Rzeszewski

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JULIA GARCIA, M.D., : No. 3:23-CV-1992

Plaintiff, (Caraballo, M..J.)

v. :

ASHLEY RZESZEWSKI and

POCONO MOUNTAIN :

REGIONAL POLICE :

COMMISSION, :

Defendants

MEMORANDUM

I. Introduction

On December 12, 2028, plaintiff Julia Garcia, M.D., initiated this

civil rights and tort action against defendants Ashley Rzeszewski and

the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Commission (collectively, the

“Defendants”). Doc. 1. Before the Court are Dr. Garcia’s five claims for

malicious prosecution, false arrest, abuse of process, failure to train,

and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Doc. 1 at 23-31. The

Court has federal question and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to

Title 28, United States Code, Sections 636(c), 13831, 13848, and 1367.

On March 14, 2025, the Defendants moved for summary

judgement on all five claims. Doc. 23. Dr. Garcia filed a timely

opposition on April 4, 2025. Doc. 33. Following oral argument, the

motion is now fully briefed and ripe for decision. For the reasons set

forth below, the Court will deny summary judgment on Dr. Garcia’s

claims for malicious prosecution and false arrest against Officer

Rzeszewski. The Court, however, will grant summary judgment and

dismiss Dr. Garcia’s claims for abuse of process, failure to train, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress against Officer Rzeszewski

and the Pocono Mountain Regional Police Commission (“Pocono

Mountain”), and dismiss Pocono Mountain from this action.

II. Background

A. Relevant Procedural History

Dr. Garcia is a board-certified physician who practiced family

medicine in Pennsylvania, and is the mother of five children. Doc. 32 at

2. In 2021, the Monroe County District Attorney’s Office brought two

failed prosecutions against Dr. Garcia for allegedly endangering the

wellbeing of her then four-year-old child, “R.E.” Jd. at 4; Doc. 33-14 at 5;

Doc. 33-15 at 1; Doc. 1 at 18. The charges lodged against Dr. Garcia

were premised on an affidavit of probable cause prepared and signed by

defendant Rzeszewski, who, at the time, was a Police Officer in the

Pocono Mountain Regional Police Department. Doc. 32 at 4; Doc. 33-10

at 2-6.

Dr. Garcia consequently filed this action against the Defendants

on December 4, 2023. Doc. 1. In her complaint, Dr. Garcia asserts five

claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania state law for: (1)

malicious prosecution (against Officer Rzeszewski); (2) false arrest

(against Officer Rzeszewski); (8) abuse of process (against Officer

Rzeszewski); (4) failure to train (against Pocono Mountain); and (5)

intentional infliction of emotional distress (against both Defendants).

Doc. 1 at 23-31. All five claims are premised on allegations that Officer _

Rzeszewski knowingly and intentionally pursued criminal charges

against Dr. Garcia without probable cause. Jd. at 5-31.

The Defendants filed their answer on January 14, 2024, asserting

the affirmative defenses of, among others, failure to state a claim and

immunity. Doc. 10 at 8-18. On March 14, 2025, after the close of

discovery, the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. Doc.

23. The Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary

judgment on all claims. Jd. at 1-4. Specifically, they aver that Officer

Rzeszewski had probable cause to charge and arrest Dr. Garcia, Dr.

Garcia was not seized, Dr. Garcia has not produced sufficient evidence

to establish her abuse of process, failure to train, or intentional

infliction of emotional distress claims, and that Officer Rzeszewski is

shielded by qualified immunity. Doc. 26 at 11-83.1

Dr. Garcia filed an opposition to the motion for summary

judgment on April 4, 2025. Doc. 38. She contends that she produced

sufficient evidence to proceed to trial on her claims for failure to train

and intentional infliction of emotional distress, that Officer Rzeszewski

is not entitled to qualified immunity, that the evidence shows Dr.

Garcia was seized, and that Officer Rzeszewski charged Dr. Garcia

despite knowing of the absence of probable cause. Id. at 8-21. The

Court held oral argument on the motion on March 4, 2026. Doc. 39.

1 The Defendants’ filings fail to comply with this Court’s local rules. In particular,

their brief exceeds the 15-page, 15,000-word limitation set forth in Local Rule

7.8(b), without having sought prior authorization from the Court via motion.

Likewise, the motion and brief lack a certificate of word count, a table of contents,

and a table of authorities. See M.D. Pa. L.Rs. 7.1, 7.8(a). Counsel is advised to

comply with all local rules in future filings, or risk adverse action.

B. Factual Background

The parties offer conflicting accounts of the underlying facts

leading to Dr. Garcia’s prosecution, with material differences noted

herein. On the morning of November 20, 2021, Dr. Garcia, accompanied

by her five minor children and one additional minor, attended the

Kalahari Waterpark in Pocono Manor, Pennsylvania. Doc. 1 at 5; Doc.

27 at 2; Doc. 33 at 2. They were joined at the waterpark by Tristin

Largey, her minor child and one additional minor. Doc. 27 at 2; Doc. 33

at 2. The Defendants aver that Dr. Garcia “admitted drinking alcoholic

beverages starting at noon,” Doc. 27 at 2, while she counters that she

drank only “part of one (1) margarita at lunch between the hours of 12

p.m. and 2 p.m.” Doc. 82 at 4.

At approximately 4:00 p.m., Dr. Garcia’s four-year-old child, R.E.,

while out of her sight, was removed from the waterpark’s hot tub after a

medical incident. Doc. 1 at 7; Doc. 27 at 2; Doc. 32 at 16. The parties

dispute the nature of R.E.’s medical episode in the hot tub and whether

he was unsupervised. The Defendants contend that Dr. Garcia’s lack of

direct supervision over R.E. rendered him unsupervised when he

entered the hot tub, where he “passed out” before being attended by

Kalahari lifeguards. Doc. 26 at 2; Doc. 27 at 2. Dr. Garcia, by contrast,

denies that R.E. was unsupervised, because he was in the presence of

over 40 individuals located within the hot tub, including his older

sisters. Doc. 82 at 2; Doc. 33 at 9-10. Further, she contends that R.E.

did not pass out, but fell asleep in the hot tub, and was fully conscious

when brought to Kalahari lifeguards, with contemporaneous medical

records listing him as oriented with no abnormalities, alert, conscious,

and answering questions. Doc. 32 at 3; Doc. 33 at 9-10.

