Rachel Mercer v. the Gloucester Township Board of Education

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-2885-24

RACHEL MERCER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

THE GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP

BOARD OF EDUCATION, THE

GLOUCESTER TOWNSHIP

PUBLIC SCHOOLS, GLEN

LANDING MIDDLE SCHOOL,

STEPHEN KLINE, and ORLANDO

MERCADO,

Defendants-Respondents.

______________________________

Argued April 22, 2026 – Decided June 11, 2026

Before Judges Paganelli, Vanek and Jacobs.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law

Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-1672-20.

Steven E. Angstreich argued the cause for appellant

(Weir LLP, attorneys; Steven E. Angstreich, on the

briefs).

William J. Moates argued the cause for respondents

(O'Toole Scrivo, LLC, attorneys; Jeffrey C. Maziarz

and William J. Moates, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Rachel Mercer appeals from a March 11, 2025 Law Division

order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Gloucester

Township Board of Education, Gloucester Township Public Schools, Glen

Landing Middle School, and school officials Stephen Kline and Orlando

Mercado, and a May 2, 2025 order denying plaintiff's reconsideration motion.

We affirm.

I.

We glean the salient facts from the summary judgment record, viewed in

the light most favorable to the plaintiff, as the non-moving party. See R. 4:46-

2(c); Christakos v. Boyadjis, 262 N.J. 447, 462 (2026). In early 2018, plaintiff

began working for Source4Teachers, a substitute teacher placement agency, and

was assigned as the building-substitute teacher for Glen Landing Middle School.

On April 23, 2019, the Gloucester Township Police Department received a

report from a parent alleging that A.W., a middle school student, had described

an inappropriate relationship with a twenty-five-year-old female substitute

teacher identified as "Mrs. Meads." The parent reported the alleged relationship

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began in September 2018 and may have involved inappropriate physical or

electronic contact. The report was referred to the Division of Child Protection

and Permanency (DCPP).

On April 24, 2019, the assigned DCPP investigator notified Assistant

Principal Stephen Kline that interviews would be conducted at the school

regarding the allegations. On arrival at the school, the investigator advised

Kline the substitute teacher identified in the DCPP report was a twenty-five-

year-old female with the last name "Meads" and asked him whether an

individual fitting that description worked at the school.

Kline had access to two lists that included the names and gender of

substitute teachers who had worked at the school during the previous two school

years. However, neither list provided the teachers' ages. In the 2017-2018

school year, thirty-one female substitute teachers worked at the school, five with

a last name beginning with "M." In the 2018-2019 school year, there were thirty-

five female substitutes, six with a last name starting with "M."

Kline did not offer the lists to the investigator. Instead, as recorded in the

DCPP Investigation Summary, Kline verbally responded to the investigator's

inquiry by stating, "[w]e don't have a Ms. Meads. We have a teacher with a

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name close to that, the only 25-year-old female substitute I can think of is Ms.

Mercer, Rachel Mercer."

The investigator interviewed A.W., who denied knowing any individual

named "Ms. Meads" or having an inappropriate relationship with plaintiff. A.W.

acknowledged telling friends that "she really like[d] Ms. Mercer as a sub." The

investigator also interviewed A.W.'s mother, who denied knowledge of the

alleged relationship.

The investigator interviewed A.W.'s friend, K.C., whose parent had

initiated the complaint. K.C. reported A.W. had told her and others she was

involved in a relationship with a substitute teacher and identified plaintiff as that

individual. K.C. described various interactions, including the allegation A.W.

and plaintiff had communicated outside of school and had seen each other naked.

K.C. also stated A.W. told her the day of the interview she had lied about the

relationship.

After advising her of the nature of the allegations, the investigator then

interviewed plaintiff. Plaintiff denied having any relationship with A.W. The

same day, school administrators, including Kline and Human Resources

Supervisor Orlando Mercado, informed plaintiff an allegation had been made,

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directed her to leave the school premises, and advised her not to return pending

the investigation results.

