Wiley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

ARMAND EUGENE WILEY,

Petitioner,

v. Case No. 3:22-cv-1300-BJD-LLL

3:20-cr-0041-BJD-LLL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

_________________________________

ORDER

I. STATUS

Petitioner Armand Eugene Wiley (Wiley), a federal inmate, is proceeding

pro se on a Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct

Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (Motion; Civ. Docs. 1, 1-1; Crim. Docs.

70, 70-11). The Government filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion

(Response; Civ. Doc. 3). Petitioner opted not to file a reply. See Civ. Doc. 4.

Upon review, the Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255

1 Citations to the record in the civil case will be denoted as “Civ. Doc. __,” and

citations to the record in the underlying criminal case will be denoted as “Crim. Doc.

__.”

Proceedings.2

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 29, 2019, Wiley was arrested and charged in Duval County

Circuit Court case number 2019-CF-4670 with possession of controlled

substances and paraphernalia, resisting a law enforcement officer with

violence, battery against a law enforcement animal, giving a false name, and

possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See Crim. Doc. 59 at 1. He pled

guilty to some of the charges and was sentenced to 36.75 months in state

prison. Civ. Doc. 3-1; Crim. Doc. 59 at 2.

While the State dropped the charge of possession of a firearm by a

convicted felon, Wiley was indicted in federal court on the same offense in

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e).3 See Crim. Doc. 1; Crim. Doc. 59

at 2. He pled guilty on June 14, 2021. Civ. Doc. 3-2; Crim. Docs. 45, 47, 48, 71.

2 Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings expressly requires the

Court to review the record, including any transcripts and submitted materials to

determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted before resolving a motion

under § 2255. However, “[t]he district court is not required to grant a petitioner an

evidentiary hearing if the § 2255 motion ‘and the files and records of the case

conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.’” Rosin v. United States,

786 F.3d 873, 877 (11th Cir. 2015); see also Tejada v. Dugger, 941 F.2d 1551, 1559

(11th Cir. 1991) (stating that a § 2255 movant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing

“when his claims are merely ‘conclusory allegations unsupported by specifics’ or

‘contentions that in the face of the record are wholly incredible’” (citations omitted)).

3 The indictment listed some of Wiley’s prior convictions and gave notice that

he likely qualified for an enhanced sentence pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal

Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Crim. Doc. 1 at 1–2.

In a Presentence Investigation Report (PSR), the United States Probation

Office recommended an ACCA sentence because Wiley had at least three prior

convictions for serious drug offenses and/or violent felonies committed on

different occasions, as follows:

• Sale or delivery of cocaine committed on February 5, 2006

(Duval County case No. 2006-CF-3845);

• Possession of cocaine committed on December 24, 2006 (Duval

County case No. 2007-CF-491);

• Sale, manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to sell,

manufacture, or deliver cocaine within 1,000 feet of a church

committed on January 4, 2007 (Duval County case No. 2007-

CF-742);

• Resisting an officer with violence committed on June 10, 2008

(Duval County case No. 2008-CF-8557);

• Possession with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cocaine

committed on June 6, 2012 (Duval County case No. 2012-CF-

5604);

• Possession with intent to sell, manufacture, or deliver cocaine

committed on May 5, 2013 (Duval County case No. 2013-CF-

4257).

Crim. Doc. 57 at 7, 14–17.

At the November 18, 2021 sentencing hearing, the Court accepted the

PSR without objection,4 and sentenced Wiley to a term of 149 months and 10

4 Wiley did not object to the predicate convictions on which the Government

relied for the ACCA designation or the Shepard-approved supporting documentation

either in his sentencing memorandum or at the hearing. See Civ. Doc. 3-3; Crim. Docs.

59, 72; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005) (stating that when

determining the nature of a prior conviction, a court “is generally limited to

days in prison followed by a term of five years of supervised release. Civ. Doc.

