Beamon v. SAIF

No. 517 June 10, 2026 415

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of the Compensation of Don L. Beamon,

Claimant.

Don L. BEAMON,

Petitioner,

v.

SAIF CORPORATION

and MMNW Holding Co - Metro Metals Northwest,

Respondents.

Workers’ Compensation Board

2203993;

A182876

Argued and submitted January 6, 2026.

Jodie Anne Phillips Polich argued the cause for petitioner.

Also on the opening brief were Law Offices of Jodie Anne

Phillips Polich, P.C.; Bailey Oswald and Bottini, Bottini, &

Oswald, PC. Also on the reply brief was Law Offices of Jodie

Anne Phillips Polich, P.C.

Daniel Walker argued the cause and filed the brief for

respondents.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and

Jacquot, Judge.

KAMINS, J.

Reversed and remanded.

Tookey, P. J., dissenting.

416 Beamon v. SAIF

Cite as 350 Or App 415 (2026) 417

KAMINS, J.

At issue in this petition for judicial review of an

order from the Workers’ Compensation Board (board) is

which party bears the burden of proof to demonstrate

whether a compensable condition is the major contribut-

ing cause of the need for treatment of a combined condition

under ORS 656.266(2)(a). Claimant had an on-the-job injury

of a disc herniation, which was accepted as compensable. He

later sought treatment for a combined claim of both the disc

herniation and his preexisting lumbar spondylosis, which

SAIF, and then the board, denied. Claimant raises two

assignments of error: (1) the board erroneously interpreted

claimant’s initial burden of proof under ORS 656.266(2)(a);

and (2) the board’s order is not based on substantial evi-

dence because, after failing to properly shift the burden to

SAIF after claimant proved the existence of a combined con-

dition, the board did not require SAIF to produce evidence

that the accepted condition was not the major contributing

cause of the need for treatment of the combined condition.

We reverse and remand.

The facts are not in dispute. While squatting at

work, clamant injured his lower back, developing leg pain

and weakness. Claimant was eventually diagnosed with a

disc herniation in his lumbar spine as well as lumbar radic-

ulopathy and foraminal stenosis (disc herniation), a condi-

tion SAIF accepted as being caused by his work. Despite

exhausting conservative non-surgical approaches, claimant

continued to experience pain and weakness in his left leg.

He then sought the acceptance of a claim for a “combined

condition” of his already accepted disc herniation with a

preexisting arthritic condition of lumbar spondylosis. SAIF

denied the request, and claimant appealed to the board.

The board evaluated the record and upheld SAIF’s

denial. Relying in large part on the report and testimony

of Dr. Button, the board acknowledged that the spondy-

losis was a preexisting condition that combined with the

accepted condition of disc herniation to contribute to the

disability or need for treatment of that herniation. The

board reasoned that Dr. Button’s opinion supported the con-

clusion that “the disc herniation itself was a compensable

418 Beamon v. SAIF

combined condition, * * * not that the work event [disc her-

niation] was a material contributing cause of claimant’s dis-

ability or need for treatment of the spondylosis condition.”

In the board’s view, that opinion did not suggest that the

work accident was a material contributing cause of claim-

ant’s disability or need for treatment of spondylosis. Thus,

the board reasoned “claimant has not carried his initial

burden to show that the work accident [disc herniation] was

a material contributing cause of his disability or need for

treatment of the lumbar spondylosis condition.” This peti-

tion for judicial review followed.

We review the board’s legal conclusions for errors

of law, ORS 183.482(8)(a); Curry Educational Service Dist.

v. Bengtson, 175 Or App 252, 254, 27 P3d 526 (2001), and its

factual findings for substantial evidence, ORS 183.482(8)(c);

Greenbriar Ag Management v. Lemus, 156 Or App 499, 505,

965 P2d 493 (1998), rev den, 328 Or 594 (1999).

Here, claimant sought to establish the compensa-

bility of a “combined condition,” arguing that the accepted

disc herniation combined with the preexisting arthritic con-

dition of spondylosis. A “combined condition” is a condition

that occurs “[i]f an otherwise compensable injury combines

at any time with a preexisting condition to cause or prolong

disability or a need for treatment.” Pedro v. SAIF, 313 Or

App 34, 39, 495 P3d 183 (2021) (citing ORS 656.005(7)(a)

(B)). The “otherwise compensable injury” refers to a medical

condition, not a work event or accident. Id. (citing Brown v.

SAIF, 361 Or 241, 272, 391 P3d 773 (2017)). Once the worker

establishes a combined condition, “the employer shall bear

the burden of proof to establish the otherwise compensable

injury is not, or is no longer, the major contributing cause of

the disability of the combined condition or * * * the need for

treatment[.]” ORS 656.266(2)(a). The shifting of the burden

to the employer is an “exception” to the “ordinary” course

where the claimant bears the burden to prove the compen-

sability of a claim. Keystone RV Co.-Thor Industries, Inc. v.

