“A plaintiff, therefore, need not prove the underlying discriminatory conduct that he opposed was actually unlawful in order to establish a prima facie [retaliation] case.”
How later courts described this case
- “A plaintiff, therefore, need not prove the underlying discriminatory conduct that he opposed was actually unlawful in order to establish a prima facie [retaliation] case.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
MEGAN LUCAS,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:25-cv-888-KCD-NPM
v.
THE SCHOOL BOARD OF
GLADES COUNTY, FLORIDA, A
POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF
THE STATE OF FLORIDA,
Defendant.
/
ORDER
In this employment discrimination case, Megan Lucas, a former
teacher in the Glades County School District, brings claims for retaliation
under the FMLA and retaliation under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. (Doc.
15.)1 Lucas alleges that she was terminated after she lodged several
complaints about Defendant’s failure to comply with the Rehabilitation Act,
stating that the school was denying disabled students the accommodations
and services to which they were legally entitled. Defendant moves to dismiss
the § 504 claim. (Doc. 19.) Because Lucas has adequately pled a claim, the
motion is DENIED.
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and
alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.
“The Rehabilitation Act prohibits a program that receives federal
funding from denying benefits to an otherwise qualified disabled individual
solely because of his disability.” Williams v. Alabama Dep’t of Indus. Rels.,
684 F. App’x 888, 892-93 (11th Cir. 2017). To plead a claim for retaliation
under this statute, Lucas must allege (1) that she participated in a
statutorily protected activity or expression; (2) that she suffered an adverse
action; and (3) a causal link between the protected expression and adverse
action. Id. at 894.
Only the first prong is at issue here. (Doc. 19 at 4.) A person engages in
protected activity if she “has opposed any ... practice made unlawful by [§
504].” Morales v. Ga. Dep’t of Hum. Res., Div. of Fam. & Children Servs., 446
F. App’x 179, 183 (11th Cir. 2011). The plaintiff must demonstrate “a good
faith, reasonable belief” that the conduct was unlawful, not that it was
actually unlawful. Harper v. Blockbuster Ent. Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1388
(11th Cir. 1998).
Defendant picks out two of Lucas’s complaints and argues that they are
not statutorily protected activity. (See Doc. 19 at 6.) But the pleadings allege
more than that. Lucas identifies three more complaints Defendant ignored,
which Defendant fails to mention. Specifically, she objected to Defendant
denying a disabled student recess “by reason of” her disability (Doc. 15 ¶¶ 21-
24); denying disabled students IEP accommodations while providing
enhanced conditions to non-disabled students (id. ¶¶ 30-31); and placing a
Down syndrome student without required support (id. ¶¶ 46-53). These
allegations are sufficient to show she engaged in protected activity. See
Gadjiev v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., No. 1:12-CV-2700-JEC, 2013 WL
5349854, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 23, 2013) (allegations that the plaintiff was
terminated because he informed his superiors that disabled students were
not receiving appropriate education as required by law stated a retaliation
claim under the Rehabilitation Act).
Defendant also suggests that Lucas cannot state a claim because the
underlying conduct she complained about does not violate the Rehabilitation
Act. (Doc. 19 at 7-8.) But Lucas need not prove an underlying violation to
prevail at this stage. See Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold Div., 103
F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997) (“A plaintiff, therefore, need not prove the
underlying discriminatory conduct that he opposed was actually unlawful in
order to establish a prima facie [retaliation] case.”). Rather, Lucas only needs
to show she “had a good faith, reasonable belief that [Defendant] was
engaged in unlawful” practices. Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307,
1311 (11th Cir. 2002); Vickaryous v. Mason Classical Acad., Inc., No. 2:21-
CV-903-JLB-NPM, 2022 WL 4463560, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2022).
Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, Lucas alleges as much in the complaint.
(Doc. 15 ¶¶ 62, 129.)
Finally, Defendant argues that Lucas’s “objections ... fail to plausibly
allege the intentional discrimination or actual knowledge by an official high
enough up the chain of command.” (Doc. 19 at 6.) Not so. Lucas alleges that
Glades County Schools Superintendent Alice Beth Barfield had actual
knowledge of § 504 violations from multiple sources, including straight from
Lucas. (See Doc. 15 §§ 55, 73-84.) And despite this actual knowledge,
Superintendent Barfield “failed adequately to respond.” (Ud. § 87). Barfield
also stood behind the school principal’s decision not to renew Lucas’s
contract. Ud. § 82.)
Lucas has stated a plausible claim for retaliation under the
Rehabilitation Act. The standard asks whether Lucas had a “good faith,
reasonable belief” that Defendant’s practices violated § 504—not whether this
Court would ultimately agree. That question is for another day.
ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on February 20, 2026.
Kyle C. Dudek
United States District Judge