Lange

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

MARK PATRICK LANGE, Pro Se,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No: 2:25-cv-00366-JES-NPM

FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF LAW

ENFORCEMENT; CARMINE

MARCENO, in his official

capacity as Sheriff of Lee

County,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on review of Plaintiff

Mark Lange’s (“Plaintiff” or “Lange”) Emergency Motion for

Immediate Relief (Doc. #83) filed on December 12, 2025. Defendant

Carmine Marceno, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County,

Florida (“Sheriff Marceno”) filed a Response in Opposition (Doc.

#90) on December 26, 2025. Defendant Florida Department of Law

Enforcement (“FDLE”) filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #93) on

December 29, 2025. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s

motion is denied.

I.

Lange was convicted of fourth degree criminal sexual conduct

in Minnesota in violation of Minnesota Statute Section 609.345

subd. 1(b) in 1995. (Doc. #68-1, p. 14.) The conviction required

Lange to register as a predatory offender in Minnesota. Minn.

Stat. § 243.166, subd. 1b(a)(1)(iii).

However, in 2003, after the Minnesota Probation Office

reported that Lange “had complied with all the terms and conditions

of probation,” and recommended that he be honorably discharged

from probation, a Minnesota state court ordered Lange “discharged

from probation, restored to all civil rights and to full

citizenship with full right to vote and hold office the same as if

said conviction had not taken place.” (Doc. #68-1, p. 4.)

Additionally, the Order provided that the “conviction is deemed to

be for a misdemeanor” pursuant to Minnesota Statute Section 609.13,

subd. 1(2). (Id.)

Lange relocated to Florida in 2003 and registered as a sex

offender in Florida pursuant to Florida Statute Section 943.0435.1

Around April 11, 2009, Lange received a letter from the

Minnesota Department of Public Safety (“MDPS”) informing him that

his registration requirement as a sex offender was fulfilled as of

January 26, 2009. As such, he was “no longer required to register

1 Any individual that is a sexual offender as defined by subsection

1(h)1 “is required to provide specific information to satisfy the

reporting requirements.” See In re Standard Jury Instructions in

Crim. Cases—Rep. No. 2007-4, 983 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2008)(per

curiam).

as a Predatory Offender in the State of Minnesota.” The letter,

however, explicitly warned Lange that the “notice only applies to

your registration requirement for the State of Minnesota.” (Doc.

#68-1, p. 2.) Lange was still required to “contact the Registry

for any other State where you have lived, worked, or attended

school to determine the status of your registration requirement

within that State.” (Id.) After that letter, Lange’s Minnesota

predatory offender registration file was closed. (Id.)

Lange then moved for an expungement in a Minnesota state court

in 2023. (Id. at p. 14-17.) The court there noted that Lange was

required to register as a sex offender and that the offense of

conviction was now deemed a misdemeanor for expungement purposes

in Minnesota. (Id. at p. 14.) The court expunged Lange’s judicial

records pursuant to its inherent authority, ordering “[a]ll

judicial branch records concerning [Lange’s conviction], including

records of arrest, citation, and charges, relative to the

offense(s) shall be sealed.” (Id. at p. 16.) The Minnesota Order

was filed in the public records of Lee County, Florida. (Id. at

p. 35)

Lange, for the second time, moves to enjoin the Defendants

from enforcing any of Florida’s registration requirements against

him. In support of his motion, Lange claims he is entitled to

injunctive relief through: (1) the Full Faith and Credit Clause;

(2) the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment; (3) the Equal

Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment; (4) the Right to Family

Integrity; (5) Right to Reputation and Liberty Interests; (6) 42

U.S.C. § 1983; and (6) Florida Statute Section 943.0435(11)(b)(4).2

II.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of

the Middle District of Florida authorize a court to issue a

preliminary injunction under certain circumstances. See Fed. R.

Civ. P. 65(a); M.D. Fla. R. 6.02. A preliminary injunction will

be issued only if the movant demonstrates: “(1) he has a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) he will suffer

irreparable injury unless the injunction issues, (3) the

injunction would not substantially harm the other litigant, and

(4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public

interest.” See Long v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 924 F.3d 1171, 1176

(11th Cir. 2019). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary

and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly

establishes the burden of persuasion as to the four requisites.”

See Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282, 1291 (11th Cir.

2 While Plaintiff cites Section 943.0435(11)(b)(4) in his motion,

the Court notes he likely meant to cite Section 943.0435(11)(a)(4),

given there is no such Section 943.0435(11)(b)(4).

2022)(quoting Forsyth Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corp of Eng’rs, 633 F.3d

1032, 1039 (11th Cir. 2011)).

A movant need only demonstrate a substantial likelihood of

success on one of his claims—not all his claims—to secure a

preliminary injunction. See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,

424 F.3d 117, 1134 (11th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, “[t]he grant or

denial of a preliminary injunction is a decision within the sound

discretion of the district court.” See United States v. Lambert,

695 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1983).

III.

Lange fails to satisfy the first requirement for a preliminary

injunction—that he has a substantial likelihood of success on the

merits. In his motion, Lange argues that Section 943.0435(11)(a)4

requires FDLE to remove him from the registry. This reading,

however, is flawed.

Section 943.0435(11)(a) requires the party to petition to

remove the requirement for registration as a sexual offender. See

15B Fla. Jur. 2d Criminal Law Procedure: Trial Matters and

Proceedings § 1246 (2026). The statute provides a multi-step

process; however, the Court need only discuss the first step. The

first step requires that Lange have been “lawfully released from

confinement, supervision, or sanction, whichever is later, for at

least 25 years . . ..” See Fla. Stat. § 943.0435(11)(a)(1).

Through Lange’s own allegations, it was only in 2009 when he was

no longer subject to any form of reporting requirement in

Minnesota. (Doc. #68.) As such, less than seventeen years have

passed since his reporting requirement was lifted and Lange is

precluded from seeking any remedy under Section 943.0435(11)(a).

Further, given FDLE’s own letter that Lange relies upon, it is

questionable at best whether Lange could ever qualify for such

petition given his requirement to register was based upon an adult

conviction for a violation of Section 800.04(5). See Fla. Stat.

§ 943.0435(11)(a)(1)(prohibiting individuals from petitioning a

court for removal from the registry where conviction is based upon

Section 800.04(5)(b) or Section 800.04(5)(c)2). Lange has

presented no evidence that his underlying conviction was not based

on any crimes similar to those excluded sections. Therefore, Lange

has failed to show a likelihood of success as it relates to Section

943.0435(11)(a).

The Court adopts the reasoning from its prior Order (Doc.

#66) as it relates to the remaining claims which still rely upon

Section 943.0435(11)(b). Thus, Lange has still failed to show

Florida Statute Section 943.0435(11)(b) likely exempts him from

Florida’s reporting requirements, and he is not entitled to a

preliminary injunction.

Further, as previously discussed in this Court’s prior Order

(Doc. #66), Lange has failed to show that a preliminary injunction

would not be adverse to the public interest. In fact, Lange makes

no allegation regarding how a preliminary injunction would serve

the public interest. (Doc. #83.) As such, this Court will deny

the preliminary injunction for this reason as well.?

For the reasons set forth in this order, the motion will be

denied.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for Immediate Relief (Doc. #83)

is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this 20th day of

February, 2026.

JGHN E. STEELE

SHEIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Copies:

Parties of record

3 Sheriff Marceno requested sanctions in the form of attorney’s

fees, however, the Court finds such award would be inappropriate.

While Lange presented similar arguments and allegations, he relied

on a different portion of the statute in seeking relief. Thus no

award of attorney’s fees will be given.