Subsequent to his medical episode, R.E’s sisters removed him from

the hot tub and presented him to a lifeguard stand, where Kalahari

medical staff tended to R.E. and phoned local emergency services for

additional help. Doc. 1 at 8; Doc. 27 at 2; Doc. 32 at 2-3, 16. This call led

to the dispatch of Pocono Mountain Regional Emergency Medical

Services (“EMS”) and Officer Rzeszewski, a member of the Pocono

Mountain Regional Police Department. Doc. 27 at 2, 5; Doc. 32 at 3, 7.

Soon after being alerted to R.E.’s condition, Dr. Garcia arrived at

the lifeguard stand, identified herself as a physician and R.E.’s mother,

and sought to intervene. Doc. 1 at 8; Doc. 27 at 5—7; Doc. 32 at 7-9.

Kalahari staff responded by telling Dr. Garcia not to interfere, and she

complied by standing to the side. Doc. 27 at 7-8; Doc. 82 at 9-10.

Kalahari medical staff then removed R.E. to the Kalahari EMS office for

further evaluation and treatment, accompanied by Dr. Garcia. Doc. 27

at 2; Doc, 32 at 3.

After the parties relocated to the EMS office, Officer Rzeszewski

arrived at the scene and joined them. Doc. 27 at 2; Doc. 32 at 3, 6.

Medical staff communicated to Dr. Garcia their view that R.E. needed

to be transported via ambulance to the hospital. Doc. 27 at 6; Doc. 39 at

8, 10. Dr. Garcia voiced her disagreement with this conclusion, and

indicated that she could instead treat him at home. Doc. 27 at 6, 8; Doc.

32 at 8, 10. Dr. Garcia alternatively offered to drive R.E. to the hospital

herself. Doc. 27 at 8; Doc. 32 at 10.

The parties dispute the tone and tenor of Dr. Garcia’s interaction

with medical staff and Officer Rzeszewski while in the Kalahari EMS

office. The Defendants contend that Dr. Garcia was “disruptive,”

emphasizing her opposition to R.E. going to the hospital, her opposition

to transporting R.E. by ambulance, and an exchange with Officer

Rzeszewski in which Dr. Garcia was told that EMS personnel needed to

do their job. Doc. 27 at 3, 5. The Defendants further cite an affidavit by

one of the Kalahari EMS workers that describes Dr. Garcia as

argumentative with staff despite the general consensus that R.E.

needed to go to the hospital, as possibly inebriated, and as slurring her

words and stumbling. Jd. at 5—6. Officer Rzeszewski also suspected Dr.

Garcia of being under the influence of alcohol. Doc. 27 at 3.

Dr. Garcia, however, claims that “she participated in the

evaluation of her son,” “thought [she] was part of the team|[,|” and only

ever communicated to staff that, in her professional opinion as a

physician, R.E. did not need to go to the hospital because his vitals were

stable. Doc. 32 at 8. She maintains, moreover, that she did not oppose

R.E. going to the hospital in an ambulance, and simply advised that she

would transport him herself, a position which she later abandoned. Id.

She also denies having been inebriated, slurring her words, or

stumbling, and cites the affidavit of her friend, Tristin Lareey, in

support. Id. Finally, Dr. Garcia refutes that medical staff reached a

general consensus that R.E. needed to go to the hospital, because she,

as the “highest-ranking medical professional at the scene,” came to a

different conclusion. Id.

Dr. Garcia ultimately acceded to R.E. being transported to the

hospital by ambulance. Doc. 27 at 6; Doc. 32 at 8. Dr. Garcia did not,

however, ride with R.E., but traveled separately and arrived later. Doc.

27 at 8; Doc. 32 at 10. Once R.E.’s treatment at the hospital concluded,

Dr. Garcia was not allowed to leave with him until the hospital

“cleared” her departure with Monroe County’s Children and Youth

Services (“CYS”). Doc. 27 at 8; Doc. 33 at 11. While the parties dispute

whether CYS required Dr. Garcia’s husband to come to the hospital

before allowing R.E.’s release, they agree that the hospital would not

release R.E. to Dr. Garcia without clearance from CYS. Doc. 27 at 8;

Doc. 82 at 10-11.

After the events at Kalahari, Officer Rzeszewski prepared an

affidavit of probable cause to charge Dr. Garcia with criminal offenses

arising out of the incident. Doc. 27 at 3-5; Doc. 33 at 4-6. On December

10, 2021, Officer Rzeszewski filed charges against Dr. Garcia for

endangering the welfare of a child under 18 Pa. C.S. § 4804(a)(1), a

felony offense, and recklessly endangering another person under 18 Pa.

C.S. § 2705, a misdemeanor. Doc. 27 at 3-5; Doc. 33 at 4-6. Prior to

filing charges, Officer Rzeszewski reviewed the charges and affidavit of

probable cause with her supervisor, and with Monroe County Assistant

District Attorney Matthew Bernal, the latter of whom verbally

approved the charges. Doc. 27 at 3-4; Doc. 32 at 5-6.

The factual disagreements between the parties extend to the

representations made by Officer Rzeszewski in her affidavit of probable

cause. Dr. Garcia contends generally that Officer Rzeszewski, in

constructing the affidavit, knowingly omitted and misrepresented

certain material facts that formed the key premises in warranting

criminal charges. Doc. 33 at 11-12. Importantly, Dr. Garcia claims that

absent this alleged malfeasance, she would not have been charged. Jd.

at 12. By contrast, the Defendants contend that the evidence supports

Officer Rzeszewski’s representations in the affidavit, and that, viewed

in their totality, Officer Rzeszewski had probable cause to charge Dr.

Garcia. Doc. 26 at 14-15. The Defendants also emphasize that Officer

Rzeszewski’s supervisor and ADA Bernal both agreed with charging Dr.

Garcia. Id. at 15.

The affidavit of probable cause states:

On 11/20/2021 at 1605 hours I, Officer Ashley Rzeszewski,

responded to a dispatch at Kalahari for a child not breathing

after drowning. While arriving on scene Control Center

advised the child was responsive and breathing.

10

I arrived on scene at 1609 hours and made contact with the

patient in the EMS office identified as R.E. and his mom Julia

Garcia. R.E. was being treated by Kalahari EMS. He was on

- oxygen and responding to questions.

