Davis

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

DEREK ANTHONY DAVIS, CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 25-2138

ALEXIS SALAY, ET AL. SECTION “R” (4)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim of

defendants Alexis Salay, John Castelin, and Bernard Blair.1 Pro se in forma

pauperis plaintiff Derek Davis opposed the motion, filing a motion for leave

to file an amended complaint.2 For the following reasons, the Court grants

the motion to dismiss and denies the motion for leave to file.

I. BACKGROUND

Davis makes the following allegations. On January 28, 2023, an ex-

girlfriend broke into his home and assaulted and robbed him.3 Davis alleges

that he had a restraining order against the ex-girlfriend.4 Davis alleges that

he reported the incident to the police, but the police did not arrive nor press

1 R. Doc. 18.

2 R. Doc. 20.

3 R. Doc. 1.

4 Id.

charges.5 Davis further alleges that the city attorney would not charge his ex-

girlfriend.6

Davis brought this suit in federal court on October 14, 2025.7 Davis

sued Alexis Salary and John Castelin, whom he alleges are police officers,

and Bernard Blair, whom he alleges is a city attorney.8 Davis sued under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the police officers and city attorney violated his

due process rights and discriminated against him in violation of Title VII of

the Civil Rights Act by not enforcing the restraining order and not arresting

and prosecuting his ex-girlfriend for the robbery and assault.9

The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).10

Davis responded, seeking leave to amend his complaint.11 The Court

considers the motion below.

5 Id.

6 Id.

7 Id.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 R. Doc. 18-1.

11 R. Doc. 20.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead

enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible

“when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court must accept all well-

pleaded facts as true and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the

plaintiff. Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 239, 244 (5th Cir.

2009). But the Court is not bound to accept as true legal conclusions couched

as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

A legally sufficient complaint must establish more than a “sheer

possibility” that the party’s claim is true. See id. It need not contain “detailed

factual allegations,” but it must go beyond “‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a

formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.’” See id. (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In other words, “[t]he complaint (1) on its face

(2) must contain enough factual matter (taken as true) (3) to raise a

reasonable hope or expectation (4) that discovery will reveal relevant

evidence of each element of a claim.” Lormand, 565 F.3d at 257 (cleaned

up). The claim must be dismissed if there are insufficient factual allegations

“to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555, or if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that there is an

insuperable bar to relief, see Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007).

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must limit its review to the

pleadings and attachments. Brand Coupon Network, LLC v. Catalina Mktg.

Corp., 748 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2014). The Court may also consider

documents attached to a motion to dismiss or an opposition to that motion

when the documents are referred to in the pleadings and are central to a

plaintiff’s claims. Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Davis fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Davis

seeks to bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting violations of his

rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and under the due process

clause.12 Turning first to Davis’ Title VII claims, he fails to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. Title VII applies only in the employment

context. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 74 (1984). To state a

cause of action, the legal relationship between Davis and the defendants

12 Davis states that he is making a “due process” claim under the Fifth

Amendment. Because Davis sues state actors, Davis’ due process claim

is appropriately analyzed as a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment,

and the Court liberally construes it thusly.

must be one of employer-employee. Id. As Davis does not allege such a

relationship, and could not, his claims under Title VII must fail. The Court

dismisses Davis’ claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act with prejudice.

As to Davis’ due process claims, these also fail to state a claim upon

which relief can be granted. To assert a due process clause claim, Davis must

plausibly allege that a state actor deprived him of life, liberty, or property

without due process of law. See Texas Faculty Ass'n v. Univ. of Texas, 946

F.2d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Though the nature of the process due varies

according to the governmental and private interests involved, whenever the

four elements necessary to trigger that guarantee occur—that is, whenever

(1) a state actor (2) deprives (3) a person (4) of a protected interest—some

sort of procedural protection must be provided.”) (emphasis in original); see

also Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch. Dist., 15 F.3d 443, 450 (5th Cir. 1994) ( “To

state a cause of action under § 1983 for violation of the Due Process Clause,

plaintiffs must show they have asserted a recognized liberty or property

interest within the purview of the Fourteenth Amendment and that they were

intentionally or recklessly deprived of that interest, even temporarily, under

color of state law.”) (internal quotations omitted).

As a threshold inquiry, the Court must determine whether the

Fourteenth Amendment protects the property interest of which the

defendants allegedly deprived Davis. Here, pretermitting other issues with

his complaint, Davis has not plausibly alleged a constitutionally protected

property interest. Construing Davis’ complaint liberally, he alleges that the

restraining order against his unnamed ex-girlfriend was a property interest

of which he was deprived when the police officers did not arrest his unnamed

attacker. But such a theory has been clearly precluded in Town of Castle

Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766-70 (2005) (holding that there is no

protected property interest in the enforcement of a restraining order). The

“benefit that a third party may receive from having someone else arrested for

a crime generally does not trigger protections under the Due Process Clause,

neither in its procedural nor in its ‘substantive’ manifestations.” Id. at 768.

Further, Davis’ claims against Blair, the city attorney, are barred by

prosecutorial immunity. Blair is protected by prosecutorial immunity in his

decisions of whom to charge, as established by the Supreme Court in Imbler

v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (holding that prosecutorial decisions

that are intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,

such as decisions of whether to prosecute, are functions to which absolute

immunity applies with full force).

Although courts generally grant pro se litigants an opportunity to

amend a complaint before it is dismissed, leave to amend is not warranted if

amendment would be futile. Mason v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 671 F. App'x

880, 883 (5th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). “An amendment is futile if it

would fail to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion.” Marucci Sports, L.L.C. v. Nat'l

Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 751 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 2014)). Here, the record

indicates that Davis cannot amend his complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion. Davis’ proposed amended complaint does not address his failure to

plausibly allege a constitutionally protected property interest, establish an

employer-employee relationship necessary to support a Title VII claim, or

overcome Blair’s prosecutorial immunity. Because amendment would be

futile, leave to amend is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss.

Davis’ claims are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court DENIES the

motion for leave to file.

New Orleans, Louisiana, this ist day of June, 2026.

SARAH S. VANCE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE