The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
D.T., a minor, by and through his )
parent/guardian and next friend ELISHA )
THORNTON, et al.; )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. )
Case No. 24-cv-00390-SH
)
INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT )
NO. 1-002, CREEK COUNTY, aka )
BRISTOW PUBLIC SCHOOLS; and )
FLOYD C. ROBINSON, an individual, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant School District’s motion for summary judgment
relating to the alleged misconduct of a now-deceased employee. Some of the employee’s
actions were serious and resulted in criminal charges, but the School District is liable for
its own unconstitutional actions—not those of others. Under the undisputed facts, no
reasonable jury could find that Defendant School District maintained a policy that led to
Plaintiffs’ constitutional injury. The Court grants judgment to the School District on
Plaintiffs’ federal claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state-law claims.
I. Procedural Background
Plaintiffs have sued the Independent School District No. 1-002 of Creek County,
a/k/a Bristow Public Schools (“School District”) relating to Defendant Floyd C.
Robinson’s (“Robinson’s”) filming of certain students in a school locker room on February
27, 2024, as well as his alleged prior sexual harassment of other students. (Dkt. No. 43.)
Plaintiffs1 are either students who were present in the locker room on February 27, 2024,
or those who allege prior harassment, or both. As relevant here, Plaintiffs’ claims against
the School District include: (1) a claim for negligence on behalf of Plaintiffs #1–132 (id.
¶¶ 38—43); and (2) a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of the due process and
equal protection rights of all Plaintiffs (id. ¶¶ 55—71).3 Defendant School District now
moves for summary judgment on these claims. (Dkt. No. 79.)
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that “a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). A factual dispute is material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law.” Id. As the court makes this determination, “[t]he evidence of the non-
movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at
255. To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must first show “that
there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Thomas v. Int’l
Bus. Machs., 48 F.3d 478, 484 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 325 (1986)). A party opposing summary judgment cannot simply allege there are
1 One plaintiff, Braden Tinsley, was dismissed from this case on his own motion on March
19, 2026. (Dkt. No. 78.)
2 Remaining Plaintiffs #1–13 are DT, ME, MP, HP, TK, JY, PJ, LJ, NJ, BJ, BM, and ZB.
(Dkt. No. 43 at 1.)
3 The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs’ negligence per se claims for failure to state a
claim and granted the voluntarily dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims under Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1682(a). (Dkt. Nos. 64, 78.) The Court also
granted the voluntary dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant Robinson after his
death. (Dkt Nos. 54–55.)
disputed issues of fact but must support its assertions by citing to the record or by showing
that the moving party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)(1); see also Cone v. Longmont United Hosp. Ass’n, 14 F.3d 526, 530 (10th
Cir. 1994) (“Even though all doubts must be resolved in [the nonmovant’s] favor,
allegations alone will not defeat summary judgment.”). “In a response to a motion for
summary judgment, a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on
suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will
turn up at trial.” Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988). The correct
inquiry for the court is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to
require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a
matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52.
In this case, both parties take issue with the other’s statement of fact, and the Court
will address those disputes first.
III. The Local Rules and Plaintiffs’ Denials of Material Facts
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have failed to comply with
the local and federal rules in their effort to dispute the School District’s statement of facts.
Rule 56 requires a party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed to support this
assertion by “(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . .; or (B) showing
that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute . . . .”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). If a party does not properly address another party’s fact assertions
as required by Rule 56(c), a district court may:
(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider
the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion; (3) grant summary
judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts
considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue
any other appropriate order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). The local rules clarify how facts must be supported or disputed, to
ensure compliance with Rule 56(c). Specifically, the nonmovant must respond, “by
correspondingly numbered paragraph, to the facts . . . not in dispute and shall state any
fact that is disputed.” LCvR 56-1(c). Each such individual statement by the nonmovant
“shall be followed by citation, with particularity, to any evidentiary material that the party
presents in support of its position” and “shall include references to the pages (including
paragraphs or lines, where applicable) . . . .” LCvR 56-1(e). The local rules make it clear
that the numbered paragraphs of disputed facts (with support) are separate from “any
additional facts the nonmovant contends preclude judgment as a matter of law.” LCvR
56-1(c).
Plaintiffs’ response to the School District’s undisputed facts consists of an
unadorned list of numbered paragraphs that generally state either “Admitted” or
“Denied.” (Dkt. No. 82 at 6—9.4) This is insufficient to create a disputed issue of fact
under the aforementioned federal or local rules. Thus, it would be appropriate to deem
the School District’s facts admitted. However, some of Plaintiffs’ additional facts (id. at
9–17) are appropriately supported by evidentiary citations and would constitute a dispute
of the School District’s facts. In this instance, the Court declines to punish Plaintiffs for
the dereliction of their counsel. Where the Court is able to discern a supported evidentiary
dispute of a material fact, it will be included in the recitation of facts below. Counsel is
warned that, in the future, briefs may be stricken or facts deemed admitted for failure to
comply with these rules.
4 Except where otherwise noted, page numbers refer to those in the court-provided
header.
IV. School District’s Objections to Plaintiffs’ Additional Facts
The School District objects that many of Plaintiffs’ proffered additional material
facts are inadmissible as hearsay, as statements made without personal knowledge, or as
conclusory statements. (Dkt. No. 86 at 2.)
Where Plaintiffs state a fact that is not supported by the materials cited, it will be
ignored. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). And where the evidentiary material cited itself contains
hearsay or is factual testimony made without personal knowledge, it will be disregarded.
At summary judgment, evidence need not be submitted “in a form that would be
admissible at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. Nonetheless, “the content or substance of
the evidence must be admissible.” Thomas, 48 F.3d at 485. “Thus, for example, at
summary judgment courts should disregard inadmissible hearsay statements contained
in affidavits, as those statements could not be presented at trial in any form.” Argo v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) (noting that hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered “to prove
the truth of the matter asserted in the statement”). By the same token, factual testimony
is only admissible if there is evidence “sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter.” Fed. R. Evid. 602 (noting such evidence may consist
of the witness’s own testimony); cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (noting that affidavits in
support of a summary judgment brief “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts
that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant . . . is competent to testify
on the matters stated”). The Court will not consider hearsay or speculative statements
contained within the exhibits to the parties’ briefing.5
V. Undisputed Facts
Unless otherwise noted, the following facts are undisputed as they relate to the
legal determinations made in this order on summary judgment. All inferences are drawn
in Plaintiffs’ favor.
A. General Background
The School District employed Robinson starting at least as early as 1992. (Dkt. No.
79 at 8 ¶ 3.6) Over time, Defendant Robinson had served as a teacher, coach, or assistant
coach; during the 2023–24 school year, he was an interim athletic/activities director. (Id.
¶ 4.)
As part of his job in 2023–24, Robinson would sometimes assist with wrestling
competitions. (Dkt. No. 79 at 12 ¶ 30.) Wrestling has weight classes; student wrestlers
would weigh themselves throughout the season to see if they needed to add or cut weight,
and wrestlers are required to weigh in prior to competitions. (Dkt. No. 79-4 ¶¶ 5, 7.)
Wrestlers would weigh in front of their coaches. (Id. ¶ 6.) In the past, it was common for
5 This does not mean that all evidence of out-of-court statements will be disregarded. For
example, as noted below, the Court has considered firsthand accounts of statements made
from students to the School District or its employees regarding Robinson, not for whether
those statements were true, but for whether the school had received notice regarding
Robinson’s alleged actions. The Court further has considered statements by Robinson as
they constitute his actions, and not for the truth of those statements.
6 Plaintiffs have explicitly and unequivocally admitted a large portion of the School
District’s statement of undisputed material facts (Dkt. No. 79 at 8–16). Specifically,
Plaintiffs have admitted the following paragraphs of Dkt. No. 79: ¶¶ 1–7, 10, 12–13, 15–
16, 19, 23, 29–30, 32, 36, 38–43, 45–47, 50, 57–58. (Dkt. No. 82 at 6–9.) For these
admitted facts, the Court will reference the paragraph of the School District’s brief. For
any facts not admitted, the Court will reference only those facts supported by the
accompanying record.
wrestlers to weigh themselves in the nude to have the lowest possible weight. (Dkt. No.
79-4 ¶ 8.) At least since the 2021–22 school year, however, wrestlers have been required
to wear a singlet for competition weigh-ins. (Id. ¶ 9.) Robinson would bring the scale to
out-of-town wrestling competitions for the high school wrestling team, and it was not
uncommon for wrestlers to weigh themselves in his hotel room. (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.)
The School District has policies prohibiting sexual harassment. (Dkt. No. 79 at 8
¶ 2 & Dkt. No. 79-1.) Prior to February 2024, there were no records in Robinson’s
employment file of any complaints of sexually inappropriate actions by Robinson or of
adverse actions taken for inappropriate conduct by Robinson. (Dkt. No. 79-26 ¶ 5.)
Plaintiffs were all students at the School District during the 2023–24 school year.
(Dkt. No. 79 at 8 ¶ 1.)
B. The February 2024 Locker Room Incident
On February 27, 2024, Plaintiffs TK, MP, KD, EB, SD, TF, JY, and HA were in the
track locker room showering and changing for school when Defendant Robinson walked
through the locker room. (Dkt. No. 79 at 9 ¶ 15.7) According to junior high track coach
Scott Hall, it was common for coaches to walk through the locker room to make sure there
was no horseplay and the team was getting ready.8 (Dkt. No. 79-5 ¶¶ 1, 9.) The coaches
7 “Locker Room Plaintiffs” are defined by the School District at Dkt. No 79 at 7. Plaintiffs
do not dispute this definition. However, it appears that Plaintiff BM was also in the locker
room on that date. (Dkt. No. 79-24 at 32:6–23.) BM was dressed, playing a game on his
phone, and did not see Robinson or anything that happened. (Id. at 32:22–33:7, 34:7–
20.) There are no other allegations relating to BM.
8 Plaintiffs dispute this fact, arguing, “[i]n the past coaches never came in the room while
students were showering.” (Dkt. No. 82 at 10 ¶ 9.) However, the only evidence cited by
Plaintiffs is the testimony of Chance Oldham, who testified as to conditions at least 30
years prior to the events at issue in this lawsuit. (Id. (citing Dkt. No. 82-4 at 13:4–10); see
also Dkt. No. 82-4 at 10:23–11:3 (noting Oldham was in 7th grade in 1989).) The Court
finds this does not create a material dispute as regular practice in the 2020s.
could also see the track locker room from their office. (Dkt. No. 79-7 at 68:1–15.9)
However, on this occasion, several students saw that Robinson was holding his
phone at his side with the screen facing his body as he walked through. (Dkt. No. 79 at 9
¶ 16.) Several boys believed, based on seeing the record button on the screen, that
Robinson was recording a video of the locker room. (Id.)
SD told Coach Wages that Robinson was recording the students.10 (Dkt. No. 79-14
at 74:7–16.) Coach Wages told SD this was a really big accusation and SD needed to make
sure it was true. (Id. at 74:17–20.) After SD again stated it was true, Coach Wages said
they would talk about it when they got back to the school, and the students loaded up on
the buses to go back to the school. (Id. at 74:21–75:1.) TF also remembers Coach Wages
telling the students, after it all happened, “to kind of let it low, like not really say anything
about it.” (Dkt. No. 82-6 at 10:1–6.) JY similarly remembers the students telling Coach
Wages about the recording, and him telling them not to tell anyone about it, not to tell
their parents, and “he would get it handled.” (Dkt. No. 79-6 at 47:22-25; Dkt. 82-11 at
48:1–3, 81:13–22.) HA recalls Coach Wages telling the boys that Robinson was an old
man, it could have been an accident, and not to go around telling everybody and making
them think he’s doing [the rest of HA’s testimony is cut off]. (Dkt. No. 82-14 at 86:12–
25.)
EB and other boys were talking about “it” on the bus back to campus when Coach
Scott Hall told the bus not to talk about it, which EB thought was because Coach Hall
9 References to summary judgment exhibits containing deposition testimony will use the
original pagination of the deposition with a “page:line” citation.
