FLOYD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MAINE

SEAN J. FLOYD, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) 1:24-cv-00454-SDN

)

JAMES PORTER & )

KEVIN LITTLEFIELD, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Before the Court is Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 28. After

review, the Court GRANTS their motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Before setting out the facts, the Court must first address Defendants’ assertion that

Mr. Floyd has failed to comply with Local Rule 56 in his summary judgment briefing and,

if Defendants are correct, how that failure impacts the facts the Court considers in

deciding their motion. Although the Court construes Mr. Floyd’s pro se filings liberally,

see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), that leniency does not excuse him from

complying with local procedural rules, see Ruiz Rivera v. Riley, 209 F.3d 24, 28 n.2 (1st

Cir. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by de Aza-Paez v. United States, 343 F.3d 552

(1st Cir. 2003). Mr. Floyd did “admit, deny, or qualify” the opposing parties’ Statement of

Material Facts (“SMF”), ECF No. 29, so the Court will credit those responses to the extent

they are relevant. D. Me. Loc. R. 56(c)(1); see ECF No. 31 (“Resp. to SMF”). However, his

additional statement of material facts, ECF No. 31-1, fails to comply with the Rule’s

requirement to support statements with record citations. See D. Me. Loc. R. 56(f). The

Court thus disregards Mr. Floyd’s additional statement of material facts, ECF No. 31-1.

See Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2007) (upholding

district court’s decision to disregard an opposing statement of material facts that “were

completely unsupported by any hint of a record citation”).1

Accordingly, the undisputed facts are as follows. Pursuant to a bail form executed

on August 17, 2018, for pretrial release on state felony charges, Mr. Floyd’s bail conditions

required participation in an electronic monitoring (“ankle monitor”) program supervised

by the Waldo County Sheriff’s Office. SMF ¶ 1; Resp. to SMF ¶ 1. The monitoring

agreement required Mr. Floyd “to keep the device adequately charged.” SMF ¶ 4; Resp. to

SMF ¶ 4; ECF No. 29-1 at 54–55. Mr. Floyd signed and initialed the operative paragraphs

in the monitoring agreement, acknowledging the terms of his conditions. SMF ¶ 6; Resp.

to SMF ¶ 6; ECF No. 29-1 at 54–55.

Around 7:00 a.m. on January 26, 2019, a Waldo County Sheriff’s Office detective

called Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Littlefield and told him he had received a dead battery alarm

from Mr. Floyd’s ankle monitor. SMF ¶ 9; Resp. to SMF ¶ 9. The detective told Deputy

Littlefield that Mr. Floyd had violated the monitoring agreement by failing to keep the

monitor charged. SMF ¶ 11; Resp. to SMF ¶ 11. Deputy Littlefield then contacted another

Sheriff’s Deputy, Kevin Porter, to accompany him to Mr. Floyd’s residence to investigate

the dead battery. SMF ¶ 14; Resp. to SMF ¶ 14. Upon arrival, Mr. Floyd told the deputies

that he had been having trouble with the ankle monitor’s charger and that he had to tape

the charger cord to hold it to the body of the charger. SMF ¶¶ 12, 17; Resp. to SMF ¶¶ 17,

20. He also indicated he had previously spoken with a different Sheriff’s Deputy a week

1 Because the Court disregards Mr. Floyd’s additional statement of material facts, it need not consider

Defendants’ reply to those facts, ECF No. 32. See Kristiansen v. Town of Kittery, No. 18-CV-00420, 2021

WL 4073273, at *4 n.3 (D. Me. Sept. 6, 2021).

earlier and communicated to him that the charger was not working. SMF ¶ 16; Resp. to

SMF ¶ 28.

Mr. Floyd then connected the monitor to the charger; after thirty seconds the

monitor beeped, received charge, and restored power. SMF ¶ 19; Resp. to SMF ¶ 19.

Deputy Littlefield disconnected the monitor from the charger after a few minutes. SMF

¶ 21; Resp. to SMF ¶ 21. The county’s tracking software then sent Deputy Littlefield a text

message indicating that the monitor’s dead battery alarm had been cleared, which he

understood to mean the monitor had properly charged after being connected to the

charger. SMF ¶ 22; Resp. to SMF ¶ 22. Several minutes later, Deputy Littlefield received

an alert from the tracking software that the battery had died again, which he attributed to

the monitor having been disconnected from the charger. SMF ¶ 23; Resp. to SMF ¶ 23.

Deputy Littlefield then arrested Mr. Floyd for violating his conditions of release. SMF

¶ 24; Resp. to SMF ¶ 24. Deputy Porter, who had been observing the interaction, did not

make the determination to arrest Mr. Floyd and had very little contact with him during

the events at issue. SMF ¶¶ 34–35; Resp. to SMF ¶¶ 34–35.

