State v. P. F.

390 June 10, 2026 No. 515

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF OREGON

In the Matter of P. F.,

a Person Alleged to have Mental Illness.

STATE OF OREGON,

Respondent,

v.

P. F.,

Appellant.

Deschutes County Circuit Court

25CC01826; A187241

Alycia M. Herriott, Judge.

Argued and submitted March 5, 2026.

Christopher J. O’Connor argued the cause for appellant.

Also on the brief was Multnomah Defenders, Inc.

Baylee Seeman, Certified Law Student, argued the cause

for respondent. On the brief were Dan Rayfield, Attorney

General, Benjamin Gutman, Deputy Attorney General, and

Colm Moore, Assistant Attorney General.

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and

Jacquot, Judge.

TOOKEY, P. J.

Reversed.

Cite as 350 Or App 390 (2026) 391

TOOKEY, P. J.

Appellant appeals a judgment of civil commitment

and an order prohibiting the purchase or possession of fire-

arms. In his second assignment of error, appellant chal-

lenges the trial court’s decision to allow law enforcement to

use restraints during the civil commitment hearing.

Addressing an issue of first impression, we hold that

persons alleged to be mentally ill have a due process right

to be free from physical restraints during civil commitment

hearings absent a showing that they present an immediate

and serious risk of danger or disruption.

Reviewing the record in light of that standard, we

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion when

it ordered full restraints during the hearing and that the

error was not harmless. We therefore reverse the judgment

and order.1

I. FACTS

On March 25, 2025, appellant was placed on an

emergency hold and a physician at St. Charles Medical

Center in Redmond completed a notice of mental illness.

According to the notice, appellant had “a long history of

psychosis. He resided at the Oregon State Hospital for 20

years and was discharged to Juniper Canyon Residential

[in] September 2024.” Appellant was considered a danger

to himself or others “due to experiencing agitated behav-

ior, internal stimuli, threatening to fight other residents,

posturing at staff and breaking items. He has refused all

medication and psychiatric medications for about the last

month.”

A certified mental health investigator filed a report

on March 28, determining that there was probable cause

to believe that appellant had a mental disorder that made

him dangerous to others and unable to meet his basic needs.

1

Because we reverse on the second assignment, we do not address appel-

lant’s first assignment, in which he argues that medical records were not made

available to the examiner and his attorney more than 24 hours before the hear-

ing. We also do not reach appellant’s argument under the second assignment of

error that it was unlawful to confine him in a courthouse holding cell during a

break or breaks in the hearing.

392 State v. P. F.

The report stated that appellant had been diagnosed with

schizophrenia. The investigator learned from nursing staff

that appellant had “been posturing to staff, making verbal

threats,” and that he had broken three iPads and head-

phones. Based on the notice of mental illness and the inves-

tigation report, the court issued a citation and scheduled a

civil commitment hearing.

Appellant, who was 72 years old, was brought to the

hearing by sheriff’s deputies in leg chains, handcuffs, and

a belly chain or waistband restraint. Appellant’s attorney

requested the court to order removal of the restraints or for

appellant not to be fully shackled. After reviewing a report

filed by the sheriff’s office, the trial court denied the motion

and allowed the deputies to keep appellant in full restraints

during the hearing.

At the hearing, and after he provided testimony,

appellant requested to return to the hospital. Appellant

clarified that he understood the hearing would continue

in his absence, and the trial court permitted him to leave.

While he was leaving, appellant stated that the restraints

were hurting his legs. The deputy told him to “take small

steps.” When appellant asked whether they could be taken

off, the deputy responded, “As soon as we get back to the

hospital.” Appellant asked for the restraints to be taken off

sooner, but the trial court stated the deputy had “his own

rules that he has to follow. I’m not sure what those are.”

At the end of the civil commitment hearing, the

trial court determined that appellant suffered from a men-

tal disorder that made him dangerous to others. The court

based its finding of dangerousness on “the overt acts that

were described * * * in the * * * testimony such as the pos-

turing, the balling of his fists, charging towards staff, and

throwing objects in their direction. Those overt acts were

combined with * * * specific verbal threats of * * * violence

to those individuals.” The trial court further explained that

it had the opportunity to observe appellant in court and

“he displayed a vehement anger during his testimony. He

demonstrated * * * aggression.” The court found it “was esca-

lating towards physical violence.”