I spoke with Julia. I asked Julia what happened and she was

uncooperative with questioning. She just kept saying that

she’s a physician and the child is fine. I advised her that EMS

needs to do their job and paramedics were on their way. IJ

asked if she had any alcohol tonight and she stated “yes but

awhile [sic] ago.” I asked how much and she said “some.” Julia

was slurring her speech and was zoned out. She was starring

[sic] at the ground not really paying attention to her child. She

had an abnormal reaction to her son in a medical emergency.

Pocono Mountain Regional EMS (PMREMS) arrived and

started treating R.E. They advised that his vitals were okay

but elevated.

Security advised that the child was in the far left hot tub of

the waterpark in the outdoor portion, with three other little

girls looking approximately 10-11 years old. They are playing

in the hot tub when you can see R.E.’s head fall backwards.

The little girls swim over to him and one girl, later identified

as his sister, picks him up and the other girls are shaking his

head trying to wake him up. The sister carries him out and

walks him over to the lifeguard at the wave pool. The

lifeguard grabs the child and is seen blowing her whistle

holding her arm up. A few seconds later you see R.E. go limp

in her arms and she puts him on the ground to start life saving

measures. A crowd of people form around her and R.E. A few

minutes go by and Julia is seen running by the crowd of

people. She stops and backtracks and realizes it was her son.

She stood back off to the side. Kalahari EMS arrive and took

over care for R.E. While R.E. was in the hot tub unsupervised

buy [sic] an adult, Julia was sitting at a table with another

11

adult at the other end of the waterpark. The hot tub R.E. was

in was not in sight of where Julia was sitting.

R.E. was in the hot tub by himself for approximately 30

minutes.

The hot tub is posted that no lifeguard is on duty, it is not

recommended for anyone under the age of 6, and should be

used in only 15 minute increments.

Julia was refusing to allow PMREMS to transport R.E. EMS

called medical command and medical command stated the

child needed to be transported due to not knowing why the

child passed out and the vitals being elevated. Julia insisted

she knew what she was talking about and would treat R.E. in

her own office when they return home in a couple days. EMS

advised her that she did not have a choice he needed to go and

she eventually agreed but advised she would not be going with

the child. She stated she would go to the hospital “later.”

PMREMS transported R.E. to Lehigh Valley Pocono.

At approximately 1900 hours the hospital called me and

advised that Julia just recently showed up in the waiting room

and drove to the hospital intoxicated with an infant.

Doc. 33-10 at 5.

Dr. Garcia takes issue with several portions of the affidavit. She

asserts that, contrary to the representations in the affidavit, evidence

shows that R.E. did not undergo lifesaving measures, his vital signs

were not elevated, he did not drown, almost drown, or pass out, and he

was not left unsupervised in Kalahari’s hot tub for 30 minutes. Doc. 32

12

at 13; Doc. 33 at 9-10. According to Dr. Garcia, R.E. wore a life vest,

and was supervised and present in the hot tub with over 40 individuals,

including his sisters. Doc. 33 at 3, 9-10. In seeking summary judgment,

the Defendants cite competing evidence that purportedly corroborates

Officer Rzeszewski’s disputed representations about R.E., including Dr.

Garcia’s testimony, a Pocono Mountain Regional Police Incident Report

form, an affidavit from one of Kalahari’s medical staff, and medical

records of R.E.’s treatment taken by Pocono Mountain Regional EMS.

Doc. 26 at 14-15; Doc. 27 at 2, 5-7.

Dr. Garcia also asserts that, contrary to the statements in Officer

Rzeszewski’s affidavit, she was not “disruptive” with EMS and she did

not advocate against R.E. going to the hospital. Doc. 33 at 10. Instead,

she avers that she assisted in evaluating R.E., offered to drive R.E. to

the hospital in lieu of using an ambulance, specifically stated to EMS

that she did not object to R.E. going to the hospital if another physician

assessed him, and ultimately agreed to EMS taking R.E. to the hospital

via ambulance. Jd. Again, the Defendants leverage competing evidence

that supports Officer Rzeszewski’s view of the events, including her

statement, Dr. Garcia’s testimony, a Pocono Mountain Regional Police

13 □

Incident Report form, and an affidavit sworn by one of Kalahari’s

medical staff. Doc. 26 at 14—15; Doc. 27 at 8, 5-8.

Dr. Garcia vigorously contests her alleged intoxication,

highlighting Officer Rzeszewski’s testimony that, although surveillance

footage led her to suspect that Dr. Garcia had an alcoholic beverage,

Officer Rzeszewski had “no idea” how much alcohol Dr. Garcia

consumed. Doc. 33 at 10. Dr. Garcia also stresses that, despite Officer

Rzeszewski having the opportunity to ask Dr. Garcia for a blood draw,

and despite Officer Rzeszewski’s alleged proficiency in administering

sobriety tests, neither metric occurred. Jd. Finally, Dr. Garcia leverages

testimony by Tristin Largey that Dr. Garcia never appeared.

intoxicated. Jd. at 11. In opposition, the Defendants again cite

competing evidence supporting Officer Rzeszewski’s allegations of —

intoxication. Doc. 26 at 14-15; Doc. 27 at 2-8, 5-8.

On December 138, 2021, the Magisterial District Court issued an

arrest warrant for Dr. Garcia, pursuant to the criminal charges. Doc.

33-14 at 6. On December 22, 2021, Dr. Garcia was arraigned and

released on unsecured bail of $10,000, and required to submit to

fingerprinting. Id.; Docs. 28-8 at 7; 32 at 23. On February 17, 2022,

14

following a preliminary hearing held before Magisterial District Court

Judge Ronald W. Swank, Judge Swank found that the Commonwealth

failed to establish probable cause, and dismissed all charges against Dr.

Garcia. Doc. 27 at 5; Doc. 32 at 7; Doc. 33-14 at 6.

Soon thereafter, Dr. Garcia was charged a second time with the

same offenses. Doc. 27 at 5; Doc. 32 at 7; Doc. 38-138 at 2-3. On June 14,

2022, Magisterial District Judge Michael R. Muth held a second

preliminary hearing, found that the Commonwealth failed to establish

probable cause, and again dismissed all charges against Dr. Garcia.

Docs. 33-13 at 2-6; 38-15 at 2.

Ill. Discussion

A. Motion for Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when record materials,

including but not limited to, “the pleadings, depositions, answers to

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (8d Cir. 2007); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a),

(c)(1)(A). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists,

15

the court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non-

moving party and must make all reasonable inferences in that party’s

favor.” Wishkin, 476 F.3d at 184.