3-3 at 5–6, 9–10, 16–17, 23; Crim. Docs. 62, 63, 72; Crim. Doc. 64 at 1. In doing

so, the Court adjusted Wiley’s sentence, pursuant to § 5G1.3(b) of the United

States Sentencing Guidelines, to account for the 30 months and 20 days he had

already served in Duval County case No. 2019-CF-4670. Civ. Doc. 3-3 at 15–

17, 22–23; Crim. Docs. 62, 63, 72. The Court also ordered Wiley’s sentence to

run concurrently with his remaining state sentence. Civ. Doc. 3-3 at 16–17;

Crim. Docs. 62, 63, 72. Wiley did not appeal his conviction and sentence. On

November 18, 2022, he timely filed the present Motion in this Court. Civ. Doc.

1 at 12; Crim. Doc. 70 at 12.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A person in federal custody may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his

sentence if: (1) the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or

laws of the United States; (2) the court lacked jurisdiction to impose the

sentence; (3) the imposed sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law;

or (4) the imposed sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2255(a). In short, only jurisdictional claims, constitutional claims, and claims

of error that are so fundamentally defective as to cause a complete miscarriage

examining the statutory definition [of the offense from the prior conviction], charging

document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit

factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented”).

of justice will warrant relief through collateral attack. United States v.

Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184–85 (1979). The movant “bears the burden to prove

the claims in his § 2255 motion.” Rivers v. United States, 777 F.3d 1306, 1316

(11th Cir. 2015); see also Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215, 1221 (11th

Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).

“[A] defendant generally must advance an available challenge to a

criminal conviction or sentence on direct appeal or else the defendant is barred

from presenting that claim in a § 2255 proceeding.” Lynn v. United States, 365

F.3d 1225, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2004). “This rule generally applies to all claims,

including constitutional claims.” Id. However, the Supreme Court has held

that the procedural default rule does not apply to ineffective assistance of

counsel claims. See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003) (“[A]n

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim may be brought in a collateral

proceeding under § 2255, whether or not the petitioner could have raised the

claim on direct appeal.”).

To avoid a procedural bar, a petitioner “must show cause for not raising

the claim of error on direct appeal and actual prejudice from the alleged error,”

or he must demonstrate he “is actually innocent.” Id. (citing Bousley, 523 U.S.

at 622). The ineffective assistance of counsel may satisfy the “cause” prong of

the first exception, but the claim must be a valid one. Fortenberry v. Haley, 297

F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 2002) (“A petitioner can establish cause by showing

that a procedural default was caused by constitutionally ineffective assistance

of counsel . . . .”). Under the second exception—actual innocence—a petitioner

must demonstrate his factual innocence and “show that it is more likely than

not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Id. (quoting Schlup v.

Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995)).

“The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants effective

assistance of counsel.” Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003) (citing

Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984)). A petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must

show that: (1) counsel’s conduct amounted to constitutionally deficient

performance; and (2) counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. To satisfy the “performance” prong, a

petitioner must show that counsel’s performance “fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness,” Martin v. United States, 949 F.3d 662, 667 (11th

Cir. 2020) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688), which is a highly deferential

standard, Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1314 (11th Cir. 2000). A

court must adhere to a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

689–90. “Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the

reasonableness of counsel’s challenged conduct on the facts of the particular

case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 690; Gates v. Zant, 863

F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1989) (same).

As observed by the Eleventh Circuit:

[The test for ineffective assistance of counsel] has nothing to do

with what the best lawyers would have done. Nor is the test even

what most good lawyers would have done. We ask only whether

some reasonable lawyer at the trial could have acted, in the

circumstances, as defense counsel acted at trial. Courts also should

at the start presume effectiveness and should always avoid second

guessing with the benefit of hindsight. Strickland encourages

reviewing courts to allow lawyers broad discretion to represent

their clients by pursuing their own strategy. We are not interested

in grading lawyers’ performances; we are interested in whether the

adversarial process at trial, in fact, worked adequately.

White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220–21 (11th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

To satisfy the “prejudice” prong, a petitioner must show “a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different.” Martin, 949 F.3d at 667 (citing Padilla

v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366 (2010)). A reasonable probability is one

“sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694. “It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some

conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id. at 693.

A court considers the totality of the evidence in determining whether the

Strickland test has been satisfied. Id. at 695. If a petitioner makes an

insufficient showing on one prong, the court need not reach the other prong.