Cite as 350 Or App 390 (2026) 393

The court also found that appellant was unable to

provide for his basic personal needs because he was “resis-

tant to taking his medications as prescribed,” he lost weight

when living at the residential facility, and his condition was

likely to deteriorate without intervention. The court stated

that the symptoms of appellant’s mental disorder were “irri-

tability, disorganization, hallucinations, delusions, impul-

sivity, and [un]predictability,” and it determined that there

was a nexus between appellant’s mental disorder, his dan-

gerousness, and his inability to meet basic personal needs.

The trial court therefore committed appellant to

the care of the Oregon Health Authority for a period not

to exceed 180 days, and, because he “was reasonably likely

to constitute a danger to self or others,” the trial court also

ordered that appellant was prohibited from purchasing or

possessing firearms.

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, appellant challenges the order requiring

restraints during the civil commitment hearing. Appellant

argues that the order violated his right to due process and

his statutory rights. Although we endeavor to decide cases

on statutory grounds before reaching constitutional issues,

State v. Mayo, 303 Or App 525, 531 n 3, 465 P3d 267 (2020),

the parties have not identified a statutory provision in ORS

chapter 426 that directly addresses the use of restraints in a

civil commitment hearing. We begin by considering statutory

provisions that bear some relation to the use of restraints.

A. Relevant Statutes

Persons subject to involuntary commitment can

pose a danger to themselves or others. See ORS 426.005(1)

(f)(A) (2023), amended by Or Laws 2025, ch 559, § 5 (defin-

ing a person with mental illness as a person who, because

of a mental disorder, is dangerous to self or others).2 ORS

426.140(1) provides:

2

The legislature recently made significant amendments to the civil com-

mitment statutes, which became operative on January 1, 2026. Or Laws 2025,

ch 559, § 66. Appellant was committed under the previous version of the statutes.

The new statutes also provide that posing a danger to themselves or others is a

reason why persons alleged to have a mental illness may be in need of treatment.

ORS 426.131(1).

394 State v. P. F.

“A person, other than a person incarcerated upon a crim-

inal charge, who has been adjudged to be a person with

mental illness or against whom commitment proceedings

have been instituted may not be confined in any prison, jail

or other enclosure where those charged with a crime or a

violation of a municipal ordinance are incarcerated, unless

the person represents an immediate and serious danger

to staff or physical facilities of a hospital or other facility

approved by the Oregon Health Authority for the care, cus-

tody and treatment of the person.”

That statute “requires that a civilly committed person be

confined in a hospital, unless he presents such a danger to

the hospital or staff that he must be confined in a prison.”

Ray v. Bachik, 101 Or App 507, 509, 791 P2d 150, rev den,

310 Or 281 (1990). For present purposes, the statute reflects

an awareness that it may sometimes be necessary for trial

courts to take precautions during a civil commitment hear-

ing when “the person represents an immediate and serious

danger.” ORS 426.140(1).

ORS 426.385 describes the rights of persons com-

mitted to the Oregon Health Authority. One subsection of

that statute provides that “[m]echanical restraints may

not be applied to a person admitted to a facility unless it

is determined by the chief medical officer of the facility or

designee to be required by the medical needs of the person.”

ORS 426.385(4). Once again, that statute suggests a pre-

sumption against the use of restraints on mentally ill per-

sons absent a showing that the restraints are necessary.

Persons with mental illness who are believed to be

extremely dangerous are also subject to civil commitment.

See generally ORS 426.701 (governing the procedures for

seeking the commitment of persons with qualifying mental

disorders who are determined to be “extremely dangerous”).

The statutory provisions relating to their commitment and

treatment refer to the constitutional right to due process.

See ORS 426.701(2)(f)(B) (“Any order of the court concerning

the placement of a person under this subparagraph must

be in accordance with the person’s constitutional right to

due process.”); ORS 426.701(5)(b)(A) (same). Because there

is no statute directly on point when considering the use of

restraints in civil commitment proceedings, we next consider

Cite as 350 Or App 390 (2026) 395

relevant constitutional provisions, including the right to due

process.

