Holland

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

NASHVILLE DIVISION

DUSTIN HOLLAND # 79425, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 3:26-cv-00435

v. )

) Judge Trauger

CHAD YOUKER, in their individual and ) Magistrate Judge Holmes

official capacity, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Dustin Holland, an inmate of the Williamson County Jail in Franklin, Tennessee, Franklin,

Tennessee filed a pro se Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5, inter alia,

concerning the removal of his religious materials, including his Bible. (Doc. No. 1). Plaintiff also

filed an Application for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (“IFP Application”) (Doc. No. 2), a

Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. No. 8), and a “Supplemental Complaint and

Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief.” (Doc. No. 9). The court must begin with the filing fee.

I. FILING FEE

Under the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a prisoner

bringing a civil action may be permitted to file suit without prepaying the filing fee required by 28

U.S.C. § 1914(a). Plaintiff has filed an IFP Application and a certified Certificate of Prisoner

Institutional/Trust Fund Account Activity. (Doc. Nos. 2, 10). From a review of these materials, the

court finds that Plaintiff lacks sufficient financial resources from which to pay the full filing fee in

advance. Therefore, his IFP Application (Doc. No. 2) is GRANTED.

Under § 1915(b), Plaintiff nonetheless remains responsible for paying the full filing fee.

The obligation to pay the fee accrues at the time the case is filed, but the PLRA provides prisoner-

plaintiffs the opportunity to make a “down payment” of a partial filing fee and to pay the remainder

in installments. Accordingly, Plaintiff is hereby assessed the full civil filing fee of $350, to be paid

as follows:

(1) The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust fund account at the institution where he now

resides is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of Court, as an initial payment, “20 percent of the

greater of – (a) the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s account; or (b) the average monthly

balance in Plaintiff’s account for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the

complaint.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

(2) After the initial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer must withdraw from

Plaintiff’s account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to 20% of all

deposits credited to Plaintiff’s account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in

the account exceeds $10. Such payments must continue until the entire filing fee is paid in full. 28

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

(3) Each time the trust account officer makes a payment to this court as required by this

Order, he or she must print a copy of the prisoner’s account statement showing all activity in the

account since the last payment made in accordance with this Order and submit it to the Clerk along

with the payment. All submissions to the Court must clearly identify Plaintiff’s name and the case

number as indicated on the first page of this Order, and must be mailed to: Clerk, United States

District Court, Middle District of Tennessee, 719 Church Street, Nashville, TN 37203.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED send a copy of this Order to the administrator of inmate

trust fund accounts at Williamson County Jail to ensure that the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate

trust account complies with that portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 pertaining to the payment of the filing

fee. If Plaintiff is transferred from his present place of confinement, the custodian of his inmate

trust fund account MUST ensure that a copy of this Order follows Plaintiff to his new place of

confinement for continued compliance.

II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND COMPLAINT

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint (Doc. No. 8) is GRANTED. The

operative pleading in this case is now the Proposed Amended Complaint attached to the Motion

for Leave to Amend Complaint. (See Doc. No. 8-1). The Clerk is DIRECTED to docket that

pleading as the Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint abandons all claims except for

Plaintiff’s Section 1983 and RLUIPA claims against Chad Youker.

III. PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT SCREENING

The Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 8-1) is before the court for an initial review pursuant

to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any portion of a civil complaint

filed in forma pauperis that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, is frivolous, or

seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Section 1915A similarly

requires initial review of any “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity,” id. § 1915A(a), and

summary dismissal of the complaint on the same grounds as those articulated in Section

1915(e)(2)(B). Id. § 1915A(b).

The court must construe a pro se complaint liberally, United States v. Smotherman, 838

F.3d 736, 739 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)), and accept the

plaintiff’s factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. See Thomas v.

Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).

Although pro se pleadings are to be held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520121 (1972); Jourdan v. Jabe, 951 F.2d 108, 110

(6th Cir. 1991), the courts’ “duty to be ‘less stringent’ with pro se complaints does not require us

to conjure up [unpleaded] allegations.” McDonald v. Hall, 610 F.2d 16, 19 (1st Cir. 1979) (citation

omitted).

The Amended Complaint alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RLUIPA concerning

the removal of Plaintiff’s religious materials and retaliation against Plaintiff for exercising (or

attempting to exercise) his religion.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color

of state law, abridges “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws . .

. .” To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege and show two elements: (1) that

he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that

the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Dominguez v. Corr. Med.

Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sigley v. City of Panama Heights, 437 F.3d 527,

533 (6th Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims are premised on the

violation of his First Amendment rights.

“The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment . . . provides that ‘Congress shall make

no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].’” Maye v. Klee, 915 F.3d 1076, 1083 (6th

Cir. 2019) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). “In any free exercise claim, the first question is whether

‘the belief or practice asserted is religious in the [plaintiff’s] own scheme of things’ and is

‘sincerely held.’” Id. (quoting Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224 (6th Cir. 1987)). Where a

plaintiff makes this threshold showing, the court must consider whether a regulation that “impinges

on inmates’ constitutional rights . . . is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Id.

(quoting O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987)). If not, “the inquiry ends, and the

prisoner prevails.” Cavin v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations

omitted). If so, then the court balances “(1) whether the prisoner possesses alternative avenues for

exercising his religion; (2) whether accommodating the prisoner would affect ‘guards and other

inmates’ or ‘the allocation of prison resources generally’; and (3) whether ‘obvious, easy

alternatives’ exist that suggest ‘the regulation is not reasonable.’” Id. (quoting Turner v. Safley,

482 U.S. 78, 89-91 (1987)).

RLUIPA provides stronger protection for the religious liberty of incarcerated individuals

than the First Amendment. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 296 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Lovelace

v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2006)). To state a claim under RLUIPA, a prisoner must

(1) “demonstrate that he seeks to exercise religion out of a ‘sincerely held religious belief’” and

(2) “show that the government substantially burdened that religious exercise.” Cavin v. Mich.

Dep’t of Corr., 927 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352, 361

(2015)). If the prisoner satisfies these elements, then the burden shifts to the government to show

“that the burden furthers ‘a compelling government interest’ and ‘is the least restrictive means’ of

doing so.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).

Here, the Amended Complaint alleges facts from which the court may infer that Plaintiff

has a sincerely held belief that reading and studying the Bible is part of his religious practice. (See

Doc. No. 8-1 at 2). For example, the Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff is a “devout

Christian” with “deeply held religious beliefs to read the Bible daily”; Plaintiff leads community

Bible studies and Men of Valor Christian programs; he attends the Church of Christ; he works at

Hope Center Ministry; and he observes all Christian holidays. (Id.)

The Amended Complaint also alleges that, on or about January 18, 2025, the Williamson

County Sheriff’s Office, under the direction of Chad Youker, seized all physical Bibles in the

county jail. A “Bible Ban” has been in place since that time, and any physical book (not just the

Bible) considered “religious” by Chad Youker has been destroyed pursuant to this county policy.

(Id. at 1). Although county officials later uploaded “digital copies” of the Bible “onto an electronic

kiosk and tablets,”1 only inmates with “privileged access” can access them on a limited basis (8:00

am to 8:00 pm). (Id. at 1-2). In addition, access is routinely withdrawn as punishment and,

according to the Amended Complaint, “[j]ail staff regularly obstructs access to practice religion or

simply read the Bible on even holidays such as Christmas, Easter, and Good Friday.” (Id. at 2).

Plaintiff has offered to pay “all costs” associated with owning a Bible. (Id. at 3).

Further, the Amended Complaint alleges that Defendant Youker retaliated against Plaintiff

after he filed grievances and a lawsuit pertaining to the Bible Ban. Plaintiff’s pod was “raided”

shortly after Plaintiff filed this lawsuit, and Defendant Youker “ripped the tv out of the wall and

screamed threats about requesting Bibles” during the raid. (Id. at 2).2 Plaintiff’s pod was the only

pod searched.

A reasonable factfinder could conclude that actions taken pursuant to a jail policy that

prohibits inmates at the Williamson County Jail from possessing physical Bibles, as alleged in the

1 The Amended Complaint alleges that inmates had no access to Bibles in any form “for months.”

(Doc. No. 8-1 at 3).

2 Specifically, the Amended Complaint alleges that Youker screamed, “You want to file grievances

and lawsuits about your fucking Bibles? Then I’m taking away all of your tablets. You forget you

are in Williamson County where I make the goddamn law.” (Id. at 8). Another jail official, Deputy

Fairchild, allegedly said to Plaintiff at that time, “Keep filing your fucking grievances about your

faggot-ass Bibles and I’ll make sure you never see a goddamn Bible again. I’ll lock all tablets so

your faggot-ass can think about being butt fucked in prison.” (Id.) Fairchild is not named as a

Defendant to this action.

Amended Complaint, and/or punishes inmates for practicing (or attempting to practice) their

religion impinges on inmates’ constitutional and RLUIPA rights. Brown v. Page, No. 2:20-cv-

00070, 2021 WL 288754, at *3 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 27, 2021) (finding plaintiff had stated viable First

Amendment and RLUIPA claims based on restricted access to Bible). “[L]imiting an inmate’s

access to the religious literature that he is required to read as part of his practice constitutes a

substantial burden on his religious exercise.” Yates v. Painter, 306 F. App’x 778, 780 (3d Cir.

2009) (citing Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 282-83 (3d Cir. 2007)).

At least as to Plaintiff’s Free Exercise claim, it may be relevant that his restricted access

did not preclude him from reading the Bible at all but rather made it more difficult.3 However,

because Defendant has not filed any responsive pleadings, the court “do[es] not have information

before [it] about all of” the factors relevant to evaluating a Free Exercise claim. See Arauz v. Bell,

307 F. App’x 923, 928 (6th Cir. 2009). And as to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, the availability of an

alternative means of practicing his belief “does not play into” the analysis. Cavin, 927 F.3d at 461

(citing Holt, 574 U.S. at 361-62).

Further, a reasonable factfinder could conclude that the allegations of the Amended

Complaint state colorable retaliation claims under Section 1983 against Defendant Youker in his

individual capacity. See Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Thaddeus-X v.

Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394, 398 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted) (To

establish a claim of First Amendment retaliation, “a prisoner must prove that (1) he engaged in

protected conduct, (2) the defendant took an adverse action that is capable of deterring a person of

3 It is unclear from the Amended Complaint whether Plaintiff was one of the inmates with

“privileged access” to the Bible on a digital reader or kiosk.

ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct, and (3) the adverse action was

motivated at least in part by the prisoner’s protected conduct.”)).

In short, the allegations presently before the court therefore permit Plaintiff’s Section 1983

and RLUIPA claims to proceed for further development of the record.4

Because Plaintiff alleges facts from which the court may infer that these alleged violations

were a result of official policies, his claim may proceed against Captain Youker in his official

capacity, which is functionally a claim against Williamson County itself. See Alkire v. Irving, 330

F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003). The Section 1983 and state-law claims also will proceed against

Captain Youker in his individual capacity, but any individual-capacity RLUIPA claim will be

dismissed. See Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 569-70 (6th Cir. 2014) (RLUIPA does not

permit money damages against prison officials in their individual capacities).

IV. “SUPPLEMENTAL COMPLAINT AND

EMERGENCY MOTION FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF”

Next, Plaintiff filed a single document entitled “Supplemental Complaint and Emergency

Motion for Injunctive Relief.” (Doc. No. 9).

In the caption of Plaintiff’s “Supplemental Complaint”, Plaintiff identifies the Defendants

to this action as “Chad Youker, et al.” (Id. at 1). However, at no point in the document does Plaintiff

name any other Defendant besides Chad Youker. If Plaintiff wishes to name additional Defendants,

he must do so by way of a properly filed motion to amend the complaint, which clearly identifies

4 The court notes that the allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint match—word for word—

the allegations made by another pro se prisoner-plaintiff in a different case against Chad Youker

filed in this court recently. The court reminds Plaintiff of his obligations under Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 11, which include certifying that the facts he alleges have evidentiary support or

likely will have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for investigation.

by name all Defendants. The Supplemental Complaint does not add claims that are not included

in the Amended Complaint.

Plaintiff’s “Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief” requests the “court grant injunctive

relief for inmates to have Bibles.” (Id. at 9). Captain Youker must respond to this motion on or

before the deadline to file a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss. The court will rule on the

motion in due course once it is fully briefed and, if necessary, will hold a hearing. Presently, the

motion will be HELD IN ABEYANCE.

V. CONCLUSION

Having screened the Amended Complaint pursuant to the PLRA, the court finds that it

states viable claims under the First Amendment (free exercise, retaliation) and RLUIPA. These

claims shall proceed against Captain Youker in his official and individual capacities, except the

RLUIPA claim which shall proceed against Captain Youker in his official capacity only.

Accordingly, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons

(AO 440) and USM 285 form) for Defendant Chad Youker. Plaintiff MUST complete the service

packet and return it to the Clerk’s Office within 30 DAYS of the entry of this Order. Failure to do

so may result in the dismissal of this case. Upon return of the properly completed service packet,

the Clerk is DIRECTED to issue summons to the U.S. Marshals Service for service on Defendant

Youker. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and 4(c)(3).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(1)(A) and (B), this action is REFERRED to the

Magistrate Judge to enter a scheduling order for the management of the case, to dispose or

recommend disposition of any pre-trial, non-dispositive motions, to issue a Report and

Recommendation on all dispositive motions, and to conduct further proceedings, if necessary,

under Rule 72(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and the Local Rules of Court.

The court’s determination that the complaint states a colorable claim for purposes of this

initial screening does not preclude the court from dismissing any claim at any time for reasons set

forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), nor does it preclude Defendant from filing a motion to dismiss

any claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.

Plaintiff is forewarned that his prosecution of this action will be jeopardized if he should

fail to keep the Clerk’s Office informed of his current address.

It is so ORDERED. Uy

United States District Judge

10