Victor Gerard Guyton, II v. Commissioner of Social Security

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 25-14160

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

VICTOR GERARD GUYTON, II,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 1:25-cv-21076-EGT

____________________

Before JORDAN, KIDD, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Victor Guyton, II, proceeding pro se, appeals the magistrate

judge’s order affirming the Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) de-

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2 Opinion of the Court 25-14160

nial of his claims for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and sup-

plemental security income (“SSI”).1 On appeal, Guyton argues that

(1) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion that

his physical impairments did not meet or equal any listed impair-

ment at step three of the disability analysis, and (2) substantial evi-

dence does not support the ALJ’s conclusion that he could perform

other jobs different from his past relevant work despite his physical

impairments at step five of the analysis. After review, 2 we affirm.

I. DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, Guyton has forfeited all of the issues he

raises on appeal because he failed to assert them with sufficient par-

ticularity in the district court proceedings. See Access Now, Inc. v.

Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This Court

has repeatedly held that an issue not raised in the district court and

raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this

1 The procedures for analyzing DIB and SSI claims are “essentially the same,”

so our discussion below applies equally to Guyton’s claims for both types of

benefits. See Bowen v. City of N.Y., 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986). The magistrate

judge handled the case pursuant to the parties’ consent.

2 “When an administrative law judge denies an application for disability insur-

ance benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, we review the adminis-

trative law judge’s decision as the final decision of the Commissioner.” Walker

v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 987 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2021). Our review

“is limited to whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether

the correct legal standards were applied.” Id. “We review de novo both the

Commissioner’s legal conclusions, and the district court’s decision about

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.”

Id. (citations omitted).

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25-14160 Opinion of the Court 3

court.” (quotation marks omitted)); Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004) (declining in social security case

to consider issue that was not raised before the district court). Re-

gardless, even if Guyton did not forfeit the issues he raises on ap-

peal, we would still affirm for the reasons below. 3

A. Listed Impairment – Step Three

In reviewing a claim for disability benefits, the ALJ must

conduct a “five-step sequential analysis” to determine if the claim-

ant is disabled. Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315,

1320 (11th Cir. 2021). “If the ALJ determines that the claimant is

not disabled at any step of the evaluation process, the inquiry

ends.” Id.

At step three of the analysis, the ALJ considers whether the

claimant has proved that he has an impairment that “meets or

equals” an impairment listed in the relevant regulations “and meets

the duration requirements.” Id.; Barron v. Sullivan, 924 F.2d 227,

229 (11th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the claimant bears the burden

of proof at step three). If the claimant’s impairments meet or equal

a listed impairment, the claimant will be found to be disabled with-

out further analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d), (e). If not,

the ALJ proceeds to step four.

3 We do not address any of the issues that Guyton raised for the first time in

his reply brief. See Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e

do not address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply

brief.”).

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4 Opinion of the Court 25-14160

“To ‘meet’ a Listing, a claimant must have a diagnosis in-

cluded in the Listings and must provide medical reports document-

ing that the conditions meet the specific criteria of the Listings and

the duration requirement.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224

(11th Cir. 2002) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1525(a)-(d)). “To ‘equal’ a

Listing, the medical findings must be at least equal in severity and

duration to the listed findings.” Id. (quotation marks omitted) (cit-

ing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1526(a)); see also Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521,

531 (1990) (“For a claimant to qualify for benefits by showing that

his unlisted impairment, or combination of impairments, is ‘equiv-

alent’ to a listed impairment, he must present medical findings

equal in severity to all the criteria for the one most similar listed

impairment.”). “If a claimant has more than one impairment, and

none meets or equals a listed impairment, the Commissioner re-

views the impairments’ symptoms, signs, and laboratory findings

to determine whether the combination is medically equal to any

listed impairment.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1224.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion that

Guyton’s impairments, both individually and in combination, do

not meet or equal any of the listed impairments. See Buckwalter, 5

F.4th at 1320 (“We will affirm the Commissioner’s decision if it is

supported by substantial evidence, even if the preponderance of

the evidence weighs against it.”). The ALJ concluded in light of the

record evidence that the majority of Guyton’s impairments gener-

ally did not meet or equal any listed impairment, which she was

permitted to do, and also found that Guyton’s obesity and mental

limitations did not meet or equal any specific listing. See Hutchison

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v. Bowen, 787 F.2d 1461, 1463 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining that at

step three, an ALJ does not need to “mechanically recite the evi-

dence leading to her determination”).

