Com. v. Brown, A.

J-S05042-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

ANTHONY BROWN :

:

Appellant : No. 979 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 21, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003913-2021

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

ANTHONY BROWN :

:

Appellant : No. 980 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 21, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003914-2021

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 8, 2026

Anthony Brown appeals from his judgments of sentence imposed

following a jury finding him guilty of murder of the first degree and possessing

an instrument of crime (PIC) at case number 3913-2021,1 and guilty of murder

____________________________________________

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a) (first-degree murder) and 907(a) (PIC).

J-S05042-26

of the first degree, conspiracy to commit murder of the first degree, and PIC

at case number 3914-2021.2 Brown was principally sentenced to two

mandatory, consecutive terms of life imprisonment without the possibility of

parole (LWOP). Upon review, we remand this matter for the limited purpose

of allowing the trial court to correct a patent and obvious error in its sentencing

order at 3914-2021, but affirm Brown’s judgments of sentence in all other

respects.

The trial court cogently summarized this case, as follows:

In the evening hours of February 28, 2020, Alexis Ellison, the sole

tenant of 2087 East Clementine Street, [Philadelphia,

Pennsylvania,] arrived home where she was greeted by an

acquaintance who notified her that he had heard shots coming

from her house and that he believed her boyfriend “BB” was

inside. Ellison subsequently unlocked the front door to find her

boyfriend, Brandon White, lying dead on the living room floor.

Ellison shut the door and ran up the street to call 911 from a

neighbor’s house. Police shortly arrived on scene and[,] upon

arrival and entry into 2087 East Clementine Street, they located

two deceased [] black males inside the property. Police later

identified the first male lying in the middle of the living room as

White. Moving to the kitchen, police located a second male

identified as Javon Skinner. Both men were pronounced dead on

scene at 6:33 p.m. At approximately 7:00 p.m., Ellison was

transported from her home to [the] Philadelphia Police[

Department’s] Homicide [U]nit[’s office] for questioning.

At the Homicide Unit [office], Ellison consented to a search of her

phone. Detectives were able to extract information from her call

log[,] which detailed her incoming and outgoing calls on February

28, 2020. Reports showed she received an incoming Face[T]ime

call at 6:23 p.m., from a number subscribed to [Brown]. Three

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2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502(a) (first-degree murder), 903 (conspiracy), and 907(a)

(PIC).

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minutes later at 6:26 p.m.[,] Ellison placed the call to 911.

Detectives subsequently recovered video surveillance from the

area showing [Brown] and his codefendant, Ahmad Thomas,

entering 2087 East Clementine Street and exiting shortly after

[the] decedents are believed to have been shot and killed.

Police eventually discovered that [Brown] had fled to South

Carolina, wherein he was shortly thereafter arrested. In January

2021, [Brown] was successfully extradited to the custody of the

Philadelphia Police Department. [Brown] was subsequently

arrested and charged with, inter alia, [two counts of murder of the

first degree].

After a mistrial in [Brown’s] first trial, held in September of 2022,

[Brown’s] second trial commenced on March 11, 2024. The

Commonwealth presented evidence as well as the testimony of

eight [] witnesses as part of its case-in-chief against [Brown].

Such witnesses from the Philadelphia Police Department included

Former Crime Scene Unit (CSU) Officer and [D]etective, Steven

Berardi, Firearms Identification Unit (FIU) Officer Paul Ward, and

lead Detective Orlando Ortiz. [City of Philadelphia M]edical

[E]xaminer Dr. Lindsay Simon[] and Ellison[] also testified.

At trial, Philadelphia Police Officer Ward, a member of [the] FIU in

2020, testified that he analyzed the ballistics recovered in this

case. This [analysis] included the sixteen [] fired cartridge casings

(FCCs), which he concluded were all fired from the same .40

caliber Smith & Wes[s]on firearm, and the other seven [] FCCs,

which he determined were all fired from the same 9-millimeter

Luger firearm. Additionally, he matched the two calibers to the

live rounds of ammunition that were recovered from Thomas’s

home.

Detective Berardi, a member of [the] CSU in 2020, testified to

recovering and cataloging the evidence recovered from the area

around the crime scene[.] This [work] included [the] recovery of

the ballistic evidence, specifically the FCC[s], retrieved from

around White and Skinner.

The Commonwealth also [called] Detective Ortiz, lead detective in

the case, [to] testify to, amongst other things, how the

investigation unfolded and resulted in the arrests of [Brown] and

his co-defendant[.] This [investigation] included the interviewing

of Ellison as well as what the search into her phone revealed.

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Detective Ortiz further testified [regarding] the several hours of

recovered video surveillance which captured the events leading up

to, during, and after the time [at] which White and Skinner were

murdered. Subsequently, the footage, [within] which [] Thomas

identified [] himself [] during an interview, tied both [Brown] and

Thomas to the murder. Additionally, Dr. Simon testified for the

Commonwealth and summarized the autopsies she performed on

both White and Skinner.

Ellison, over the span of two days, testified to finding White and

Skinner dead in her house, her relationships with [Brown] and

White, conversations with [Brown] both before and after [Brown]

and Thomas killed White and Skinner, and the information that

she gave detectives that served as the starting point of their

investigation.

The Commonwealth and [Brown’s] counsel stipulated that

[Brown] did not have a license to carry a firearm on February 28,

2020. They also stipulated to the testimony of Latoya Sharper,

[Brown’s] aunt, who would have testified to [Brown’s] reputation

in the community.

The Commonwealth and [Brown’s] counsel [also] stipulated to the

testimony of Michael McCandless, a longstanding employee of

Vacant Property Security. McCandless would have testified that on

February 28, 2020, every point of entry, and the windows, in the

vacant property listed at 2085 East Clementine Street was secured

and unwanted entry would have only been possible by means of

force.

The Commonwealth and [Brown’s] counsel [additionally]

stipulated to the testimony of Andrea Williams, an expert in

fingerprint identification and analysis with the Philadelphia Police

Department Latent Print Unit. Williams would have testified that

she examined the latent print cards from 2087 East Clementine

Street[] provided by Detective Berardi. She would have affirmed

that all prints examined were found to be inconclusively

associated with [Brown].

Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/25, at 2-5 (record citations and name titles and

unnecessary first names omitted).

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Brown and Thomas were tried together, both at the mistrial and the

subsequent trial. Ultimately, after hearing several days of evidence and

argument, the jury in the second trial found Brown guilty of, inter alia, the

aforementioned two counts of murder of the first degree, resulting in two

consecutive LWOP sentences.3

After sentencing, Brown filed post-trial motions, which were denied.

Thereafter, Brown filed a timely notice of appeal and correspondingly

submitted a statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(b).

On appeal, Brown challenges the weight and sufficiency of the evidence

at each of his first-degree murder convictions and the admissibility of a certain

portion of Detective Ortiz’s testimony. 4 See Appellant’s Brief at 7-8. Although

____________________________________________

3 Brown received two additional terms of one-to-two years of incarceration for

the PIC offenses, each to be served concurrent with their respective LWOP

sentences.

4 Brown’s statement of questions involved contains an additional issue

regarding the admissibility of Ellison’s crimen falsi convictions, see Appellant’s

Brief at 8, but the brief contains no additional references to this contention.

Therefore, this argument is waived. See Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809

A.2d 908, 912 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“an issue identified on appeal but not

developed in the appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived”).

Separately, and more broadly, we note our displeasure with the organizational

structure of Brown’s brief. It is written in a manner that reads like an outline,

replete with indented and individually lettered/numbered lists, many of them

single sentences, rather than in paragraph format. Moreover, the argument

section contains only seven citations to authority across three distinct issues,

most serving to simply describe our applicable standards of review. This lack

of development has impeded our review. We note that this Court has

previously addressed, in multiple unpublished memoranda, prior examples of

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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his brief places his weight claim before his sufficiency claim, we address the

sufficiency claim first. See Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d 29, 33 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (en banc) (“Because a successful sufficiency of the evidence

____________________________________________

Brown’s counsel, George S. Yacoubian, Jr., Esquire, offering deficient

developments of arguments in his briefs filed for our review. See

Commonwealth v. Watts, 2025 WL 1604565, *2 (Pa. Super., filed June 6,

2025) (unpublished memorandum; 2428 EDA 2024) (noting that counsel’s

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), contained

“citations to the pertinent standard of review, but little to no additional

citations to legal authorities supporting his arguments”); Commonwealth v.