10 Other than being called “Coach,” there is no evidence in the record regarding Cori
Wages or Coach Wages role or position at the School District.
“didn’t know if we were being for real or joking.”11 (Dkt. No. 79 at 8 ¶ 6; Dkt. No. 79-11 at
45:4–14, 22–25; Dkt. No. 82-9 at 46:1–6.)
After they returned to the main school, EB, SD, MP, and some of the other boys
went to the middle school front office and reported the incident. (Dkt. No. 79-11 at 45:16–
21; Dkt. No. 82-9 at 46:7–15; Dkt. No. 79-14 at 75:1–3; Dkt. No. 79-12 at 101:16–24 (MP
recalls someone saying they would “take care of it” but “nothing really happened there”).)
SD and some other students were called into the principal’s office to tell what happened.
(Dkt. No. 79-14 at 75:4–9, 85:3–25.) Then, the school had students—including SD and
EB—write statements of what happened. (Id. at 75:8–9; Dkt. No. 79-11 at 47:1–9.)
By the next day, Robinson had been arrested for the anticipated charges of
procuring and possessing child pornography and use of electronic equipment in a
clandestine manner for an illegal or lascivious purpose. (Dkt. No. 82-21 at 1.)
In their briefing, Plaintiffs present the probable cause affidavit for the truth of the
matters asserted therein (Dkt. No. 82 at 9 ¶ 1), and the School District does not object to
this use (see generally Dkt. No. 86 at 3–5). According to the affidavit, the police found a
deleted video on Robinson’s phone that was taken on February 27, 2024, and lasted for
two minutes and 30 seconds. (Dkt. No. 82-21 at 3.) The video included images of the
locker room and depicted approximately 14 juvenile males in various stages of undress,
including some entirely nude. (Id.) There is no evidence as to whether any of the
individual Plaintiffs were depicted on the video or in what state of dress. After Robinson
died in April 2025, the criminal case was dismissed. (Dkt. No. 79 at 10 ¶ 19.)
11 Coach Hall denies receiving any reports of inappropriate behavior or misconduct
regarding Robinson. (Dkt. No. 79-5 ¶ 14.)
C. Robinson’s Prior Conduct
After the February 2024 locker room incident, various students asserted that
Robinson had previously acted in ways that were inappropriate or made them
uncomfortable.
1. 1989–1993
Travis Wycoff was a student at the School District in the late 1980s/early 1990s.
(Dkt. No. 82-1 at ¶ 3.) Wycoff states that, during the 1989–90 school year, Robinson
would place a chair in an old locker room’s shower entry; watch Wycoff and other students
showering; and comment on their genitals. (Id. ¶¶ 5–6.) In a different field house, at an
unknown time, Robinson would again watch Wycoff and other students showering or
dressing. (Id. ¶¶ 7–8.) Twice, Robinson attempted to pull off Wycoff’s towel. (Id. ¶ 9.)
When that failed, Robinson placed Wycoff in a wrestling hold he called the “banana split,”
and touched and flicked Wycoff’s genitals while commenting that Wycoff “better not get
a boner because that would mean [Wycoff] enjoyed it.” (Id.) Wycoff witnessed Robinson
doing the same to other students. (Id.) During the 1992–93 school year, Robinson
attempted to hit Wycoff in the genitals at a track meet. (Id. ¶ 10.) After the track meet,
Wycoff reported “the above stated incidents/abuse” by Robinson to the high school
principal at that time, Bob Stewart. (Id. ¶ 11.)
Chance Oldham attended the School District during that same time period. (Dkt.
No. 82-4 at 6:8–17, 10:23–11:3). Oldham testified that, during the 1989–90 and 1990–
91 school years, Robinson would stand or pull up a chair in the locker room and watch the
students shower. (Id. at 11:23–12:9, 18:8–11.) Robinson would also “pop[] kids on the
butt with towels, stuff like that.” (Id. at 12:12—15, 18:8–11.) Oldham also recalls Robinson
flicking his and others’ privates. (Id. at 18:19–19:14, 68:4–9.) Oldham never made a
report with anyone at the School District or anyone else regarding Robinson until after
Robinson was arrested in 2024. (Dkt. No. 86-1 at 47:8–48:10.)
2. 1993–2019
There are no allegations regarding Robinson during this 26-year period.
3. 2019–2024
More recent allegations regard Plaintiffs, and the Court will address each Plaintiff
in turn. For most, the date of the allegations is not clear; where the dates are in the record,
it is reflected below.
a. DT
DT testified that, a few weeks before February 6, 2024, he was in the locker room
with others showering and getting ready for school. (Dkt. No. 79-9 at 69:25–70:5; 70:22–
24.) Robinson walked into the locker room with his phone to his ear, walked over to a
locker, moved things around in the locker, and then walked out without taking anything.
(Dkt. No. 79-9 at 70:24–71:17; 72:10–17.) At the time of his deposition, DT was not sure
whether Robinson was talking on the phone or not. (Id. at 71:10–12.) DT had never seen
Robinson in the locker room while using his phone before that incident. (Id. at 72:1–5.)
It appears DT’s grandmother contacted the school on February 6, 2024, but there
is no cognizable evidence in the record as to this. (Dkt. No. 79-9 at 66:4–13.) That day,
Principal Seachris12 brought DT in to talk about it. (Id. at 73:23–25.) DT told Seachris
only that Robinson had come into the locker room looking for something and talking on
his phone; he did not tell Seachris that Robinson did anything else or anything sexual.
(Id. at 74:8–75:7.)
12 It appears Seachris is the middle school principal. (Dkt. No. 79-14 at 85:2–14.)
b. ME
ME testified that he has been bald his entire life, and “random” people—generally
students—will rub or slap his head. (Dkt. No. 79-21 at 60:6–25; Dkt. No. 82-19 at 62:1–
63:5.) ME does not like this, but he does not tell people to stop, nor has he complained
about it. (Dkt. No. 82-19 at 63:6–64:8.) At some point, Robinson also rubbed ME’s head;
none of the other coaches did that. (Dkt. No. 79-21 at 59:3–10; Dkt. No. 82-19 at 64:9–
16.) There is nothing in the record that ME reported the head-rubbing to the School
District.
c. MP
MP testified that, when he was in 7th grade, he was weighing in for wrestling when
he was a bit over weight. (Dkt. No. 82-7 at 64:16–22.) MP joked that he was going to
have to cut off his hair or his ear, when Robinson said, “I know something else we can cut
off” and touched MP in an unspecified location with his cane. (Id. at 64:23–65:22.) MP
did not report this or any other incident prior to February 27, 2024. (Dkt. No. 79-12 at
90:20–91:5.)
d. HP
HP testified that, when he was in 7th grade, he went down to the locker room at
lunchtime to check his weight in his underwear. (Dkt. No. 79-20 at 30:19–24; Dkt. No.
