Shalaby

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 ANDREW W SHALABY, Case No. 25-cv-03072-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO

DISMISS

9 v.

Re: Dkt. Nos. 13, 14

10 CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et al.,

11 Defendants.

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13 Pending before the Court are Defendants California Highway Patrol’s (“CHP”) and County

14 of San Mateo, California’s (“the County”) motions to dismiss. See Dkt. Nos. 13, 14. The Court

15 GRANTS the motions.

16 I. BACKGROUND

17 As alleged in the Complaint, shortly after leaving the Taco Bell parking lot in Pacifica,

18 California, Plaintiff Andrew Shalaby was pulled over for a traffic stop by Defendants Alexis

19 Rodriguez and Brian Elder, both CHP officers. Dkt. No. 1-1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 11. Rodriguez

20 explained that she initiated the traffic stop because Plaintiff’s registration sticker was expired. Id.

21 ¶ 12. Plaintiff underwent a field sobriety test, which he alleges he “passed effortlessly.” Id.

22 Rodriguez later informed him that she had observed two beer cans in the front seat of his car. Id.

23 ¶ 16.

24 Plaintiff alleges that during the traffic stop, he began experiencing symptoms of atrial

25 fibrillation. Id. ¶ 13. He asked Rodriguez if he could take his medication, which was in an

26 unmarked container. Id. ¶¶ 13, 53. The Complaint contains somewhat contradictory allegations

27 about the reasons for what happened next. Plaintiff alleges that Rodriguez and Elder would not

1 Plaintiff also alleges that they took him to the hospital “for blood extraction to test for DUI.” Id.

2 ¶ 49. Plaintiff alleges that the toxicology report was “issued” approximately 45 minutes before he

3 was transported to the county jail, and that the report showed he was not intoxicated. Id. ¶ 21.

4 And although he alleges that a “medic received” those results, he does not plead facts showing he

5 or the Defendants were made aware of those results before he was taken to jail.

6 While at the hospital, Elder asked Plaintiff to sign a citation for driving under the influence

7 and an open container violation. Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff hesitated to sign it, believing it was in error

8 since “he had not been drinking and there were no open containers” in his car. Id. The officers

9 asked the medic to confirm whether Plaintiff’s medications were, as he represented, Nitroglycerin

10 and Diltiazem. Id. ¶ 19. After the medic confirmed this, Elder and Rodriguez “confiscated” them

11 and edited the citation to reflect that Plaintiff was also in possession of a “‘controlled substance’

12 (HS 11350(a)).” Id. Elder informed Plaintiff that if he did not sign the citation, he would be taken

13 to jail. Id. ¶ 20. After Plaintiff asked for a moment to read it, Elder allegedly said he could have

14 “five [] seconds to sign it, then you’re going to jail.” Id. And when Plaintiff reiterated that he

15 wanted to read it first, Elder had Plaintiff discharged into his custody and took Plaintiff to the

16 county jail. Id. ¶ 20–28.

17 Plaintiff was booked for DUI and open container, and possession of a controlled substance.

18 Id. ¶ 28. Defendants Rodriguez and Elder conducted a strip search and cavity search of him. Id. ¶

19 27. He alleges that he was booked at the jail without a legal arrest or any charges, and without

20 receiving any Miranda warnings. Id. ¶ 30. He contends that the jail’s legal specialist, Nancy

21 Preston, informed him there were “no grounds” to hold him in the absence of any charges or

22 required bail, and he would be released. But he also alleges that Preston stated that “because he

23 was charged” with a DUI, the jail was required to hold him for six hours form the time of the

24 traffic stop. Id.

25 Preston placed Plaintiff in a “low-security holding room,” where he again experienced

26 symptoms of atrial fibrillation. Id. ¶¶ 30–31. He asked Defendant County of San Mateo’s jail

27 staff, individual Defendant Carlos Oropeza, if he could have his medications, but Oropeza did not

1 A.M., the earliest time he could be released due to the DUI charges. Id. ¶ 33. Plaintiff therefore

2 “demanded” to make a report for false imprisonment, and “in response,” Oropeza placed him in

3 solitary confinement. Id. Plaintiff “conclude[ed] he was likely going to go into cardiac arrest and

4 die in the cell,” and suffered “sever[e] emotional distress” as a result. Id. ¶ 34. He was released

5 from the cell approximately an hour and forty-five minutes after being placed there. Id. ¶¶ 33, 35.

6 Plaintiff initially sued in Superior Court of San Mateo County, asserting claims against

7 CHP, the County, Rodriguez, Elder, and Oropeza.1 See Compl. Defendant CHP removed. Dkt. 1.

8 He asserts the following eleven claims: (1) false imprisonment; (2) assault, (3) battery, (4)

9 intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”); (5) negligent infliction of emotional distress

10 (“NIED”); (6) violations of California Penal Code § 142; (7) violations of California Government

11 Code §§ 815.2, 820(a); (8) violations of the Bane Act, California Civil Code § 52.1, 43, 118.1; (9)

12 constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (10) vicarious liability; and (11) injunctive

13 relief.2

14 II. LEGAL STANDARD

15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint contain “a short and plain

16 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A

17 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be

18 granted under Rule 12(b)(6). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the

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1 CHP and the County indicate that none of individual defendants have been served, and the

21 docket reflects that none of the individual defendants have appeared in this case. Rather than

grapple with his failure to properly serve individual defendants, Plaintiff contends that “it does not

22 appear that Officers Alexis Rodriguez and Brian Elder are seeking dismissal of the claims against

them,” Dkt. No. 17 at 3, and he seems to believe that Officer Oropeza is represented by counsel

23 for the County of San Mateo, see Dkt. No. 18 at 1.