Moore, 2025 WL 3162145, *3 (Pa. Super., filed Nov. 12, 2025) (unpublished

memorandum; 1418 EDA 2024) (finding another Anders brief filed by counsel

deficient where counsel failed “to state his reasons for concluding why the

appeal [was] frivolous” and did not “articulate the relevant facts of record,

controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that led him to conclude that

the appeal [was] frivolous”); Commonwealth v. Sims, 2024 WL 2153505,

*3 (Pa. Super., filed May 14, 2024) (unpublished memorandum; 1695 EDA

2023) (describing another Anders brief from counsel as deficient where

counsel offered no specific discussion of claims that were raised in a Rule

1925(b) statement, or any explanation as to why those issues were frivolous);

Commonwealth v. Boozer, 2019 WL 5655295, *4 (Pa. Super., filed Oct. 31,

2019) (unpublished memorandum; 492 EDA 2018) (finding another Anders

brief by counsel to be deficient, noting that counsel had “done nothing more

than present conclusory statements supporting affirmance” of a verdict, and

remanding for the appointment of new counsel); see also Commonwealth

v. Watts, 2026 WL 1292529, *2 n.3 (Pa. Super., filed May 8, 2026)

(unpublished memorandum; 2429 EDA 2024) (noting that, after our prior

finding of deficient briefing in Watts’s appeal by counsel, counsel filed a new

Anders brief that “remained substantively deficient,” and, as a result, we

vacated counsel’s appointment and remanded for the appointment of new

counsel). For the benefit of our Court’s ease of review, we insist that counsel

adhere to the briefing requirements addressed in our appellate rules of

procedure. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“Briefs . . . shall conform in all material

respects with the requirements of these rules as nearly as the circumstances

of the particular case will admit, otherwise they may be suppressed, and if the

defects in the brief . . . are substantial, the appeal . . . may be quashed or

dismissed”); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (a brief’s argument section “shall have . . .

such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”).

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claim warrants discharge on the pertinent crime, we must address this issue

first.”); see also Commonwealth v. Ford, 141 A.3d 547, 552 (Pa. Super.

2016) (addressing challenge to sufficiency prior to weight although the

appellant presented the issues in reverse order).

As to our standard of review for sufficiency of evidence challenges, we

employ the following:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence

is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light

most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence

to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh

the evidence and substitute our judgment for a fact-finder. In

addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by

the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of

innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be

resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and

inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be

drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial

evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record

must be evaluated and all evidence received must be considered.

Finally, the trier of fact, while passing upon the credibility of

witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to

believe all, part[,] or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Haahs, 289 A.3d 100, 104 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(citation omitted).

The elements of first-degree murder are as follows: “(1) a human being

was unlawfully killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for the killing; and

(3) the defendant acted with malice and a specific intent to kill.”

Commonwealth v. Padilla, 80 A.3d 1238, 1244 (Pa. 2013); see also 18

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Pa.C.S. § 2502(a).

Brown’s sufficiency argument is limited to two sentences. See

Appellant’s Brief at 18. Brown simply argues that he “was not responsible for

the killing.” Id. We find that the trial court’s opinion comprehensively refutes

Brown’s assertion and adopt it as our own. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/25,

at 9-21.

In particular, we emphasize the following:

The Commonwealth presented ample evidence for the jury to find

[Brown] entered 2087 East Clementine Street despite the fact that

the property’s front door was not seen on video, nor can [Brown]

be seen entering the home. Based on his personal knowledge of

the exterior of Ellison’s residence, Detective Ortiz testified he was

certain the trashcan seen on video chained to the railing of 2087

East Clementine Street was in the same [position] that he

observed when he arrived on scene and that it exactly depicts

where the trashcan was located on February 28, 2020. Video

surveillance recovered from the surrounding area showed

[Brown], wearing the same distinct clothing used to identify him

in a surveillance video clip, and Thomas walking up the stairs of

2087 East Clementine Street, having to pass the trashcan on the

top step. The two men are presumed to be inside the residence

from 3:53 p.m. to 3:59 p.m. until [Brown and Thomas] are both

seen exiting the residence, having to again pass the trashcan as

they walk down the steps. [Brown] is seen on video walking back

up to the top step of the residence and down again before he

meets the other males in the street and depart[s] from the scene.

Id. at 14 (record citations and name titles omitted).

The court continued to tether Brown to the location of the crime:

[S]urveillance video evidence showed that [Brown and Thomas]

staked out and followed White and Skinner from the corner store

to 2087 East Clementine Street where [Brown] and Thomas killed

them. [Brown is] seen wearing white sneakers and sweatpants

with white lettering on his pant leg throughout the entirety of [the]

surveillance video [and] is seen on video ascending up the steps

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to the trash can located at the top step of 2087 East Clementine

Street, followed by Thomas. Using the trashcan at the top of the

steps in front of the entry door of 2087 East Clementine Street as

a landmark, once [Brown] and Thomas pass the trash can[,] they

fade off camera where they cannot be seen on camera from 3:53

p.m. to 3:59 p.m. until they are both seen coming down the steps

of 2087 East Clementine Street, passing the trashcan before

[Brown briefly] walks back up and down the stairs. Detective Ortiz

estimated the homicides occurred [between] 3:51 p.m. and 4:01

p.m. on February 28, 2020.

Id. at 20 (record citations and name titles omitted).

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, there was enough presented to, at a minimum,

circumstantially demonstrate that Brown committed the two homicides,

especially when juxtaposed against the preexisting relationships between both

Brown and White as well as Brown and Ellison, and the evidence showing that

White’s cell phone ceased communications just before Brown and Thomas’s

entrance into the home. See, e.g., id. at 17 (describing one of Brown and

White’s interactions over Facebook Messenger, two days before the murders,

involving discussion of guns, drugs, and Ellison); id. at 14 (summarizing a

portion of Detective Ortiz’s testimony as demonstrating that “White’s phone

records did not have any outgoing social media messages, calls[,] or text

activity from his phone after 3:51 p.m.”).

We also note that, although some of the evidence is circumstantial in

this case, “[t]he Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every

element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly

circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Gause, 164 A.3d 532, 541 (Pa.

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Super. 2017) (en banc). Despite Brown’s assertion, the Commonwealth was

not required to show direct proof of him, inter alia, “holding, carrying, or

otherwise concealing firearms[.]” But see Appellant’s Brief at 18. Accordingly,

with the varied evidence linking him to the crime scene on the date of the

murders, there was sufficient evidence for the fact-finder to conclude, beyond

a reasonable doubt, that Brown was guilty of, inter alia, two counts of murder

of the first degree.5 Thus, he is due no relief.

For challenges to the weight of the evidence, wholly distinct from a

sufficiency claim, we begin by noting our standard of review:

A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against

the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the

trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere

conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts

would have arrived at a different conclusion. When a trial court

considers a motion for a new trial based upon a weight of the

evidence claim, the trial court may award relief only when the

jury’s verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s

sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that

right may be given another opportunity to prevail. The inquiry is

not the same for an appellate court. Rather, when an appellate

court reviews a weight claim, the court is reviewing the exercise

of discretion by the trial court, not the underlying question of

whether the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The

appellate court reviews a weight claim using an abuse of discretion

standard.

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5 Although Brown raises no argument as to the sufficiency of evidence of the

elements vis-à-vis his singular conspiracy and two PIC convictions, we would

find their evidentiary support equally sufficient, predicated on much of the

same circumstantial evidence, which established a concerted effort between

Brown and Thomas to kill White as well as the criminal intentions Brown had

in relation to his possession of the weapon used to kill both Skinner and White.

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At trial, the jury [is] the ultimate fact-finder and the sole arbiter

of the credibility of each of the witnesses. Issues of witness

credibility include questions of inconsistent testimony and

improper motive. A jury is entitled to resolve any inconsistencies

in the Commonwealth’s evidence in the manner that it sees fit.

Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1080 (Pa. 2017) (quotation

marks and citations omitted).6

Brown’s brief summarizes the evidence against him at his trial, see

Appellant’s Brief at 12-17, and then suggests, inter alia, that the

Commonwealth adduced nothing that actually connected him to the murders.

Brown argues that

[d]espite [there being] hours of raw video footage recovered by

the police, [he and Thomas] were never seen holding, carrying, or

otherwise concealing firearms; [he] was never seen entering or

exiting the house; there were no instinctual reactions by any

civilian witnesses on Clementine Street to 23 shots fired from two

large-caliber weapons on the first-floor; no forensic evidence

linked [him] to the crime scene; and the search of [his] property

yielded no physical evidence linking him to the murders.

Id. at 17. As such, he alleges that “the verdicts for first-degree murder were

so contrary to the evidence that it should shock our sense of justice.” Id. We

disagree and find the court, to the extent Brown even argued a cognizable

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6 Brown’s post-sentence motions did not motion for a new trial, consistent

with Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607(A) (“A claim that the verdict

was against the weight of the evidence shall be raised with the trial judge in

a motion for a new trial[.]”), but instead erroneously sought a judgment of

acquittal. See Post-Sentence Motions, 3/22/24, at ¶ 3.

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weight-based claim, did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown relief on his

weight claim.

Preliminarily, Brown’s weight challenge, which is predicated on an

argument that he has not been shown to be connected to the murders, can

largely be characterized as a sufficiency challenge. See Commonwealth v.

Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 643 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[A] true weight of the evidence

challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the verdict but

questions which evidence is to be believed.”) (emphasis added and citation

omitted). Other than an undeveloped suggestion that pedestrians walking past

the murder scene, identifiable in a video played to the jury, should have

reacted to loud and repetitive gunfire that corresponded with the

Commonwealth’s position as to the time in which the murders occurred, see

Appellant’s Brief at 15-16, Brown does not challenge the believability of the

evidence that was employed against him or concede that the same evidence

could have sustained the murder verdicts. Instead, he maintains that the

Commonwealth failed to show a demonstrable nexus to his involvement in the

murders.

Nevertheless, in a direct refutation of Brown’s supposition that there

was no evidence tying him to the homicides, 7 the court, likely guided by his

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7 This evidence was discussed in more detail in addressing his sufficiency

claim, supra.

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erroneous framing of his weight-of-the-evidence claim, see Trial Court

Opinion, 6/26/25, at 26 (remarking that Brown “now effectively challenges

if[] there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict[]”), was satisfied there

was enough evidence presented for a reasonable inference that Brown

perpetrated these crimes:

D[octor] Simon testified White and Skinner both died from

multiple gunshot wounds and ruled the manner of their deaths as

homicide. Philadelphia [b]allistics expert, Officer Ward[,] and

Philadelphia Homicide Detective Ortiz provided testimony

supporting Dr. Simon’s conclusion. Officer Ward testified that of

the ballistic evidence collected from the scene, he recovered only

. . . fired cartridge casings [that had been] fired from a .40 caliber

Smith [& Wesson] firearm and a 9[-]millimeter Luger firearm.

Microscopic comparison confirmed all [twenty-three total FCCs]

recovered were . . . fired from the same [two firearms]. . . . The

two models of [FCCs] recovered from inside 2087 East Clementine

Street confirm Detective Ortiz’s theory that there were two

shooters inside on February 28, 2020. Furthermore, police also

recovered identical .40 caliber and [9-]millimeter bullets from

Thomas’s residence at 2109 East Clearfield Street, where [Brown]

and Thomas are seen on surveillance camera entering minutes

before White and Skinner are subsequently killed.

The Commonwealth also presented video surveillance evidence

substantiating the fact that the murders were committed by two

individuals inside the home. Footage recovered from nearby

showed two individuals, one being [Brown] identified by

Philadelphia Police Officer[] Malik Carr[] and the second, Thomas,

who identified himself in the video to police, ascending the steps

of 2087 East Clementine Street where they entered the home.

Detective Ortiz testified that the murders occurred at some time

between 3:51 p.m. and 4:01 p.m. on February 28, 2020. The time

of the murders was affirmed from [surveillance] footage that

show[s] [Brown] and Thomas fading off camera after they ascend

up the stairs of 2087 East Clementine Street[] and by evidence

that White made his last outgoing call from his cell phone [] at

3:51 p.m. [Neither] White nor Skinner were []ever seen again on

video nor were they seen exiting 2087 East Clementine [S]treet

any time after 3:51 p.m.

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Id. at 26-28 (record citations and name titles and unnecessary first names

omitted).

Notwithstanding the court’s quasi-sufficiency analysis, it also, in that

same section of its opinion, wrote that “[t]he jury weighed the testimony and

evidence presented by the Commonwealth’s eight [] witnesses . . . and[, upon

consideration of these witnesses, the court] concluded that the jury’s verdict

did not shock the judicial conscience[.]” Id. at 26. We are convinced that the

trial court properly exercised its discretion in determining that the verdicts

were not against the weight of the evidence. Although Brown has obfuscated

his weight claim, given that he was required to concede that the elements of

his homicide convictions had been sufficiently proven, he has failed to

challenge the veracity of any testimonial or videographic evidence. Simply

put, because of his lack of challenge as to the believability of any of the

evidence employed against him, there is nothing evident in the record or

provided by Brown in his appellate brief to demonstrate that the court abused

its discretion in concluding that the jury’s verdicts did not shock its judicial

conscience. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brown

relief on this basis.

Finally, at Brown’s last issue, which suggests that the court erred by

allowing certain testimony of Detective Ortiz, we emphasize that, broadly

speaking, the admission of evidence is within a trial court’s sound discretion

and will only be reversed where the court clearly abuses that discretion. See

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Commonwealth v. Wilson, 273 A.3d 13, 19 (Pa. Super. 2022). An abuse of

discretion occurs only where the judgment is “manifestly unreasonable or

where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a

result of partiality, prejudice, bias[,] or ill-will.” Id. (internal citation omitted).

It is not enough to persuade an appellate court that, if given the opportunity,

it would have reached a different result; an appellant must show the trial court

abused its discretionary power. See Commonwealth v. Norton, 201 A.3d

112, 120 (Pa. 2019). Even if an error had occurred, evidence issues are still

subject to harmless error, and “an evidentiary error of the trial court will be

deemed harmless on appeal where the appellate court is convinced, beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the error could not have contributed to the

verdict.” Commonwealth v. Vance, 316 A.3d 183, 192 (Pa. Super.

2024) (citation omitted).8

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8 The following principles guide our harmless error analysis:

an error will be deemed harmless where the appellate court is

convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the error could not

have contributed to the verdict. Guidelines for determining

whether an error is harmless include: (1) whether the error was

prejudicial to the defendant or if prejudicial, whether the prejudice

was de minimis; (2) whether the erroneously admitted evidence

was merely cumulative of other, untainted evidence which was

substantially similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3)

whether the evidence of guilt was so overwhelming as established

by properly admitted and uncontradicted evidence that the

prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by comparison

to the verdict.

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Brown contends that his entire trial strategy was “premised on the

compilation video [offered into evidence by the Commonwealth] that showed

no instinctual reactions from any civilians or vehicles to [twenty-three] loud,

large-caliber successive rounds of ammunition fired on the first[]floor of a row

home in a residential neighborhood during the middle of the afternoon.”

Appellant’s Brief at 19 (emphasis omitted). Brown avers that Detective Ortiz’s

testimony admitted that there was no reaction from anybody outside. See id.

However, Brown takes issue with Detective Ortiz’s statement that he

interviewed someone who heard shots being fired. See id.

Brown claims that Detective Ortiz’s statement regarding his interview

with a potential witness was hearsay because it was being offered for the truth

of the matter asserted, i.e. “that someone did hear shots during the time in

question[.]” Id. at 20. Brown’s position was that “the shots could not have

been fired during the time in question because not a single pedestrian or

vehicle in the compilation video reacted to the [twenty-three] shots being

fired[.]” Id. As such, Brown asserts that he was unfairly prejudiced by the

admission of that testimony evidence. We disagree.

After reviewing the record, we again find the court’s resolution of

Brown’s claim, to the extent it delves into a harmless error analysis,

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Commonwealth v. Adams, 39 A.3d 310, 322 (Pa. Super. 2012) (cleaned

up).

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appropriately demonstrates that he is not entitled to relief:

[The court] properly admitted Detective Ortiz’s testimony as

evidence to the thoroughness of the police’s investigation rather

than relying on the statement to establish the truth of the fact

that someone heard gunshots in the area around the time that the

murders occurred.[9] [The court] properly admitted Detective

Ortiz’s testimony because it did not state “exactly what the person

said”[10] and for that reason did not provide any specific details

that would directly rebut [the] defense’s strategy that no one can

be seen reacting to gunshots in the [surveillance] video, nor did

any witness state they heard gunshots in relation to this incident.

Additionally, Detective Ortiz’s testimony also was properly

admitted by [the court] on account that it was repeated,

unobjected to, testimony previously covered in Ellison’s and

Detective Ortiz’s direct examination and thus had no prejudicial

impact on [Brown].