B. Constitutional Considerations

In criminal cases, defendants have a right to appear

free of physical restraints during jury trials, and that right is

grounded in Article I, section 11, of the Oregon Constitution,

the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution. State v. Washington, 355

Or 612, 628, 330 P3d 596 (2014). Neither Article I, section

11, nor the Sixth Amendment, apply in civil commitment

proceedings because those provisions address the rights of

an accused in “criminal prosecutions.” Or Const, Art I, § 11;

US Const, Amend VI. Civil commitment proceedings are

civil, not criminal. See State v. O’Neill, 274 Or 59, 70-72,

545 P2d 97 (1976) (explaining that a civil commitment hear-

ing is not a criminal proceeding and Miranda warnings are

not required before statements made by the appellant in

hospital records can be admitted into evidence). Therefore,

because neither the state nor federal constitutional criminal

procedure rights apply in civil commitments, to the extent

that there is a right to be free from restraints in civil com-

mitment proceedings, it must derive from the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

That clause provides that no state shall “deprive

any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” US Const, Amend XIV, § 1. The United States Supreme

Court has recognized “that civil commitment for any pur-

pose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that

requires due process protection.” Addington v. Texas, 441 US

418, 425, 99 S Ct 1804, 60 L Ed 2d 323 (1979). The Oregon

Constitution does not have a due process clause. State v.

Merrell, 170 Or App 400, 403, 12 P3d 556 (2000), rev den,

331 Or 674 (2001). As a result, in Oregon, persons alleged to

be mentally ill are entitled to due process protections under

the federal constitution. See, e.g., State v. T. C., 327 Or App

558, 562, 536 P3d 591 (2023), rev den, 371 Or 825 (2024)

(“Where the state seeks to civilly commit a person for any

purpose, prehearing notice is a core component of the due

process protections afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment

396 State v. P. F.

to the United States Constitution.”); State v. Allison, 129 Or

App 47, 49-50, 877 P2d 660 (1994) (“Involuntary commit-

ment proceedings involve the possibility of a massive cur-

tailment of liberty and, thus, implicate due process protec-

tions.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)).

When determining what the federal right to due

process requires, courts consider the three factors set out in

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 US 319, 96 S Ct 893, 47 L Ed 2d 18

(1976). Those factors are:

“First, the private interest that will be affected by the offi-

cial action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of

such interest through the procedures used, * * * and finally,

the Government’s interest, including the function involved

and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the addi-

tional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”

Id. at 335.3

Applying those factors here to determine whether

there is a due process right to be free of restraints in civil

commitment cases, we begin by noting that the private

interest at stake is significant because it involves a “threat-

ened loss of liberty,” as well as the adverse and stigmatiz-

ing social consequences that can result from a civil commit-

ment. State v. Matthews, 46 Or App 757, 762, 613 P2d 88,

rev den, 289 Or 588 (1980), cert den, 450 US 1040 (1981); see

also State v. A. M., 333 Or App 453, 462, 553 P3d 593, adh’d

to on recons, 335 Or App 320, 558 P3d 75 (2024) (stating that

the private interest affected by an involuntary civil commit-

ment is significant).

Under the second factor, requiring physical

restraints at a civil commitment hearing absent a showing

that the person presents an immediate and serious risk of

dangerous or disruptive behavior could lead to an errone-

ous deprivation of liberty. In the context of a criminal trial,

3

In an opinion by our court, when deciding whether the appellant had a right

to remain silent in a civil commitment proceeding, we considered the same three

factors, albeit in a slightly different order: “In determining the specifics of due

process in any given situation three factors must be considered: first, the private

interest that will be affected by the state’s action; second, the state’s interest; and

finally, the risk of an erroneous decision if the procedure is not applied.” State v.