Erickson, 277 Or App 631, 633, 373 P3d 1122 (2016)

Here, claimant established the “compensable

injury”—i.e., medical condition—of a disc herniation.

Claimant then sought coverage for the combined condition

Cite as 350 Or App 415 (2026) 419

of that accepted herniation with his preexisting spondylosis.

Resolving that request requires a two-step determination:

the board must determine (1) whether claimant established

a combined condition, and, if so, (2) whether the employer met

its burden to establish that the accepted condition is not the

major contributing cause of the need for treatment or disabil-

ity of the combined condition. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) (“[T]he

combined condition is compensable only if, so long as and

to the extent that the otherwise compensable injury is the

major contributing cause of the disability of the combined

condition or the major contributing cause of the need for

treatment of the combined condition.”).

At the first step, claimant met his burden to estab-

lish a combined condition. As described above, claimant

was required to demonstrate that the accepted disc herni-

ation combined with the preexisting spondylosis to cause

the need for treatment. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B). In the record

before the board, Dr. Button opined that “the spondylosis

was a portion of the reason that his disc herniated and led

to his need for treatment.” Indeed, as the board determined,

that “opinion supports the conclusion that the spondylosis

was a preexisting condition that combined with the work

event [disc herniation] to contribute to claimant’s disability

or need for treatment of the disc herniation.” That is suf-

ficient to meet claimant’s burden to establish a combined

condition.1

1

The dissent asserts that claimant sought compensability only for the spon-

dylosis “component” of the combined condition and faults our analysis because

it does not require claimant to demonstrate the need for treatment “of the spon-

dylosis.” 350 Or App at 423 (emphasis in original) (Tookey, P. J., dissenting). In

the dissent’s view, a “claimant’s initial burden in a combined condition claim

is to establish that an ‘otherwise compensable condition’ combined with a pre-

existing condition ‘to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment’ of the

claimed combined condition.” Id. (slip op at 2) (emphasis in original) (quoting ORS

656.005(7)(a)(B) (citing Keystone RV Co.-Thor Industries, Inc. v. Erickson, 277 Or

App 631, 373 P3d 1122 (2016); Giffin v. Dish Network Services, 296 Or App 233,

437 P3d 252 (2019)), and here, claimant only provided evidence of a need for treat-

ment of disc herniation and not spondylosis. But nowhere in the statute, or the

cases cited by the dissent, does that emphasized language appear. Claimant does

not need to prove causation separately as to each component of the combined

condition once he has already proven that the otherwise separate conditions com-

bined to cause a need for treatment. Ultimately, the dissent’s analysis suffers

from the same flaw as the board’s, in that it requires a claimant to prove more

than the fact that a work injury combined with a preexisting condition to cause a

disability or need for treatment.

420 Beamon v. SAIF

The board, however, did not proceed to step two.

Rather, it determined that, despite demonstrating that a

compensable injury combined with a preexisting condition

to cause the need for treatment, claimant nevertheless

failed to meet his burden. That is so, according to the board,

because Dr. Button’s opinion “supports the conclusion that

the disc herniation itself was a compensable combined con-

dition” separate and apart from the spondylosis. As such,

the board required claimant to show, as part of his initial

burden to establish a combined condition, that the spondy-

losis was separately, materially caused by the disc hernia-

tion. Because the disc herniation did not cause the need for

treatment of the “disputed lumbar spondylosis condition,”

the board denied the compensability of the claim.

The board’s reasoning veered off course in two

respects. First, the herniation itself could not have been a

“compensable combined condition;” rather, a combined con-

dition is “two separate conditions that combine.” Carrillo v.

SAIF, 310 Or App 8, 11, 484 P3d 398, rev den, 368 Or 560

(2021) (emphasis in original). Second, the board appears to

have conflated steps (1) and (2) of the combined condition

analysis. Once it determined that claimant had established

a combined condition, the board’s next task was to deter-

mine whether the employer met its burden to show that the

accepted condition was not the major contributing cause of

the need for treatment. Rather than do that, the board deter-

mined that claimant failed to prove that the accepted por-

tion of the condition was the material cause of the need for

treatment.

SAIF concedes that the board determined that

“claimant did not meet his initial burden under ORS

656.005(7)(a)(B) to prove the existence of a combined condi-

tion because the work accident was not a material contrib-

uting cause of claimant’s disability or need for treatment

[of spondylosis].” According to SAIF, that analysis is cor-

rect because it is claimant’s burden to demonstrate that the

spondylosis qualifies as “the ‘otherwise compensable injury’

component of the combined condition.” That analysis misses

the mark; the disc herniation is the otherwise compensa-

ble injury, not the spondylosis. Under ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B),

Cite as 350 Or App 415 (2026) 421

the two components of a combined condition are “an other-

wise compensable injury” and “a preexisting condition.”