On appeal, Guyton argues that his physical impairments

meet or equal the specific listed impairments described in sections

1.21 (“[s]oft tissue injury or abnormality under continuing surgical

management”) and 8.08 (burns). We disagree.

The physical impairments that Guyton relies on for his ar-

guments on appeal are a left shoulder injury and road-rash-like

burns on his left heel and back/buttocks that he received in March

2021 when he was struck by a truck while riding a moped. An x-ray

of Guyton’s shoulder performed within days of the accident indi-

cated “[s]ubluxation of the acromioclavicular joint” but “[n]o acute

[bone] fracture.” After a subsequent MRI, Guyton was diagnosed

with left shoulder “pain,” “sprain,” “strain,” “tendinitis/bursitis,”

and “[acromioclavicular] separation grade 3.”

Guyton’s impairments do not meet or equal the “[s]oft tis-

sue injury or abnormality under continuing surgical management”

impairment described in section 1.21 because Guyton did not sub-

mit any evidence indicating that his shoulder or burn injuries were

undergoing “continuing surgical management.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1 § 1.21(A). In fact, none of the records Guyton sub-

mitted indicate that he ever underwent any surgery at all for his

injuries. Instead, for his shoulder injury he was prescribed physical

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6 Opinion of the Court 25-14160

therapy and “conservative treatment.” Additionally, records indi-

cate that Guyton’s burns were “well healed” as of April 2022 with-

out any surgery.

Guyton’s impairments also do not meet or equal the

“burns” impairment described in section 8.08 because Guyton did

not submit any evidence indicating that his burns caused him to be

unable to stand up from a seated position or to maintain an upright

position while standing or walking. Id. § 8.08(C)-(D). As already

stated, as of April 2022, Guyton’s burns were “well healed,” and he

was also able to “[a]mbulate[] independently with normal gait.”

No records indicate that his burns ever caused him problems with

standing, walking, or sitting.

For these reasons, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s

conclusion that Guyton failed to show that his impairments met or

equaled a listed impairment. 4

4 Guyton also argues for the first time in his reply brief that his impairments

meet or equal the impairment listed in section 1.18 (“[a]bnormality of a major

joint(s) in any extremity”). Even if Guyton did not abandon this argument by

raising it for the first time in his reply brief, see Timson, 518 F.3d at 874, we

would still reject it because Guyton failed to show a medical need for a

“one-handed, hand-held assistive device . . . that requires the use of the other

upper extremity,” which includes “walkers, canes, or crutches, which you hold

onto with your hand(s) to support or aid you in walking.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404,

Subpt. P, App. 1 §§ 1.18(D)(2), 1.00(C)(6)(d). Guyton argues that his shoulder

injury meets or equals the § 1.18 impairment because he was provided an arm

sling for his shoulder when he received treatment immediately after the acci-

dent, but a sling clearly does not satisfy the above requirement. There is also

no evidence that Guyton had to use the sling for a significant amount of time.

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25-14160 Opinion of the Court 7

B. Ability to Perform Other Jobs – Step Five

If the ALJ concludes at step four of the disability analysis

that the claimant is unable to perform his past relevant work be-

cause of his impairments, the burden then shifts at step five to the

Commissioner “to show the existence of other jobs in the national

economy that the claimant can perform, given [his] impairments.”

Buckwalter, 5 F.4th at 1320-21. “The ALJ thus must determine, in

light of the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) and the voca-

tional expert’s (VE) testimony, ‘whether jobs exist in the national

economy in significant numbers that the claimant could perform

in spite of his impairments.’” Id. at 1321 (quoting Washington v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2018)). The ALJ

does this by considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity

(“RFC”)—“the most physical and mental work [the claimant] can

perform despite [his] limitations”—age, education, and work expe-

rience. Id. at 1320; Malak v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 131 F.4th 1280, 1283

n.2 (11th Cir. 2025).

The ALJ concluded at step four that Guyton could not per-

form his past relevant work as a commercial truck driver but that

he could perform the alternative jobs of bagger and machine oper-

ator, which required medium exertion. The ALJ reached this con-

clusion after thoroughly detailing and weighing the various medi-

cal records submitted in the case and hearing testimony from a VE.

The ALJ did not defer to any medical opinion but rather weighed

all submitted opinions objectively in light of the totality of the rec-

ord evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).