Matthews, 46 Or App 757, 762, 613 P2d 88, rev den, 289 Or 588 (1980), cert den,

450 US 1040 (1981).

Cite as 350 Or App 390 (2026) 397

we have explained that shackles “may inhibit consultation

with [a defendant’s] attorney and [the defendant’s] decision

whether to take the stand as a witness.” State v. Kessler, 57

Or App 469, 474, 645 P2d 1070 (1982); see also Washington,

355 Or at 629 (same).

The same concerns apply in a civil commitment

proceeding. Use of restraints—and especially the use of full

restraints—may inhibit communication between the person

alleged to be mentally ill and that person’s attorney, and

they may inhibit the person’s participation in the hearing.4

And given that the trial court is often required to determine

whether the person’s mental disorder makes the person dan-

gerous, the use of full restraints at the hearing could bias

the civil commitment proceeding in favor of that finding. See

Larsen v. Nooth, 292 Or App 524, 531, 425 P3d 484 (2018),

rev den, 364 Or 749 (2019) (James, J., concurring) (“Judges

do not become immune to the inherent, unconscious, biases

present in the human mind by virtue of their office.”).

We must also assess the third Matthews factor;

namely, the government’s interest in civil commitment

proceedings:

“The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae

powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable

because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the

state also has the authority under its police power to pro-

tect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some

who are mentally ill.”

Addington, 441 US at 426. However, the state “has no inter-

est in confining individuals involuntarily if they are not

mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves

or others.” Id.

Under Oregon case law, the state has similar inter-

ests in providing care to persons with mental illness and

protecting the community. See Mesch v. Unity Center for

4

At the hearing in this case, appellant’s attorney requested that appel-

lant not be fully shackled so that he could have the “use of his hands at least

* * *, so that he can communicate with me.” Although appellant testified, he also

requested to return to the hospital after his testimony and when leaving he indi-

cated that the restraints were hurting his legs, so the use of full restraints may

have been a factor in his desire to leave.

398 State v. P. F.

Behavioral Health, 349 Or App 463, 487, ___ P3d ___ (2026)

(“The comprehensive civil commitment framework seeks to

balance the liberty interest of persons with mental illness

with the interest of the state in providing treatment to those

persons.”); see also State v. T. L. B., 335 Or App 225, 229, 558

P3d 861 (2024), rev allowed, 373 Or 556 (2025) (explaining

that civil commitment proceedings “are designed to provide

care for mentally ill persons as well as to provide for the

safety of the community”).

A relevant consideration under the third Matthews

factor is the state’s interest in maintaining the dignity of

judicial proceedings. As the Court explained when address-

ing the use of shackles in criminal jury trials,

“The courtroom’s formal dignity, which includes the

respectful treatment of defendants, reflects the importance

of the matter at issue, guilt or innocence, and the grav-

ity with which Americans consider any deprivation of an

individual’s liberty through criminal punishment. And it

reflects a seriousness of purpose that helps to explain the

judicial system’s power to inspire the confidence and to

affect the behavior of a general public whose demands for

justice our courts seek to serve. The routine use of shackles

in the presence of juries would undermine these symbolic

yet concrete objectives. As this Court has said, the use of

shackles at trial affronts the dignity and decorum of judi-

cial proceedings that the judge is seeking to uphold.”

Deck v. Missouri, 544 US 622, 631, 125 S Ct 2007, 161 L Ed

2d 953 (2005) (internal quotation marks and brackets omit-

ted); see also State v. Bates, 203 Or App 245, 251, 125 P3d

42 (2005), rev den, 340 Or 483 (2006) (noting, in the crimi-

nal context, that shackling can impinge on “the dignity of

judicial proceedings” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Although there is no right to a jury trial in civil commitment

proceedings, State v. Mills, 36 Or App 727, 729-30, 585 P2d

1143 (1978), rev den, 285 Or 195 (1979), the state’s interest

in maintaining the dignity of the proceeding is undoubtedly

at play when considering the use of restraints because their

use could create the mistaken impression that the person

alleged to be mentally ill is being punished, when the focus

should be on determining whether the person is in need of

Cite as 350 Or App 390 (2026) 399

care and whether the community is in need of protection.

Addington, 441 US at 426.

Under the third Matthews factor, we must also con-

sider the burden on the state that the procedural require-

ment would entail. Mathews, 424 US at 335. Like in crim-

inal cases, in civil commitment cases, we think that the

state must make a record showing that the person presents

an immediate and serious risk of dangerous or disruptive

behavior, and the trial court must make a record of its find-

ings and reasoning supporting the use of restraints. Cf.