Id. at 697; see also Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1163 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating

that “a court need not address the performance prong if the petitioner cannot

meet the prejudice prong, and vice-versa”). “If it is easier to dispose of an

ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we

expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

697.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Grounds One Through Three

As Ground One, Wiley alleges that in light of United States v. Jackson,

36 F.4th 1294 (11th Cir. 2022) (“Jackson I”),5 his federal sentence must be

vacated for prosecutorial misconduct because his prior Florida cocaine-related

convictions no longer qualify as serious drug offenses under 18 U.S.C. §

924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Civ. Doc. 1-1 at 1–3; Crim. Doc. 70-1 at 1–3. As Ground Two,

Wiley alleges he “is actually innocent” of his ACCA sentence because he does

not have at least three prior convictions for “serious drug offenses” and/or

“violent felonies,” committed on occasions different from one another as

5 In Jackson I, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “due-process considerations

require [the court] to use the iteration of the Controlled Substances Act Schedules

incorporated into § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s definition of ‘serious drug offense’ in effect when

[the defendant] possessed the firearm that undergirds his federal conviction.” 36

F.4th at 1300. However, Jackson I was vacated on September 8, 2022, see 2022 WL

4959314 (11th Cir.), and superseded on December 13, 2022, see 55 F.4th 846, 849, 855

(11th Cir. 2022) (“Jackson II”) (holding that “the ACCA’s ‘serious drug offense’

definition incorporates the version of the controlled-substances list in effect when the

defendant was convicted of his prior state drug offense”). The Supreme Court affirmed

Jackson II in Brown v. United States, 602 U.S. 101, 118, 123 (2024) (holding that “a

prior state drug conviction may constitute an ACCA predicate if the drugs on the

federal and state schedules matched when the state drug offense was committed”).

clarified in Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022). Civ. Doc. 1-1 at 4–5;

Crim. Doc. 70-1 at 4–5. As Ground Three, Wiley alleges that due process

considerations and the rule of lenity demand that his ACCA sentence be

vacated because, as clarified in Wooden’s concurring opinions, the Occasion

Clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) is unconstitutionally vague. Civ. Doc. 1-1 at 6–7;

Crim. Doc. 70-1 at 6–7.

Observing that Wiley did not raise the claims in Grounds One through

Three either at the sentencing or on direct appeal, the Government argues that

these claims must be denied as both procedurally defaulted and meritless.

Because the Court agrees that these claims lack merit, the Court bypasses the

procedural default analysis. See Dallas v. Warden, 964 F.3d 1285, 1307 (11th

Cir. 2020) (“[A] federal court may skip over the procedural default analysis if

a claim would fail on the merits in any event.”); see also Garrison v. United

States, 73 F.4th 1354, 1359 n.9 (11th Cir. 2023) (same).

Turning to Ground One, Wiley is not entitled to relief on his claim that

his prior cocaine-related convictions no longer qualify as serious drug offenses

under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). This claim is premised on the Eleventh

Circuit’s now-vacated opinion in Jackson I. Pursuant to Jackson II, which is

binding on this Court, “the ACCA’s ‘serious drug offense’ definition

incorporates the version of the controlled-substances list in effect when the

defendant was convicted of his prior state drug offense.” 55 F.4th at 849, 855,

aff’d, Brown, 602 U.S. at 123. “Jackson II and Brown make clear as a matter

of law that [Wiley] was correctly sentenced as an armed career criminal.”

United States v. Wilson, No. 21-14460, 2024 WL 3175749, *2 (11th Cir. 2024).6

As in Jackson II, Wiley’s prior state “cocaine-related convictions occurred when

both the state and federal drug schedules included ioflupane.” Wilson, 2024

WL 3175749, at *2 (citing Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 861–62 & 851 n.3).7 Because

ACCA’s definition of a “serious drug offense” “turn[s] on the law in effect when

the defendant’s prior convictions occurred,” it follows that Wiley’s prior state

convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13 qualify as “serious drug offenses” under

ACCA. Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 859, 861–62.

Similarly, Wiley is not entitled to relief on Ground Two, where he claims

that he “is actually innocent” of his ACCA sentence because he does not have

6 The Court does not rely on unpublished opinions as binding precedent;

however, they may be cited as persuasive on a particular point. See McNamara v.