A factual dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a □

reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). And a fact is

material only if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the

governing law ....” Jd. But “a complete failure of proof concerning an

essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all

other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323

(1986).

The movant “bears the initial responsibility of informing the

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions

of [the record], ... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact.” Id. “ ‘[T]he non-moving party must

[then] oppose the motion and, in doing so, may not rest upon the mere

allegations or denials of his pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth

specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare

assertions, conclusory allegations, or suspicions will not suffice.’ ”

16

Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288-89 (8d Cir. 2018)

(quoting D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268-69 (8d Cir.

2014)).

Even when the movant contends that the non-movant failed to

produce sufficient evidence to prevail on a claim at trial, the movant

must still satisfy the initial burden of informing the court of the basis

for its motion. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323 ([A] party seeking

summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing

the district court of the basis for its motion[.]”). This means that

“Iwlhere the moving party does not have the burden of proof on the

- yrelevant issues,” and they have pinpointed in their motion “deficiencies

in the opponent’s evidence” sufficient to show no reasonable jury could

return a verdict for the non-movant, they are entitled to “judgment as a

matter of law.” Anchorage Assocs. v. Virgin Islands Bd. of Tax Rev., 922

F.2d 168, 175 (8d Cir. 1990).

B. False Arrest Claim

The Defendants contend that, because Officer Rzeszewski had

probable cause to arrest Dr. Garcia, summary judgment should be

granted on her false arrest claim. Doc. 26 at 11-15. In response, Dr.

17

Garcia responds that Officer Rzeszewski did not have probable cause,

or, alternatively, that the issue remains a disputed issue of material

fact. Doc. 33 at 8-9. As a review of the relevant evidence of record

confirms that the existence of probable cause remains hotly contested,

the Court cannot grant summary judgment as a matter of law.

False arrest claims under Section 1983 require a plaintiff to

establish “(1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made

without probable cause.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675,

680 (8d Cir. 2012). The Defendants conceded at oral argument that Dr.

Garcia was arrested, leaving only the probable cause element in

dispute. Thus, under the circumstances, “summary judgment... is

proper only if no reasonable juror could find a lack of probable cause for

any of the charged crimes.” Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190, 199 (8d

Cir. 2020).

“Probable cause exists if there is a ‘fair probability’ that the person

committed the crime at issue.” Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 789 (3d

Cir. 2000) (quoting Sherwood v. Mulvthill, 118 F.3d 396, 401 (8d Cir.

1997)). In practical terms, this means that, “when the facts and

circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in

18

themselves to warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense

has been or is being committed by the person to be arrested|[,]” an officer

has probable cause to arrest someone. Orsatti v. New Jersey State

Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (8d Cir. 1995). Yet, an arresting officer’s

probable cause calculus “must consider plainly exculpatory evidence in

addition to inculpatory evidence.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 200. This

continues to be true “ ‘even if substantial inculpatory evidence (standing

by itself) suggests that probable cause exists.” Jd. (quoting Wilson, 212

F.3d at 790).

A plaintiff may challenge probable cause in an affidavit or arrest

warrant “by showing (1) an officer ‘knowingly and deliberately, or with

a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions

that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant’; and (2) the

statements or omissions were ‘material, or necessary, to the finding of

probable cause.’” Alburg v. Jones, 784 F. Supp. 3d 775, 790 (E.D. Pa.

2025) (alterations in original) (quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-87). “An

omission is made with reckless disregard if the officer withholds

something that ‘any reasonable person’ would consider “ ‘the kind of

thing| | the judge would wish to know.’ Jd. (alteration in original)

19

(quoting Wilson, 212 F.3d at 788). Unsurprisingly, exculpatory

information is material or necessary to the finding of probable cause. Id.

Functionally, assessment of probable cause at the summary

judgment stage is “based upon the ‘totality-of-the-circumstances’

available to the arresting officer,” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 200, but

“considered in their totality in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party.” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 468 (8d

Cir. 2016). However, because “[t]his totality-of-the-circumstances

inquiry is ‘necessarily fact-intensive’.. . ‘it will usually be appropriate

for a jury to determine whether probable cause existed.’ Id. (quoting

Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 468). As such, it “is inappropriate for a court to

grant a defendant officer’s motion for summary judgment... if there

are underlying factual disputes bearing on the issue [of probable cause]

or if ‘reasonable minds could differ’ on whether he had probable cause

for the institution of the criminal proceedings based on the information

available to him.” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 2738, 300 (8d Cir. 2014)

(first alteration in original) (quoting Deary v. Three Un-Named Police

Officers, 746 F.2d 185, 192 (8d Cir. 1984)).

20

Here, the probable cause analysis must be undertaken on a

“crime-by-crime basis.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 200; Alburg, 784 F. Supp.

3d at 790. First, Dr. Garcia was charged under 18 Pa. C.S. § 4304(a)(1),

for allegedly endangering the welfare of R.E. Doc. 33-10 at 4. Section

4304(a)(1) provides, in relevant part, that ‘[a] parent, guardian, or other

person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 years of age...

commits an offense if he knowingly endangers the welfare of the child

by violating a duty of care, protection or support.” Commonwealth v.

Howard, 257 A.3d 1217, 1222 (Pa. 2021) (alteration in original) (quoting

18 Pa. C.S. § 4804(a)(1)).

For the actus reus element of section 4304(a)(1), it must be proven

that “the accused has either failed to act or has taken action so lame or

meager that such actions cannot reasonably be expected to protect the

child’s welfare.” Com. v. Bryant, 57 A.3d 191, 197 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).

For the mens rea element, there must be sufficient proof that the

accused was “aware of the nature of his conduct and the certainty with

which the conduct will” place a child “in a perilous or dangerous

situation.” Howard, 257 A.3d at 1226-27 (emphasis omitted) (quoting

Com. v. Moser, 549 A.2d 76, 79 (Pa. 1988)).

21

Second, Dr. Garcia was charged under 18 Pa. C.S. § 2705 for

recklessly endangering another person. Doc. 33-10 at 4. “[A] person is

guilty of recklessly endangering another person if he ‘recklessly engages

in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death

or serious bodily injury.” Harvard, 973 F.3d at 200 (quoting 18 Pa. C.S.