82-13 at 56:3–12.) Robinson then came in, which scared HP because he had not seen
anyone come in and the area was dimly lit. (Dkt. No. 79-20 at 30:25–31:3.) Robinson
then sat there while HP weighed in and talked to him. (Id. at 31:4–6.)
It was a normal occurrence when HP was in 7th grade for Robinson to watch the
students while they got ready. (Id. at 31:9–21.) Robinson would also put his arm around
HP and grab or rub HP’s shoulders from HP’s 7th grade year until he left in 2024.13 (Id.
at 33:1—25; Dkt. No. 82-13 at 34:1–13.)
Then, in the second week of February 2024, the wrestling team went to an out-of-
town tournament. (Dkt. No. 82-13 at 37:1–14.) For such tournaments, the team brings a
scale so they can check their weight. (Id. at 37:16–19.) At the tournament in February
2024, the weigh-ins were in Robinson’s hotel room bathroom, and Robinson would
sometimes watch the weigh-ins and would get up close so he could see the weight. (Id. at
37:20–21, 38:3–8, 42:13–20; Dkt. No. 79-20 at 40:1–17.) HP would either weigh in his
underwear or naked, because he was trying to cut weight. (Dkt. No. 82-13 at 42:8, 42:21–
43:1.) HP did not tell the coaches this made him uncomfortable or talk to the coaches
about the weigh-ins. (Id. at 43:11–15, 44:16–20.) However, HP did make a joke when
Coach Moore14 told the students they would have to weigh in Robinson’s room; HP told
another student that he would go with the student who was weighing in to “make sure it’s
safe.” (Id. at 43:15–44:5.) Coach Moore told HP to “shut the fuck up.” (Id. at 44:5–15.)
13 Ryan Powell, a parent, testified that at some point, possibly in 2022, he attended a
meeting with other wrestler parents and Coach Moore, Coach “Rich,” and “Roebuck.”
(Dkt. No. 82-15 at 24:19–25:21.) At the meeting, they discussed locker room etiquette,
but he does not know whether Robinson was mentioned. (Dkt. No. 82-15 at 24:19—25:1.)
Coach Richerson denies receiving any reports of inappropriate behavior or conduct by
Robinson. (Dkt. No. 79-4 ¶¶ 15–16.) Powell also claims his wife made certain reports to
the school, but it does not appear he has personal knowledge of these reports and is
instead relying on hearsay from his wife about what was reported to the School District.
(Dkt. No. 82-15 at 23:20–24:3; 26:10–24.)
14 Other than the title “Coach,” there is no evidence in the record regarding Coach Moore’s
role or position at the School District.
e. TK
TK had no contact with Robinson prior to the February 2024 locker room incident
and does not appear to be asserting any claims based on events prior to that date. (Dkt.
No. 79-13 at 42:1–4.)
f. JY
JY testified that, at some time, Robinson put his arm around JY’s shoulders with
his arm draping over JY’s front and then pulled JY closer when he tried to move away.
(Dkt. No. 82-11 at 38:17–24, 42:6–25.) JY made no complaints to any School District
employees or anyone else about Robinson before the February 2024 locker room incident.
(Dkt. No. 79-6 at 71:5–17.)
g. PJ
PJ testified that, when he was in 7th grade, he was checking his weight and “really
close to weight.” (Dkt. No. 79-19 at 79:9–15.) Robinson told PJ he could take off his
underwear to weigh in. (Id. at 79:17—19.) PJ also heard Defendant Robinson “joke” to
others “you know I wouldn’t mind if you-all are getting on the scale naked.” (Id. at 82:19—
83:1.) PJ testified that he told Coach Moore about this, but “he would just turn us down
about it, just saying we were lying or stuff like that.” (Id. at 83:3–25.)
PJ also testified that, after basketball games, Robinson would, at times, sit in the
locker room while PJ was getting dressed or people were showering. (Id. at 101:19—
102:10.) When PJ was in 7th grade, Robinson would sit on the benches where he could
see students walking out of the shower. (Id. at 110:6–21.) PJ was present when a group
of students told Coach Hall that Robinson was in the locker room for two days in a row
when people were showering for track. (Dkt. No. 82-18 at 112:4–113:6.)
In eighth grade, PJ told Coach Moore that Robinson was “still being weird,” but he
does not remember what else he said. (Id. at 119:3–22.) Then, a group including PJ told
Coach Moore that Robinson was standing in the locker room while they were showering.
(Id. at 119:23–120:7.) Coach Moore did not respond. (Id. at 120:8–11.) After practice the
next day, Coach Moore lined PJ and others up and had them run sprints because they
wanted to “keep joking around.” (Id. at 120:11–15.) Later a group including PJ talked to
Coach Moore again and had to run again. (Id. at 120:16–20.) PJ did not talk to anyone
else at the School District about what he told Coach Moore. (Id. at 121:13–15.)
h. LJ
LJ testified that, during his 7th grade year, after the students had just gotten out of
the showers, Robinson came into the locker room, sat down by him and others, and put
his phone to his ear without talking. (Dkt. No. 79-22 at 51:8–19.) Another time, LJ saw
Robinson tell another student who was weighing in, “If you get naked, then you’ll weigh
less.” (Id. at 53:15–22; Dkt. No. 82-17 at 54:2–4.) The student was under weight and did
not remove his undergarments. (Dkt. No. 82-17 at 54:5–6, 17–21.) LJ told Coach Hall
about this and recalls Hall telling him, “That’s just Coach Rob. That’s how he is.” (Id. at
58:1–14.) LJ has seen other students weigh naked to try and make weight. (Dkt. No. 79-
22 at 59:9–13.)
i. NJ
NJ testified that, during his 7th and 8th grade years, Robinson was “always” sitting
in the locker room while the students showered and changed. (Dkt. No. 79-23 at 37:2–
21.) NJ never reported any discomfort with Robinson to anyone with the school.15 (Id. at
42:21–43:7.)
j. BJ
BJ testified that, even though BJ wrestled in the heavyweight division, Robinson
instructed him to weigh in and told him he would lower his weight without underwear.