Plaintiff is mistaken. Presumably, Rodriguez and Elder have not moved to dismiss the

24 complaint because they have not been properly served, and Oropeza is not represented by the

County. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to serve individual Defendants within 30 days

25 of this order, and to provide an update to the Court within 35 days of this order regarding his

efforts to serve them. To the extent Plaintiff is unable to serve the individual Defendants, they

26 will be dismissed from this case in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m).

2 Plaintiff brings claims one through five, seven and eight against Elder, Rodriguez, and Oropeza.

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He brings claim six against individual Rodriguez and Elder only. Finally, he brings his tenth

1 complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”

2 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). To survive a Rule

3 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff need only plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible

4 on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible

5 when a plaintiff pleads “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

6 the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

7 In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in the

8 complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”

9 Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Nevertheless,

10 courts do not “accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of

11 fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Secs. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir.

12 2008) (quoting Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)).

13 III. DISCUSSION

14 A. Plaintiff Does Not Properly Allege a § 1983 Claim (Count 9)

15 The Court finds that Plaintiff’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is plainly deficient. To state

16 a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: “(1) that a right secured by

17 the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was

18 committed by a person acting under color of State law.” Long v. City of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d

19 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). Although Plaintiff alleges wrongful conduct, he does not identify any

20 violation of a right secured by the Constitution or federal law, and he does not specify which

21 defendants violated those rights. See generally Compl. In his opposition, Plaintiff articulates for

22 the first time that CHP and County officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

23 See Dkt. No. 17 at 4–6; Dkt. No. 18 at 4–6. But any such allegations must be in the complaint, not

24 raised in a brief. Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In

25 determining the propriety of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint

26 to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to

27 dismiss.”). To the extent Plaintiff wishes to bring this claim against the County, he must “identify

1 Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). And to the extent Plaintiff wishes to sue CHP, that

2 entity plainly appears to be entitled to sovereign immunity from § 1983 claims. See O’Leary v.

3 California Highway Patrol, 923 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Because the CHP is a state agency . . .

4 and the State of California has not consented to suit . . . both the State and the CHP enjoy

5 sovereign immunity and cannot be sued under section 1983.”). It may be possible for Plaintiff to

6 cure some of these deficiencies by amendment, and accordingly, his § 1983 claim is DISMISSED

7 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.3

8 B. State Law Claims

9 “A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims

10 once it has ‘dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d

11 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). “[I]n in the usual case in which all

12 federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the

13 pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point

14 toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Sanford v.

15 MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted); see also United Mine

16 Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1966) (“Needless decisions of state law should

17 be avoided both as a matter of comity and to promote justice between the parties . . . .”).

18 Having dismissed Plaintiff’s only federal claim, the Court will decline supplemental

19 jurisdiction and defer ruling on the viability of Plaintiff’s state law claims unless and until he

20 states an actionable federal claim.4 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s state law claims are DISMISSED

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22 3 Because the Court dismisses with leave to amend, it declines to consider CHP’s argument that

qualified immunity for its officers shields it from liability. To determine whether an officer is

23 entitled to qualified immunity, the Court must consider whether (1) the officer’s conduct violated

a constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the time of the incident. Pearson

24 v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). To the extent Plaintiff amends his § 1983 claim, and CHP

re-asserts this defense, the Court will consider “whether the complaint alleges sufficient facts,

25 taken as true, to support the claim that the officials’ conduct violated clearly established

constitutional rights of which a reasonable officer would be aware in light of the specific context

26 of the case.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 2018).

4 Plaintiff titles his eleventh cause of action “injunctive relief,” which asserts against the County.

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Injunctive relief is a remedy, not an independent claim. See Di Loreto v. Chase Manhattan Mortg.

] without prejudice. °

2 || Iv. CONCLUSION

3 Defendants’ motions to dismiss, Dkt. Nos. 13 and 14, are GRANTED WITH LEAVE

4 || TO AMEND. If Plaintiffis able to adequately state a federal cause of action, he may file an

5 amended complaint within 21 days of the date of this order. He may not add any new claims or

6 || defendants. Additionally, the Court ORDERS Plaintiff to serve individual defendants within 30

7 || days of this order, and to provide an update to the Court regarding his efforts to serve individual

8 defendants within 35 days of this order.

9 IT IS SO ORDERED.

10 || Dated: — 1/27/2026

i Abeyrod 5 Mb □□

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

12 United States District Judge

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26 || federal claim, he should also amend his claims (whether under federal or state law) to indicate

whether he seeks injunctive relief.

27 \Is If Plaintiff declines to amend his § 1983 claim, he should indicate whether he prefers for the

28 Court to remand the state claims to state court or dismiss those claims without prejudice to him re-

filing them in state court.