§ 2705). “Thus, the crime requires (1) a mens rea [of] recklessness, (2)

an actus reus [of] some ‘conduct,’ (8) causation ‘which places,’ and (4) the

achievement of a particular result[ing] ‘danger,’ to another person, of

death or serious bodily injury.” Com. v. Reynolds, 835 A.2d 720, 727 (Pa.

Super. Ct. 2008) (emphases added). “Recklessness” in this context is

defined as “a conscious disregard of a known risk of death or great

bodily harm to another person|.]” Id.

Here, the parties dispute several material facts germane to the

determination of whether Officer Rzeszewski had probable cause to

charge Dr. Garcia with either crime. Beginning with the question of

whether R.E. was unsupervised, viewing the evidence and facts in the

light most favorable to Dr. Garcia, a reasonable juror could reach either

conclusion. Although the parties agree that R.E. was not within Dr.

Garcia’s immediate vicinity or line of sight while he was in the hot tub,

22

she refutes knowledge of any posted signs limiting access to the hot

tubs by children R.E.’s age, or for limited durations. Moreover, Dr.

Garcia produced evidence that R.E. was wearing a life-vest during his

time at the waterpark, accompanied by his older sisters, and

surrounded by 40 adults while in the hot tub. See Doc. 33-7 at 16-18,

82; Doc. 33-12 at 57-59. Determining whether those circumstances

placed R.E. in a dangerous situation is an issue appropriate for the

factfinder, and goes directly to the elements of the offenses underlying

the probable cause analysis.

With respect to the severity of R.E.’s condition, a reasonable juror

could find for either party. While Dr. Garcia agrees that R.E. was

extricated from the hot tub for a medical event, she disagrees about the

nature, and seriousness, of this precipitating episode. She contends

that, rather than pass out, R.E. fell asleep, and produced evidence in

support of her position, in the form of EMS records and testimony. See

Doc. 33-6 at 34; Doc. 33-7 at 29; Doc. 33-12 at 32; Doc. 33-20 at 2-3. In

light of the conflicting evidence and viewpoints on this issue, deciding

the severity of R.E.’s medical episode, which bears on the elements of

the offenses and corresponding probable cause analysis, must be left to

28

a factfinder. Likewise, whether Dr. Garcia was disruptive with EMS

personnel is an issue for the factfinder. Although Dr. Garcia agrees that

she expressed a difference of opinion regarding R.E.’s condition to EMS

personnel, she contests her depiction as disruptive, and instead

contends that she participated in R.E.’s evaluation. See Doc. 33-6 at 16—

17.

The parties’ vigorous dispute over whether Dr. Garcia appeared

intoxicated is a question that also must be determined by a factfinder,

and that bears directly on the existence of probable cause. Although the

parties agree that Dr. Garcia drank an alcoholic beverage several hours

before R.E.’s ordeal, she denies being or appearing intoxicated during

the events at issue, and produced testimony and other record evidence

in support of her position. See Doc. 33-7 at 14, 19, 21; Doc. 33-9 at 2;

Doc. 88-12 at 56.

Those disputes all bear on the determination of whether Officer

Rzeszewski’s affidavit of probable cause omitted, falsified, or altered

relevant facts. For example, the affidavit omits R.E.’s use of a life vest,

and that R.E. was surrounded by 40 adults while in the hot tub. Doc.

38-10 at 4. And although Officer Rzeszewski acknowledges that R.E.

24

was accompanied by his sisters in the hot tub, the affidavit also states

that “R.E. was in the hot tub by himself for approximately 30 minutes.”

Doc. 33-10 at 4. The affidavit also depicts Dr. Garcia as “slurring her

speech and [] zoned out,” as being uncooperative and interfering with

EMS personnel, and claims that she “drove to the hospital intoxicated

with an infant.” Id.

Accordingly, “reasonable minds could differ on whether

[Rzeszewski] had probable cause for the institution of the criminal

proceedings” under 18 Pa. C.S. §§ 4304(a)(1) and 2705. Halsey, 750 F.3d

at 300 (internal quotation omitted). Summary judgment on Count II of

the complaint, charging false arrest, is denied.

C. Malicious Prosecution Claim

The parties raise a near-identical dispute concerning Dr. Garcia’s

malicious prosecution claim, warranting an equal outcome at this stage

of the litigation. “To prove malicious prosecution under section 1983, a

plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendants initiated a criminal

proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiffs favor; (3) the

proceeding was initiated without probable cause; (4) the defendants

acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to

25

justice; and (5) the plaintiff suffered deprivation of liberty consistent

with the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.”

Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 521 (3d Cir. 2008).

Although a prosecutor is typically considered the party to initiate

charges under the first element, “an officer can fulfill this element by

filing an affidavit of probable cause.” Thompson v. City of Williamsport,

2023 WL 8005306, at *5 (M.D. Pa. 2028) (citing Berg v. Cnty. of

Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261, 272 (8d Cir. 2000); and Wilson v. Russo, 212

F.3d 781, 786-87 (3d Cir. 2000)). Here, the parties neither dispute that

Officer Rzeszewski initiated a criminal proceeding, nor that it ended in

Dr. Garcia’s favor. See Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 49 (2022) (“In

sum, we hold that a Fourth Amendment claim under § 1983 for

malicious prosecution does not require the plaintiff to show that the

criminal prosecution ended with some affirmative indication of

innocence. A plaintiff need only show that the criminal prosecution

ended without a conviction.”).

Although the parties spent most of their brief contesting whether

Dr. Garcia was seized, the Defendants conceded this element during

oral argument. Thus, the remaining dispute arises only out of whether

26

Officer Rzeszewski filed charges without probable cause, and acted

maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing Dr. Garcia to justice by

including alleged falsehoods, omissions, and factual distortions in the

affidavit of probable cause. “Malice may be inferred from the absence of

probable cause.” Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502 (8d Cir. 1993).

Accordingly, for the reasons detailed above in the Court’s analysis

of Dr. Garcia’s false arrest claim, disputed issues of fact concerning the

existence of probable cause and Officer Rzeszewski’s intent mandate

denying summary judgment on Count I of the complaint, charging

malicious prosecution.

D. Qualified Immunity

The Defendants contend that, because Officer Rzeszewski had

probable cause to charge and arrest Dr. Garcia, and because no clearly

established rights are at issue, Officer Rzeszewski is entitled to

qualified immunity. Doc. 26 at 21—28. In opposition, Dr. Garcia

contends that, because Officer Rzeszewski did not have probable cause

to file charges, and because Dr. Garcia had a clearly established right

to be free from arrest and prosecution absent probable cause, qualified

immunity does not protect Officer Rzeszewski. Doc. 33 at 16-17. As the

27

parties’ contentions again hinge on their pervasive dispute over the

existence of probable cause, the Court declines to grant summary

judgment on the basis of qualified immunity at this juncture.

Qualified immunity “protect[s] officials who are required to

exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging

the vigorous exercise of official authority.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509

U.S. 259, 268 (1998) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). To that end, the doctrine “shields officials from civil liability so

long as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 178 (8d Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted)

(first quoting Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021);

and then citing Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (per curiam)).

“Put simply, qualified immunity protects ‘all but the plainly

incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ Mullenix,

577 U.S. at 12 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

Third Circuit “courts assessing a claim of qualified immunity must

answer two questions.” Sauers v. Borough of Nesquehoning, 905 F.3d

711, 716 (8d Cir. 2018). The first inquiry is “whether the plaintiff

28

sufficiently alleged a right had been violated”—in other words, a Rule

12(b)(6) analysis. Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167, 178 (8d Cir. 2022)

(citing Williams v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corrs., 848 F.3d 549, 557 (8d Cir.

2017)). The second question is “whether that right was clearly

established when it was allegedly violated to the extent ‘that it would

have been clear to a reasonable person that his conduct was unlawful.’ ”

Id. (quoting Williams, 848 F.3d at 557). “If the answer is yes to both

questions, the officer is not entitled to qualified immunity.” Alburg, 784

F. Supp.3d at 796.

Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense and the burden of

proving the prerequisites for its application rests with the defendant.

Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 292 (8d Cir. 2006). “The

issue of qualified immunity is generally a question of law, although a

genuine issue of material fact will preclude summary judgment on

qualified immunity.” Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 326 (8d Cir. 2009).

In deciding qualified immunity questions at summary judgment, a court

must view the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id. The

Court “ha[s] discretion to address either inquiry first.” Sauers, 905 F.3d

at 716 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 228, 236 (2009)).

29

Regarding the second qualified immunity prong, a “right is clearly

established when the law is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable

official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’

” Id. at 719 (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). “In

undertaking that task, [the Court is] guided by the Supreme Court’s

repeated instructions to do so in light of the particular facts of the case

at hand.” Jd. at 716-17 (citations omitted). Put differently, the Court’s

inquiry must refrain from “a broad general proposition.” Clark, 55 F.4th

at 719 (quotations omitted). This, however, “does not require a prior

precedent with indistinguishable facts[.]” Sauers, 905 F.3d at 719.

Rather, “ ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-

Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).

Existing precedent places a constitutional question beyond debate

and defeats qualified immunity under three circumstances. First, when

the precedent is a “controlling authority” from the Supreme Court or

Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. Second, when a “robust consensus of

cases of persuasive authority” on the question exists within the

boundaries of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. (quotations

30

omitted). And third, when a “robust consensus of persuasive

authority[,]” outside the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, exists in the

“Courts of Appeals” from around the country. Fields v. City of

Philadelphia, 862 F.3d 3538, 361 (8d Cir. 2017).

Although it is the Defendants’ burden to establish that Officer

Rzeszewski is entitled to qualified immunity, they failed to articulate

the right implicated by Dr. Garcia’s allegations. Doc. 26 at 23-28.

Indeed, the Defendants state simply that “the arrest of Plaintiff does

not constitute a ‘clearly established’ violation of the Fourth

Amendment,” and failed to offer greater clarity at oral argument. Id.

Dr. Garcia frames the right at issue as follows: the right to be free from

arrest and prosecution absent probable cause. Doc. 33 at 17. However,

because the Court must refrain from using “broad general

proposition[s]” like the one offered by Dr. Garcia, Clark, 55 F.4th at 719,

it will instead frame the right in the context of the specific allegations

in this action: the right to be free from an arrest and prosecution based

on an affidavit of probable cause that omitted material facts and

included false and misleading representations, when a complete and

31

accurate affidavit would have militated against a finding of probable

cause.

Controlling authority dictates that this right was clearly

established at the time of the incidents giving rise to this action. It has

been long settled that omitting exculpatory and material information in

an application for a warrant, and any subsequent prosecution stemming

from that deficient application, violates the Fourth Amendment. See

Lippay, 996 F.2d at 1504 (“[Plaintiff] had to prove that [defendant]

acted with reckless disregard for the truth or falsified information

contained in the affidavits used to initiate the criminal proceedings. If a

police officer submits an affidavit containing statements he knows to be

false or would know are false if he had not recklessly disregarded the

truth, the officer obviously failed to observe a right that was clearly

established.”); Sherwood, 118 F.3d at 399 (holding that a police officer is

not entitled to qualified immunity if he “knowingly and deliberately, or □

with a reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or

omissions that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant” and

“such statements or omissions [were] material, or necessary, to the

finding of probable cause.”); Wilson, 212 F.3d at 786-87 (“[A] plaintiff

32

may succeed in a § 1988 action for false arrest made pursuant to a

warrant if the plaintiff shows, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1)

that the police officer knowingly and deliberately, or with a reckless

disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create

a falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or

omissions are material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.”)

(internal quotations omitted); Fallen v. McEnroe, 2025 WL 32816, at *2

(8d Cir. 2025) (“[Plaintiff] would ordinarily be entitled to qualified

immunity unless ‘the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a

reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions

that create[d] a falsehood in applying for a warrant’ and ‘such

statements or omissions [were] material, or necessary, to the finding of

probable cause. ”) (alterations in original) (quoting Sherwood, 113 F.3d

at 399).

Thus, when viewing the record in the light most favorable to Dr.

Garcia, her Fourth Amendment right to be free from an arrest and

prosecution based on a deficient affidavit of probable cause that omitted

material facts and included false and misleading representations was

33

clearly established in 2021, when the circumstances giving rise to this

action occurred.

Regarding the first qualified immunity prong, and as detailed

above, because a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to

probable cause, it precludes the Court from determining, at this

juncture, whether she sufficiently demonstrated a constitutional

violation. Indeed, because probable cause is an essential element in Dr.

Garcia’s false arrest and malicious prosecution claims, its presence or

absence is integral to the Court’s ability to assess the sufficiency of the

alleged constitutional violations here. Clark, 55 F.4th at 178; Estate of

Smith, 318 F.3d at 521; James, 700 F.3d at 680. Thus, until the

factfinder determines whether Officer Rzeszewski had probable cause to

charge Dr. Garcia, the Court cannot fully assess the sufficiency of those

claims.