In the weeks that followed, the investigator conducted additional

interviews, including three students identified by K.C. Each of these students

reported A.W. had claimed to be involved with plaintiff, although several

indicated A.W. later stated the claims were a joke or untrue. None of the

students reported witnessing any inappropriate conduct. The investigator also

conducted a follow-up interview with plaintiff, during which she was

represented by counsel. Plaintiff again denied the allegations.

After the investigator contacted plaintiff's employer, she was suspended

by the agency pending the outcome of the investigation. In June 2019, DCPP

concluded its investigation and determined the allegations against plaintiff were

"unfounded." Law enforcement ultimately declined to pursue criminal charges

against plaintiff.

On May 10, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants, alleging

defamation, libel, slander, negligence, and intentional and negligent infliction

of emotional distress. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to

Rule 4:6-2(e). On January 22, 2021, the judge granted defendants' motion,

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dismissed the complaint without prejudice, and permitted plaintiff to file an

amended complaint.

Plaintiff then filed an amended complaint that included the same causes

of action and alleged one or more school employees identified her as the teacher

involved in the alleged relationship. The judge denied defendants' subsequent

motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

During discovery, plaintiff deposed Kline, Mercado, and various school

staff members. Mercado testified he was unaware of any policy governing

Kline's response to the DCPP investigator's inquiry. Mercado also testified he

would have advised Kline to offer the lists of all substitute teachers' names rather

than volunteer plaintiff's name, but Mercado was unaware of any policy

requiring a preferred course of action under such circumstances. All school

personnel deposed denied having been told about the accusation against

plaintiff.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. On March 11, 2025, the judge

granted defendants' motion and in an oral decision dismissed the amended

complaint. The judge determined the school did not initiate the report to DCPP

and was required to cooperate with the investigation. The judge found Kline

responded to the investigator's inquiry about a 25-year-old substitute teacher

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named "Meads" by identifying plaintiff. The judge concluded Kline's

identification was reasonable under the circumstances based on the record which

demonstrated plaintiff was the building-substitute and the only substitute-

teacher who matched the description the DCPP investigator had provided. The

judge also determined Kline was not obligated to give the investigator a list of

substitute teachers. The judge further found Kline's response demonstrated an

attempt to assist DCPP's investigation, rather than an effort to accuse plaintiff

of any misconduct.

The judge noted the DCPP investigator had conducted multiple interviews

with students and other witnesses prior to determining the allegations were

unfounded, and the investigator then found the student statements identifying

plaintiff were consistent with the underlying rumor and were not the product of

improper conduct by school officials.

The judge applied the summary judgment standard and concluded

defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The judge determined

Kline's statement identifying plaintiff was not wrongful, did not violate

plaintiff’s rights, and did not constitute actionable conduct. The judge found

the defendants acted appropriately in cooperating with the DCPP investigation

and did not engage in conduct giving rise to liability.

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The judge denied plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and clarified the

rationale underpinning his decision to grant summary judgment to defendants.

The judge found Kline's statement to the DCPP investigator was not defamatory

because it was true—the DCPP investigation revealed plaintiff was indeed the

subject of the allegation eventually deemed "unfounded." The judge further

found there was no evidence the allegation was communicated to other staff, so

there was no basis for a jury to find defendants liable for slander per se, and

defendants' conduct was not "extreme and outrageous" as required to prove

intentional infliction of emotional distress.

On appeal, plaintiff contends the judge improperly made factual and

credibility determinations that should have been left to a jury. Plaintiff also

argues the judge ignored the "law of the case" doctrine by granting summary

judgment on the basis of statutory immunity, despite having previously denied

defendants' motion to dismiss on that basis. Plaintiff further maintains statutory

immunity for reporting child abuse only applies when there is "reasonable cause

to believe" abuse occurred, which was not present here. She asserts Kline's

actions were reckless and defamatory because he had no reasonable grounds to

suspect plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff contends the judge dismissed her entire

complaint without addressing several of her claims, including slander per se,

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intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligent

disclosure of the investigation.

Defendants argue plaintiff was the subject of the DCPP investigation from

the outset and Kline acted reasonably and appropriately in cooperating with

DCPP's investigation. Defendants assert Kline's identification of plaintiff was

based on information provided by the DCPP investigator, and there was no

evidence of malice or recklessness. They maintain plaintiff failed to establish

the elements of her defamation claim, as there was no evidence Kline acted with

actual malice or reckless disregard for the truth. Additionally, although they

acknowledge the judge did not rule on the issue, defendants maintain they are

immune from liability under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.13 and the Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A.

