Kirby

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

BRADFORD F KIRBY CIVIL ACTION NO. 25-cv-1345

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE HORNSBY

MEMORANDUM ORDER

Bradford F. Kirby (“Plaintiff”), who is self-represented, filed this civil action

against the State of New Hampshire, the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human

Services, Bureau of Child Support Services, the Social Security Administration, and

multiple other defendants based on his dissatisfaction with the collection of child support

obligations. Before the court is Plaintiff’s Motion for Recusal (Doc. 34). For the reasons

that follow, it will be denied.

The undersigned magistrate judge recently issued a Report and Recommendation

that recommended Plaintiff’s claims against the Social Security Administration and related

defendants be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Doughty adopted

that recommendation over Plaintiff’s objections.

The undersigned simultaneously issued a memorandum order (Doc. 30) that

required Plaintiff to file a Restated and Amended Complaint that complies with the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff’s original complaint was 174 pages, and it was

accompanied by 666 pages of exhibits, for a total of 840 pages. The undersigned discussed

the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a) and concluded that the length of Plaintiff’s

complaint was ridiculous, given that respected civil rights attorneys file complaints with

multiple claims that are rarely longer than 20 to 25 pages, with many being much shorter.

The undersigned discussed court decisions that found similar lengthy complaints excessive

and determined that Plaintiff’s complaint was “far too lengthy and convoluted to comply

with Rule 8.”

Plaintiff was allowed from the March 25 order until April 21, 2026 to file a proposed

Restated and Amended Complaint of no more than 30 pages and with proposed exhibits

not to exceed 20 pages. Plaintiff was warned that sanctions, including dismissal, could

follow if he proposed an amended complaint that the court found was another attempted

abuse of the judicial process. Plaintiff was also advised that the court likely lacks subject

matter and personal jurisdiction over several of the defendants he has named. The order

granted any defendant previously served an extension of time until further order of the

court to file an answer or other responsive pleading.

Plaintiff filed objections (Doc. 33) to the Report and Recommendation regarding

the Social Security defendants. He included in the objections a request for recusal of the

undersigned magistrate judge, and those arguments were docketed as a separate motion for

recusal (Doc. 34). Plaintiff argued that the memorandum order regarding the need to file

a restated and amended complaint “unethically continues to grant unjust and unfair

concessions to the Defendants” who Plaintiff urges are in default. Plaintiff has complained

repeatedly that the various defendants should be cast in default for lack of timely answers.

Plaintiff characterizes the court’s order as a “rant” that threatened him and made “numerous

derogatory remarks” against his character. Plaintiff accused the undersigned of favoritism,

based largely on Plaintiff’s perception that the court has refused to enter defaults against

the defendants. He expressed concern that “the Court and one of the Defendants’ Counsel

share the same location in Shreveport, LA for their offices” and suggested that the court

has “greatly favored his neighboring Counsel and his defendants.” Plaintiff asked that the

undersigned recuse himself from this case and rescind all prior orders and

recommendations.

A magistrate judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his

impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). The standard is whether

a reasonable and objective person, knowing all of the facts, would harbor doubts

concerning the judge’s impartiality. U.S. v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1995). The

inquiry is made with regard to “how things appear to the well-informed, thoughtful and

objective observer, rather than the hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person.” Id. at

156. A judge is presumed to be impartial, and the party seeking recusal bears the

substantial burden of proving otherwise. IFG Port Holdings LLC v. Lake Charles Harbor

& Terminal Dist., 742 F. Supp. 3d 530, 542 (W.D. La. 2024).

Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that recusal is warranted. The

suggestion that a judge must recuse if counsel for a party has an office in the same building

is patently frivolous. The Tom Stagg United States Court House includes offices for

multiple judges, including the undersigned, as well as the United States Attorney’s Office

(which represents the Social Security defendants). That is not unusual. Courthouses

throughout the nation often house judges, prosecutors, and public defenders under one roof.

Plaintiff’s characterization of the court’s order as a rant or personal attack on him is

not well founded. Any objective observer who read the order would not perceive it in that

way. It was a reasoned order based on the rules and reported decisions, and the undersigned

has entered a similar order in other cases where a plaintiff filed an excessively lengthy

complaint. See, e.g., Moreland v. Kolb, 24-cv-1424 at Doc. 57. Plaintiff has also argued

that the court should have ordered this correction soon after he filed his complaint. Judges

do not read every complaint or filing as it is filed. Filings are typically not reviewed by

the court until a motion or other event requires review and a decision. Plaintiff’s case was

handled just like every other civil action.

Plaintiff, like many self-represented parties, has fixated upon a perceived

entitlement to win by default. See, e.g., Docs., 9 & 20. Even if there has been some form

of technical or procedural default by a defendant, default judgments are disfavored. There

is a strong policy in favor of decisions on the merits and against resolution of cases through

default, which is a drastic remedy not favored by the federal rules and resorted to by courts

only in extreme situations. Lindsey v. Prive Corp., 161 F.3d 886, 893 (5th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff would also face another major hurdle with respect to obtaining a valid

default judgment in this case. As noted in the prior order, the court likely lacks subject

matter and personal jurisdiction over several (if not all) of the defendants. A default

judgment is void if the court that rendered it lacked subject matter jurisdiction or personal

jurisdiction over the defendant. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 143 (5th

Cir. 1996); Sys. Pipe & Supply, Inc. v. M/V VIKTOR KURNATOVSKIY, 242 F.3d 322,

324 (Sth Cir. 2001). A district court has the duty to assure that it has the power to enter a

valid default judgment. Sys. Pipe & Supply, 242 F.3d at 324.

The undersigned has rarely, if ever, refused to set aside a default or entertained a

motion for default judgment when a defendant appeared in a reasonably prompt fashion

and expressed a desire to defend a case on the merits. And a default has certainly never

been approved when there was significant doubt about the court’s jurisdiction. The court’s

rejection of Plaintiffs efforts to obtain a default is nothing personal to him. The same rules

apply to all other plaintiffs in the same position. For these reasons, Plaintiff's Motion for

Recusal of Magistrate Judge (Doc. 34) is denied.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this 29th day of April, 2026.

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Mark L. Hornsby

U.S. Magistrate Judge

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