Ellison testified at this trial that on February 28, 2020, after she

left the nail salon and was headed home where White and Skinner

were, she attempted to contact White, but he had not answered

any of her calls. When she arrived at her residence at 2087 East

Clementine Street, she testified that she was greeted by a “crack

head” who told her[,] “We heard shooting. BB’s [White] in the

house.” Similarly, Detective Ortiz testified that[,] during the time

[Brown] and Thomas are not seen on camera from 3:53 p.m. to

3:59 p.m., when they [are] presumed to be inside of 2087 East

____________________________________________

9 To the extent the court indicates that the evidence was admitted for a non-

truth purpose, it should have been “admitted in conjunction with a limiting

jury instruction to ensure that the jury considers the evidence solely [for the

limited purpose] and not for the truth of the words spoken.” Commonwealth

v. Fitzpatrick, 255 A.3d 452, 493 (Pa. 2021). There does not appear to have

been a limiting instruction. Therefore, we conclude that its admission was in

error, leading to our subsequent analysis, indicated infra, whether that

admission was harmless.

10 We are unpersuaded by the court’s line of reasoning in this regard because

there is no requirement that hearsay’s applicability or admissibility hinges on

whether there is an exact replication of the out-of-court statement offered to

prove the truth of the matter asserted.

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Clementine Street, [two other males] can be seen on video at 3:57

p.m. walking up to the front of 2087 East Clementine Street when

they both simultaneously turn around and walk back on Amber

Street towards the corner store. The abrupt, synchronous decision

of both men to turn around and walk away fro[m] East Clementine

Street, where they are believed to be meeting [Brown] and

Thomas, in the timeframe the murders are believed to have

occurred, can also be interpreted as their reaction to hearing

gunshots.

[The court] committed no error when admitting Detective Ortiz’s

hearsay testimony as it was offered to show the course of

Detective Ortiz’s conduct during his investigation of White and

Skinner’s death. The evidence was not admitted proving someone

heard gunshots at the time and location of the murders nor did

the testimony provide any exact details that would lead [the court]

to conclude[] it was offered to prove that fact. Furthermore, [the

court] reasonably concluded the testimony would have no

prejudicial impact to [Brown] given that it only repeated evidence

covered in Ellison’s and Detective Ortiz’s prior testimony.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/26/25, at 29-31 (record citations and name titles

omitted).

Given that there were multiple sources of evidence that gunfire could be

heard, without any refutation of any of these sources by Brown, Detective

Ortiz’s complained-of testimony, wherein he briefly described interviewing

someone who had heard shots, was “merely cumulative of other, untainted

evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously admitted

evidence.” Adams, 39 A.3d at 322. Therefore, we find its admission to be

harmless. Consequently, Brown is due no relief on this issue.

During our examination of the record for this case, we noticed an

obvious and patent error in one of Brown’s sentencing orders, which requires

additional action by the trial court. Specifically, although the jury found Brown

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guilty of PIC at 3914-2021, located at count seven on the verdict sheet, the

sentencing order and court commitment sheet for that case erroneously reflect

that Brown was instead found guilty of possession of firearm by a prohibited

person in violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105. See Verdict Sheet, 3914-2021,

3/21/24; N.T. Jury Trial, 3/21/24, at 8; Sentencing Order, 3914-2021,

3/21/24; Court Commitment Sheet, 3914-2021, 3/21/24. Accordingly, we

remand to allow the trial court to issue a new, corrected sentencing order for

the case at 3914-2021, and affirm the judgments of sentence in all other

respects. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Umoh, 311 A.3d 24, 34 (Pa. Super.

2024) (sua sponte remand for correction of a sentencing order that listed the

defendant’s contempt conviction as a violation under an incorrect statute

number).11

Case remanded for correction of a patent and obvious error in

sentencing order at 3914-2021. Judgments of sentence affirmed in all other

respects. Jurisdiction relinquished.

____________________________________________

11 We need not vacate Brown’s judgments of sentence, as directing the court

to correct Brown’s sentencing order does not affect the court’s overall

sentencing scheme. Cf. Commonwealth v. Thur, 906 A.2d 552, 569 (Pa.

Super. 2006) (“If our disposition upsets the overall sentencing scheme of the

trial court, we must remand so that the court can restructure its sentence

plan.” (cleaned up)).

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Date: 6/8/2026

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