treatment under Title VII, Count

II for retaliation, and Count III insofar as it alleges disparate treatment or retaliation.

The Defendant shall file an answer within 14 days after the filing of any amended

complaint or, if no amended complaint is filed, within 14 days after the expiration of the

amendment deadline.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 11th day of June, 2026.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE