The opinion
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Carlos Medina, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 533 C.D. 2025
: SUBMITTED: April 13, 2026
Pennsylvania Department of :
Transportation, City of Philadelphia, :
and American Lighting and :
Signalization, Inc. :
BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
HONORABLE MATTHEW S. WOLF, Judge
HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: June 10, 2026
Appellant, Carlos Medina, appeals from the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granting summary judgment in favor of the
City of Philadelphia. The trial court found that the City was entitled to governmental
immunity on Medina’s negligence claim stemming from a motor vehicle accident.
Upon review, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
The pertinent facts, as alleged in Medina’s complaint, are as follows.
On December 6, 2022, Medina was walking across the intersection of Sanger Street
and Summerdale Avenue in the City around 7:15 p.m. when he was struck by a
vehicle driven by Idelfonso Zorilla. Medina was in, or near, the crosswalk when
Zorilla’s vehicle struck him while making a left turn onto Sanger Street. The
collision was captured by nearby surveillance video cameras. Still images from that
video footage show generally dark and rainy conditions, with a single street light
illuminated above the crosswalk. Medina suffered serious and permanent injuries
as a result of the accident, in particular to his right shoulder, arm, and clavicle, which
required several surgeries to repair.1
In June 2023, Medina filed a negligence action naming as defendants
Zorilla and the three entities allegedly responsible for the street lighting at the
intersection where the accident occurred – the City, the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation (DOT),2 and American Lighting and Signalization, Inc. (American
Lighting).3 According to Medina, “the street[ ]lights responsible for lighting the
crosswalk that [he] was walking on[,] at or near the Summerdale intersection with
Sanger Street in [the City] produced an improper and/or inadequate amount of
lighting[.]” Original Record (O.R.) Part I at 22. Defendants’ failure to provide
adequate lighting created a dangerous condition and hazard to pedestrians, and
caused or contributed to Medina being struck by Zorilla’s vehicle. Because the City
had notice of the dangerous condition, Medina alleged that the City is liable under
the trees, traffic controls, and street lighting exception (street lighting exception) to
1
According to Medina’s deposition testimony and medical records, he was taken by
ambulance to the hospital on December 6, 2022, where he was treated and underwent tests, was
given a sling and discharged that same day. See Original Record (O.R.) Part II at 494, 498; O.R.
Part III at 1-2. Five days later, Medina fell down a flight of stairs and was again taken to the
hospital by ambulance. See O.R. Part II at 498. Medina had the first surgery on his shoulder on
December 28, 2022. See id. at 499; O.R. Part III at 101. Citations to the Original Record refer to
electronic pagination.
2
In September 2024, the trial court granted the parties’ stipulation to dismiss, without
prejudice, all claims and cross claims against DOT. O.R. Part II at 283.
3
Medina also brought his complaint against two John Does allegedly responsible for
installing, inspecting, and/or overseeing the street lights and lighting equipment at the intersection
where the accident occurred. O.R. Part I at 18.
2
governmental immunity under what is commonly known as the Political Subdivision
Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542.
The City filed an answer with new matter asserting multiple defenses,
including that it is entitled to immunity from suit. Specifically, the City denied that
a dangerous condition existed and, even if it did exist, denied that the City “had or
should have had actual or constructive notice of the existence of the alleged
dangerous and hazardous condition prior to the” accident. O.R. Part II at 58. The
City further alleged that the street light at the intersection was possessed or
controlled by an independent contractor, namely American Lighting, and that any
purported dangerous condition was due to American Lighting’s carelessness and
negligence.
After the pleadings were closed, the City filed a motion for summary
judgment again asserting that it is entitled to immunity under the Act. The City
noted there was no evidence that the street light was out or not functioning at the
time of the accident; to the contrary, the record, including still images taken from
the surveillance videos, demonstrates the street light at the intersection was
functioning. See O.R. Part II at 530-45. Medina’s engineering expert, Randy R.