Washington, 355 Or at 628. But that showing can be made

at the civil commitment hearing, and we do not rule out

that, in an appropriate case, it would be sufficient for the

state to rely on a report from the sheriff’s office to make the

necessary showing. Although the requirement to show that

the person presents an immediate and serious risk of dan-

gerous or disruptive behavior imposes some burden on the

state, considering the significant interests at stake and the

risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty, we think that the

burden is justified. See Trujillo v. Pacific Safety Supply, 181

Or App 302, 309-10, 45 P3d 1017 (2002), aff’d, 336 Or 349, 84

P3d 119 (2004) (explaining that due process requires “mini-

mum procedural safeguards, depending on the nature of the

interests involved and a weighing of costs and benefits in

terms of the risks of erroneous decisionmaking in the gen-

erality of cases”); see also Koskela v. Willamette Industries,

Inc., 331 Or 362, 382, 15 P3d 548 (2000) (“Efficiency does

not trump the basic constitutional right to a minimally ade-

quate hearing.”).

Thus, considering the significant interests at stake

and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty, we

conclude that there is a due process right to be free from

restraints at a civil commitment hearing, and before the

court can require a person alleged to be mentally ill to be

physically restrained at the civil commitment hearing, due

process requires a showing of an immediate and serious

risk of dangerous or disruptive behavior.5

5

We offer no opinion on the use of restraints in a hospital setting or in trans-

porting persons alleged to be mentally ill to the civil commitment hearing.

400 State v. P. F.

C. The order requiring the use of full restraints at appellant’s

civil commitment hearing was an abuse of discretion.

Having clarified that there is such a right, we next

address the trial court’s order requiring full restraints in

this case. In criminal cases, we review orders requiring

restraints for abuse of discretion. See Washington, 355 Or

at 629 (“We review a trial court’s order requiring that a

defendant be physically restrained for purposes of court-

room security * * * for abuse of discretion.”). We think the

same standard of review applies in civil commitment cases

because the decision derives from the trial court’s power to

control the proceedings, and that authority is not limited to

criminal cases. See State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282, 300, 4 P3d

1261 (2000) (“It is well established that a trial court gener-

ally possesses broad discretion to control the proceedings

before it.”); ORS 1.010(3) (a court has the power “[t]o pro-

vide for the orderly conduct of proceedings”); ORS 1.010(5)

(a court can “control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct

* * * of all persons in any manner connected with a judicial

proceeding before it”); see also Dept. of Human Services v.

T. S. M., 322 Or App 424, 425, 519 P3d 897 (2022), rev den,

370 Or 740 (2023) (in a juvenile dependency case, quoting

ORS 1.010(3), and stating that we review a juvenile court’s

actions to control the proceedings for abuse of discretion).

Here, sheriff’s deputies transported appellant to

the civil commitment hearing in full restraints and appel-

lant’s attorney sought their removal at the hearing. The trial

court reviewed the report prepared by the sheriff’s office,

which included information from the investigation report,

and ordered that appellant should remain in full restraints.

Reviewing that decision for abuse of discretion, we are not

persuaded that requiring full restraints was within the

range of legally permissible choices. See State v. Hayter, 303

Or App 235, 238, 463 P3d 33 (2020), rev dismissed, 369 Or

705 (2022) (“A court abuses its discretion if its decision is

outside the range of legally permissible choices or exceeds

the bounds of reason.”).

The sheriff’s report on restraints indicated that

appellant had criminal convictions for resisting arrest,

assault with a deadly weapon, and violation of his parole,

Cite as 350 Or App 390 (2026) 401

but the report did not state when those convictions occurred.

It is reasonable to infer they occurred over 20 years before

the hearing because appellant had resided in the Oregon

State Hospital for 20 years before being discharged to a resi-

dential facility about six months before the hearing. Notably,

appellant did not face any pending criminal charges at the

time of his civil commitment hearing. Because the criminal

convictions identified in the sheriff’s report were likely to

have occurred a long time ago, they did not provide much

support for the court’s decision to allow the use of restraints.