GEICO, 30 F.4th 1055, 1060–61 (11th Cir. 2022); see generally Fed. R. App. P. 32.1;

11th Cir. R. 36-2 (“Unpublished opinions are not considered binding precedent, but

they may be cited as persuasive authority.”).

7 Wiley’s prior Florida cocaine-related convictions occurred between 2006 and

2013. Crim. Doc. 57 at 7, 14–17. Since the version of the federal schedules listed

ioflupane until 2015, “it makes no difference whether [Wiley’s] convictions involved

ioflupane or cocaine.” Jackson II, 55 F.4th at 861 n.9; see also Moore v. United States,

No. 8:22-cv-1415-CEH-CPT, 2025 WL 3214360, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 2025)

(“Under the holding in Jackson II, the only Florida cocaine-related drug convictions

that may no longer be considered serious drug offenses under ACCA are those for

which a defendant was convicted after September 11, 2015, when the federal drug

schedule was changed to eliminate ioflupane, and before July 1, 2017, when the

Florida drug schedule was also amended.” (internal citations omitted)).

at least three predicate convictions for “serious drug offenses” and/or “violent

felonies” committed on different occasions from one another. This argument

lacks any merit. Because Wiley’s prior Florida convictions occurred in different

years—namely, on February 5, 2006, January 4, 2007, June 10, 2008, June 6,

2012, and May 5, 2013—he cannot make a valid argument pursuant to Wooden

that his offenses were not committed on different occasions from one another.

Crim. Doc. 57 at 7, 14–17; Wooden, 595 U.S. at 366, 370, 376 (finding that

Wooden’s “one-after-another-after-another burglary of ten units in a single

storage facility occurred on one ‘occasion’” on a single night for purposes of

ACCA). As Wooden explains, “offenses separated by substantial gaps in time

or significant intervening events” would not be deemed to have occurred on a

single occasion for purposes of ACCA. 595 U.S. at 369.

Further, to the extent Wiley argues that the Court “could not rely on

such non-elemental facts [as the dates of his prior convictions in Shepard-

approved documents] to impose a sentence under the ACCA,” Civ. Doc. 1-1 at

4,8 the Eleventh Circuit has already rejected this argument. See United States

v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[D]istrict courts may

8 Wiley’s argument that the Government “failed to introduce any evidence” that

he had committed predicate offenses on different occasions, Civ. Doc. 1-1 at 4, is

contradicted by the transcript and minutes of the sentencing hearing, and the

attachment thereto, see Civ. Doc. 3-3 at 9–10; Crim. Docs. 62, 62-1, 62-2, 62-3, 62-4,

62-5, 62-6, 62-7, 62-8, 62-9, 62-10, 62-11; Crim. Doc. 72 at 9–10.

determine both the existence of prior convictions and the factual nature of

those convictions, including whether they were committed on different

occasions, so long as they limit themselves to Shepard-approved documents.”),

abrogated on other grounds by Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013);

see also United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249, 1259 (11th Cir. 2021) (stating

that in undertaking a different-occasions inquiry, “the court is limited to

Shepard-approved sources, as only information found in such conclusive

judicial records has gone through a validation process,” and from those sources,

the court “may determine both the existence of prior convictions and the factual

nature of those convictions, including whether they were committed on

different occasions, based on its own factual findings” (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1376 (2022); United States

v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2017) (concluding that a

defendant’s argument that the district court “should not have looked at ‘non-

elemental facts,’ the dates of his prior convictions, in Shepard-approved

documents when deciding whether his predicate offenses were committed on

different occasions” was “directly foreclosed by” Weeks); United States v. Hollie,

817 F. App’x 880, 885–86 (11th Cir. 2020) (reaffirming Weeks following

Descamps and Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016)). Therefore,

Ground Two fails.

Wiley is also not entitled to relief on Ground Three, where he claims that

his ACCA sentence must be vacated because the different-occasions

requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (i.e., the Occasions Clause) is void for

vagueness as clarified in the concurring opinions in Wooden. Civ. Doc. 1-1 at

6–7; Crim. Doc. 70-1 at 6–7. Wiley is mistaken. As stated previously, Wiley’s

prior offenses occurred on different occasions because they were committed in

different years. See Wooden, 595 U.S. at 369 (stating that courts “have nearly

always treated offenses as occurring on separate occasions if a person

committed them a day or more apart”). And while the concurring opinions in

Wooden addressed the rule of lenity in the context of the Occasions Clause,

these opinions do not compel a different outcome for Wiley.