Patarcity, merely opined that the City should have installed a different type of street
light at the intersection and concluded that the “insufficient illumination provided
by the [single] streetlamp at the intersection” contributed to Zorilla being unable to
see Medina, resulting in the accident. O.R. Part II at 532 (emphasis in original).
According to the City, it has “no legal duty . . . to light its thoroughfares or streets,
and it cannot be held responsible for a mere insufficiency of light.” O.R. Part II at
3
533 [quoting Wecksler v. City of Phila., 115 A.2d 898 (Pa. Super. 1955)];4 see also
O.R. Part II at 540 (same). Moreover, Patarcity’s opinions lack merit because they
are based on observations he made of the scene more than a year and a half after the
accident occurred. In the alternative, the City argued that it cannot be vicariously
liable for the actions of an independent contractor, such as American Lighting. Nor
can the City be liable for negligent supervision of a contractor. For “the City to be
liable under the . . . Act, it must be for the ‘active negligence of the agency itself or
one of its employees.’” O.R. Part II at 536 [quoting Nardo v. City of Phila., 988
A.2d 740, 746 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010)].5
In response, Medina asserted that the street light at the intersection was
defective and this was a substantial factor in causing the accident. While the City
“is under no legal obligation to install street lighting . . . when it does . . . , it is legally
obligated to maintain the lighting in good working order.” O.R. Part II at 726
(emphasis in original); see also O.R. Part II at 734. Given this requirement and
Patarcity’s expert report opining that the lighting was “defective and insufficient[,]”
Medina stated a legally cognizable claim under the street lighting exception to
immunity and presented more than sufficient evidence to support a verdict in his
favor. O.R. Part II at 727. Therefore, Medina argued that the City’s motion for
4
While not binding on this Court, Superior Court decisions “offer persuasive precedent
where they address analogous issues.” Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 180 A.3d 545,
550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
5
American Lighting filed a separate motion for summary judgment, noting that the street
light at issue is owned by the City’s Streets Department. See O.R. Part II at 292-307. According
to its contract with the City for street lighting maintenance, American Lighting is not responsible
to unilaterally repair and maintain street lights that are dim. Because the record demonstrates that
the street light here was functioning on the night of the accident and American Lighting only had
a duty to repair outages, American Lighting argued that it did not breach any duty to Medina and
was therefore entitled to summary judgment.
4
summary judgment should be denied. As support for his arguments, Medina
submitted Patarcity’s expert report and photographs of the intersection, including
still images taken from the surveillance videos. Notably, neither party addressed at
the summary judgment stage whether the City had actual or constructive notice of
the dangerous condition, i.e., the purportedly defective street light.
In December 2024, the trial court granted the City’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint as to the City. O.R. Part IV at 9.6
Medina subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. The trial
court then granted Medina’s motion for leave of court to discontinue as to less than
all parties, namely Zorilla and the two John Doe defendants (O.R. Part IV at 70), and
the appeal to this Court followed.7
Issues
Medina contends that the trial court erred by failing to view the record
in the light most favorable to him as the non-moving party, in determining there were
no genuine issues of material fact, and in concluding the City was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.8 Specifically, with respect to the alleged dangerous
condition of the street light, Medina claims that the trial court erred by disregarding
his expert’s opinion and by making a determination without reviewing the video
6
The trial court likewise granted American Lighting’s motion for summary judgment and
dismissed all claims and crossclaims against the entity. O.R. Part IV at 8.
7
Both DOT and American Lighting filed notices with the Court stating that they would not
be participating in this appeal.
8
Summary judgment is appropriate “only in those cases where the record clearly
demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Sellers v. Twp. of Abington, 106 A.3d 679, 684 (Pa. 2014). When
considering a motion for summary judgment, courts “examine the evidence of record in a light
most favorable to the non-moving party, accepting as true all well-pled facts and reasonable
inferences to be drawn from those facts.” Angell v. Dereno, 134 A.3d 1173, 1179 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2016).