(Dkt. No. 79-18 at 26:6—21.) There is nothing in the record showing BJ reported this to
anyone at the school district.
BJ also said, when demonstrating wrestling moves, Robinson grabbed him on his
chest and near his buttocks in a way that BJ felt was not right and with other coaches
present.16 (Id. at 27:1—21, 32:15–20; Dkt. No. 82-16 at 33:9–34:8.) BJ told Coach Moore
and head wrestling coach Dustin Richerson about the wrestling moves, and they told him
if he kept coming up there they would make him do towel pushes as a punishment. (Dkt.
No. 79 at 8 ¶ 5; Dkt. No. 82-16 at 34:8–34:24; Dkt. No. 79-18 at 35:1–4.)
k. BM
There is nothing in the record regarding any interactions between BM and
Robinson before the February 2024 locker room incident, and it appears BM is not
asserting any claims prior to that date.
15 Plaintiffs present NJ’s testimony for the proposition that NJ’s friend’s older brothers
made a report to Superintendent Curtis Shelton. (Dkt. No. 82 at 11 ¶ 11.) However, NJ
did not witness any such report but is, instead, relating something his friend told him that
the brothers had told that friend. (Dkt. No. 82-20 at 44:24–46:9.) The truth of the
brothers’ statements and the truth of the friend’s recounting of those brothers’ statements
are both inadmissible hearsay. In any event, the report is only described as “they was like
experiencing stuff with Coach Rob.” (Id. at 45:15–16.)
16 Coach Richerson states he was present when Robinson demonstrated wrestling moves
generally and denies seeing Robinson touch a student in an inappropriate manner. (Dkt.
No. 79-4 ¶¶ 12–13.)
l. ZB
ZB testified that, when he was in 7th grade during the 2019—20 school year,
Robinson made ZB feel uncomfortable by coming into the locker room while ZB and his
teammates were changing and showering. (Dkt. No. 79-17 at 74:24—75:13.) Robinson
would also grab ZB, hug him, say “hi,” and rub his hair; Robinson acted that way with “a
lot of the boys.” (Id. at 81:11—82:20.) Then, during ZB’s 9th grade year, ZB hurt his knee,
and Robinson rubbed his other thigh “towards [his] groin area.” (Dkt. No. 82-8 at 88:4—
21.) While Robinson was rubbing ZB’s thigh, there was the sound of a door opening, and
Robinson then stopped and left. (Id. at 88:23–24.) ZB did not report Robinson’s
behavior to anyone at the School District. (Id. at 94:16–23.)
m. KD
KD testified that, when he was in 8th grade, Robinson came into the wrestling
locker room while students were showering or in towels. (Dkt. No. 82-12 at 35:16–36:5.)
Robinson had his phone to his head, said he was on a phone call, and said someone had
called needing some wrestling shoes. (Id.) Robinson asked a student wearing a towel to
climb up the locker and get the shoes with both hands. (Id. at 36:7–12.) The student did
not take off his towel, and Robinson left. (Id. at 36:14–22.) There is no evidence in the
record that KD reported this incident to anyone.
n. HA
HA testified that Robinson would grab students by the back of their neck and talk
to them when they were weighing in for wrestling. (Dkt. No. 79-7 at 61:1–7.) One time,
when HA was weighing in his underwear and not making weight, Robinson told him he
might make weight if he removed his underwear—a suggestion HA did not take. (Id. at
61:8—18.) HA did not report any of Robinson’s behavior to anyone at the School District
before the 2024 locker room incident. (Id. at 70:4–7.)
o. EB
EB testified that, prior to the February 2024 locker room incident, Robinson had
never done anything that made him uncomfortable, and he does not appear to be
asserting any claims prior to that date. (Dkt. No. 79-11 at 47:22–48:4.)
p. SD
SD testified that the February 2024 locker room incident was the only time
Robinson had acted inappropriately around him, and he does not appear to be asserting
any claims prior to that date. (Dkt. No. 79-14 at 97:18–23.)
q. TF
TF testified that, other than the February 2024 locker room incident, he had no
interactions with Robinson that were inappropriate, and he does not appear to be
asserting any claims prior to that date. (Dkt. No. 79-15 at 18:24–19:6.)
VI. Analysis
A. Plaintiffs’ Federal Claims under § 1983
Federal law provides a private cause of action for persons who are deprived of their
Federal constitutional rights by another person acting under color of State law. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Plaintiffs claim they were deprived of their due process and equal protection
rights.17
17 “[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
Municipal entities—including school districts—are persons subject to § 1983.
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688–89 (1978) (municipalities); Fitzgerald
v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 257–58 (2009) (referring to school district as a
type of municipal entity).
However, state actors are liable under § 1983 for their own acts, not those of others.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (noting vicarious liability is inapplicable to
§ 1983 claims). As such, a § 1983 plaintiff must show “that each Government-official
defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”
Id. For municipal entities like the School District, this means the constitutional injury
must be inflicted by the execution of that entity’s policy or custom. Monell, 436 U.S. at
694. To succeed on a § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs must show “(1) that a municipal employee
committed a constitutional violation, and (2) that a municipal policy or custom was the
moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.” Myers v. Okla. Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.
Comm’rs, 151 F.3d 1313, 1316 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown,
520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (noting that “rigorous standards of culpability and causation
must be applied to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of
its employee”).
The School District argues that the undisputed facts fail to show a municipal policy
or custom, that the policy or custom caused a violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights,
or that the School District acted with the requisite state of mind.
1. The Existence of a Policy or Custom
The parties agree that the School District’s policy or custom may be proven in a
variety of ways.