Determining at this stage whether Officer Rzeszewski is entitled

to qualified immunity on Dr. Garcia’s false arrest and malicious

prosecution claims would be premature. See Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d

271, 278 (8d Cir. 2002) (“Just as the granting of summary judgment is

inappropriate when a genuine issue exists as to any material fact, a

34

decision on qualified immunity will be premature when there are

unresolved disputes of historical fact relevant to the immunity

analysis.”); Giles, 571 F.3d at 326 (“[A] genuine issue of material fact

will preclude summary judgment on qualified immunity.”); Barasky v.

Dent, 2025 WL 3678888, at *12 (M.D. Pa. 2025) (“Determining qualified

immunity at this [summary judgment] stage would be premature due to

several disputes of material fact.”); Contreras v. Conrad, 2020 WL

2193429, at *9 (M.D. Pa. 2020) (finding that genuine issues of material

fact “preclude the entry of summary judgment as to Defendants’

qualified immunity argument.”). Accordingly, the Defendants’ motion

for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is denied,

without prejudice.

EK. Abuse of Process Claim

The Defendants contend that no record evidence can establish

that Officer Rzeszewski abused legal process after initiation of Dr.

Garcia’s prosecution. Doc. 26 at 20-21. Although Dr. Garcia did not

respond to this contention during briefing, she averred during oral

argument that Officer Rzeszewski abused legal process by initiating a

second set of criminal charges after the county court dismissed the first

35

prosecution, and by prompting an investigation by CYS. Neither of

those positions saves the claim from summary judgment.

“An abuse of process occurs when a party employs legal process

against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it was not

designed.” Napier v. City of New Castle, 407 F. App’x 578, 582 (8d Cir.

2010) (citing Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 387 F.3d

297, 307 (3d Cir. 2008)). “ ‘In contrast to a section 1988 claim for

malicious prosecution, a section 19838 claim for malicious abuse of

process lies where prosecution is initiated legitimately and thereafter is

used for a purpose other than that intended by the law.’ ” Jd. (quoting

Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 350 n.17 (3d Cir. 1989)) (some internal

quotations omitted). Critically, “[a]buse of process is not concerned with

what led to the prosecution—rather, the plaintiff must establish that the

defendant perverted the proceedings after they were initiated.” Forlina

v. Doe, 2019 WL 5188400, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2019).

Dr. Garcia alleges that “Rzeszewski utilized the criminal legal

process against [her] to charge her with crimes wholly unsupported by

probable cause.” Doc. 1 at 25. Dr. Garcia further alleges that

“Rzeszewski’s purpose [in utilizing the criminal justice process] was to

36

unlawfully arrest and charge [her] in an attempt to intimidate, harass,

annoy, and alarm her.” Jd. at 25-26. Even if record evidence

corroborated those allegations, it would fall short of establishing an

abuse of process claim. The conduct on which Dr. Garcia’s claim is

premised concerns Officer Rzeszewski’s initiation of charges, not an

abuse of legal process occurring thereafter.

Dr. Garcia’s reliance on Officer Rzeszewski’s reinitiation of

charges without offering new evidence does not salvage the claim. Even

if the second set of charges arose out of “bad intentions,” a viable abuse

of process claim does not exist when the defendant “merely carries out

the process to its authorized conclusion.” Douris v. Schweiker, 229 F.

Supp. 2d 391, 404 (E.D. Pa. 2002), affd sub nom. Douris v. Rendell, 100

F. App’x. 126 (8d Cir. 2004); Zerby v. Waltz, 2017 WL 386616, at *10

(M.D. Pa. 2017). And Dr. Garcia offers no rationale for how prompting a

CYS investigation constitutes an abuse of legal process; a shortcoming

that she effectively conceded at oral argument.

As no record evidence shows that Officer Rzeszewski perverted the

process after the initiation of charges, or after the reinitiation of

charges, the claim necessarily fails. Forlina, 2019 WL at *6; Talbert v.

37

Ciglar, 2019 WL 653219, at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (concluding that plaintiff

failed to allege abuse of process claim where he claimed merely that

defendant improperly initiated proceedings); Ference v. Twp. of

Hamilton, 538 F. Supp. 2d 785, 798 (D.N.J. 2008) (“To establish [an

abuse of process] claim, there must be some proof of a definite act or

threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not

legitimate in the use of the process.”). Accordingly, summary judgment

on Count ITI, claiming abuse of process, is granted.

F. Failure to Train Monell Claim

The parties dispute whether any record evidence shows that

Pocono Mountain failed to train Officer Rzeszewski. Docs. 26 at 30-32;

33 at 19-20. As the evidence fails to show that Pocono Mountain was

deliberately indifferent to a specific training need, summary judgment

is warranted on the Monell claim.

“TA] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury

inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servus., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Instead, Section 1983 claims against

municipalities may proceed in two ways. First, “[a] plaintiff may put

forth that an unconstitutional policy or custom of the municipality led

38

to his or her injuries[.]” Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 98, 105 (8d Cir. 2019).

Second, and relevant for current purposes, a plaintiff may allege that

their injuries “were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the

municipality that ‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice[.]’” Id.

(quoting Estate of Roman v. City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir.

2019)). “The latter avenue arose in the failure-to-train context, but

applies to other failures and inadequacies by municipalities, including

those related to supervision and discipline of its police officers.” Id.

(citing Estate of Roman, 914 F.3d at 798-99).

Here, Dr. Garcia acknowledged at oral argument that her Monell

claim was premised on a deliberate indifference failure to train theory,

not on an alleged policy and custom. Proving a municipality’s deliberate

indifference is “demanding,” and requires a plaintiff to demonstrate:

“(1) municipal policymakers know that employees will confront a

particular situation, (2) the situation involves a difficult choice or a

history of employees mishandling, and (8) the wrong choice by an

employee will frequently cause deprivation of constitutional rights.” Id.

at 106 (citing Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 389, 357 (8d Cir.

1999)). In the failure to train context, this means that the plaintiff □

39

“needs to show that a defendant was on notice that, absent additional

specialized training, [the injury] was so predictable[,] that failing to

train the municipal employees amounted to conscious disregard for the

constitutional rights of citizens.” Diaz v. City of Philadelphia, 670 F.

Supp. 3d 174, 185 (E.D. Pa. 2023) (cleaned up).