59:1-1 to 12-3 (TCA). We address the parties' arguments in turn.

II.

We review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same standard used by the trial court. Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78

(2022). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and that

the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-

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2(c). A court should grant summary judgment when "the evidence 'is so one -

sided that [the moving] party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Rios v. Media

Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Petro-Lubricant Testing Labs., Inc.

v. Adelman, 233 N.J. 236, 257 (2018)).

The key inquiry is whether the evidence presented, when viewed in the

light most favorable to the non-moving party, is "sufficient to permit a rational

factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving

party." C.V. v. Waterford Twp. Bd. of Educ., 255 N.J. 289, 305 (2023) (quoting

Samolyk, 251 N.J. at 78). In deciding "whether a genuine issue of material fact

exists, the trial court must 'draw[] all legitimate inferences from the facts in

favor of the non-moving party.'" Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472

(2020) (alterations in original) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J.

469, 480 (2016)). When deciding a summary judgment motion, courts may not

weigh evidence or resolve credibility disputes. See Rios, 247 N.J. at 13 (quoting

Brill v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)) ("The court's

function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but

to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'").

We review a trial court's decision on a motion for reconsideration for

abuse of discretion. In re Est. of Jones, 477 N.J. Super 203, 216 (App. Div.

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2023). "An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is made without a rational

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an

impermissible basis.'" Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC Caging Fulfillment, 440

N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015) (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor,

171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A motion for

reconsideration should be granted solely in "those cases which fall into that

narrow corridor in which either 1) the [c]ourt has expressed its decision based

upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or 2) it is obvious that the [c]ourt

either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the significance of probative

competent evidence." Castano v. Augustine, 475 N.J. Super. 71, 78 (App. Div.

2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Triffin v. SHS Grp., LLC, 466 N.J.

Super. 460, 466 (App. Div. 2021)).

III.

Based on prevailing law applied to the undisputed facts, we are

unconvinced the judge erred in granting summary judgment to defendants and

dismissing plaintiff's complaint.

To prove defamation, "a plaintiff must establish, in addition to damages,

that the defendant (1) made a defamatory statement of fact (2) concerning the

plaintiff (3) which was false, and (4) which was communicated to a person or

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persons other than the plaintiff." Feggans v. Billington, 291 N.J. Super. 382,

390-91 (App. Div. 1996). "[A] statement is defamatory if it is false,

communicated to a third person, and tends to lower the subject's reputation in

the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from association with

[the subject]." Lynch v. N.J. Educ. Ass'n, 161 N.J. 152, 164-65 (1999). A

plaintiff must also prove fault, Feggans, 291 N.J. Super. at 391, whether

negligence or actual malice.

"There must be a showing of actual malice by a defendant where the

statement is about a plaintiff who is a public figure or relates to an issue of

public concern." Herman v. Muhammad, 480 N.J. Super. 480, 492 (App. Div.

2024) ("The actual malice standard applies here because [plaintiff's] conduct

arose in the context of her teaching in a public school."); see also Rocci v. Ecole

Secondaire Macdonald-Cartier, 165 N.J. 149, 156 (2000). The actual-malice

standard is subjective. Thus "[t]o find actual malice, the factfinder must

determine that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts about the truth of

the statement or that defendant had a subjective awareness of . . . [its] probable

falsity." Costello v. Ocean Cnty. Observer, 136 N.J. 594, 615 (1994). Although

questions of intent are generally fact-sensitive, summary judgment is

appropriate in a defamation case where the plaintiff is a public figure and fails

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to "demonstrate that a reasonable jury could conclude that 'clear and convincing

evidence' exists that the defendants" acted with actual malice. Id. at 614

(quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254-55 (1986)).