A municipal policy or custom may take the form of (1) a formal regulation
or policy statement; (2) an informal custom amounting to a widespread
practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal
policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage
with the force of law; (3) the decisions of employees with final policymaking
authority; (4) the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions—
and the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was delegated
subject to these policymakers’ review and approval; or (5) the failure to
adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure results from
deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.
Bryson v. City of Okla. City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (citation modified).
Plaintiffs argue there was an informal custom, ratification, and failure to train or
supervise that caused their injuries. (Dkt. No. 82 at 19—20.)
a. Informal Custom
When a student asserts a § 1983 claim based on an informal custom, the plaintiff
must prove (1) there existed a continuing, persistent, and widespread practice of
unconstitutional misconduct by school employees; (2) the school’s policymaking officials
had notice of that particular misconduct and were deliberately indifferent or tacitly
approved it; and (3) the plaintiff was injured by that custom, which was the moving force
behind the acts. Gates v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 449, 996 F.2d 1035, 1041 (10th Cir. 1993);
see also Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th
Cir. 2008) (same). “Although the Tenth Circuit has never adopted a bright-line rule as to
the number of similar incidents required to establish the existence of a custom, most
courts, including the Tenth Circuit, have concluded that a single incident—or even three
incidents—do not suffice.” S.R. v. Tri-Cnty. Interlocal CO-OP Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 6:23-
CV-255-JAR, 2025 WL 845117, at *6 (E.D. Okla. Mar. 18, 2025) (collecting cases).
Here, Plaintiffs have shown that one individual, Robinson, repeatedly acted in a
way they allege sexually harassed students in the few years leading up to the 2024 locker
room incident, and that he acted similarly with two students decades earlier. Many of the
complaints were not of an overtly sexual nature. Most were completely unknown to
anyone else at the School District.18 Exceptions include the report by Wycoff in 1993 that
Robinson had watched him and others showering or dressing, flicked his genitals during
wrestling while making an inappropriate comment, and attempted to hit him in the
genitals at a track meet. (Supra § V(C)(1).) After that report, there was no notice to
anyone at the School District of any misconduct for at least 26 years. Then, (1) DT
reported to Principal Seachris on February 6, 2024, that Robinson had walked into the
locker room while talking on his phone (supra § V(C)(3)(a)); (2) PJ reported to Coaches
Moore and Hall that Robinson told students they could weigh in naked and that he was
standing in the locker room while they were showering (supra § V(C)(3)(g)); (3) LJ
reported to Coach Hall that Robinson told a student he would weigh less if he weighed in
naked (supra § V(C)(3)(h)); and (4) BJ complained to Coaches Moore and Richerson that
he felt Robinson’s wrestling moves were not appropriate (supra § V(C)(3)(j)).19
Even for these reports, there is no evidence that the School District’s policymaking
officials knew about them. To determine whether an official is a final policymaker, courts
18 This includes all of the incidents alleged by Chase Oldham in 1989–1991 (supra
§ V(C)(1)); all of the incidents alleged by ME, MP, JY, NJ, ZB, KD, and HA (supra
§§ V(C)(3)(b)–(c), (f), (i), (l)–(n)); and some of the incidents alleged by BJ (supra
§ V(C)(3)(j)). Plaintiffs TK, BM, EB, SD, and TF do not allege that Robinson acted
inappropriately around them before the 2024 locker room incident. (Supra §§ V(C)(3)(e),
(k), (o)–(q).)
19 Plaintiffs also point to Robinson’s purported nicknames. Oldham testified he heard
Robinson be called “Freaky Floyd” or “Funky Floyd.” (Dkt. No. 82-4 at 13:11–25.) JY
testified he had heard people call Robinson “Freaky Floyd” but without any explanation.
(Dkt. No. 79-6 at 63:16–21, 67:3–8.) One parent said the “kids” called Robinson “Creepy
Floyd.” (Dkt. No. 82-15 at 35:12–22.) There is no evidence these nicknames were known
to the School District or its employees, nor do they alone indicate inappropriate action by
Robinson.
consider “(1) whether the official is meaningfully constrained by policies not of that
official’s own making; (2) whether the official’s decision[s] are final—i.e., are they subject
to any meaningful review; and (3) whether the policy decision purportedly made by the
official is within the realm of the official’s grant of authority.” Randle v. City of Aurora,
69 F.3d 441, 448 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation modified). The relevant question is whether
the school employee has “‘policymaking’ authority, not ‘decision making’ authority.”
Rubio v. Turner Unified Sch. Dist. No. 202, 453 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (D. Kan. 2006)
(collecting cases); see also City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126 (1988) (“If
the mere exercise of discretion by an employee could give rise to a constitutional violation,
the result would be indistinguishable from respondeat superior liability.”).20 Whether an
official has “final policymaking authority” is a question of state law. Praprotnik, 485 U.S.
at 123. If the employee’s decision on a matter needs approval of another governing body,
then the employee cannot be considered the final policymaker for that matter. Young v.
City of Idabel, 721 F. App’x 789, 802 (10th Cir. 2018).21
Under Oklahoma law, the governing body of a school district is its board of
education. See Okla. Stat. tit. 70, § 5-106(A). However, other Oklahoma school officials
may be considered final policymakers if they are shown to have the appropriate authority.
See, e.g., Najera v. Indep. Sch. Dist. of Stroud No. I-54 of Lincoln Cnty., No. CIV-14-657-
R, 2015 WL 4310552, at *5 (W.D. Okla. July 14, 2015) (finding superintendent was final
policymaker in § 1983 sexual harassment case, where he served as chief executive officer
20 While Praprotnik was a plurality opinion, the Tenth Circuit has found that it can be
fairly read as binding precedent. See Randle, 69 F.3d at 448 n.9.
21 Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but they may be cited for their persuasive
value. 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
of the district and was charged with implementing the district’s sexual harassment
policy). But here, there is no evidence in the record that anyone other than the school
board or certain designated employees had policymaking authority regarding sexual
harassment at the Bristow School District.22 There is no evidence that Principal Seachris
or the coaches served in any of these roles. The Court cannot assume facts not in evidence
and cannot find that the School District’s policymakers knew of the limited instances
reported before the February 2024 locker room incident.