In drafting its report, the sheriff’s office quoted the

investigation report, which stated that appellant had “ ‘no

ability for safety due to compromised insight and mem-

ory.’ ” However, when that statement is read in context, it

is not clear whether the mental health investigator meant

that appellant posed a danger to others or whether he was

unable to meet his basic personal needs. In the investigation

report, the investigator wrote:

“Client is not medication compliant and will likely require

compelled medications regardless of placement and out-

come. Client does present with gross disorganization,

unable to note any ability for safety due to compromised

insight and memory. Writer is unclear surrounding cli-

ent’s full history with state hospitalization, however it does

appear client’s mental health with recent potential cogni-

tive decline does indicate a higher level of intervention as

client cannot agree to treatment and evidences that his

quality of life would benefit with ordered intervention as he

has benefited from in the past.”

Considered in context, the statement that appellant had “no

ability for safety” added little to the calculus of whether full

restraints in the courtroom were justified.

The report from the sheriff’s office also pointed

out that a deputy called the psychiatric emergency services

(PES) unit at St. Charles Medical Center the day before the

hearing. “Nursing staff reported that [appellant] has been

taking his medications recently and his behavior is improv-

ing.” Thus, the nursing staff update suggests that appel-

lant was not likely to pose an immediate or serious risk of

dangerous or disruptive behavior at the civil commitment

402 State v. P. F.

hearing because his behavior was improving. Rather than

providing support for the need for full restraints, the nursing

staff update weighed against their use, or at least weighed

against the use of full restraints. See, e.g., State v. T. W. W.,

289 Or App 724, 727 n 1, 410 P3d 1032 (2018) (observ-

ing, in a civil commitment case, that the appellant was in

restraints at the hearing but that there was “no indication

in the record that appellant had attempted or threatened an

act of violence prior to the hearing that necessitated the use

of restraints”).

In our view, the trial court gave undue weight to

the sheriff’s report in determining whether full restraints

were necessary. The court essentially delegated the decision

to the sheriff’s office or deferred to its preference for full

restraints, rather than independently determining whether

the state had made a showing of an immediate and seri-

ous risk of danger or disruption during the hearing. We

acknowledge that appellant’s mental health disorder and

the conduct described in the investigation report indicated

that there was some risk of dangerous or disruptive behav-

ior in the courtroom, and we are reluctant to second guess

a trial court’s assessment of its security needs. See State v.

Perez, 325 Or App 64, 69, 528 P3d 318 (2023) (“Generally, we

do not second guess a trial court’s assessment of its security

needs.”) Here, for example, it was reported that appellant

had a long history of psychosis, that he had threatened oth-

ers and broke things, and that he had thrown “toilet paper

with semen on it at a PES tech.”

Nevertheless, here, the factors weighing in favor of

requiring full restraints were much less compelling than in

State v. J. J. S., 337 Or App 5, 10-11, 13, 563 P3d 382 (2024), a

case in which we affirmed the decision to require restraints

at a civil commitment hearing because the appellant had

injured his mother and punched a cab driver. In addition, in

J. S. S., the appellant “did not make a record that he would

not need to be restrained in the hospital setting.” Id. at 10.

By contrast, here, the record shows that appellant was 72

years old, he was accompanied to the hearing by two sher-

iff’s deputies, his prior criminal convictions likely occurred

over 20 years ago, nursing staff indicated that appellant

Cite as 350 Or App 390 (2026) 403

was taking his medications, and there was some indication

that restraints were not required at the hospital because the

sheriff’s deputy told appellant that the restraints could be

removed once appellant was returned to the hospital.

Based on those considerations, we conclude that it

was not legally permissible for the court to order appellant

to remain in full restraints during the civil commitment

hearing and the court abused its discretion when it ordered

full restraints.6

In their briefing, the parties do not address harm-

lessness. The error in requiring full restraints was not

harmless because, without the state having shown that

appellant presented an immediate and serious risk of dan-

gerous or disruptive behavior at the hearing, the trial court

violated appellant’s federal right to due process. See ORS

19.415(2) (“No judgment shall be reversed or modified except

for error substantially affecting the rights of a party.”). We

therefore reverse the judgment of civil commitment and the

order prohibiting the purchase or possession of firearms.

Reversed.

6

We offer no opinion on whether it would have been permissible to require

partial restraints at the hearing.