Even accepting plaintiff's version of events—that Kline suggested

plaintiff's name to the DCPP investigator without offering documentation—we

discern no error in the judge's conclusion Kline's conduct did not, as a matter of

law, constitute actionable defamation. We agree Kline's response to the DCPP

investigator's inquiry was not defamatory because the undisputed facts establish

it was true. The record does not establish the information Kline provided was

inaccurate and non-responsive to the DCPP investigator's description of a

twenty-five-year-old female substitute named "Mrs. Meads." The record also

demonstrates plaintiff was in fact the person to whom K.C.'s mother was

referring when she reported the alleged relationship to the police.

We are also unpersuaded the judge improperly made a determination as to

Kline's state of mind on summary judgment. Although questions of intent are

generally fact-sensitive, summary judgment is appropriate here because

plaintiff, as a public school substitute-teacher, is a public figure and failed "to

demonstrate that a reasonable jury could conclude . . . 'clear and convincing

evidence' exists" that Kline acted with actual malice. Costello, 136 N.J. at 614.

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(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 354-55). Rather than impermissibly resolving

issues of intent, the judge made a legal determination as to the sufficiency of

evidence supporting the conclusion Kline acted with actual malice. Ibid. The

judge did not err given the record contains no objective evidence of falsity or

evidence Kline subjectively entertained doubts as to the information he provided

to DCPP. The judge's conclusion was grounded in undisputed facts—the DCPP

investigator provided Kline with limited information, and Kline referenced a

substitute teacher who matched the investigator's description.

IV.

We are unconvinced the judge erred by dismissing all claims without

separately analyzing each cause of action. Trial courts may dispose of all claims

"[g]rounded . . . in the same conduct alleged in the defamation counts,"

Fortenbaugh v. N.J. Press, Inc., 317 N.J. Super. 439, 457 (App. Div. 1999), "if

the alleged defamation is not actionable," LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 323 N.J.

Super. 391, 417 (App. Div. 1999). In other words, "a plaintiff . . . may not

circumvent the required elements of or defenses applicable to another cause of

action that directly governs a particular form of conduct"—here, defamation—

"by relying upon them as a basis for" other claims. Griffin v. Tops Appliance

City, Inc., 337 N.J. Super. 15, 24 (App. Div. 2001).

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Here, the judge reasonably concluded all of plaintiff's claims arose from

the same core conduct, Kline's reference to plaintiff during DCPP's

investigation. To the extent plaintiff argues the "accusation against her was

wrongfully shared with others in the school," those allegations are inextricably

intertwined with her defamation claim. Having determined Kline's conduct was

non-defamatory, the judge properly concluded all of plaintiff's claims were

barred as a matter of law. See Salek v. Passaic Collegiate Sch., 255 N.J. Super.

355, 361 (App. Div. 1992) ("To hold otherwise would permit plaintiff to . . .

circumvent defenses to the defamation action."). Moreover, there is no evidence

in the record that the DCPP investigation was revealed to any staff member.

Therefore, we are unconvinced by plaintiff's arguments on this issue.

V.

Finally, plaintiff asserts the court improperly disregarded the "law of the

case" doctrine when it revisited the applicability of immunity defenses after an

earlier denial of defendants' motion to dismiss on the same issue. The law of

the case doctrine "is a discretionary rule that calls on one court 'to balance the

value of judicial deference for the rulings of a coordinate [court] against those

factors that bear on the pursuit of justice and, particularly, the search for truth.'"

State v. K.P.S., 221 N.J. 266, 276 (2015) (alteration in original) (quoting

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Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538-39 (2011)) (internal quotation marks

omitted). "[T]he law of the case doctrine 'is only triggered when one court is

faced with a ruling on the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical

issue.'" Lawson v. Dewar, 468 N.J. Super. 128, 135 (App. Div. 2021) (emphasis

omitted) (quoting Lombardi, 207 N.J. at 539).

The record reflects, however, the judge did not specifically address

defendants' arguments on the immunity defenses in his March 11, 2025 summary

judgment ruling. Therefore, because the issues are not identical and our

determination on the remainder of plaintiff's arguments is dispositive, we reject

plaintiff’s argument that the judge’s decision does not comport with the law of

the case doctrine.

To the extent we have not otherwise addressed plaintiff's arguments, it is

because they do not merit discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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