ANALYSIS

In his amended complaint, Mr. Floyd brings one claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

alleging that Deputies Littlefield and Porter violated his constitutional rights under the

Fourth Amendment by making an unreasonable and warrantless arrest. ECF No. 8 at 6.

Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing there is no dispute of material fact that

Deputy Littlefield had sufficient probable cause to effectuate Mr. Floyd’s arrest because

Mr. Floyd had violated his conditions of release by failing to keep his ankle monitor

adequately charged. ECF No. 28 at 8–10. Defendants also assert qualified immunity

shields them from liability. Id. at 10.

Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A dispute is ‘genuine’ if the evidence ‘is such that a

reasonable jury could resolve the point in the favor of the non-moving party.’” Taite v.

Bridgewater State Univ., Bd. of Trs., 999 F.3d 86, 93 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Ellis v. Fid.

Mgmt. Tr. Co., 883 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2018)). A fact is “‘material’ if it ‘has the potential of

affecting the outcome of the case.’” Id. (quoting Pérez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc.,

656 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 2011)). The Court “review[s] the record in the light most favorable

to the nonmoving party, and . . . draw[s] all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving

party’s favor.” Block Island Fishing, Inc. v. Rogers, 844 F.3d 358, 360 (1st Cir. 2016).

Because Mr. Floyd is pro se, the Court construes his filings liberally. See Erickson, 551

U.S. at 94.

The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of people to be secure against

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. This guarantee requires

police officers to have probable cause before making an arrest. See United States v. Ayres,

725 F.2d 806, 809 (1st Cir. 1984). Probable cause exists where an officer possesses

reasonably trustworthy information about facts and circumstances that would lead a

prudent person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by the person to

be arrested. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). “If an officer has probable cause to

believe that an individual has committed even a very minor criminal offense in his

presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the offender.” Atwater

v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). An arrest challenged as lacking probable

cause is “deemed ‘objectively reasonable’ unless ‘there clearly was no probable cause at

the time the arrest was made.’” Topp v. Wolkowski, 994 F.2d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1993)

(quoting Floyd v. Farrell, 765 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985)). Under Maine law, police officers

may conduct a warrantless arrest of “[a]ny person who has committed or is committing

in the officer’s presence any Class D or Class E crime,” 17-A M.R.S. § 15(1)(B), which

includes “[a] defendant who has been granted preconviction or postconviction bail and

who, in fact, violates a condition of release,” 15 M.R.S. § 1092(1)(A) (defining violations

of conditional release as a Class E crime).

The undisputed facts indicate probable cause existed. On the day of his arrest, Mr.

Floyd was subject to a monitoring agreement as a condition of his preconviction bail that

required him “to keep the device adequately charged.” ECF No. 29-1 at 54–55. When the

deputies arrived to his house, Mr. Floyd’s ankle monitor was not adequately charged—it

had been without charge long enough to trigger the county’s notification system. Mr.

Floyd knew the charging was required; he had signed and initialed the monitoring

agreement acknowledging that obligation. Deputy Littlefield had received word from a

sheriff’s detective that the dead battery constituted a violation of Mr. Floyd’s conditions

of release. Deputy Littlefield also observed firsthand that the ankle monitor was

uncharged when he arrived, and that it died again several minutes after Deputy Littlefield

disconnected it from the charger. These facts were sufficient to give an objectively

reasonable officer in Deputy Littlefield’s position probable cause to believe Mr. Floyd had

violated a condition of his release. Deputy Littlefield therefore did not violate the Fourth

Amendment by conducting a warrantless arrest of Mr. Floyd. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at

354.2

2 To the extent Mr. Floyd argues he had experienced previous issues with the charger, or that the incident

did not constitute an actual violation of his conditions of release, those determinations fall squarely within

the domain of state court proceedings for violations of conditional release. This Court’s only concern is

whether, at the time of arrest, Deputy Littlefield had probable cause to believe a crime had been committed.

See Thompson v. Olson, 798 F.2d 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1986) (“[H]aving once determined that there is probable

To the extent Mr. Floyd presses his Fourth Amendment claim against Deputy

Porter, such claim fails. Because “vicarious liability is inapplicable” in a federal civil rights

action, a government official is “only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676–77 (2009). The undisputed facts establish that Deputy Porter

had no role in investigating the ankle monitor violation or in deciding to arrest Mr. Floyd.

Because Mr. Floyd has not established a Fourth Amendment violation by either

Defendant, Deputies Littlefield and Porter are entitled to qualified immunity on this

section 1983 claim. See Topp, 994 F.3d at 46 (finding qualified immunity where officers

“violated no clearly established federal or state standards in arresting [defendant]”).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons provided, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment. ECF No. 28. This case is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Dated this 9th day of June, 2026.

/s/ Stacey D. Neumann

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

cause to arrest, an officer should not be required to reassess his probable cause conclusion at every turn,

whether faced with the discovery of some new evidence or a suspect’s self-exonerating explanation from the

back of the squad car.”).