The evidence in the record fails to show either a widespread practice or that the
School District’s policymakers tacitly approved the practice (or were deliberately
indifferent to it) under Tenth Circuit precedent. For example, in Gates, there was a prior
report to the school board that the teacher was “chasing” another student who was
“infatuated” with him and he had an “affair” with her; the school board president believed
“there was a chance that [the teacher] may have done so with other high school girls” and
heard “scattered comments from a high school student” that the teacher was “chasing
after” the plaintiff; and the offending teacher admitted to a fellow teacher he had sex with
yet another student. Gates, 996 F.2d at 1037–38, 1042. The Tenth Circuit found “the
evidence would not support a finding of the existence of a pattern of persistent and
widespread unconstitutional practices that had become so permanent and well-settled as
to have the force and effect of law.” Id. at 1042. The court also found the evidence did
“not demonstrate that the [school district] had notice of a pattern of unconstitutional acts,
22 The School District presented evidence it had sexual harassment policy, which Plaintiffs
admitted. (See Dkt. No. 79 at 8 ¶ 2; Dkt. No. 82 at 6 ¶ 2.) The policy requires reports of
harassment be passed up to a Title IX coordinator, with an interim decision on such
reports made by the Title IX coordinator or an investigator, subject to a final decision by
the appeal decisionmaker. (Dkt. No. 79-1 at 2–4.)
or that [it] displayed deliberate indifference or tacitly authorized the violation of plaintiff’s
constitutional rights.” Id.
The evidence in this case is more lacking than that in Gates. As in Gates, there are
allegations of actions by only one employee. But unlike the allegations in Gates, many of
the allegations here are nonsexual, and there is no evidence that any of Robinson’s alleged
misconduct was known to the policymakers at the School District. The Court finds
Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate an informal policy on which they could base a § 1983
claim. See also Doe No. 1 v. Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. No. Re-2, No. 11-CV-02107-PAB-
KLM, 2012 WL 4378162, at *8 (D. Colo. Sept. 25, 2012) (no “widespread or persistent
unlawful conduct” where plaintiffs alleged “rumors among the student body about [a
student teacher’s] relationships with students” and not that “other school district
employees were also having unlawful relationships with students.”), aff’d, 523 F. App’x
514 (10th Cir. 2013); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 820 (10th Cir. 1989) (no informal
custom of sexual harassment where a supervisor “engaged in isolated and sporadic acts
of sexual harassment directed at a few specific female members of his staff” and there was
“no indication that sexual harassment by others in the office was tolerated or occurred”).
But cf. Aubert v. Cent. N.M. Cmty. Coll., No. 18-CV-0118-WJ-LF, 2019 WL 1239435, at
*9 (D.N.M. Mar. 18, 2019) (finding plaintiff alleged informal custom where there were no
Title IX policies and the institution failed to respond to the plaintiff’s complaints in
several instances).
b. Ratification
Plaintiffs also fail to show “the ratification by . . . final policymakers of the
decisions—and the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority was delegated
subject to these policymakers’ review and approval.” Bryson, 627 F.3d at 788 (citation
modified). As noted above, the only policymakers established by the evidence in this case
are the School District’s school board and certain official(s) listed in the sexual
harassment policy. And again, as noted above, Plaintiffs have not shown those
policymakers delegated any decisions to their subordinates and then ratified those
decisions.23 Plaintiffs have presented no evidence from which a jury could find
ratification.
c. Failure to Train or Supervise
Finally, Plaintiffs have not put forth evidence that the School District failed to
adequately train or supervise employees. Failure to adequately train or supervise
employees can constitute an official policy, “so long as that failure results from deliberate
indifference to the injuries that may be caused.” Lucas v. Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC,
58 F.4th 1127, 1145 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation modified). “A municipality’s culpability for
a deprivation of rights is at its most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.”
Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011). “It is not enough to [show] general
deficiencies in a particular training program. Rather, a plaintiff must identify a specific
deficiency in the entity’s training program closely related to his ultimate injury . . . .”
Keith v. Koerner, 843 F.3d 833, 838–39 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation modified).
The parties conducted discovery for over a year in this case, but Plaintiffs put
forward no facts regarding the (lack of) training provided by the School District to its staff,
or how staff were supervised. Plaintiffs do not even identify what training or supervision
they believe was inadequate—was it training of employees like Robinson on how they
23 The parties treat all Plaintiffs identically in their arguments, and so will the Court.
However, for some of these issues—like prior notice and ratification—there would be
serious questions based on the timing of any alleged notification and the date of the
alleged harms committed against those Plaintiffs.
should act or was it training on whether or how student complaints should be reported
under the sexual harassment policy? Instead, Plaintiffs appear to assume that, because
Robinson’s actions occurred, any training or supervision must have been deficient. This
omission by itself dooms Plaintiffs’ arguments on failure to train or supervise.
But Plaintiffs also fail to show deliberate indifference to any training deficiencies.
“To satisfy the stringent deliberate indifference standard, a pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary.”24 Waller v. City
& Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277, 1285 (10th Cir. 2019). “Without notice that a course of
training is deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have
deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.”
Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. Plaintiffs put forward various instances of Robinson’s conduct
and a few instances of school staff learning of that conduct and—given Robinson’s clean
record—not reporting that conduct up the chain of leadership or to the Title IX
coordinator. But Plaintiffs fail to show notice to the School District’s policymakers of
these events or that the training was deficient.
Plaintiffs have failed to show a municipal policy or custom that led to their injuries
under any theory, and their § 1983 claims against the School District fail for lack of this
essential element.25
24 “Deliberate indifference may [also] be found absent a pattern of unconstitutional
behavior only in a narrow range of circumstances where a violation of federal rights is a
highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction.”
Waller, 932 F.3d at 1284. As Plaintiffs provide no evidence of the School District’s action
or inaction, they cannot show that a violation of federal rights was a predictable or plainly
obvious consequence.
25 Although much of the parties’ Monell arguments center around the due process claims,
the parties agree that a failure to demonstrate any policy or custom that led to Plaintiffs’
injuries similarly defeats equal protection claims. (Dkt. No. 79 at 28; Dkt. No 82 at 27.)