“Ordinarily, this means that a plaintiff must show that ‘[a]

pattern of similar constitutional violations’ put the city on notice that,

by failing to act, it was being deliberately indifferent to [citizen]s’

rights. Hightower v. City of Philadelphia, 130 F.4th 352, 357 (8d Cir.

2025) (first alteration in original) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 5638

U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). Additionally, the alleged failure to conduct

specialized training must have a close causal relationship with the

alleged constitutional injury, because “[i]n virtually every instance

where a person has had his or her constitutional rights violated by a

city employee, a § 1988 plaintiff will be able to point to something the

‘city ‘could have done’ to prevent the unfortunate incident.” City of

Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392 (1989); Kelley v. Reyes, 2025

WL 618207, at *21 (D.N.J. 2025).

40

In support of her claim, Dr. Garcia first submits that she

identified and deposed a policymaker at Pocono Mountain, Chief

Christopher Wagner. Doc. 33 at 18. Second, she asserts that “Chief

Wagner knew of Defendant Rzeszewski’s dishonesty|[,]” because Officer

Rzeszewski “previously made criminal allegations of misconduct against

one of her colleagues, which was determined to be unfounded.” Id. at

19-20. In further support of her contention that Chief Wagner was

aware of Officer Rzeszewski’s alleged dishonesty, Dr. Garcia raised at

oral argument a matter previously before the Court, Barnello v. Pocono

Mountain Reg Police Comm'n, 2024 WL 3794676 (M.D. Pa. 2024), that

involved Officer Rzeszewski and accusations of faulty probable cause.

Doc. 1 at 28—29. Thus, Dr. Garcia concludes that the “Defendant

Commission knew that Defendant Rzeszewski was ill-equipped, if not

incapable, to carry out her duties as law enforcement without infringing

on citizens’ constitutional rights, yet placed her in a position to do

exactly that despite her obvious need for training.” Jd. at 20.

The scant evidence supporting those allegations falls short of the

showing required to survive summary judgment. Although the record

evidence establishes that by 2023, Chief Wagner was aware of Officer

41

Rzeszewski’s dubious misconduct allegations (Doc. 33-8 at 5-6), this

was more than a year after the 2021 events at issue in this action—a

temporal dissonance that Dr. Garcia conceded at oral argument.

Moreover, record evidence fails to establish that, by 2021, Chief Wagner

had reason to be aware of the facts at issue in Barnello, a case initiated

in 2028. 2024 WL 3794676 at *3.

Even if Chief Wagner had known about either of those incidents

prior to late 2021, neither circumstance would logically give rise to a

need to provide Officer Rzeszewski with specialized training for the

Fourth Amendment constitutional injuries alleged in this action. Unlike

the injuries alleged here, Officer Rzeszewski’s misconduct allegations

concerned alleged sexual assault, and the facts in Barnello involved,

among other things, a preliminary hearing “where the magisterial

district court judge found that there was a prima facie case to hold the

charges over for trial.” 2024 WL 3794676, at *5; Diaz, 670 F. Supp.3d at

185. And even absent those dissimilarities, Dr. Garcia cannot establish

a pattern premised on just two previous occurrences. Hightower, 130

F.4th at 857. Moreover, Dr. Garcia does not identify a particular

42

requisite training, the absence of which can be traced directly to her

injury. Id.; City of Canton, Ohio, 489 U.S. at 392.

Thus, the evidence produced by Dr. Garcia falls well short of

establishing a deliberate indifference failure to train claim, even when

viewing it in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Accordingly,

summary judgment is granted on the Count IV Monell claim.

G. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim

The Defendants contend that Dr. Garcia failed to offer any

medical evidence establishing injury arising out of her claimed

emotional distress, or any evidence that Officer Rzeszewski engaged in

extreme or outrageous conduct. Doc. 26 at 32. Dr. Garcia responds that

Officer Rzeszewski’s conduct in authoring the affidavit of probable

cause and initiating charges suffices to establish the claim, Doc. 33 at

20-21, and further averred at oral argument that a reasonable juror

could assume that those actions would cause emotional damage. As the

record is bereft of evidence showing treatment for emotional distress or

physical harm, summary judgment is warranted.

To succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress

under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must show “ ‘(1) the conduct [of the

43

defendant] must be extreme and outrageous; (2) it must be intentional

or reckless; (3) it must cause emotional distress; [and] (4) the distress

must be severe.” Smith v. RB Distribution, Inc., 515 F. Supp.3d 311,

315 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Hoy v. Angelone,

691 A.2d 476, 482 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), aff'd 720 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1998)).

“Pennsylvania maintains a high bar for what constitutes extreme and

outrageous conduct[.]” Zucal v. Cnty. of Lehigh, 760 F. Supp.3d 290, 305

(E.D. Pa. 2024). “In addition, ‘a plaintiff must suffer some type of

resulting physical harm due to the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ ”

Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 231 (8d Cir. 2010) (quoting Swisher v.

Pitz, 868 A.2d 1228, 1230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)).

Dr. Garcia focuses on caselaw in this circuit holding that

“(k] knowingly instituting false criminal charges c[an]...

constitute outrageous conduct.” Kovalev v. City of Philadelphia, 2017

WL 770945, at *11 (E.D. Pa. 2017), aff'd, 775 F. App’x 72 (8d Cir. 2019).

But even assuming that those circumstances exist here, the claim still

fails, as Dr. Garcia must also prove that such actions caused her severe

emotional distress, and resulting physical harm. Smith, 515 F. Supp. 3d

at 315; Reedy, 615 F.3d at 231. However, as Dr. Garcia conceded at oral

44

argument, the record does not contain evidence establishing that she

was treated for either emotional distress or physical harm. And a jury’s

potential assumptions do not salvage the claim. See, e.g., Galullo v. Fed.

Exp. Corp., 937 F. Supp. 392, 398 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“Pennsylvania courts

have long held that a jury is not permitted to speculate or guess since

conjecture, guess[,] or suspicion do not amount to proof.”).

Absent that requisite evidence, summary judgment on the Count

V intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is granted. As no

other surviving claims are advanced against Pocono Mountain, that

defendant will be terminated from this action.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the Court will deny in part, and

grant in part, the motion for summary judgment. A separate order shall

be issued.

Date: March 30, 2026 s/ Phillip J. Caraballo

Phillip J. Caraballo

United States Magistrate Judge

45