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8 Opinion of the Court 25-14160

Guyton argues that the ALJ’s step-five conclusion is not sup-

ported by substantial evidence for two reasons. First, he asserts

that the Commissioner did not submit evidence establishing that

he could perform medium-exertion work given that his past rele-

vant work as a commercial truck driver was “sedentary.” Second,

he contends that the ALJ improperly disregarded his subjective tes-

timony about the pain he suffered from his impairments and his

inability to stand, walk, and sit at all during an eight-hour workday.

Guyton is wrong on both counts.

Guyton’s first argument fails because he is incorrect that his

past relevant work as a commercial truck driver was “sedentary.”

According to the DOT, the job of commercial truck driver requires

medium exertion, like the bagger and machine-operator jobs the

ALJ concluded Guyton could perform. DOT §§ 905.663-014,

920.687-014, 920.685-078. Regardless, the ALJ appropriately con-

cluded that Guyton could perform the jobs of bagger or machine

operator based on the record evidence regarding his physical and

mental limitations and the VE’s testimony. See Biestek v. Berryhill,

587 U.S. 97, 105 (2019) (“[A] vocational expert’s testimony may

count as substantial evidence even when unaccompanied by sup-

porting data.”). Guyton has not shown any flaw in the ALJ’s anal-

ysis on this ground.

Guyton’s second argument fails because the ALJ appropri-

ately rejected his subjective testimony about the intensity of his

symptoms.

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To establish a disability based on subjective testimony of

pain or other symptoms, the claimant must show “(1) evidence of

an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medi-

cal evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain [or other

symptoms]; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condi-

tion can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain [or

other symptoms].” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225. If the ALJ rejects sub-

jective testimony about pain or other symptoms, she “must articu-

late explicit and adequate reasons for doing so.” Id.

In this case, the ALJ rejected Guyton’s subjective testimony

that he could not work because of pain and that he could not stand,

walk, or sit at all during an eight-hour workday. The ALJ recog-

nized that Guyton’s medically determinable impairments could re-

sult in the symptoms he described but concluded that his state-

ments concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of

those symptoms were not entirely consistent with the record evi-

dence.

The ALJ’s credibility determination regarding Guyton’s sub-

jective testimony was based on “explicit and adequate reasons” and

is supported by substantial evidence. See id.; Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc.

Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (“We have held that

credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ, and we will

not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding supported by

substantial evidence.” (citations omitted)). In support of her credi-

bility determination, the ALJ specifically pointed to the fact that

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10 Opinion of the Court 25-14160

Guyton “received routine and conservative treatment for his im-

pairments,” which indicated that his symptoms and limitations

were not as severe as he alleged.

Guyton did not receive surgery for any of his injuries and

was prescribed only physical therapy and “conservative treatment”

for his shoulder, although he received multiple spinal injections for

reported neck and back pain in June and September 2021. Guyton’s

burns were found to be “well healed” in April 2022, and during that

same examination, Guyton’s left shoulder was found to have a

“[n]ormal range of motion” and “[n]ormal strength.” Further,

when Guyton was examined in November 2023, he was found to

have “full range of motion,” and when he was examined in April

2024, the examining physician reported that he had “[n]ormal mo-

tor strength of 5/5 in both upper and lower extremities” and could

“perform gait, station, heel to toe, tandem walk, and knee squat

without difficulty.” During the November 2023 examination, Guy-

ton reported that his pain was “well controlled with [over the coun-

ter] medication.” Additionally, when Guyton testified before the

ALJ that he could not stand, walk, or sit for any time during an

eight-hour workday, the ALJ remarked that Guyton apparently had

no trouble with walking to the hearing office using public transpor-

tation or sitting for at least fifty-three minutes during the hearing.

Based on these facts, the ALJ’s rejection of Guyton’s subjec-

tive testimony about his pain and inability to stand, walk, or sit is

supported by substantial evidence. The above evidence supports

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the ALJ’s finding that the treatment Guyton received for his inju-

ries and his various examinations indicated that his symptoms were

not as severe as he alleged. Thus, Guyton has failed to show any

error in the ALJ’s step-five analysis.

II. CONCLUSION

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusions that

(1) Guyton’s impairments did not meet or equal any of the listed

impairments and (2) Guyton could perform other jobs in the na-

tional economy different from his past relevant work despite his

limitations. Accordingly, the magistrate judge did not err by af-

firming the ALJ’s denial of Guyton’s disability claims.

AFFIRMED.