The spondylosis is the preexisting condition, and claimant

is not required to demonstrate that that preexisting con-

dition of spondylosis itself is compensable on its own. As

noted, claimant needs only to establish that the hernia-

tion (a compensable injury) combined with the spondylosis

(a preexisting condition) to cause the disability or need for

treatment. Under the board’s own findings, claimant did

that. Now the burden shifts to the employer to demonstrate

that the herniation is not the “major contributing cause of

the need for the treatment.” SAIF’s remaining arguments

support the conclusion that the disc herniation is, in fact,

not the major contributing cause of the need for treatment,

a point that it will be free to make—and support—to meet

its burden on remand.

We cannot be sure, on this record, that the board’s

shifting of the burden of proof would not have made a dif-

ference in the outcome. We therefore reverse and remand for

the board to apply the correct burden of proof.

Reversed and remanded.

TOOKEY, P. J., dissenting.

As the majority correctly points out, there is med-

ical evidence that claimant’s preexisting spondylosis com-

bined with his work injury to cause a need for treatment of

the accepted herniated disc condition. But the majority incor-

rectly concludes that that evidence was sufficient to meet

claimant’s initial burden to establish the existence of a com-

bined condition for treatment of the preexisting spondylosis.

That conclusion is the result of a misconception of claimant’s

statutory burden to establish a combined condition.

As I describe below, under a proper application of

claimant’s statutory burden, the board correctly held that

claimant had not established a combined condition. I there-

fore dissent.

A combined condition arises when “an otherwise

compensable injury” combines with a preexisting condition

“to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment.” ORS

422 Beamon v. SAIF

656.005(7)(a)(B).1 Thus, a cognizable combined condition is

one that causes or prolongs disability or a need for treat-

ment. Generally, the claimant bears the burden to prove

the compensability of an injury or disease. ORS 656.266(1).2

That means, as the parties agree, that a claimant seeking

compensation for disability or treatment of a combined con-

dition has the initial burden to establish the existence of the

combined condition for which benefits are sought.

Here, claimant seeks compensation for treatment of

his preexisting spondylosis as a component of a combined

condition. As the parties agree, claimant, as the party seek-

ing compensation for a combined condition, had the burden

to establish the existence of the claimed combined condi-

tion. The majority concludes that claimant met that burden

through Dr. Button’s opinion that claimant’s preexisting

spondylosis had combined with the mechanism of claimant’s

work injury to cause or prolong disability or a need for treat-

ment of the herniated disc. That was evidence of a combined

condition, but it was not evidence of the combined condition

for which claimant seeks compensation.

A claimant’s initial burden in a combined condition

claim is to establish that an “otherwise compensable con-

dition” combined with a preexisting condition “to cause or

prolong disability or a need for treatment” of the claimed

combined condition. ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B); Keystone RV Co.-

Thor Industries, Inc. v. Erickson, 277 Or App 631, 373 P3d

1122 (2016); Giffin v. Dish Network Services, 296 Or App

233, 437 P3d 252 (2019). Here, the claimed combined con-

dition for which claimant seeks benefits is the preexisting

spondylosis.

1

ORS 656.005(7)(a)(B) provides:

“If an otherwise compensable injury combines at any time with a pre-

existing condition to cause or prolong disability or a need for treatment, the

combined condition is compensable only if, so long as and to the extent that

the otherwise compensable injury is the major contributing cause of the dis-

ability of the combined condition or the major contributing cause of the need

for treatment of the combined condition.”

2

ORS 656.266(1) provides:

“The burden of proving that an injury or occupational disease is compensable

and of proving the nature and extent of any disability resulting therefrom is

upon the worker.”

Cite as 350 Or App 415 (2026) 423

Thus, to establish a cognizable combined condition,

claimant’s burden was to show that the compensable disc

injury (the otherwise compensable injury) combined with

the preexisting spondylosis to cause or prolong disability or

the need for treatment of the spondylosis. Although Button’s

opinion was evidence that the preexisting spondylosis com-

bined with the work injury to cause or prolong disability

or the need for treatment of the herniated disc, there is no

evidence of the converse—that the herniated disc combined

with the preexisting spondylosis to cause a need for treat-

ment of the spondylosis.

The board thus correctly held that Button’s opinion

was not sufficient to meet claimant’s burden to establish a

combined condition. For that reason, I would reject claim-

ant’s contention that the board misapplied the burden of

proof and would affirm.