2. Substantive Due Process
Because Plaintiffs have failed to show any policy that led to their injuries, they
cannot establish the School District’s liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Muskrat v.
Deer Creek Pub. Schs., 715 F.3d 775, 788–89 (10th Cir. 2013) (applying Monell to a
substantive due process claim). But even had Plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for
municipal liability under Monell, their substantive due process claim would still be
foreclosed by their failure to show affirmative action that shocks the conscious. A
substantive due process violation occurs when “government action deprives a person of
life, liberty, or property in a manner so arbitrary it ‘shocks the conscience.’” Abdi v. Wray,
942 F.3d 1019, 1027 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
846 (1998)). Plaintiffs assert the School District violated their substantive due process
rights under the “danger creation” theory.
Under that theory, a state actor can be liable for the acts of a third party, where the
state actor “affirmatively acts to create, or increases a plaintiff’s vulnerability to, danger
from private violence.” Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001). To prevail
on this theory, a plaintiff must “establish as a threshold matter (1) private violence, and
(2) affirmative conduct on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger.”
Hernandez v. Ridley, 734 F.3d 1254, 1259 (10th Cir. 2013). Then, the plaintiff “must also
satisfy all elements of a six-part test:
(1) defendant created the danger or increased plaintiff’s vulnerability to the
danger in some way; (2) plaintiff was a member of a limited and specifically
definable group; (3) defendant’s conduct put plaintiff at substantial risk of
serious, immediate, and proximate harm; (4) the risk was obvious or
See also Rost, 511 F.3d at 1124 (“A school district’s liability for sexual harassment under
the Equal Protection clause is analyzed under a municipal liability framework.”).
known; (5) defendant[] acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk;
and (6) such conduct, when viewed in total, is conscience shocking.
Id. (citation modified). Plaintiffs’ claims fail on multiple fronts.
First, putting aside whether any private violence occurred, Plaintiffs fail to show
“affirmative conduct” on behalf of the School District and fail at the threshold level.
Affirmative conduct typically involves “conduct that imposes an immediate threat of
harm, which by its nature has a limited range and duration” and is “directed at a discrete
plaintiff rather than at the public at large.” Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1183 (10th
Cir. 2002). “[M]ere negligence or inaction is not enough.” Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen, 710
F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2013).
As noted above, Plaintiffs’ complaints center around the School District’s inaction.
In their response brief, however, Plaintiffs argue the School District “affirmatively
increased the risk to Plaintiffs by promoting Robinson to interim athletic director, thereby
expanding his authority and access to student-athletes.”26 (Dkt. No. 82 at 24.) There is
no evidence in the record that Robinson’s job as interim athletic director expanded his
access to students or otherwise played a role in the alleged events. The undisputed facts
are that Robinson had been, at various times, a coach of wrestling and track (Dkt. No. 79
at 8 ¶ 4) and his alleged wrongdoing occurred when engaged with the wrestling and track
teams. Moreover, Robinson’s promotion would not impose an immediate threat of harm
26 Plaintiffs also argue, in passing, that the School District affirmatively acted by
“punishing students who reported misconduct.” (Dkt. No. 82 at 24.) Plaintiffs appear to
base this on the testimony of PJ and BJ. PJ testified Coach Moore had him and others
run sprints the day after complaining about Robinson being in the locker room and then
again on the same day as another complaint. (Dkt. No. 82-18 at 119:23–120:20.) BJ
testified that Coaches Moore and Richerson threatened him with towel pushes if he did
not stop complaining about the way Robinson demonstrated wrestling moves. (82-16 at
34:5–24.) Plaintiffs do not provide legal authority for attributing these acts to the School
District.
but, instead, a threat of an indefinite range and duration. See Ruiz, 299 F.3d at 1183
(noting the improper licensure of daycare facility did not meet the affirmative conduct
requirement for this reason).
Second, even if Plaintiffs passed the threshold inquiry, they fail to show the School
District’s conduct shocks the conscious. “The ‘shocks the conscience’ requirement for a
danger-creation claim is grounded in three principles: (1) restraint in defining the scope
of substantive due process claims; (2) the concern that § 1983 not replace state tort law;
and (3) the need for deference to local bodies in making decisions impacting public
safety.” Kerns v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 31, 984 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (N.D. Okla. 2013)
(citing Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir.
1998)). For this element, a plaintiff must prove that the state action was not only
intentional or reckless but it also had a “degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of
potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking.” Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1262
(citation modified). Whether state conduct shocks the conscience is a question of law for
the Court. See Perez v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty./Kansas City, 432 F.3d 1163,
1168 n.4 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Terrell v. Larson, 396 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2005)).
Here, the argued affirmative conduct consisted of placing Robinson in his role and
appearing to punish (or threatening to punish) some individual students for complaining
about Robinson’s presence in the locker room and the way he touched a student while
demonstrating wrestling moves. This does not arise to the level of “brutal and inhumane
abuse of official power” that shocks the conscious. Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama
Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1256–57 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation
modified).
B. Plaintiffs #1–13’s State Law Claims for Negligence
Finally, the School District argues that, if the federal claims are dismissed, the
Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.
Plaintiffs do not dispute this portion of the School District’s argument. (Dkt. No. 82 at
28.) The Court finds it is appropriate to decline jurisdiction.
By statute, when a district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action, it also
has supplemental jurisdiction over related claims that form part of the same case or
controversy. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, the court may decline to exercise that
jurisdiction if it has dismissed all the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Id.
§ 1367(c)(3). “Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of
comity and to promote justice between the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966); see
also Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (“When all federal
claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise
jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.” (citation modified)).
Here, no party argues the Court should retain jurisdiction should the federal claims
fail, and there do not appear to be any compelling reasons to do so. The Court will
therefore dismiss the remaining negligence claims of Plaintiffs #1–13 without prejudice.
VII. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. No. 79) is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE. Plaintiffs #1–13’s state-law negligence claims are DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant School District’s Omnibus Motion in
Limine (Dkt. No. 83) is DENIED as MOOT.
ORDERED this 8th day of June, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
31