5
evidence of the accident. Regarding notice, Medina maintains that the trial court
again ignored evidence and improperly invaded the province of the jury since notice
is a factual determination. Neither party raised the issue of notice and Medina claims
that the trial court erred by addressing the issue sua sponte.
Discussion
Pursuant to the Act, local agencies such as the City are generally
immune from tort liability. 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. However, Section 8542(a) of the Act
provides that a cause of action against a local agency may be maintained if (1) the
damages would otherwise be recoverable under common law or statute, (2) the
injury was caused by the negligence of the local agency or an agency employee
acting within the scope of his or her official duties, and (3) the negligent conduct
falls within one of the exceptions to governmental immunity set forth in Section
8542(b) of the Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b). As noted above, the relevant exception
here is the street lighting exception, which provides as follows:
(4) Trees, traffic controls and street lighting.--A dangerous
condition of trees, traffic signs, lights or other traffic
controls, street lights or street lighting systems under the
care, custody or control of the local agency, except that the
[appellant] to recover must establish that the dangerous
condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk of the kind
of injury which was incurred and that the local agency had
actual notice or could reasonably be charged with notice
under the circumstances of the dangerous condition at a
sufficient time prior to the event to have taken measures to
protect against the dangerous condition.
42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(4) (emphasis added).
Medina’s “theory of liability is that the City allowed the single street[ ]
light at the intersection of Summerdale and Sanger to be, and remain in, a defective
condition. The failure to remedy this defect caused the intersection to be unsafe.”
6
O.R. Part II at 728 (emphasis in original); see also Medina’s Br. at 5, 7, 9 & 14. As
the trial court explained in its opinion issued pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure (Pa.R.A.P.) 1925(a), Medina failed to present any evidence to
support his claim that the street light was defective or malfunctioning on the night
of the accident. Patarcity’s opinions are not relevant to this issue because they are
based on his observations and the illumination readings he took more than a year
and a half after the accident.9 The record also demonstrates that there were no work
orders indicating that the street light was out or was malfunctioning on the night of
the accident, and the still images produced from the surveillance videos do not
support Medina’s contentions. At the summary judgment stage, a non-moving party
cannot rely upon the pleadings alone. See Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035.3. “If the non-moving
party fails to adduce sufficient evidence on an essential issue for which it bears the
burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Angell
v. Dereno, 134 A.3d 1173, 1179 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citation omitted); see also
Young v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp., 744 A.2d 1276, 1277 (Pa. 2000). Because Medina
failed to present prima facie evidence on the issue of the purportedly dangerous
condition, the trial court did not err in granting the City’s summary judgment motion.
Medina also claims that the trial court erred by not viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to him as the non-moving party. Specifically, he notes
that the trial court rendered its summary judgment decision without actually viewing
the surveillance videos that captured the accident. This argument misconstrues the
standard and is somewhat disingenuous as the trial court could only review the
record before it, and Medina failed to submit the videos along with his opposition to
9
As stated earlier, the accident occurred on December 6, 2022. Patarcity’s report indicates
that he visited the accident site on August 20, 22 and 29, 2024, and that he obtained illumination
levels on the evenings of August 22 and 29, 2024. O.R. Part II at 549.
7
the City’s summary judgment motion. Despite Medina’s argument to the contrary,
Philadelphia Rule of Judicial Administration No. 5005(d) did not prohibit him from
providing the videos as exhibits to the trial court, it simply mandated that the videos
be submitted on a USB drive rather than directly uploaded electronically. At all
ends, the videos are not part of the record.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court.10
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
President Judge Emerita
10
Given our determination, we need not address Medina’s argument regarding notice.
8
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Carlos Medina, :
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 533 C.D. 2025
:
Pennsylvania Department of :
Transportation, City of Philadelphia, :
and American Lighting and :
Signalization, Inc. :
ORDER
AND NOW, this 10th day of June, 2026, the Order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is hereby AFFIRMED.
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
President Judge Emerita