According to Justice Gorsuch, “the rule of lenity demand[ed] a judgment

in [Wooden’s] favor,” but there is no indication in the present case that

“reasonable minds could differ” as to whether Wiley’s crimes from his prior

convictions “took place on one occasion or many.” Id. at 388 (Gorsuch, J.,

concurring); see also id. at 376 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (stating that “the

rule of lenity provides an independent basis for ruling in favor of a defendant

in a closer case” (emphasis added)). Even accepting Justice Gorsuch’s

suggestion that the majority opinion did not forbid lower courts from

consulting the rule of lenity in “doubtful cases” concerning the Occasions

Clause, Wiley’s case is not such a “doubtful” case. See id. at 397. Simply put,

Wiley had “fair notice” that his prior convictions from different years could

expose him to an enhanced sentence. See id. at 389–90. Moreover, as the

concurring opinions in Wooden acknowledge, id. at 377–79, 392, the Supreme

Court’s view is that the rule of lenity applies only if “at the end of the process

of construing what Congress has expressed, there is a grievous ambiguity or

uncertainty in the statute.” Shaw v. United States, 580 U.S. 63, 71 (2016)

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Ocasio v. United States, 578

U.S. 282, 295 n.8 (2016) (stating the rule of lenity “applies only when a criminal

statute contains a ‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty,’ and ‘only if, after seizing

everything from which aid can be derived,’ the Court ‘can make no more than

a guess as to what Congress intended’”); United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10,

17 (1994) (stating the rule of lenity “applies only when, after consulting

traditional canons of statutory construction, we are left with an ambiguous

statute”). Based on the foregoing, Ground Three is denied.

B. Ground Four

As Ground Four, Wiley alleges his trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to raise the claims in Grounds One through Three. Civ. Doc. 1-1 at 8; Crim.

Doc. 70-1 at 8. First, to the extent Wiley claims his trial counsel was ineffective

for failing to raise the claim in Ground One, “counsel cannot be deemed to have

performed deficiently by failing to anticipate the issue raised in Jackson,”

because both Jackson I and II were decided in 2022, whereas Wiley was

sentenced in 2021. Moore, 2025 WL 3214360, at *6. Further, to the extent

Wiley claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the claims in

Grounds Two and Three, counsel also cannot be deemed to have performed

deficiently because these claims were premised on Wooden—another 2022

decision. Moreover, because all of Wiley’s claims in Grounds One through

Three are meritless, his counsel cannot be deemed to have performed

deficiently for failing to raise meritless claims. See Hollis v. United States, 958

F.3d 1120, 1124 (11th Cir. 2020) (“Hollis’s counsel did not perform deficiently

for failing to raise a meritless objection.”). In addition, Wiley cannot establish

prejudice because, based on the ultimate holdings in Jackson II, Brown, and

Wooden, he remains eligible for his enhanced sentence. Therefore, Wiley is not

entitled to relief on Ground Four.

V. CONCLUSION

Finding Petitioner advances no argument warranting relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2255, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The Motion (Civ. Doc. 1; Crim. Doc. 70) is DENIED, and this

action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment denying the

Motion and dismissing this action with prejudice, to terminate any pending

motions, and to close the file.

3. If Petitioner appeals this Order, the Court denies a certificate

of appealability.? Because this Court has determined that a certificate of

appealability is not warranted, the Clerk shall terminate from the pending

motions report any motion to proceed on appeal as a pauper that may be filed

in this case. Such termination shall serve as a denial of the motion.

DONE AND ORDERED at Jacksonville, Florida, this 20th day of

February, 2026.

BRIAN/I, DAVIS

United States District Judge

Jax-11 2/9

C:

Counsel of Record

Armand Eugene Wiley, #16224-509

9 This Court should issue a certificate of appealability only if a petitioner

makes “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). To make this substantial showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that

reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional

claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 4738, 484 (2000)), or that “the issues presented were

‘adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537

U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n.4 (1983)).

Upon due consideration of the record as a whole, this Court will deny a certificate of

appealability.

16